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PROLOGUE 
In this paper an attempt is made at comparing the 
ways in which Dutch criminal law -of the civil brand-
at one hand, and Canadian criminal law -of common law 
heritage- deal with liability for negligent conduct and 
conduct in no-fault scenarios, as set out in doctrine 
and legislation and exemplified by case law. 
Essentially, this paper addresses itself to a 
Dutch readership, since it is to be presented to a 
Dutch university. Why, then, is it written in English? 
There are two main reasons: where it deals, in part, 
with the criminal law of Canada, its contents had to 
be checked as to orthodoxy by the writer's Canadian 
supervisors. Prof. Christopher Granger and Prof. Bruce 
K. Arlidge of the Faculty of Common Law at the Univer-
sity of Ottawa, Ontario. Furthermore, after having 
lived and worked in Canada for over 20 years, the 
writer cannot claim that his command of the Dutch lan-
guage has retained its former level. 
Since the readership of this paper is likely to 
consist of persons more familiar with Dutch (civil) 
law than with Canadian (common) law, the writer has 
taken special care to define basic notions or terms 
in both systems, in order to facilitate their compar-
ison where they appear to be analogous. The risk invol-
ved in using this method is that, while many statements 
may have the flavor of 'news' to some readers, they may 
-at the same time- be boring other readers by stating 
the obvious. This is hardly avoidable. 
On the basis of similar considerations Part One 
was written. It contains the barest minimum of inform-
ation on the history of both criminal law systems as 
well as on certain basic concepts, in its broad out-
lines only offering a backdrop against which the spe-
cific issues discussed in Part Two may be highlighted. 
That part deals in some detail with the parameters of 
criminal liability. 
One serious handicap is to be mentioned: the lack 
in Canada of Dutch sources, whether it be text books 
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or case law. Literally every book used had to be 
imported from The Netherlands, and although there 
now are compilations of judgments available, the 
quantity of materials was, in comparison to the over-
abundance of common law sources, Canadian and other, 
rather restricted. For that reason an approach had to 
be adopted more into the direction of dogmatics than 
of research. Nonetheless, the writer feels that the 
Dutch case law presented is adequate to support the 
discussions and ensuing conclusions. 
Excerpts from texts in languages other than Eng-
lish have been carefully translated in order to 
reflect correctly the cited author's thoughts. 
Some tables and schedules have been added for the 
for the purpose of providing an overview of the matters 
discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
Erubescit lex filias castigare 
parentes. 
(8 Coke, 116) 
The law blushes when children 
correct their parents. 
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PART ONE 
SUMMARY NOTES 
ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 
OF CANADA 
Lex Angliae non patitur absurdum. 
9 Coke, 22a 
The law of England does not 
suffer an absurdity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this paper is a comparative study of the posi-
tion of two different law systems, Dutch Civil Law and Canadian 
Common Law, in their treatment of liability problems arising from 
negligent conduct at one hand, or in no-fault situations on the 
other, that is in their treatment of strict liability issues 
within the ambit of the criminal law, with some digressions into 
tort law. 
At the suggestion of the writer's Promotor, Prof. Dr. G.E. 
Mulder, a brief overview of the common law system, its develop-
ment between 1066 A.D. and 1867 A.D., and of some of the relevant 
basic notions, precedes the discussion of the main topic. Its 
purpose is to assist the Dutch reader in assessing the merits of 
the conclusions suggested. 
The discussion of topics of a purely introductory nature has 
been kept succinct in order to keep the size of this paper within 
reasonable limits. Practically, this means that no detailed 
discussions oí diverging points of view regarding certain doc-
trines are being presented. Rather, the writer has limited him-
self to stating generally accepted principles, contrasted against 
a historical backdrop where this would clarify the statements 
made. 
An attempt was made to arrange this introductory material in 
such a fashion that it will lead up to and prepare for a detailed 
discussion of strict liability. 
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Jus est norma vesti, et quiaquid 
est oontra r.ormam recti, est in-
juria . 
Dig.1,1.i,i; 
Bract.fol. 2b. 
Law is a rule of right; and what-
ever is contrary to the rule of 
right is an injury. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CANADIAN COMMON LAW 
When William the Conqueror concluded his successful invasion 
and subsequent occupation of England in 1066, he became in truth 
the Sovereign of the Realm. He established strong government, 
centralized in the person of the King and encompassing not only 
administrative, but also legislative and judicial powers. 
Of necessity he had to delegate the daily exercise of these 
powers to persons and institutions, and part of the history of 
the common law shows the continuous efforts of the kings to re-
tain suppremacy as fully as possible while at the same time 
yielding to the necessity of sharing power on practical grounds. 
William, born and educated in France, in Normandy, embark-
ing upon the task of restoring peace and lawful order in his new-
ly won kingdom of England, found a diversity and rather unorgan-
ized mass of ancient local customs, unwritten, containing pre-
cepts providing for crude justice, often enforced by cruel 
means. These, however, were to become the foundation for an in-
creasingly humanized and sophisticated system that would resist 
in the ages following the Conquest, permanent intrusion by such 
extraneous influences as generated by a renewed interest in Roman 
law, the new system also would tolerate but keep in check the in-
fluence exercised by Canon law in certain domains. Generally, 
this system would follow a pattern of splendid isolation. 
The legal principles so evolved would, in contrast to local 
customs, obtain the quality of 'The Law' for the entire kingdom, 
the law common to the whole kingdom. "The sum of these 'common 
rules' was to become the 'common law'" (1) 
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A. COMMON LAW 
a) Definitions 
In order to define 'common law', the term may be contrasted 
with terms indicating other bodies of law, such as law enacted by 
legislature, Canon law and equity. 
"The common law, as distinguished from 
law created by the enactment of legislatures, 
comprises the body of those principles and rules 
of action, relating to the government and security 
of persons and property, which derive their 
authority solely from usages and customs of imme-
morial antiquity, or from the judgments and 
decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and 
enforcing such usages and customs; and, in this 
sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of 
England." (2) 
"From Canon (or ecclesiastical or church) law 
it is distinguished in that it is a system of law 
administered by the purely secular tribunals. 
"As distinguished from equity law, it is a 
body of rules and principles, written or unwritten, 
which are fixed and immutable authority, and which 
must be applied to controversies rigorously and in 
their entirety, and cannot be modified to suit the 
peculiarities of a specific case, or colored by 
any judicial discretion, and which rests confes-
sedly upon custom or statute, as distinguished 
from any claim to ethical superiority." (3) 
Thus, common law is that body of law 'common to the whole 
realm'. It is not promulgated by the Sovereign, as statute law 
is. Maitland contrasts it with 'equity', which he defines as 
'supplementary law, a gloss upon the common law', connecting and 
supplementing it. (4) 
Semantically, there might arise a cause for some confusion. 
Speaking about common law and defining it as indicated above, the 
question arises: does the common law of England not encompass 
'equity', 'law originated by legislative bodies' and 'Canon law' 
or its derivatives? The answer must be affirmative: equity, 
statute law and Canon law based law are part and parcel of the 
common law. 
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The term 'common law' is used in two meanings, one restrict-
ive, the other comprehensive. 
In the restrictive interpretation common law is the law ori-
ginated in ancient times, based on custom and shaped into uni-
formity for the whole realm by the King's common law courts. (5) 
It is that system that, for several reasons, (6) petrified to a 
great degree and, in a growing society, was no longer in step 
with, nor adequate in meeting the requirements of everyday life. 
In the comprehensive interpretation the term 'common law' 
indeed comprises equity, statute law and canon law derivatives. 
This is common law in its widest sense the universal law of the 
realm, the national inheritance or birthright of Englishmen, not 
only in their own home country, but wherever they would settle 
when creating a new colony. 
It is a system, said Lord Wensleydale, which consisted in 
applying to new combinations of circumstances those rules which 
we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents. (7) 
b) Common Law Countries 
Common law, originated in England and introduced into Ire-
land, spread to all parts of the globe under English domination 
or influence Canada, the United States of America, Australia, 
New-Zealand, to be adapted to requirements of time and place 
without losing its basic characteristics. Since we are concerned 
with a comparison of Dutch and Canadian law, the following obser-
vations should be made. 
c) Common Law in Canada 
In Canada common law reigns supreme m nine provinces, both 
in the fields of piblic and private law. Even in the province of 
Quebec public law, including criminal law, is common law. When 
using the term 'criminal' law, reference is made to 'true crimin-
al law' only. (8) Only private law m Quebec is civil law. 
Since tort law deals with infringements on personal rights 
as existing between two specific parties and is concerned with 
redress of the consequences -for instance through distribution of 
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losses sustained- tort law is essentially private law, having its 
own treatment in Quebec civil law. Where in this paper a brief 
digression is made into the domain of tort law, we have limited 
ourselves to the common law's position as to torts. 
Thus· all federal law is common law, including true criminal 
law. All provincial and municipal law, except in Quebec, is com-
mon law. 
Having placed the outer markers in order to show the limits 
of our concern, a brief historical sketch of the development of 
the common law seems to be in order. 
Before so doing, however, we shall present some notes on 
tort law. 
d) The Law of Torts 
Strict responsibility las its place not only in criminal but 
also in tort law. Moreover, criminal law and tort law are closely 
related in their origin. Also, the tort law area in the common 
law and the area of the onrechtmatige daad in Dutch law, are lar-
gely comparable, while the concept of 'negligence', now in full 
development in the common law, is the common ground. 
Strict responsibility offences essentially being offences of 
negligence, it is clear \4iy a few short remarks may be useful, if 
only for the purpose of pointing out the relationship between 
issues that may fall either way: to be decided in a criminal or 
in a civil court. 
Therefore we shall take a cursory look at the essence of the 
tort and indicate its relevance today, stating at the same time 
that its development history is far from complete, a development 
that might, as some writers appear to predict, end with its re-
placement . 
Linden in his preface to Canadian Tort Law (9) states 
"Chapter 13, on products liability, focuses on a 
serious, modern problem and tort law's response 
to it... The last chapter, on auto accident com-
pensation, raises the whole question whether, in 
the light of our social welfare laws, tort law 
has any claim to survive in modern Canada ... 
"... both New Zealand and Australia have virtual-
ly abolished the tort suit as a remedy for acci-
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dental injury and have established in their place, 
comprehensive, government-operated, compensation 
schemes. These plans force us to consider, once 
again, whether tort law is worthy of survival in 
our time. 
If the exclusive function of the law of torts 
is compensation, as some believe, then perhaps it 
should be discarded. If, however, tort law serves 
other useful social functions, then perhaps it 
deserves to survive." 
In this light, then, the first question is: what is a tort? 
Wright observes: (10) 
"While no definition of a 'tort' has yet been made 
that affords any satisfactory assistance in the 
solution of the problems we shall encounter, the 
purpose, or function, of the law of torts can be 
stated fairly simply. 
... (it) is to adjust... losses and to afford com-
pensation for injuries sustained by one person as 
the result cf the conduct of another..." 
Salmond explains: (11) 
"A tort is a species of civil injury or wrong. 
The distinction between civil and criminal wrongs 
depends on the nature of the appropriate remedy 
provided by law. 
A civil wrong is one which gives rise to civil 
proceedings -proceedings, that is to say, which 
have as their purpose the enforcement of some 
right claimed by the plaintiff as against the 
defendant. Criminal proceedings, on the other hand, 
are those which have for their object the punish-
ment of the defendant for some act of which he is 
accused . 
It is often the case that the same wrong is 
both civil and criminal -capable of being made 
the subject of both kinds. Assault, libel, theft 
and malicious injury to property, for example, are 
wrongs of this kind. 
Speaking generally, in all such cases the civil 
and criminal remedies are not alternative but con-
current, each being independent of the other. The 
wrongdoer may be punished criminally by imprison-
ment or otherwise and also be compelled in a civil 
action to make compensation or restitution to the 
injured person." 
Prosser (12) characterizes the law of torts as "a battle-
ground of social theory" where particular interests of individu-
als and/or groups clash and losses have to be adjusted. 
Fleming (13) asks the question: "Tort or Torts?" and goes on 
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to say 
"The question may well be put at this point 
whether there is some broad unifying principle 
underlying tortious liability or merely a random 
collection of miscellaneous wrongs which have 
little or no relation to each other, except per-
haps a vague notion that harm resulting from 
anti-social behaviour should be compensated". 
Prosser (14) speakingcf the historical development of the 
tort(s) explains 
"The shadow of the past still lies rather hea-
vily on the law of torts. When the common law 
first emerged, its forms of procedure were rigidly 
prescribed, and the plaintiffs could have no cause 
of action unless he could fit his claim into the 
form of some existing and recognized writ. These 
'forms of action we have buried, but they still 
rule us from their graves.'" 
When we speak of 'plaintiff' and 'cause of action' we are 
within the ambit of the private law and not of the criminal law. 
But in earlier ages no distinction between criminal and tortious 
conduct was clearly made. 
Potter (15) points out that behaviour was judged on its out-
ward and visible signs, motive or intention played no role in 
the earlier years. The main concern in those rowdy times was 
elimination of extra-judicial self-help, with violence meted out 
in retalliation of violence suffered, whether criminal or tort-
ious. The objective was preservation of the King's Peace. 
In Norman times, Potter explains, (16) the first clear sep-
aration between crime and tort resulted from the innovations in-
corporated in the Ordinances introduced by the Assizes of Claren-
don and Northampton. 
"They show the central authority taking charge 
of the suppression of the gravest offences. Fur-
thermore, the procedure was directed simply towards 
punishment. The extension of the procedure to les-
ser offences attacking the wellbeing of the commun-
ity led to the modern distinction between civil and 
criminal liability, e.g. some infractions of law 
broadly known as 'trespass' might be crimes if 
tried criminally or torts if tried civilly. 
Even today many, if not most, crimes give rise 
to civil liability. 
The point is that the object of the procedure 
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was to rid the community of its gravest offenders, 
and it was the State in the person of the King 
which took upon itself this duty. This emphasises 
the public character of the offence, and is the 
real sign of distinction between tort and crime." 
Tort law, in creating tort liability, aims at compensation 
and at distribution and shifting of losses. In our times, the 
capability to bear a loss is one of the many factors the courts 
have in mind, when deciding where the chips must fall. "Rather 
than leave the loss on the shoulders of the individual plaintiff, 
who may be ruined by it, the courts have tended to find reasons 
to shift it to the defendants... The development of the doctrine 
of strict liability 'without fault' for dangerous conditions and 
activities has rested to some extent on this basis", states 
Prosser. (17) 
Whatever the future of tort law may be, whatever other, 
related issues may exist, whether specific forms of liability 
based on negligence may replace part or all of tort law as we 
know it today and whether, alternatively, strict responsibility 
may to some extent be replaced by aationes in rem, we shall have 
to abstain from discussing such issues here in order to keep 
this paper on course. 
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В. RESUME OF COMMON LAW HISTORY 
a) Introduction 
The development of a legal system must of necessity reflect 
the political, social and cultural history of a country. Laws of 
a statutory nature are promulgated by the ruling power of the pe­
riod, whether in an absolute monarchy or in a democratic republic. 
Customary law, said to be the expression of what in the minds of 
the populace represents what is good and just, can only be ef­
fective where such customs are allowed to influence daily life 
by the grace of those in power. 
History reports on the fluctuations in the power structure 
of a country. Part of legislation's aims is to protect those 
having power as well those subjected to it. Where a power strugg­
le is going on, the laws of the land will reflect the legislative 
will and intentions of those who overcame their opponents, abso­
lutely or relatively, and mirrors the structure of a balance 
where power had to be shared. 
England's history, too, is a report on the power struggle 
between kings and kings, between kings and nobility, between 
king and parliament, between the upper and lower classes, between 
ecclesiastical and secular rulers, between the rulers and the 
ruled. An expose of English history may therefore assist in gain­
ing a clear impression of the development of the law of England. 
b) The Period before 1066 A.D. 
The early history of England is a history of invasions. 
Going back into a misty past, as far back as the Bronze and Iron 
Ages, the island west of the European continent has attracted 
militant adventurers of various kinds. 
The Goidels or Gaels were followed by the Brythons, who in 
turn had to bend to Roman supremacy. Gaius lulius Caesar executed 
the first raid in 55 B.C. Septimius Severus completed the action 
in 208 A.D. and for 200 more years the island's inhabitants lived 
under Roman domination. 
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When the Romans evacuated the territory, they left behind 
cities, strongholds, a network of roads and two colossal defence 
systems they built in the north: the Hadrian and Antoninian 
Walls. They also left behind the impact of their culture, their 
language, their legal concepts and doctrines, one of which would 
inspire later kings to strive for royal absolutism based on the 
Roman law concept of the king's divine rights. Moreover, they 
left behind Christianity. 
Then the Picts came from the north, the Teutonic invaders, 
Saxons, Anglos, Jutes from the east, the Scandinavians from the 
north-east. 
Local kingdoms vied for hegemony. Egbert was the first Saxon 
king of a long row, who really ruled over all of England. Danish 
kings took the throne, followed again by Saxons of whom Harold II 
was the last to be elected by the council of wisemen, the 'Witen-
agemot', after Edward the Confessor died in 1066 A.D. 
Edward's uncle William, Duke of Normandy, after charging 
that Harold's election was not legal, claimed the English throne, 
crossed the Channel, smashed Harold's army in the Battle of Hast-
ings and was crowned on Christmas Day 1066 A.D. English history 
was to record far reaching changes. 
Life in the days of the Anglo-Saxons must have been rough. 
"It was a wild time", says Potter, "Men lived in terror of the 
vast forests, where it was easy to be lost and succomb to star-
vation, of their fellow men who would plunder and slay, and above 
all of the unknown, whose inscrutable ways seemed constantly to 
be bringing famine and disaster." (18) 
Early laws were conservative and cruel,"consisting mainly 
of a mass of local customary rules modified here and there by the 
Dooms (Statutes) of the Anglo-Saxon or Danish kings." (19) 
Preservation of life, recognition and protection of freedom 
and property, land being the one great source of material securi-
ty, were the main objects ancient customary law was concerned 
about. As civilization, under the influence of spreading Christ-
ianity, progressed, the blood feud was replaced by compensation, 
assessment of damages to be found in the tariff schedules in the 
Dooms. Crude methods of private revenge, extra-judicial self-
help as it were, yielded to a system of retribution that was to 
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become the point of origin for tort and criminal law of later 
ages The Dooms of Aethelbert (about 600 A.D.). Alfred (about 
890 A.D.) and Cnut (about 1029 A.D.), written in the Anglo-Saxon 
language of the times, are among the best known, though perhaps 
not entirely understood today. Their main objective appears to 
have been enforcement of customary law rather than renewal or in­
troduction of new provisions. (20) 
Originally the Normans may not have altered too many of the 
local customs but they introduced some major administrative 
changes. 
c) William The Conqueror 
The greatest impact regards the land law of England and was 
made by the introduction by William of the Norman brand of feuda­
lism. William, to whom the nobility had sworn the oath of fealty 
(the Salisbury Oath, 1086 A.D.) in turn granted and confirmed ex­
isting grants by which the grantees held a given territory, the 
estate, of the king upon certain conditions, among which was a 
diversity of services to be rendered to the king. 
It must be stressed that such grants did not transfer any 
proprietory rights which the king reserved entirely for himself. 
The grantee became a 'tenant' who only could continue in posses­
sion of the estate by fulfilling the conditions set out in the 
grant. The grantee, holding directly of the king and being the 
'tenant-in-chief' -tenant гп ааргіе- in turn was entitled to 
parcel out the estate to persons of his choice, the 'mesne lords' 
following a similar pattern of requiring payments in the form of 
services. 
Thus a feudal 'pyramid' was constructed, the king on top, 
the tenants-гn-σαpгf:e -barons and church- a level down, the mesne 
or lesser lords further down and, later, private persons -the 
commoners- at the bottom. Since disputes regarding landholdings 
would be heard by the king's courts, operating mainly on the 
basis of Norman law, and since William's first supporters were 
the nobles in his invasion army who had to be remunerated for 
their support, land law developed following Norman law principles. 
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William and his sucessors also centralized government with 
its classic triad of powers: legislative, executive and judicial. 
One of the results was uniformity in a growing body of decisions, 
the origin of today's common law, for the courts would hand down 
similar decisions in similar problem situations. Perhaps this 
budding system was still harsh, rigid and, above all, incomplete, 
but it worked in daily life. 
Before starting his campaign, William had sought to obtain 
papal blessing on his undertaking to invade England, and he had 
promised that, if successful, he would grant authority for the 
establishment of ecclesiastical courts, where canon law was to be 
enforced. At this time the Church of Rome was well established 
in England. It claimed to be its own ruler, having exclusive 
jurisdiction over the clergy and, as regards certain areas of law 
also over laymen in things considered 'spiritual'. (21) 
Consequently, the England of William the Conqueror saw the 
development of the feudal system built following Norman patterns, 
justice being done in the king's courts (criminal matters, land 
law), in the seigneurial courts (local customary law: conflicts 
between the seigneurial tenants (freemen) and in the local 
courts; it saw the development of the influence of the church and 
the ecclesiastical courts (canon law); it saw the introduction of 
Norman French and Latin as official languages. 
Also, the king demanded that the mesne lords made the oath 
of fealty not to their baron, who was himself a tenant-in-capite, 
but directly to the king himself. 
The Norman kings had set their mark at centralization of 
government, legislation and distribution of justice in their own 
hands. Over the ages to come the reaction of the church, the no-
bility and, later, the commoners was to become directed at limit-
ing the ambit of royal power, and to subject the king to the law. 
d) ^he Period after William The Conqueror 
For the purposes of this paper the following phases in this 
power struggle will be scanned briefly: 
1) the subsequent changes in the scope of the royal 
power, affecting: 
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2) the king's relationship with the nobility, 
3) parliament, 
4) the church, and 
5) the commoners. 
1) Royal Power 
Five years after the Conquest, when the last Saxon chieftains 
had surrendered, the Conqueror was indeed king of all England. 
Sooner or later, some of his successors were to aspire absolute 
royal power; others would cooperate with parliament; some were 
to disregard the consequences of the development of a middle and 
-later- lower class and others would heed the expression of the 
will of the people. Some would recognize the Pope as a super 
power and others were to alienate themselves from Rome, establish 
their own persons as head of the Roman church in England and, af-
ter a complete breach with Rome, become the head of the, no lon-
ger Roman-Catholic, Church of England. 
Fach of the elements mentioned represents a facet of the re-
lationship between the rulers and the ruled. 
One of the potential threats to the centralized administra-
tive power of the king as supreme ruler was inherent to the feu-
dal system itself. At one hand, it was the king's interest to 
bind a number of nobles to him as vassals by the granting of 
land with all the ensuing profits and advantages. In these days, 
money not yet playing the role it was to play later, obtaining 
the vassal's military and other services, the products of the 
land and manpower, was vital to the king's own interest. At the 
other hand, since land represented wealth, the vassals had sim-
ilar interests as the king. The nobility, through sub-infeudation 
would distribute the burden of their obligations towards the king 
by imposing similar obligations and burdens on the mesne lords, 
their tenants, ^he nobility thus had an interest in splitting up 
the estates granted to them by the king. Moreover, they had an 
interest in preventing all or part of the estate from reverting 
to the king (escheat) for any of the recognized reasons. 
However, sub-infeudation, that is delegation (from the 
king's point of view) led to decentralization of administrative 
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power. Therefore the king's interest was better served by disal­
lowing sub-infeudation to go out of control. (22) 
The history of land law, the law of real property, shows all 
the marks of this conflict of interests to such a degree, that 
the law of property can only be understood against the background 
of England's history of the period between the Conquest and, 
roughly, the middle of the 17th century. Of all the body of com­
mon law, the law of property is the most technical and the least 
logical. 
The history of the development of the wide variety of courts 
also witnesses to the rivalry between king and nobility. 
From ancient times some form of justice had been administer­
ed in the local courts, ancient customs being the touchstone pat­
tern of social behaviour. The barons, lords of the manor, had 
jurisdiction over their freemen and serfs. Such compilations of 
local customary law as may be found in the Leges Henriai (about 
1130 A.D.) and Leges Willelmi (about 1100 A.D.) were the main 
sources of substantive law considered in the seigneurial courts. 
The king's courts, in the period immediately after the Conquest, 
do not appear to have been the busiest: cases were brought be­
fore these courts because "the king was the overlord of the dis­
putants, or because his royal rights were involved, or because 
his justice was sought in default of justice elsewhere".(23) 
The Conqueror started out with a complete survey of all the 
land holdings in the realm. The resulting report contained a 
detailed inventory of the estates, their tenants, the size of the 
agricultural operations and the flocks of cattle and sheep, ^his 
report, compiled in 1086 А.П., provided not only one of the bases 
for a rather efficient administration (in the sense of 'govern­
ment') but was also used as a basis for taxation. The name this 
report obtained: ^he Domesday Pook, may well betray the vener­
able age of Pritish humor. 
2) King and Nobility 
The Council of VVisemen, the Witan of olden days, changed 
name and became known as the Curia Pegis, at the same time the 
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highest feudal court dealing with conflicts between the barons 
and, indeed, for all men who could not find justice done elsewhere. 
Also, the Curia Regis was the supreme administrative body 
-king and parliament in modern days- governing the country as a 
whole. As a court of law, its main jurisdiction was criminal law, 
the king being the keeper of the peace in the realm, and tort 
law. Over the years, its work load increasing, specific courts 
would emanate from it such as the common law courts and, later, 
the conciliar courts. 
The successors of William the Conqueror, inspired in their 
methods of government by what they considered a 'royal preroga-
tive' , attempted to keep their absolutist powers free from in-
trusion by their vassals. John, brother of Richard Ilonheart 
(about 1200 A.D.) was to be the first king having to yield part 
of his powers to the barons. After two major clashes with Pope 
Innocent III, caused by a dispute on the issue of who was en-
titled to appoint the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Pope or the 
King, John and his country were placed under a papal interdict. 
When this move proved futile, John personally was excommunicated. 
The threat of a military invasion of Fngland by the combined 
forces of the Pope and the King of France caused John to give in 
and make his peace with the Pope. He then launched a campaign 
against the King of France, unsuccessfully, and having lost most 
of his possessions in France, returned to Fngland where be found 
himself confronted by something amounting to a rebellion. 
Parons, churchmen and ordinary citizens, headed by Stephen 
Langton, the Pope's appointee for the See of Canterbury, utterly 
tired of continuous wars, increasing taxes and cruel injustice, 
presented the King with nothing less than an ultimatum aimed at 
a change in his methods of government. A written list of agree-
ments regarding principles, partially already recognized in ear-
lier days by Fdward and both Henries, was presented to the King· 
the Magna Capta (1215 A.D.). John signed, having no way out. 
Among other things, this agreement, the result of close 
cooperation between barons and churchmen, placed the law above 
the king, made tax collection an object of prior legislation and 
provided that no imprisonment or fines or other punishment were 
-20-
to be handed out without a lawful trial. 
The Charter was later confirmed by various Parliaments, ex-
tended to all freemen (a Puritan interpretation advocated by Sir 
Edward Coke), and reinforced by the Petition of Right (1628 A.D.) 
and the Bill of Rights (1689 A.D.). The Charter was the spring-
board for the coming superiority of the Parliament over the 
Crown. 
3) Parliament 
Rising from its infancy, Parliament -as we know it today in 
its modern form- took its more or less definite basic shape under 
Fdward I, who in 1295 A.D. convened the first Parliament in which 
the (then) four 'estates' were represented: the barons, including 
the higher clergy, the knights, the burgesses and lower clergy 
who were to drop out later. 
Under Edward's son Henry III Parliament was divided into the 
House of Lords, (barons and higher clergy) and the House of Com-
mons (knights and burgesses). Then the struggle between king and 
parliament was on and it was going to last for several hundreds 
of years. Wars followed upon wars, involving the continuous cam-
paigns of the English kings to preserve their domains in France, 
with which country England has had an interesting love-hate af- . 
fair in all of its history. England ended up losing all of its 
holdings in France. 
More fateful for England's internal situation was the battle 
between rival barons from Lancaster and Yorkshire for ascendancy 
to the throne, known as the Wars of the Roses. Those from Lancas-
ter emerged victoriously and brought the Tudors into royal power 
-(1485 A.D.). The country, however, was impoverished. 
There was another important shift: the continuous wars had 
also weakened the nobility. The Flack Death had taken a shatter-
ing toll. The towns grew in number and importance; serfdom, as a 
result, broke down. Gunpowder entered upon the military scene and 
the manor-castle lost its significance us a defence works and 
stronghold, no longer able to defend the surrounding area and its 
inhabitants against an enemy. Consequently, the nobility saw its 
status of exclusivity disappear to a great degree and the feudal 
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system began, to crumble. 
The struggle was no longer mainly between king and nobility. 
It gathered impetus between the king, the church and the middle 
classes. It was Henry VII, the first Tudor king, who brought new 
strength and power to the monarchy. A period of peace, law and 
order created prosperity. 
4) The Church 
His son Henry VIII, crowned in 150P A.D., found himself in 
conflict with the Church, a conflict that would end by the es-
tablishment of the -no longer Roman Catholic- Church of Fngland, 
the king being its official head. When the last ruler of the Tu-
dor line, Elisabeth I, ascended the throne, the monarchy was 
solidly in control of the church and the barons. 
Also, the Tudors and the succeeding Stuarts adhered to the 
doctrine of the 'divine rights of kings'. The power struggle 
shifted again, now placing king and parliament in opposite cor-
ners and matching royal power to people power. The continuous 
need for money, to be mainly raised by taxation and needed for 
warfare, was one of the roots of this struggle. 
Rulers such as James I and Charles I would go over the head 
of Parliament when raising funds and the Civil War between the 
Royalists and the Roundheads (the supporters of parliament) en-
ded, causing Charles to lose his head on the block. 
Cromwell came and went and so did the innovations he had at-
tempted to introduce: a dictatorship of sorts, with a semblance 
of royal power. 
The monarchy was restored under Charles II (1660 A.D. ) who 
-clearly educated by the way Charles I was forced to leave this 
world- chose for cooperation with Parliament. The Habeas Corpus 
Act (1679 A.D.) was passed, protecting the citizen from illegal 
imprisonment. (.Habeas Corpus was a court order by which jailers 
or any other person, having a person in custody as a captive, 
were ordered to bring that person before a court, stating the 
reasons for his confinement). 
Religion was the main cause for continued internal squabb-
les between Roman Catholic rulers and rulers adhering to the 
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Church of England. 
Charles II accepted the principle that king and parliament 
need to cooperate in government and that the doctrine of the di­
vine right of kings was no valid tenet on which to hase claims 
for extraordinary royal powers. 
His brother, James II, fought a bitter battle against parli­
ament and also clashed severely with the Church of England... and 
lost, earning the reputation of a tyrannical king who flouted the 
Laws of England. He was a staunchly Roman-Catholic king and when 
a son was born to him, the higher classes feared that another 
Roman-Catholic king was going to be the next ruler. The time for 
change was clearly ripe. 
The nobility grouped together and invited a Dutch ruler, 
William 'Stadhouder' of Holland, married to James II's oldest 
daughter Mary and a Protestant, to take the throne. This action 
of the nobility, recorded in the books of history as the 'Rebel­
lion of 1688', resulted in William's invasion -the second Willi­
am from the continent to invade England- and his and Mary's sub­
sequent crowning. Parliament had won the struggle. No longer was 
a king able to rule without parliament and in 1β89 A.n. the Bill 
of Rights was passed. Among other things, this Bill provided 
that parliament must be elected through free elections, was to 
have freedom of speech and meet frequently, and approve any tax­
es to be levied. 
The king could not be a Roman-Catholic or be married to 
one. He could not, through his own power solely, amend or set 
aside the laws of the land. Subjects were to be free to petition 
the king. Parliament was to vote annually on financial subsidies 
to the royal treasury, government and the military. 
5) The Commoners 
It would take another hundred years for parliament to reach 
its present day status. The industrial revolution brought the 
lower classes on the scene as a power group to be reckoned with. 
The French Revolution had its limited impact and so had the 
struggle against Napoleon. Parliament gave more attention to the 
needs of the ordinary citizens and it was now elected by a major-
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ity of the people. By 1900 A.D. democracy in government through 
parliament was a fact: Parliament emerged supreme. 
Having surveyed some of the relevant highlights of England's 
history, a brief description of the reflection of the events men­
tioned on the development of the court system would seem to be in 
order. 
С THE COURT SYSTEM 
Again, to stay within the scope of this paper, only the main 
elements of the court system will be discussed briefly. For more 
detailed discussion reference is made to literature on the topic. 
a) The Common Law Courts 
Retracing our steps through Fngland's history we shall have 
to add some more detail to what was discussed before. 
Originally, the local courts doing justice on the basis of 
customary law, were the instances before which conflicts of any 
kind were to be brought for resolution. 
The position of William the Conqueror, as soon as all of 
Fngland's territory was under his control, was strong. The king 
based himself on the premise that the realm was 'his personal 
property'. This premise was one of the corner stones of the feu­
dal system. Since the king, when grantin-g an estate to a vassal, 
retained all property rights and remained the 'true owner', his 
own interests dictated his duties, among which the foremost pro­
bably was to 'keep the peace', that is: to maintain a state of 
law and order. The king provided protection to his vassals, the 
tenants in capite, who in turn provided protection to their mes­
ne lords. Easically it was a 'do 'ut des' transaction, in which 
protection was paid for by the rendering of services. 
The. king could never hope to live up to his side of the 
transaction, unless it was within his power to create the condi-
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tions that would allow him to be an effective and efficient ad-
ministrator, the supreme governor, the supreme legislator and 
the supreme justice. As time passed, this supremacy was to be mo-
dified and tempered, as discussed above, but in the first centu-
ries after the Conquest the kings were after centralization of 
the classic triad of powers. 
Thus, the king was 'the fountain of justice' and he would, 
where the local and manorial courts would fall short for one rea-
son or the other, provide justice in and by his Curia Regis and 
usurp to a great extent the jurisdiction of the existing courts. 
(24) 
One of the main causes for 'breaches of the King's Peace' 
was found in the extra-judicial self-help by which an individual 
reacted to an infringement of his rights with violence. We are 
looking at a period of rough and tough mores that aimed at survi-
val of the fittest. Consequently, in order to suppress violence 
as a primitive tool for imposing or protecting one's rights, the 
king had to provide for redress of injustices committed. Hence 
breaches of the king's Peace formed the basis of 'much of the 
criminal law, and also of the Writ of Trespass and its offshoots' 
(25). 
At this point in time criminal law and tort law were still 
'united', later to become distinct and separated, criminal law 
growing out to a well rounded-off body of public law, complete in 
its scope, dealing with 'public wrongs' as opposed to the 'civil 
wrongs' that were to become the concern of tort law, that is: 
private law, and instead of being complete in its scope, still 
growing with the growing needs and increasing sophistication of a 
technocratic society. 
The Curia Regis "threw out certain branches as law courts" 
(26) and they were to become tribunals, distinct and separated 
from the Curia. 
Without intending to go into any sort of detail, the follow-
ing permits a glance at the courts system of those days. 
Pefore the Conquest justice was done in the communal courts 
of Saxon origin; after the Conquest the seignorial courts of Nor-
man origin developed, comprising the 'courts leet' (criminal 
jurisdiction), the baronial, domanial courts, the courts baron 
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and the courts customary. Parallel to these courts the common law 
courts came into being. They were the Courts of Assize, the Gene-
ral Eyre, the Residuary Courts (Court of the Exchequer, Court of 
Common Pleas, King's Bench and Exchequer Chamber) and the Prero-
gative Courts (the King's Council, the Star Chamber and the 
Courts of Equity: Chancery and the Court of Requests). 
From olden days onward, traveling justices had roamed the realm, 
following more or less organized timetables, bearing criminal and 
-later- civil cases: the 'Justices to take the Assizes'. Origin-
ally they were fact finders, not judges handing down judgments, 
who would submit the cases they had investigated, for pleading to 
the Court of Common Pleas or the King's Bench. 
These Courts of Assize (since 1072 A.D.) dealt entirely with 
facts: they were to 'fret out the truth' with respect to crimes 
committed (verum diaere) and come up with a 'verdict', not a 
judgment. It appears to be generally accepted that the Assizes of 
Clarendon and Northampton (under ITenry II, 1145 A.D.) saw the 
origin of true criminal law. 
In about the same period a novel system originated to deal 
with civil cases, among which was the Writ of Trespass. This sys-
tem entailed trial by jury or inquisition, where twelve 'legal 
men', law abiding men with no criminal record, were to decide on 
the factual truth in a given situation. 
Specific assignments, 'commissions' for special inquiries 
were also given to itinerant judges. Parallel to this, periodical 
sessions of such judges -their stay in one place sometimes last-
ing up to one year- were organized and known as 'General Eyre'. 
They inquired into all Pleas of the Crown (criminal offences), 
checked up on the performance of the local sheriffs or franchi-
sees where a 'court leet' was a part of the manorial grant, on 
the collection of fines imposed and penalties handed out. 
b) The Residuary Courts 
As mentioned before, the Curia Regis generated many courts, 
which broke away from it, one by one. Three of them are known as 
the 'residuary courts', dealing with issues not resorting under 
the local courts and coming under the 'residual' jurisdiction 
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of the king: the Court of the Exchequer, the Court of Corranon 
Pleas and the King's Bench. (?7) 
The Court of the Exchequer (under Henry I, about 1100 A.D.) 
was originally mainly concerned with the collection of revenue 
(taxes). Later it became a court for Common Pleas, that is civil 
matters and obtained some equitable jurisdiction, based on natu-
ral justice, as a forerunner of the Chancellor's court of equity. 
The Court of Common Pleas (at Westminster), under Henry III 
(about 1216 A.D.) dealt mainly with routine civil cases, having 
no criminal jurisdiction. One 'Pench' was sitting to hear oral 
pleadings (reported in the Year Pooks) and one 'Pench', sitting 
with a jury, to decide the cases pleaded. 
The King's Bench, gathering 'coram Rege', had a criminal as 
well as civil jurisdiction, both in first instance and appellate. 
It would also supervise the courts 'below' and have jurisdiction 
over 'officials'. 
The Exchequer Chamber was the assembly of all judges in Eng-
land sitting with the purpose of considering questions of law 
having arisen in any court. No formal judgments were made and on-
ly issues of pure law (and not of fact) were decided. This Cham-
ber expired around 1738 A.D. (28) 
The above mentioned courts, except the Exchequer Chamber, 
being general courts, all other courts are 'special' or 'preroga-
tive' courts, that is: courts emanating from the king alone and 
not from the king in parliament. 
The main group comprises the 'conciliar' courts, administra-
tive tribunals, based on expediency, not on 'justice for the in-
dividual grounded on law'. Although originally not courts of law 
during the 15th and 16th centuries, they became -still control-
led by the executive to some degree- judicial bodies, finally to 
develop into courts of law independent of the executive. The main 
conciliar courts were: the King's Council, the Star Chamber, the 
Courts of Equity and the Court of Requests. 
The King's Council, formerly the Curia Regis, generated a 
number of common law courts as mentioned, each one assuming its 
own scope and character. 
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Yet, the King in Council would retain general jurisdiction: 
to do residuary justice. Access to this 'fountain of justice' 
when everything else failed, was channeled via a petition 'for 
God's sake' or 'the King's grace'. (29) Most members of the 
King's Council were 'barons', landed gentry with large estates, 
who in later days were to assemble in the House of Lords, the 
Lords in Parliament, sitting to hear appeal and cassation cases. 
Although common lawyers were attracted as advisors, they 
were rather suspicious that a competing jurisdiction was emerging 
likely to cause them loss of business. To help ward off this risk 
they alligned with Parliament, itself a split-off from the Coun-
cil and concerned with common law, whereas King and Council in 
later years engaged in political justice (the Tudors, the Stuarts) 
that finally contributed to the Council's downfall. (1641 A.D.) 
The Star Chamber was founded by the Tudors (1485-1603) as 
part of a general effort to re-establish law and order in the re-
alm, to reinforce the position of the government and to aim at 
almost absolute royal power. 
The King's Council was re-organized with the result that the 
Council assumed two distinct roles: the Council 'about the King' 
-wherever he was-, involved with government and affairs of state, 
and the Council sitting at Westminster, which developed into the 
Court of the Star Chamber. The latter became a political tool in 
royal hands under the Stuarts (1603-1702). In 1641 the Act for 
the Abolition of the Star Chamber was passed and the Stuarts lost 
the instrument with which to enforce their absolutist policies. 
The Star Chamber died before Charles I was executed. 
Before dealing with the Courts of Equity, the Writ system 
should be glanced at, since the origin of the courts of equity is 
to be found in the inadequacy of the writ system to provide just-
ice in a developing society, as a result of what Prof. Clarence 
Smith calls: "hardening of the judicial arteries". (30) 
c) The Writ System 
The writ system, based on pre-existing rules dating back to 
customs 'from the time whence memory did not run', are at the 
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origin of the common law. Up to a point the system calls up memo-
ries of the Roman law 'aotiones '. Justice, that is: a remedy ap-
plicable to a given wrong, was only available when a 'writ' of a 
certain description, worded in almost 'sacral' terms, covered the 
situation at issue. If no such writ could be found, the claimant 
had to leave empty-handed and unsatisfied. 
Originally, the writ was an order to 'summon' a defendant 
to appear before the royal court. Its name survives up to this 
day under the label 'Writ of Summons'. Thus, there were writs 
covering money claims (de debito) or claims regarding chattels 
('roerende goederen') (de detentione) or a claim to take posses-
sion (de ingressu) of a piece of real property ('onroerend goed') 
These were the precipe writs following which the defendant either 
appeared in court or satisfied the claimant. Later, the defendant 
was simply ordered to appear in court and 'show why he had harmed 
the plaintiff' (ostensurus quare). "Trial was by jury, the proof 
was rational, and judgment no longer for specific relief but for 
damages". (31) 
Here we enter the field of civil wrongs: the 'trespass' (de 
transgressione), later extended to 'trespass on the case'. 
It was Chancery that would extend the availability of writs 
in cases where the individual sought the king's justice. New 
writs were 'invented', sooner or later to be incorporated in the 
Register of Writs, containing standardized forms of action. 
Everything looked rather well for a period of time but "from 
the end of the fourteenth century ... Chancery practically stop-
ped inventing", (32) thus causing another deadlock. To a certain 
extent the old situation, petrification of the judicial process, 
was repeated, though more remedies were available than in earlier 
days. Again it became true: "Ubi remedium ibi ius". It was the 
Chancellor who was to reverse the adage to: "Ubi ius, ibi reme-
dium". The vehicle was 'equity'. 
d) Equity (33) 
The Chancellor, head of the royal government, was to bring 
new forms of relief, circumventing the fossillizing aspects of 
existing procedure with regard to evidence, allocation of damages 
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and other issues. Equity provided justice based on conscience, 
natural law and to a degree, Christian doctrine, many chancellors 
being clerics. When the 16th century drew to a close Equity had 
gained its own definite character and scope: it now meant 'the 
sum of rules recognized and administered by the Chancellor's 
Court' as contrasted with 'Law': 'the sum of rules administered 
by the ordinary courts', 'two bodies of well defined rules ad-
ministered by separate and independent courts', equity being sup-
plementary in character and giving precedence to the law, where 
the law provided a remedy. 
This separation has been long since abolished (Judicature 
Act, 1873) and all courts will do justice on the basis of law, as 
supplemented by equity. 
The development of the Courts of Equity introduced a new 
controversy, this time between the 'courts of law' and 'the 
courts of equity'. Being entitled to 'hold court' entailed having 
a source of income generated in the process of doing justice. 
Writs had to be bought. Thus, one facet of this controversy was 
of a financial nature. When equity provided easier access to 
justice, cheaper procedures and a wider range of remedies, the 
courts of equity drew away business from the courts of law. Con-
sequently, part of the controversy translated itself in efforts 
by the law courts, later supported by a Parliament that sought to 
wrestle its way out of royal control, to restrict the jurisdicti-
on of the courts of equity. 
For many years the two parallel jurisdictions co-existed but 
legal history is enlivened by many examples that show the effects 
of the controversy. 
Although the Court of Chancery originally was involved in 
justice for 'the poor', this role appears to have been taken over 
by the Court of Requests, a minor court of equity that also dealt 
with issues brought before it by 'civil servants'. It died short-
ly after 1642. (34) 
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e) Sources of the Common Law 
1) Customary Law 
The history of customs is lost in the 'mists of time'. What-
ever their origin, their raison d'etre or their substance may be, 
it is clear that local customs constituted a body of unwritten 
rules for human behaviour, generally accepted -and enforced- in 
the local community as far as memory goes back. 
Given the make-up of human nature with its seemingly innate 
sense of right and wrong -however crude-, given the influence of 
christian doctrines in a country slowly converting to implemen-
tation of these doctrines as guidelines for everyday behaviour, 
customs aimed at a peaceful, just and durable organization of a 
society slowly emerging from the times when only the strongest 
had 'right' on their side. 
Humanizing the struggle for survival, protecting life, com-
munal and private property, eliminating self-help by following 
the precepts of a basic morality, are all part of the aims un-
derlying customary law. Customs also formed the basis for the 
oldest writs. Regrettably no compilation is available. 
?) Statute Law 
Statute law is usually distinguished from ordinances in that 
statutes were and are promulgated by Parliament; ordinances eman-
ated from the Curia Regis. They do not create new law but rather 
the means (regulations) to enforce existing law as did the chart-
ers of still older days. 
The modern statute dates back to the reign of Henry IV 
(139P-1413). Before Henry IV, statutes originated from petitions 
made to the King in Parliament. If accepted and intended to be 
permanent, they were engrossed on the 'statute rolls', all too 
often incorrectly as it seems. Since Henry IV the petition was 
worded in the terms in which the statute was to be engrossed. 
In another than the modern sense of the word, statutes pre-
date Henry IV. Important and far-reaching legislation was embo-
died in 'statutes' such as De Bonis (1285) and Quia Emptores 
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(1290), originated before the time Parliament took up its role. 
3) Judge-made Law 
The statement: 'common law is case law', that is: judge-made 
law, may not be entirely correct due to tbe fact that in present 
days the statute -that is: law promulgated by Parliament- has ma-
de inroads into territory formerly entirely regulated by case law. 
From the time that the first 'law reports' were written 
during the reign of I'enry III (1?16-1?72) records of judicial de-
liberations are available, althoug the- decisions may be missing. 
Later, under Fdwar'd IV (1461-1483) these reports are more comple-
te. Judgments are recorded together with the reasons leading to 
the decisions made. 
Other sources of knowledge regarding judicial reasoning and 
decision making are to be found in the 'Plea Rolls', the 'Assize' 
and 'Eyre Rolls', the 'Exchequer Rolls' and similar reports. 
In a growing judicial system with an increasing workload 
-due to gradually extending procedural ways to 'get one's right'-
one of the main needs must have been the need for consistency in 
decision making. T'he law must be predictable as to its applica-
bility to given issues and fact situations. The law-subjects must 
be reasonably sure that alike decisions may be expected in alike 
configurations of facts and circumstances. 
Thus, over the ages, judges would take their-enlightenment 
from decisions made in earlier, comparable cases, establishing a 
judicial technique from which in more recent times the doctrine 
of 'binding precedent' could arise. More must be said about this 
doctrine later. 
Statutes, even in modern times, may 'make law' but it is, 
still today as it has been ever before, the judge who decides if 
and to what extent a statutory provision applies in a given case. 
For a very clear and recent statement on this topic the fol-
lowing quote from the Sault Ste. Marie case -which will be dis-
cussed in more detail later- may serve. (35) 
"It may be suggested that the Introduction of 
a defence based on due diligence and the shifting 
of the burden of proof might better be implemented 
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by legislative act. 
In answer, it should be recalled that the con­
cept of absolute liability and the creation of a 
jural category of public welfare offences are both 
the product of the judiciary and not of the Legis­
lature. 
'''he development iodate of this defense
л
 in the 
numerous decisions I have referred to, of courts 
in this country as well as in Australia and new 
Zealand, has also been the work of judges. 
The present case offers the opportunity of con­
solidating and clarifying the doctrine". 
-Emphasis added-
If anyone should have any doubt as to the question whether 
judges do still 'make law', the case quoted should provide an af­
firmative answer. 
In the cited case an existing defence receives recognition 
as being valid and available in fact situations where it was not 
accepted earlier and a relatively new theory in regard of the 
classification of offences is accepted. For a more detailed dis­
cussion, please refer to Part Two of this paper. 
4) Academic Writing 
No formal authority has ever been assigned to academic 
writing, but academic opinion clearly is of influence oh judges' 
minds today as it has been from the earliest days of Henry II on­
ward . 
Glanvil(le), Chief Justiciar, is held to be the author or at 
least the supervisor or editor of the famous Tractatus de legibus 
et consuetudinibus Angliae, a manual in 14 books, discussing pro­
cedure before the King's Courts, mainly in the form of a commen­
tary on the writs then available. 
About a hundred years later (1256) Henry of ßratton, Clerk 
and King's Justice, wrote -under the same title- a more scienti-
fically organized treatise dealing with general principles and 
applications of procedural law in the King's Courts. He is known 
as 'Bracton' rather than under his original name. 
Many other authors followed in their footsteps. Learned 
writers such as Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633), Sir Matthew Hale 
(1609-1676) and Sir William Plackstone (1723-1780) have recorded 
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and commented on the substantive and procedural law of their days. 
For a more detailed overview of legal authors and their works, see 
Potter. (36) 
One author is to be singled out here for a practical reason, 
namely the fact that he is quoted with approval in the Sault Ste 
Marie case in which his 'half-way house' theory became one of the 
underpinnings of the judgment: Dr. Glanville Williams. This theo-
ry shall be further discussed later. (37) 
Quoting academic sources has now become the rule rather than 
the exception in the common law courts. 
Where, in a far past, the authors of the Rolls were more 
concerned with the contents of the pleadings than with the out-
come of the dispute, that is: with the judgment, later scribes 
recorded the judgments as well. This seems to document a change 
in approach, from an utterly pragmatic 'how to plead' technique 
to a more sophisticated 'how to analyze an issue' modus operan-
di. Authors of treatises went a parallel path, when explaining 
the law of England. Departing from a factual exposition of avail-
able writs in the earliest days, they arrive at a formulation of 
doctrines in our days. 
But still, the common law judge or lawyer does not treat 
academic writing in the same way their civilian colleagues do. 
It is still precedent that dictates the analysis of and the deci-
sion in issues before the common law courts. 
D. SOURCES OF AND INFLUENCES ON COMMON LAW 
For the purpose of this paper a brief sketch of the influen-
ce of four law systems on the common law may serve as a back-
ground to further discussions. They are: ancient customary law, 
Roman law, Canon law and Continental (mainly French) civil law. 
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a) Ancient Customary Law 
Customary law, by its very nature, was law in the sense of 
'generally accepted, unwritten rules, inherited from days long 
past', when communication between tribal settlements and later, 
between manors, and still later, between villages and towns, was 
scant, while any form of centralizing government was absent. 
Customs had a strictly local delimitation. Taboos, unwritten 
codes of behaviour, in force within a group since times immemori-
al, served the promotion of the survival chances of the group 
living in an almost alien environment, as well as the self-pro-
tection of the group internally against socially detrimental be-
haviour of individuals. 
When the country became more organized and a central govern-
ment started forging the countless small groups, widely spread 
out over a vast area, into some rudimentary form of nationhood, 
it became opportune to set a date from which 'legal memory' was 
to be assumed having started. The reasons for this move were pu-
rely practical. Punishment for unlawful conduct as well as recog-
nition of a claim to a given right were based on customary rules. 
The year 1189, during the reign of Richard I, was chosen as the 
year starting from which "legal memory would not be out of mind" 
Anything, custom, usage, an alleged grant, dating from before 
1189 was "beyond legal memory", needed no proof and was to be 
respected as established beyond legal doubt. 
In later years this time span was reduced: limitation was 
set at 60 years under Fenry III (1509-1547) and to 20 years under 
William IV (1830-1837). 
Customs, applied in the local courts and, in the beginning, 
in the common law courts, were at the very basis of the law of 
England. 
b) Roman Law 
Roman law was not 'received' in England as it was in most 
countries of the European Continent, where it became the under-
structure of the civil law systems, after its rediscovery around 
1100 and its revival starting at Bologna. 
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From the days of the Roman occupation of England, -the laws 
of Rome at that time still being pre-Justinian-, and the ensuing 
invasion by Germanic warriors, not much Roman law filtered into 
Anglo-Saxon law, as the followers of the Germanic school of 
thought see it. To the contrary, the Romanist school sees 'con-
siderable survival' and finds that the 'more barbaric people 
borrowed, though in borrowing vulgarised, largely from the old 
Roman law'.(38) 
When attempting to put order in the legal system, the schol-
ars of later days faced a widely varied, incoherent and unorgan-
ized body of often contradictory customs. Among those scholars 
were Glanvil and Bracton, who were knowledgeable of Roman law as 
expounded in commentaries (glosses) by medieval lawyers. The 
Roman systematics must have had a great appeal, showing a well 
rounded off and complete body of law. 
Law schools were established at Oxford, Cambridge and Lon-
don where Vacarius appears to have taught Roman law. The London 
school was closed in 1234 when Henry III forbade the teaching of 
Roman law, as Stephen (1135-1154) had done before him. 
Henry VIII founded chairs in Roman law at the Universities 
of Oxford (1535) and Cambridge (1540). 
Yet, apart from a few exceptions, Roman law did not become 
incorporated into common law; however, these exceptions show at 
least some influence. Firstly, equity was introduced by the Chan-
cellor, himself a churchman in most cases, educated in Roman and 
Canon law, who therefore could not fail being inspired by both 
systems where equity's aim was "to abate the rigour of the com-
mon law". Secondly, the law merchant, above all maritime law, 
originated in Roman law and was developed by civilians in the 
Admiralty Courts. Thirdly, the use of written dispositions in the 
King's Council and the Chancery, and in the Admiralty Courts was 
based on ideas regarding pleading and procedure found in Roman 
law. 
It must be kept in mind that the common law courts were the 
champions for the rights of the individual, the villagers, the 
farmers, the ruled masses. A clear cut controversy existed be-
tween the common lawyers and the scholars who advocated the in-
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troduction of Roman law. The common lawyers were to win this 
battle. 
One of the elements in civilian thinking of the times, in-
spired upon Roman law, was specifically repulsive to the minds 
trained in the common law. It was the doctrine that the German 
Emperor was the "sole successor to the all-powerful Roman Empe-
ror". Quite to the contrary, the common lawyer held that the King 
was under the law as were all his subjects and that the law was 
supreme. 
"Rex debet esse sub lege quia lex facit regem"; 
(3P) "Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo 
et lege, quia lex facit Regem"; (40) "Rex est ma-
jor singulis y minor universis". (41) 
Such kings as would defy these tenets (Charles I is one ex-
ample) found the vigor of the common law in their paths. 
c) Canon Law 
Comparable trends may be noted as to the influence of Canon 
law, which itself had its origins in Roman law. 
William the Conqueror had promoted the establishment of ec-
clesiastical courts in return for the papal blessing on his vent-
ure to invade England. The Church, its influence on daily life in 
upswing, claimed jurisdiction over everyone in matters spiritual 
'as defined by the Church'. The definition was wide: matters spir-
itual encompassed marriage and its effects on the parties, wills 
and their execution and situations in which 'good faith' was an 
element, such as in contracts. 
As early as 1164 (Fenry II) opposition against direct influ-
ence of Canon law was translated into action: by the Constitution 
of Clarendon Henry forbade the ecclesiastical courts to deal with 
civil debts "on the pretext of enforcing the moral duty of good 
faith". 
Henry VIII, while re-introducing the teaching of Roman law, 
prohibited the teaching of Canon law. Nonetheless, when contracts 
-with the inherent moral duty to keep the given word- were lifted 
away from the jurisdiction of the Canon law, marriage, the dis-
tribution of personal property upon the death of a person, and 
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disputes or confirmation of wills remained under church juris-
diction. Apart from this, no direct influence of Canon law on 
Common law appears to be noticeable except for the fact that ear-
ly chancellors and judges were clerics, cognizant of Canon as 
well as of Common law. It would seem reasonable to venture that, 
at least subconsciously, they were under the influence of both 
systems in their thinking and decision making. 
Common law was, already in early days, established as 'the 
perfection of reason' and emerged unscathed from a confrontation 
with Roman and Canon law. 
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Lex vigilantíbus, non dormienti-
bus, subvenit. 
8 Coke, 116 
Law assists the alert, not the 
sleep ing. 
CHAPTER THREE 
DUTCH CIVIL LAW 
A. CIVIL LAW 
a) Hefinition 
In an attempt to assist Canadian readers of this paper, the 
following short notes on Dutch civil law have been added. 
Unless indicated otherwise in this paper, the term 'civil 
law' is to be understood as 'that body and system of law as 
originated in and was mainly derived from Roman law'. 
In this sense the term is not contradistinguished with 'pub-
lic law', 'Canon law', 'criminal law' and so on but rather with 
'common law. 
It is the heritage of the continental peoples very much in 
the same way as common law is the heritage of the English. 
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b) Civil Taw Countries 
Although in the Scandinavian countries Roman law was not re­
ceived and they stand apart -in that respect- from the other Eu­
ropean countries, they too belong to the civil law group, one of 
which is "Чіе Netherlands. 
c) Civil Law in the Netherlands 
Historically speaking it is as confusing to speak of 'The 
Netherlands' when comparing systems and institutions as they have 
evolved over the ages, as it is confusing to speak about 'Canada' 
covering the period from the day the first settlers arrived, 
through the period of the growth of Confederation from a four-
province to a ten-province entity, reaching its present day 'full 
size' only in 1949. 
When we speak of 'The Kingdom of The Netherlands' we refer 
to the country as it is today, with the geographical limits ob­
tained after its separation from Belgium in 1830. 
It is proposed not to go back any farther than the French 
Revolution in as far as the development of substantive criminal 
law is concerned, although some quick glances must be thrown on 
prior historical data in order to deal with the background of to­
day's 'Dutch law'. 
This may be the place to clear up some problems in semantics 
representing some confusion as to the use of terms such as 'Hol­
land', 'Dutch', 'Netherlands' -as an adjective- and 'The Nether­
lands' -as a noun-. 
The country's constitutional designation is: 'The Kingdom of 
The Netherlands' or, for short, 'The Netherlands'and the proper 
adjective is 'Netherlands'. 
The country consists of eleven provinces, two of which car­
ry the name 'Holland', namely 'Northern Holland' and 'Southern 
Holland'. 
Dating far back historically, the word 'Holland' became pop­
ular as a pare pro toto denominator for the entire country, much 
to the chagrin of nine other provinces and the corresponding ad-
-40-
adjective is 'Hollands' usually translated into English as 
'Dutch'. The purist, speaking of The Netherlands, will avoid 
using the word 'Holland' or 'Hollands', 
The most used adjective 'Dutch' has no contemporary link 
with the German word 'Deutsch' although their etymology seems to 
put both words in the same cradle. To confuse the issue it may be 
mentioned that not too long ago the Belgians would refer to the 
Germands as the 'Duts' (First World War) while calling the 'Ne-
therlanders': 'Ollanders'. 
There seems to be no hard and fast rule for distinction. In 
this paper 'Dutch law' will be used as a translation of the term 
'Nederlands recht'. 
В. RESUME OF THE HISTORY OF DUTCH LAW 
a) Introduction 
As referred to previously, the Kingdom of The Netherlands in 
its present geographical delimitation, dates back to 1830, when 
its union with Belgium was disrupted. 
For the purposes of this paper, however, a short flash-back 
to earlier times appears useful in view of the great minds and 
fateful events that left their impressions on the development of 
civil law in Europe generally and in The Netherlands especially. 
Again: only some of these historical highlights will be referred 
to. Influences dating back to yet earlier periods are to be dis­
cussed later. 
The background of most of the political and juristic think­
ing of the 18th and 19th centuries may be found in the works of 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the searcher for 
certainty in law on the basis of justice, father of the theory 
of the 'social contract' and the voluntary restriction of an in­
dividual's personal freedom, leading to the formation of the 
state as a replacement of the status naturalis -ideas similar to 
those as may be found in the writings of the Dutch philosopher 
and rationalist De Spinoza (1632-1677)- and the investiture of 
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original sovereignty in the people. 
This background was further detailed by John Locke (1632-
1704), originator of empiricism, proponent of the distinction in 
government's functioning in three power areas: legislation (being 
supreme although always submitted to the people's will), executi-
ve power and administration of justice. 
These precursors of the era of 'Enlightenment' were followed 
by continental philosophers such as de Montesquieu (1689-1755) 
-L 'Esprit des Lois- (1748), treating of the relationship between 
the laws of the land and the characteristics of the people under 
various forms of government: monarchy, republic, despotism; 
Voltaire (1649-1778) -Commentaires sur l'Esprit des Lois- and 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), also a proponent of the social 
contract doctrine, but holding that the natural, primitive state 
of man, from a moral point of view, is to be considered superior 
to the civilized state, which has corrupted man. He and Voltaire 
clashed fiercely, becoming bitter enemies in the process. 
However, there were other authoritative philosophers whose 
influence was probably more pronounced in The Netherlands. De 
Spinoza was considered a non-believer; Hobbes' theories tended to 
preach and defend a totalitarian monarchy, which did not sit too 
well with the Dutch love of democratic, individual freedom as the 
most basic and precious of all their rights. 
Therefore, more influential on Dutch thinking were German 
philosophers such as Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) -the great 
systematist whose influence is still noticeable today (contracts, 
risks) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), another systematist with 
the mind of a mathematician and the originator of the methodics 
of modern codification. 
The great modeler of Dutch thought par excellence was the 
philosopher, humanitarian, theologian and jurist Hugo de Groot, 
also known as Grotius (1583-1645) who based his philosophy on hu-
man reason as the source of man's knowledge of the natural law. 
His De Jure Belli ac Pacis, perhaps his opus magnum, divorces 
natural law from divine revelation and identifies it as emanating 
from human nature, itself a creation of God. 
His Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence is still famous as 
is his Mare Liberum. 
-42-
He was one of the protagonists of 'Roman-Dutch' law -the 
Dutch School- so influential outside of The Netherlands that in 
Scotland, the Skandinavian Countries and South Africa these old 
philosophers may be quoted in the court room, even today. 
One other jurist should be mentioned, Cornells van Bynkers-
hoek (1673-1743), justice and later president of the Supreme 
Court of Holland and Zeeland, who kept meticulous notes of this 
Court's decisions, giving -a novelty in those days- their ratio-
nes decidendi and referring to dissenting opinions. 
Finally, the scholar Beccaria (1738-1794) must be referred 
to, famous Italian jurist, follower of De Montesquieu, economist, 
advocate of leniency in matters penal, adversary of torture and 
capital punishment and a writer whose influence was to be one of 
the moving factors in penal law reform in Europe, and thus in The 
Netherlands. 
His treatise on Crime and Punishments was widely published 
in many languages, one of them being Dutch, together with Voltai-
re's Commentary (1766). Attaching greater value to certainty of 
penalties -which must be based on previously promulgated laws-
than to their severity, he proposed that crime prevention is more 
important than punishment; penalties should reflect the measure 
of damage caused to society and be proportionate to it. 
The Dutch Criminal Code clearly shows the influence of Bec-
caria' s theories. He had precursors in The Netherlands, one of 
them being Daniel Jongtys, a magistrate at Rotterdam, who opposed 
the use of the rack in penal procedure. 
Gerbenzon and Agra (42) point out that Locke's doctrine is 
echoed in the American Declaration of Independence (1776), empha-
sized in the Bills of Rights of the individual American states 
which, in turn, inspired the French De'alaration des droits de 
l'homme et du citoyen' (1789) for which the Virginia Bill of 
Rights stood model - as Georg Jellinek demonstrated in his Die 
Erklärung der Menschen und Bürgerrechte (1919). 
The Declaration, finally, became the model for the Dutch 
Proclamation of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1795), after the 
departure of the hereditary stadtholder William V to England, 
while the French troops were advancing north into The Nether-
lands. 
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The revolution that started in France, in 1789, engendered a 
similar movement in the Low Lands. The days of the French occupa-
tion had begun. 
b) The French Occupation 
The period of the French occupation lasted some 18 years. It 
was a crucial period in Dutch history for it was the period dur-
ing which the various Dutch codes were promulgated. 
The revolution in The Netherlands was a low key event with 
little or no bloodshed; its aim was getting rid of the, until 
then solidly entrenched 'establishment' of upper class families, 
who were the true rulers of the country. 
The people, assuming the name of 'patriots', inspired by the 
French philosophers, chose the doctrine of the 'sovereignty of 
the people' and a 'national assembly' was created. Within this 
body three political currents developed: the 'Unitarians', in fa-
vour of a centralized political organization of the country, the 
'Federalists' who wanted to grant the provinces autonomy in a 
number of areas, and the 'Moderates' who stayed out of this con-
troversy. 
Notwithstanding all serious disagreement in the First Nati-
onal Assembly, a draft constitution containing no less than 918 
sections (and therefore aptly called Het Dikke Boek -which trans-
lates into something like 'The Bulky Book' or 'The Fat Volume') 
was submitted to a plebiscite in 1797 but rejected by a 75% ma-
jority. This draft was based on the mandate theory. (43) 
Section III: "Man in society surrenders no 
larger portion of his natural rights than is 
absolutely indispensable for the achievement 
of the primary objectives of a 'civilian so-
ciety'". 
What were these 'primary objectives' held to be? 
Section II: "... to ensure and safeguard 
equality, freedom, personal and proprietory 
rights". 
The influence of the French philosophers was clearly demon-
strated in the following: 
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Section XVII: "All power with which the 
people entrust their representatives is 
only surrendered by proxy and is merely 
lent. Its exercise is granted only for a 
specific period of time, not as a right 
due to them but rather as a duty imposed 
upon them. Their authority ends when it 
is reclaimed by the people". 
Sofar the attempts to establish a "democratic republic had 
faltered. A second National Assembly was convened but the French 
stepped in, supported a Unitarian eoupe d'état, and ordered the 
National Assembly to formulate a constitution that left no door 
open to exertion of influence by aristocrats, anarchists, feder-
alists or partisans of the stadtholder, . 
The Batavian Republic was born (1798), the Republic of the 
Seven United Provinces died. 'The Netherlands' bacarne a nation, 
one and indivisible, governed by a Supreme College (12 members), 
ranking over a Legislature that had no right of initiative, the 
right-to propose new legislation. 
For the period of about one year the powers of this 'colle-
ge' were concentrated in one man, the 'council-pensionary' Rut-
ger Jan Schimmelpenninck (1805), governing on the basis of a new 
constitution imposed by Napoleon, who had become Emperor of the 
French in 1804. 
In 1806 the Batavian Republic was forced to sign a treaty 
with Napoleon. As a result the republic now became a kingdom and 
Napoleon sent his brother Louis Napoleon to assume the role of 
King of The Netherlands. After only four years (1810), King Louis 
not living up to the expectations of his imperial brother and 
therefore having been dismissed from his function, The Nether-
lands became a French province, completely under the control of 
and governed by prefects. Life in The Netherlands was modeled on 
French patterns. 
From the point of view of legal history, this period is of 
great importance. The Dutch Constitution and Codes were conceived 
in a flurry of drafting activities, and reflected the French Co-
des. 
The Dutch Civil Code (Burgelijk Wetboek) dates from 1804, 
reviewed and revamped in 1807 and called the Code Napoléon, that 
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is the Napoleoniic Code arranged for the Kingdom of Holland, was 
an adaptation of the French Code Civil. 
The Code de Commerce (1807) reflecting the special status of 
the merchants, recognized specialized mercantile courts (fora 
ргг гіедгаіа). Finally, the Code Pénal (1810) shows the mitigat-
ing influence of Beccaria, initiator of the 'Classic School' in 
criminal law, in its abolishment of corporal punishment and res-
traint in the application of capital punishment 
During the reign of Louis Napoleon several draft codificati-
ons were written Only two became law The Сгътъпаі Code for the 
Kingdom of Holland (1809) and The Code Napoleon adapted for the 
Kingdom of Holland (1809). These codes were replaced in 1811 by 
the original French codes (and other statutes) among which was 
the Code Penal which was to remain in force until 1886. 
The year 1813 brought along Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig. 
The son of the exiled William V, William VI, the 'Prince of Oran­
ge' , came back to The Netherlands (1813) and assumed -in 1815-
the title of William I, King of The Netherlands, ruling a newly 
formed state comprising all of the former Dutch provinces, the 
'Belgian Netherlands' and entering into a personal union with the 
Duchy of Luxembourg. 
с Separation of The Netherlands and Belgium 
Europe, soon after Napoleon's defeat, found itself in renew­
ed turmoil, caused by revolutionary trends all over the continent 
The forced union between the Dutch and the Belgian Netherlands 
appeared to have no chance of a durable existence basic differ­
ences in religious adhérences, political views, language problems 
and persistent influence of a traditionally French-oriented upper 
crust in Walloon Belgium, led to an uprising by the Belgians in 
1830. William I initiated a successful military campaign against 
the Belgians but had to withdraw after 10 days, when French mil-
itary forces appeared on the scene. 
An international conference in London, convened at William's 
initiative later in 1830, had already pronounced dissolution of 
the united kingdom before military action started. It changed its 
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decision in 1831, setting out conditions for separation which 
were more acceptable to the Dutch and after further deliberations 
The Netherlands and Belgium signed a definitive Treaty of Separ-
ation in 1839, ending up as two independent kingdoms. 
From that day forward the territory of The Netherlands has 
its present geographical delimitation -apart from some insignifi-
cant corrections afterwards- and is known as 'The Kingdom of The 
Netherlands'. 
In this paper, when comparing certain legal issues and their 
solutions, it is the contemporary law of this kingdom that is 
considered, as it has been influenced by previous systems and by 
a historical background reaching back to Roman days. On this back 
ground some brief notes may now follow. 
C. SOURCES OF DUTCH LAW 
a) Ancient Customary Law 
This does not seem to be the place for going deeply into the 
many doctrines respecting customary law. Rather, based on a pure-
ly practical approach, the discussions are centered on the manner 
in which the Dutch legislator dealt with customary law. 
Point of departure is the historical fact that the Dutch 
legislator was less influenced originally by German philosophers 
such as Von Savigny (1779-1861), founder of the Historical School 
of Jurisprudence (law originates in the national spirit, the 
spirit of the people - Volksgeist - and is developed and confirm-
ed by judicial decisions and not by the arbitrary will of a leg-
islator) or Puchta, but rather by French doctrines which recog-
nized that law is the product of legislation, the exclusive 
source of law. Later, late 1800, early 1900, the Historical and 
Sociological Schools found followers among the Dutch theorists. 
Important is the recognition that, as to substantive law, 
Dutch law has its roots in two systems: "Numerous provisions in 
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our (Dutch) Civil Code may be traced back to the Corpus Iuris of 
Justinian (527-565), several also in the compilations of Germanic 
tribal law", states Van Apeldoorn. (44) 
In The Netherlands the place assigned to customary law is 
clearly expressed in the Wet Algemene Вераігпдеп (an act dealing 
with general rules of administration). 
Section 3: "Custom does not create a right 
unless the law refers to it; 
exemplified, for instance, by the Civil Code 
Section 1375: "Contracts bind parties not 
only as to what has explicitly been agreed 
upon between them, but also to all and every 
aspect of their performance, which may, in 
view of the contract's nature, be demanded 
upon grounds of equity, custom or law". 
Presently, the doctrine that customs are a source of law in 
their own right and equivalent to positive law, appears to be 
winning adherence. In this modern view customs do not need 'rati­
fication' or recognition by the legislator. This view may lead 
to a conflict where a custom, called upon as a support for one's 
legal position, is of a derogatory nature and not merely supple­
mentary. Section 5 of the Wet Algemene Bepalingen reads 
"An act may lose its force of law, either m 
its entirety or partially, only through iater 
enactment of derogatory legislation". 
In such cases it is the judge who may, by way of 'interpret­
ation' "assign to certain provisions a purport and meaning which 
may never have entered into the mind of the legislator, or may 
even lead to an entirely opposite of that what was in his mind". 
However, such judicial interpretation would not be regarded 
as 'judicial legislation' but rather as "new customary law, paral­
lel with or opposite to positive law". (45) 
b ) Statute Law 
Broadly speaking, it may be stated that the main body of 
positive law is contained in statutes and regulations, emanating 
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from the various levels of legislation. 
In Dutch law there is no concept equivalent to the English 
concept 'common law / equity'. What the law systems in The Neth-
erlands and other continental countries have in common, are: 
their earliest roots in Germanic, Roman and Canon law. Customs 
are not held in common, not even within the boundaries of a small 
country such as The Netherlands. 
When dealing with customary law, a distinction is to be 
made between customs as a source from which, over the years, a 
more or less complete body of law emerges, whether it be eventu-
ally consolidated in the form of precedents and principles such 
as stare decisis (as in common law) or in the form of codifica-
tion (as in civil law), and customs as: customary law created in 
the court rooms of the nation through the activities of the ju-
diciary. In that sense, judge-made law, i.e. the interpretation 
and judicial sanctioning of what customs and statutes prescribe 
as legitimate conduct, belongs in the latter category. 
Ideally, legislation and administration of justice calls 
for team-work, in which representatives of either field cooperate 
and influence oneanother mutually. 
Where the legislator, aiming at codifying customary law, 
sits down at his task, he will attempt to draw into the ambit 
of his work as many potential situations as he could possibly 
and reasonably foresee, while realizing at all times that he will 
never succeed in being totally complete. Therefore he may even, 
within the statute he created, refer to customary law as a sup-
plement . 
And so it is in Dutch law: translating section 3 of the 
Wet Algemene Bepalingen -referred to above- using slightly dif-
ferent terms, the section reads: "Custom does not establish a 
right except where a statute so provides". Statutes do indeed 
point to custom as a source of right or obligation. See above: 
section 1375 of the Civil Code. Thus the legislator attempts to 
achieve a twofold purpose: extending the ambit of the legislation 
to the fullest, trying to cover as many situations as may occur 
in daily life and also keeping in tune with such changes in prac-
tice as may become manifest. 
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At the same time, legislation and customs become objects of 
scrutiny by the judiciary. Their pronouncements, reflecting what 
is held to be just, proper, equitable, in conformity with the law, 
will crystallize in patterns: the communis opinio of judges, up-
held not only for practical reasons (it makes little sense to 
write judgments that are likely to be quashed by courts above) 
but, perhaps even more so, because of the realization that such 
judgments are essentially sane and sound and reflect the thoughts 
and the input of the consciences of a multitude of judges. This 
is judicial customary law that, in turn, may after some (con-
siderable) lapse of time, 'reach the books' via the formal legis-
lator. Thus, there is a continuous and consistent interaction 
between legislator and judiciary and, again ideally, the combined 
result of their cooperative efforts should answer the question: 
"What is the 'law' in respect to a given issue?" 
The view of Prof. J. ter Heide, one of the prominent Dutch 
contemporary philosophers, that statute law carries hardly any 
more weight than that of a mere guide line ('action line') for 
the judge, appears to go to a far extreme. However, this is not 
the place to go into any further detail. Suffice it to say that 
judicial interpretation and judicial decision making result in 
judicial customary law, both in the common and civil law systems. 
We now return to the statute. 
A statute, then, is a law in the formal sense of the word: 
legislation promulgated by King and Parliament and, usually, con-
taining provisions binding upon all citizens. An enactment by a 
government of any level and setting out generally binding provi-
sions, is a law in the 'material sense of the word', that is: in 
view of its contents and the matter regulated. 
There is a hierarchy in legislation passed by the various 
levels of government: highest ranking is the Constitution, itself 
a 'formal law', followed by all other formal laws. As an aside: 
it is interesting to note that formal laws cannot be declared 
void on account of them being un-constitutional. 
Next in rank are the 'Royal Decrees' (.Algemene Maatregelen 
van Bestuur) whereby the King may set out generally binding rules 
restricted, however, to issues outside of the ambit of the crim-
inal law (all sanctions require a formal law, which must spell 
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out their nature and extent) and to issues regarding which the 
Constitution does not require a formal law. 
On a lower level are the Provincial Regulations and, still 
further down, the by-laws made by municipalities, water boards 
and suchlike rural administrations. 
Sofar we referred to statutes as the product of a country's 
internal legislation. There's a class of regulations emanating as 
a result of agreements made between autonomous states: the treat-
ies, such as for instance the Treaty of Rome (1950) regarding the 
protection of human rights and fundamental liberties, and many 
others. 
Section 67 of the Dutch Constitution provides that, under 
certain conditions, specified legislative, administrative and 
judicial powers may be transferred, by treaty, to international 
organizations; their legislation, measures of control and judici-
al decisions are binding upon the subjects of the nations that 
are parties to a treaty, and supersede national legislation, con-
trol and judicial decisions, when such treaties are self-execut-
ing. We shall leave this area of the law out of the discussions. 
c) Judge-Made Law 
No judge in The Netherlands is bound by the judgment of any 
other judge, regardless of his place in the judicial hierarchy. 
In practice, however, with the possibility always present that a 
judgment might be subjected, in highest resort, to the scrutiny 
of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) in 's-Gravenhage, the equivalent 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ottawa, another factor must be 
considered. 
Mention already has been made that, in The Netherlands too, 
judicial customary law has won its own place: certain issues are, 
over a period of time, being decided in similar ways. A 'establ-
ished jurisprudence' -in the sense of: collection of judicial de-
cesions- results in giving sanction to decisions made by the 
Courts below in comparable cases and thus in demonstrating a com-
mon opinion among the judiciary as to what is right or wrong in 
given situations. 
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Unless he has sound reasons for attempting to go against 
the tide, no practitioner -and probable no judge- will be inspir­
ed to gamble on the outcome of a case, since he knows that the 
judges in lower as well as in higher courts will keep both eyes 
open to see what the Supreme Court is likely to decide. 
There is some leeway, however. The Supreme Court will not 
deal with issues of fact, but exclusively with the question 
whether the court(s) below correctly applied relevant positive 
law, which -since 1963- includes unwritten law and general legal 
principles. The Supreme Court will not deal either with matters 
regarding tenant farmers, whose legal battles are to be fought in 
lower and highest resort before the Paahtkamer of the High Court 
of Arnhem. 
Since a law suit could, essentially, only live through two 
stages, the first resort and the appeal, m which fact situations 
as well as issues of law are considered, the decisions of the 
High Court, acting as Court of Appeal, may have a more penetrat-
ting practical influence than one might suspect, for similar 
reasons as outlined with reference to the Supreme Court. 
Regardless of all of this, the rule remains that courts be­
low are not bound by decisions of courts above. Stare аеагегз is 
not a formal tenet of Dutch law. 
De гиге every judicial decision is restricted to the case 
in which the decision was made. 
d) Academic Writing 
Although in the common law of modern times academic writing 
appears to gain in importance , and although in the far past 
Glanvil, Bracton, Blackstone and many others influenced the minds 
of judges and practitioners alike, and although their writings 
appear to have laid down the law for judges and parties -since 
they contained positive law of customary heritage- the works of 
modern writers on common law only have such authority as may be 
expressed by the rather vague term of 'persuasiveness'. Perhaps 
they could be compared with and considered to be at the same 
level with оЪгЬег сігсіа, 'asides' in common law judgments. For an 
illustration see the Sault Ste Marie decision. (45a) 
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In modern Dutch law -and the same goes for other continent-
al European countries- the same is true. No judge or practitioner 
is bound in any way by the communis opinio dootorum, although, 
here too, the influence of academic writing on the minds of the 
members of the Bench and Bar may lead to judicial customary law. 
Yet, Romans, Germanic tribes and medieval doctores have all put 
their signatures on modern civil law. The doctrine of binding 
precedent, however, never materialized in civil law, whereas in 
common law precedents, still followed, may date back to a faraway 
past, as may certain enactments nobody ever bothered to have re-
pealed. 
D. SOURCES OF AND INFLUENCES ON CIVIL LAW 
a) Source of Law 
The word 'source' in Dutch legal language is a tricky word. 
Up to the present day, there appears to always have been a very 
special concern with nomenclature, reflecting a deeprooted pen-
chant to assign a preponderant place to semantics as one of the 
by-products of legal philosophy. There is the ever present need 
to categorize, index, label certain terms, in other words: to en-
gage in theorizing with respect to the basic notions used in the 
science of establishing the fundamentals of legal thinking and 
the art of doing justice. 
The common law approach appears to be more pragmatic and 
what is deeply pondered are rather the questions regarding ap-
plicability -or the contrary- of precedents and related problems. 
The 'distinguishing' of the civil law is directed at basic 
philosophies, that may change with the times for the ars aequi et 
boni is a constantly changing art. Precedents do indeed contrib-
ute to change, but -rather than philosophies- they are purely 
practical, factual. 
Students in Dutch law are initiated in the art by the man-
datory study of Roman law and Ancient Dutch law. But, most impor-
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tant, they are to absorb what is usually labeled 'the encyclo-
paedia of law', a general instruction or all round education in 
the basics of jurisprudence -meaning rechtsgeleerdheid and not 'a 
collection of judgments' as in the Dutch sense of 'jurisprudence' 
One masterful example of such an introductory work is the 
Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandse Recht' ('Introduct-
ion to the study of Dutch Law') by Prof.Mr. L.J. van Apeldoorn, 
revised by Prof.Mr. J.CM. Leyten. 
Regarding the term 'source of law' it is explained that it 
means different things to different people: the historian, the 
sociologist, the philosopher, the positivist. 
Speaking of 'source of law' the word is taken to indicate: 
those pre-existing systems which the legislator had in mind when 
formulating a (new) enactment or, such legal systems as were the 
basis of and yielded building blocks for the construction an 
further extension of a country's positive law system. 
Sources of Dutch law in that sense were: customs, Germanic, 
Roman and Canon law and, more explicitly, the French Codes. 
b) Ancient Customary Law 
The influence of ancient customary law may perhaps best be 
demonstrated by tracing the origin of the Dutch Civil Code, par.t-
ly an imitation, partly a mere translation of the French Code 
Civil of 1804, also based on the 'Code Napoleon adapted for the 
Kingdom of Holland' (1809) and on the 'Draft of the Civil Code 
for the Kingdom of The Netherlands' (1820) 
The French Code Civil itself was based on ancient French 
law, a mixture of customary law of Germanic heritage -mostly in 
Northern France, although permeated by vulgarized Roman law- and 
written Roman law -although influenced by Germanic customary law 
in southern France. 
The Roman expeditionary forces, having subjugated all of 
France (Caesar, 50 B.C.) romanized the country and introduced 
vulgar Latin as a language and Roman law as an administrative 
system. In the 5th century A.D. Teutonic invaders took their 
place: the Visigoths, the Burgundians and the Salic Franks. 
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"The Germanic (invaders) allowed the Roman 
population of the conquered territories to 
live according to their own laws. The Visigoth 
and Burgundian kings even went a step further. 
For the benefit of their Roman subjects they 
compilated codes, collected from Roman law 
sources: the Lex Romana Visigothorum (506 A.D.) 
by King Alaric II (later entitled the Brevia-
rium Alaricianum) and the Lex Romana Burgun-
dionum (about 500 A.D.) by King Gundobad". 
"The Breviarium proved to be the most im-
portant by far. It was, later, also 'received' 
by the Romans in Burgundy and by the Roman in-
habitants of other parts of the Frankish realm." 
(46) 
Germanic and Roman elements fused and the division of the 
population, living according to either Roman or Germanic laws, 
ceased to exist. When the Frankish realm dissolved, local custom-
ary law and its inherent diversity developed, constituting a 
mixture of impure Roman and impure Germanic law. 
c) Roman Law 
Roman law became again the focus of attention in the 11th 
century, starting in Italy. Southern France received Roman law as 
early as in the 11th century. It obtained the status of ius com-
mune and was supplemented by local customary law. {Pays de droit 
écrit). In northern and central France customary law remained the 
ius commune, supplemented by Roman law (.Pays de droit coutumier). 
The main body of Roman law that survived after the Carolin-
gian Renaissance (Charlemagne) and the ensuing political turmoil, 
is private law. Feudalism and its main characteristic of decent-
tralized government and administration, reaching a high point in 
the 12th century, made place for a centralized administration, 
embodied in the persons of kings and princes (such as in France, 
England and in the German lands) or in the Municipalities of Nor-
thern Italy and Flanders) and in The Netherlands, later than 
elsewhere in Europe, in the hands of prominent local lords. 
The magister artium Irnerius (late 11th century) started 
teaching Roman law in Bologna. In word and writing, the old Roman 
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law, as available in surviving copies of the Corpus Iuris, Di-
gesta, Institutiones, Codex and Novellae, is 'restored', puri-
fied, explained, annotated, commented on and capsulized. Two of 
his followers, known as 'Legists' or 'Glossatores' reached a pos-
ition of great authority: Azzo with his Summa Codicis (about 
1320) and Accursius with his critical Glossa Ordinaria, set down 
the definitive commentaries and compilations of Roman law. Such 
was the persuasiveness of these works, that the writings of pre-
vious authors were no longer consulted: Quicquid non agnosait 
glossa, neo agnosait forum ('He who does not acknowledge the 
gloss, does not acknowledge the Court either') 
Other disciples moved to France. Known as the Ultramontani 
(13th century) and critical of the writings of Accursius and 
defenders of a liberal interpretation of texts, leaning towards 
speculation and inductive reasoning in order to arrive at a 
rounded off and complete system, they were followed somewhat la-
ter (14th century) by the Commentatores or Postglossatores who 
focused their attention more at daily practice and the formula-
tion of legal advice. (Bartolus de Sassoferrato and Baldus de 
Ubaldis). They all were the channels through which the reception 
of Roman law in Europe would move to become a historical fact. 
(47) 
d) Canon Law 
A parallel development took place with respect to Canon law 
(since 1140). Its students were iuris utriusque doctores, versed 
both in Canon and Roman law, among whom Gratianus was one of the 
greatest. 
Rome, in the earlier middle ages, was considered the centre 
of the world, its law the ius commune. The German Emperor held 
himself to be the successor to the Roman emperors: the world's 
overlord in secular matters in the same manner as the Pope of 
Rome was considered to be the world's overlord in spiritual mat-
ters. Since all people at the time were roman-catholics, the 
Pope was held to have jurisdiction in a great number of matters 
involving clerics as well as laymen. 
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This is not the kind of doctrine likely to find acceptance 
across the Channel and history showed its failing to do so. Eng-
land went its own way, rejected the unique overlordship of the 
king, even of an English king -and, later, of the Pope-, saw its 
romanists and canonists relegated to a few special fora, devel-
oped its own common law courts, educated its own practitioners, 
trained them in the Inns of Court and, out of their midst, chose 
the judges. 
In England there was no parallel to the European reception 
of Roman law and common law was to create its own specific pat-
terns. 
Out of the Roman/Canon law procedure, essentially a proce-
dure based on written documents, grew the modern civil law proce-
dure, the judge having an inquisitorial function. Rigid local law 
had no appeal when compared with the more pliable romano-canonie 
methods in the quest for justice: the aequitas aanoniaa based on 
conscience is similar to the English chancellor's equity. 
Both Roman law and Canon law were to remain influential as 
'learned law' until Napoleontic legislation replaced it formally. 
A quote from Hugo Grotius' Introduction to Dutch lurispru-
dence (1631) may illustrate how the influence of Roman and Canon 
law on Dutch law was assessed in his days: 
"Thus, where no written law, charters, 
by-laws or customary law could be found 
regarding specific issues, judges have tra-
ditionally been instructed solemnly to fol-
low their best insight based on knowledge and 
intellect. 
"But since the Roman laws, especially 
those which have been compiled in the days of 
the Emperor Justinian, have been found by. 
learned persons to be laws possessing the 
fulness of wisdom and fairness, they have 
initially been accepted as examples of wisdom 
and equitableness and later, having developed 
into customs, they were accepted as laws." 
Then he continues to state that a similar development 
occurred with respect to Canon law. 
-57-
e) Continental Civil Law 
The era of humanistic jurisprudence (early 16th century) in­
troduced new interest both in the classic sources of Roman law 
and in the old Germanic Leges Barbarorum. 
Erasmus' friend Nicolaes Everaerts (1462-1532), Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645), Viglius van Aytta (1507-1577) are only a few of the 
well known exponents of humanistic jurisprudence. 
Two main streams are visible: the mos gallious in France, 
and the тов italious in Italy (the followers of Bartolus) became 
synthetized in the 'Dutch School': humanistic-scientific research 
of the old sources, coupled with a keen insight into legal prob­
lems and their practical solutions. Parallel to the mos gallicus 
(juridical humanism) and the mos italious (bartolists and pragma-
tists) the usus modernus pandectarum came to life in Germany. 
Since the Napoleontic codes have been the patterns upon 
which the modern Dutch codes have been modeled to the point 
where the latter are either translations or adaptations, the 
sources of the French codes are in that sense also sources for 
the Dutch codes. Therefore a brief look at the law of France be­
tween 1500 and 1700 is of some interest. 
As mentioned before, in the Middle Ages southern France was 
known as the 'pays de droit écrit', where Roman law retained its 
dominance, while northern France was known as the 'pays de cou-
tumes', the contents of which are Germanic. Since the 13th cent-
ury numerous compilations of local customary law were written and 
after having been assessed as to the coherence of their contents 
and in the light of equity, were approved by the regional ruler 
or by the king. 
Their authors, being intellectuals knowledgeable of Roman 
and Canon law, introduced in their compilations ideas adopted 
from both systems and as a result, the law of contracts and the 
law of property were strongly influenced by Roman law, whereas 
matrimonial law showed the influence of Canon law. 
As a whole, however, customary law remained uncertain as a 
result of the diversity of its components, a situation that led 
to numerous law suits. 
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In or after 1454 the French kings ordered the recording of 
all customs, a massive work that took some 100 years for its in-
itial stages and after review -which usually entailed a further 
romanizing- of the work done, the 'definite' compilations known 
as the Nouveau Coutumier General by Bourdot de Richebourg result-
ed. (1724) 
The customs of southern France were in fact Roman law, sup-
plemented by statuts promulgated by the regional ruler, and by 
local customs. 
In all of France the king's Ordonnances were in force, deal-
ing primarily with matters subject to public law. Private law was 
the subject of Roman law and customs, although the king could in-
terfere and 'reform'. These ordonnances, codifications in their 
own right, were the forerunners of the Napoleontic codes. 
The Ordonnance civile pour la reformation de la justice 
(1667) preceded the Code de procedure civile; the Ordonnance sur 
la procedure criminelle (1670) was the main source of the Code 
d'instruction criminelle; the Ordonnance du commerce (1673) con-
tained mercantile law; the Ordonnance de la marine (1681) dealt 
with maritime law. 
The Coutume de Paris, which also contained case law of the 
Parliament of Paris, obtained farreaching authority as being des-
criptive of French customary law in general and as a source for 
supplementing or completing other local customs. (About 1600). 
Other influences on the Napoleontic codes are to be found in 
the works of legal writers such as Antoine Loisel (1536-1617), 
Institutes coutumibres (1607), exposing general principles found 
in many customs as a common element; François Eourjon ( ...-1751) 
Le droit commun de la France et la coutume de Paris réduits en 
principes (1720); Jean Domat (1625-1696), Les lois civiles dans 
leur ordre naturel (1649) and Robert Joseph Pothier (1699-1772), 
Pandectae lustinianae in novum ordinem digestae (1748), who also 
wrote numerous treatises on the law of contracts. 
The Dutch Joannes van der Linden (1756-1835), barrister in 
The Hague and Amsterdam, author of the Draft Civil Code 1807-1808 
translated some of Pothier's treatises: those on contracts and 
other forms of commitment (1806), on bills of exchange (1801), on 
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company law and related matters (1802) and on legacies (1803). 
His Regtsgeleert praotiaaal en koopmanshandboek (1806) carried 
the authority of legislation in the Republic of South Africa from 
1859 to 1901, together with Simon van Leeuwen's Roomsah Hollands 
recht and Hugo de Groot's Inleidínge. 
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Quid sit jus, et in quo aonsistit 
injuria, legis est definire. 
Co.Litt. 158b. 
What constitutes right, and what 
injury, it is the business of the 
law to declare. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN CANADA 
A. LEGISLATURES 
a) Distribution of Legislative Power 
1) The British North America Act. 
The relationship between the 'Dominion of Canada' and the 
British homeland is in more than one respect an unique one. 
Evolving from the status of 'one of the colonies overseas', 
where French and English colonists battled for hegemony -the Eng-
lish emerging victorious- to the status of dominion, present day 
Canada established itself as a confederation on its road to al-
most complete autonomy. 
On March 29, 1867 the British Parliament passed the British 
North America Act, proclaimed on July 1, 1867, which gave Canada 
incomplete self-government. (48) 
It is not always being realized outside of Canada, that the 
creation of 'confederated Canada' was not a historical event 
taking place on one given date and mainly the result of the pas-
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sing of the British North America Act. 
In 1867 Canada consisted of only four provinces: New Bruns-
wick, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec. Other provinces followed 
relatively soon: Manitoba joined in 1870, British Columbia in 
1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873. More than 30 years later two 
further provinces came into Confederation: Alberta and Saskatche-
wan in 1905. Newfoundland, however, became the tenth province 
only after World Y/ar II, in 1949. Consequently, Ten-Province Can-
ada is merely some 30 years old. 
In 1931 the Statute of Westminster, passed by the British 
House of Commons on December 11, gave Canada formal full sover-
eignty: full control of the Dominion's internal and external af-
fairs. The British monarchy was freely accepted as the 'symbol of 
the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations'. As a consequence Britain could no longer, as it was 
before, amend or annul any legislation promulgated in Canada, nor 
was any British law enforceable in Canada, except where such law 
had been adopted by the Canadian Parliament. 
Up to 1949 and at a time that Canada already had its own 
Supreme Court of Canada since 1875, certain cases decided in this 
highest court could be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council of Great Britain (at London). This Committee repre-
sents the King in Council; its decisions are formalized as 'Or-
ders in Council'. This appeal procedure ended in 1949. Canada, 
judicially speaking, was now completely in control of its own 
law. 
A brief look at some of the provisions of the British North 
America Act (usually referred to as the 'E.N.A. Act') may illust-
rate its importance. 
In its preamble it is said that the colonies desired to be 
'federally united into one Dominion under the (British) Crown... 
with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United 
Kingdom'. Since the British constitution is an example par excel-
lence of customary law, unwritten, the Canadian constitution is 
also largely unwritten, although the B.N.A. Act contains 147 pa-
ragraphs. 
This Act is often labeled 'the Canadian Constitution' but it 
-62-
is a constitution of sorts. Peing a Pritish Act, the British 
Parliament was in control of its contents and therefore the only 
legislator empowered to amend it and, generally, could also annul 
any other legislation passed by the Canadian Parliament. 
In 1949 the Canadian Parliament became empowered to amend 
provisions of the B.N.A. Act dealing with issues under federal 
control or jurisdiction only; issues under provincial control or 
jurisdiction were excepted. 
2. Assignment of Legislative Powers. 
By the B.N.A. Act legislative powers are distributed between 
the federal and provincial governments. Sixteen specific areas of 
law were assigned to the provinces, giving them the exclusive 
competence to legislate on topics of provincial, that is local 
and private interest, as distinguished from matters of national 
and public interest. 
Among the areas where the provinces have legislative power 
are the following: direct taxation to raise revenue for provinci-
al purposes; borrowing money on the sole credit of the province; 
establishing, maintaining and managing public and reformatory 
prisons in and for the province, hospitals, asylums, charities 
and 'eleemosynary' institutions; municipal institutions; licens-
ing shops, saloons, taverns, auction halls for raising revenue 
for provincial, local or municipal purposes; incorporation of 
companies with provincial objects; solemnisizing marriages; mat-
ters of property and civil rights; administration of justice, 
establishing provincial courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
including setting out the rules for civil procedure; imposition 
of punishment by fine3 penalty or imprisonment for the enforce-
ment of any law of the province relating to any matter under pro-
vincial jurisdiction. (B.N.A. Act, head 92) 
3) The Dispute between the Federal and 
Provincial Governments. 
As mentioned before, sections of the B.N.A. Act regulating 
matters under provincial control, can still be amended or annul-
la-
led by the British Parliament. The Federal Government has no 
power to do so, but this topic has been the hottest to be dis-
cussed over the years in conferences between the federal and pro-
vincial governments. Today it is the centre of political attenti-
on the issue being largely known as the issue of 'patriating the 
Constitution' or, in other words: eliminating any residual Brit-
ish jurisdiction in respect of any part of the B.N.A. Act. The 
final outcome of this battle between the federal and provincial 
governments may soon be known. 
This residual jurisdiction has been incorporated into the 
Act not as a result of British insistence on retaining some power 
over Canadian provincial legislation, but as a result of the fact 
that the provinces did not wish to risk the consequence of feder-
al legislative supremacy over provincial matters. 
Moreover, some provinces desire more control of matters now 
under exclusive federal control, one of these being the matter of 
control of natural resources -gas, oil, ores, other raw materi-
als- found in those provinces. 
Todate, these conferences have not led to any definite re-
sult and the federal government has indicated being prepared to 
'go it alone', that is to patriate the constitution without the 
cooperation of the provinces. Even the Supreme Court of Canada 
has, just recently, pronounced on the matter, delivering a deci-
sion that does not conclude the matter. However, this is not the 
place to go into further detail. 
4) Parliament. 
The Federal Parliament consists of two houses: an elected 
House of Commons and an appointed Senate. 
Federal enactments are known as 'federal statutes' completed 
by 'federal regulations'. 
Provincial 'Parliaments', i.e. the Provincial Legislatures, 
are uni-cameral, elected assemblies holding legislative powers. 
Their enactments are known as 'provincial statutes', complemented 
by 'provincial regulations'. 
The Sovereign of the United Kingdom is represented by the 
Governor General, appointed by the British Government at the 
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recommendation of the Government of Canada and having the formal 
executive power, but always acting exclusively on the advice of 
the Canadian Prime Minister and his cabinet. His authority encom-
passes giving royal assent to bills enacted by Parliament, sum-
moning and dissolving Parliament, and (exceptionally) commission-
ing the Prime Minister to represent the Crown for provincial 
purposes. In each province a Lieutenant-Governor is appointed. 
The Governor-General has no legislative jurisdiction. 
Based on Section 92, head 8 of the B.N.A. Act, municipali-
ties and counties hold delegated provincial legislative juris-
diction regarding topics of local interest. 
It should be kept in mind that the B.N.A. Act is not the on-
ly source of Canadian constitutional law. Other statutes and en-
actments carry this category as well, supplementing what, upon 
British example, is still largely unwritten constitutional cust-
omary law. 
b) Criminal Law 
Section 91, head 27 of the B.N.A. Act constitutes criminal 
law and procedure in criminal matters the exclusive legislative 
territory of the federal legislator, the federal government, with 
the exception of the establishment of provincial courts of crim-
inal jurisdiction. 
Section 92, head 14 assigns the administration of justice 
in the provinces, including the establishment, maintenance and 
organization of provincial courts -both of civil and criminal 
jurisdiction as well as procedure in civil matters- to the pro-
vincial legislator; head 15 does the same in respect of the im-
position of punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment for the 
purpose of enforcing provincial law. 
1) 'True' Criminal Law. 
Consequently, criminal law is an exclusive federal juris-
diction. No other legislatures have the competence to create 
criminal offences, yet, they are competent to make regulations 
and set out penalties for the purpose of enforcing them. 
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It must therefore follow that no type of offence created by prov-
incial legislatures -or by lower level administrative entities 
whose legislative powers are derived from provincial legislative 
power- is to be classified as a 'criminal offence'. 
We have used the term 'true crime'. V.'hat does it mean? 
True crimas consist of conduct that is fundamentally wrong. 
Criminal law is, in fact, applied morality and justice. The Law 
Reform Commission of Canada -more about this Commission later-
advocates that liability for true crime should be based on guilt 
resulting from mens rea only, that is: from intent or reckless-
ness only and strict or absolute liability should have no place 
here. We shall return to this topic in due course. 
Non-criminal, that is: penal or statutory or regulatory law 
prohibits certain conduct merely for reasons of convenience, to 
promote certain standards of safety or quality, to warn off 
people from negligent conduct. There, strict or absolute liabili-
ty may play a role, but where imprisonment is concerned, it 
should not. As it now stands, mens rea is hardly required regard-
less of the penalty provided. This, and related problems, are mo-
re amply discussed in Part Two. 
The term used for non-criminal, that is 'penal law' is: 
quasi-criminal law. We prefer the term 'penal law'. 
/ It should be noted that the provinces need no specific fed-
eral authorization for creating offences enforced by sanctions; 
it is a sequel of their legislative power. 
2) 'Quasi-Criminal' Law 
The reason why we prefer the term 'penal law' over the term 
'quasi-criminal law' is that the offences so indicated really 
have nothing to do with crime. Such offences prohibit 'misuses' 
while engaged in otherwise totally legitimate activities. They 
are created by statutes (hence: statutory offences) that have the 
purpose of promoting safety, quality and other standards in pre-
scribing certain methods to follow or proscribing certain ways of 
going about that legitimate business (hence: regulatory offences) 
and are, usually, promulgated by the provincial legislator (hence: 
provincial offences). Their scope and character will be discussed 
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in some more detail later. 
3) The Canadian Criminal Code 
Depending on what is to be understood by the word 'code', it 
may be said that the Canadian Criminal Code does not appear to be 
a true code. (49) 
In Black's, p.323, the following definition of the term 'co-
de' is given: 
"A complete system of positive law, scientifically 
arranged, and promulgated by legislative authority. 
"A 'code' implies compilation of existing laws, 
systematic arrangement into chapters, subheads, 
table of contents, and index, and revision to 
harmonize conflicts, supply omissions, and 
generally clarify and make complete body of laws 
designed to regulate completely subjects to which 
they relate." (50) 
Webster's definition reads: (51) 
"Systematic body of laws compiled by authority 
of the state." 
Is the Canadian Criminal Code, the first written formulation 
of Canadian criminal law, based on the common law of England, 
anything more than "a compilation or re-arrangement of disparate 
laws and regulations"? Does this Code provide judges with any 
statement of the principles of Canadian penal philosophy, the 
basic rules of criminal law, or their underlying social postul-
ates? (52) 
For instance, does this Code define an all important and 
basic notion such as mens rea, the necessary mental element in 
numerous criminal offences? The answer to all of these questions 
must be negative. 
"Canadian judges, with rare exceptions, 
considered the Code in force as simply another 
statute and treated it as such. They followed 
the best traditions of statutory interpretation 
by using and relying on the common law to con-
strue the Criminal Code and by giving some pro-
visions of the Code a purely literal interpret-
ation." (53) 
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To the civilist this may seem a confusing and illogical 
state of affairs. However, the following needs to be considered. 
4) Some Criticisms of The Code 
Although it is correct to state that all 'true' criminal law 
is federal law and that the Code is a federal statute, it does 
not follow that all true criminal law may be found in the Code 
and nowhere else. "Indeed, despite the 1955 Code, criminal pro-
visions are scattered throughout the nation's legislation...", 
states the Law Reform Commission of Canada. (54) 
Furthermore, stating that Canada is autonomous as to its 
legislative jurisdiction, does not necessarily entail that all 
criminal law is Canadian made. As a matter of fact, it is not. 
Sections 7(2) and (3) of the Code may illustrate the above. 
Section 7 deals with the Code's applicability throughout 
Canada. Section 7(2) sets out that the criminal law of England, 
in force in a province before April 1, 1955, continues in force 
in the province "except as altered, varied, modified or affected 
by this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada". This 
means that, essentially, Canadian criminal law is English crimin-
al law (that is largely unwritten common law) either in its 
original form or as it has been altered by a Canadian federal 
statute. 
Section 7(3) sets out that every rule and principle of the 
common law, relating to any justification, excuse or defence, 
continues in force except in so far as altered by or inconsistent 
with any federal act. Again: British common law, whether custom-
ary or statutory, 
Yes, the Canadian federal legislator is in control, but 
where he is silent -by not altering, varying, modifying or in any 
other way affecting the common law of England- English common law 
still applies, 
Section 8 contains a broad exception as to the applicability 
of the common law of England by stating that no one shall be con-
victed of an offence at common law, of an offence under an Act of 
the Parliament of England, or of Great Britain, or of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or under an Act or ordinan-
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ce in force before a territory became a province of Canada, but: 
"contempt of court" remained a punishable offence. 
Consequently, the definition of any criminal offence must be 
taken from the Code exclusively. Looking at potential defences, 
justifications or excuses, English common law is the only source, 
except where conflicting with Canadian statutes. 
This is the theory. Practically neither section 7 nor secti-
on 8 leave too much leeway to the implementation of English com-
mon law since the Code contains a rather complete inventory of 
'true criminal offences' and the justifications, excuses and de-
fences available. 
The aforegoing may help illustrate the statement that the 
Canadian Criminal Code is indeed not a 'complete' code in that it 
does not deal with general principles of criminal law as perceiv-
ed by the Canadian legislator, reflecting a Canadian view on the 
philosophy of law as generally accepted in Canada. Nor does the 
Code present its subject matter in a logical fashion. For exam-
ple: Part I, section 3 deals in one breath with determination of 
age, states that a postcard is a chattel, then deals with determ-
ining the value of 'valuable security', defines 'possession' and 
sexual intercourse and sets rules for service of process. 
It should be noted that this Code is in fact: two codes in 
one: combining substantive criminal law and criminal procedure in 
one code. 
5) The Law Reform Commission of Canada 
One item on the impressive list of tasks the Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada has taken on is: to produce in-depth studies of 
the criminal law in Canada, its codification, criteria it should 
meet, general principles to be embodied, the limits to the crim-
inal law to be set, the penal system and related subjects. The 
Commission's studies on strict liability merit special attention 
and will be discussed later. 
c) Legislator and Judiciary 
What is the relationship between Legislature and Judiciary? 
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From the history of the common law it may be seen that the courts 
of law played a key role in the protection of the individual's 
basic rights against intrusion by powers who might otherwise have 
retained the upper hand because of their position in society, 
their influence and wealth. 
Historically it is rather amazing that, emanating from the 
same source, the Ситга Еедгв, originally concerned with both ad­
ministration (government) and distribution of justice, two in­
stitutions should come forth, one of which, Parliament, was to 
continue the king's tasks as a ruler and the other, the Judiciary 
which was to become the instrument of justice. Both institutions 
were to find themselves continuously in opposite corners. This 
became especially clear in those periods when Parliament was 
controlled to a great degree by the ruler of the period. 
1) Statute and Case Law 
All through common law's history statute law and case law 
co-existed. It may help to define both terms. By 'statute law' 
is meant enactments of parliament or other legislators, setting 
out rules and regulations and the ways and means for their en­
forcement. 'Case law' is law as expounded by judges findings as 
to what is just in a given fact configuration and, if of suffici­
ent authority, setting a pattern for future decisions. 
Since no statute is perfect in its regulatory effectiveness, 
its implementation will give rise to conflicts which then will be 
submitted to judicial scrutiny and decision making. 
Case law deals with unwritten and written common law. The 
rules of precedent and of statutory interpretation are the guide­
lines to be followed by the judiciary. 
2) Legislator and Case Law 
Since Parliament is the supreme legislator, it is empowered 
to overrule case law, whereas judges are bound by statutes. 
3) The Statute Prevails 
Case law is the oldest component of the common law and 
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originally statutory law was -and still is- an accessory to case 
law. Nonetheless, a statute may amend, vary or annul case law. 
True to common law tradition and well aware of the courts' 
role as guardians of the law, Parliament has left quite widely 
set parameters for freedom where the judges fulfil their task of 
adapting 'legal standards to social needs'. 
Hence the identification of common law with creativeness as 
exercised by the judges in a constant search for adaptation. But 
also, where a statute leaves no room for manoeuvering, one may 
read in the motivations of a judgment that a judge, unhappy with 
the unavoidable result of his considerations, says that the stat-
ute leaves him no choice but to decide as he did or, that in or-
der to avoid decisions of the 'regrettable kind' Parliament only 
could correct the situation by changing the law. 
B. THE COURTS 
a) Judges Create Law ... 
When discussing strict liability, it will become clear that 
strict liability problems are of a kind, where at one hand the 
statutory regulations set a hard and fast rule, not concerned 
with the fault aspect of an actor's behaviour, and yet, at the 
other hand, it seems repugnant to punish a person for faultless 
conduct. 
These are situations where the judge, on the basis of his 
conscience, his sense of equity and justice, will have to create 
new solutions in order to resolve new kinds of problems until 
such time that Parliament should change the unsatisfactory, out-
dated, fossilized precepts of a past that could not even imagine 
this brand of problems for the simple reason that they had not 
been encountered ever before. Thus true judge-made law is created 
and the Sault Ste Marie case -to be discussed in detail later- is 
one of the more recent examples in the field. 
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b) ... But Are Bound 
Judges, however, are not completely free to decide as they 
see fit and proper. They are bound, as mentioned before, by stat-
utes and by certain precedents. 
A 'precedent' is a documented judgment, showing on what con-
siderations the decision was made. The ratio decidendi is the 
(legal) ground upon which the decision rests, as it determines 
the judgment, resolving the issue at hand. This ratio decidendi 
is the only binding element in a precedent. Considerations of a 
secondary nature, judicial 'asides' may show the trend in the 
judge's train of thought when pondering related or opposed reas-
onings. Known as obiter dicta they are never part of the ratio 
decidendi and, consequently, are never binding. However, depend-
ing on the overall level of authority a judge may enjoy, obiter 
dicta will be treated with more than casual respect, for today's 
obiter dicta may well become tomorrow's law: all that would take 
is a judge who would make an obiter dictum of one of his brother 
judges the ratio decidendi in the case before him. 
c) Genesis of a Judgment 
Perhaps a brief look at the genesis of a judgment may clari-
fy the points raised. 
1) the common law, civil as well as criminal, as to pro-
ceedings in a court of law, follows the methods of the 'adversary 
system'. Party opposes party whereby, in a criminal procedure, 
the Queen is represented by the 'Crown' (the prosecuting attorney) 
Both parties are considered to be at an even keel. 
2) the judge is the passive arbiter, who has no active 
role in the fact finding phase of the proceedings, apart from 
asking for clarification of representations made by a party. The 
common law judge is no inquisitor. 
3) where a jury was empaneled, it is their task to de-
cide on the truth of the facts presented by the parties; they are 
the triers and finders of fact and their verdict will announce 
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whether they hold the accused guilty or not guilty. Where there 
is no jury, it is the judge who has to be convinced either of the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. 
4) the judge's task is to implement the law as based on 
the established factual truth and to that effect he must find the 
applicable law. 
5) in order to do so, the judge must consider the proven 
facts as to their consequences in law at which point, in both 
civil and criminal law, he will form a sense of what is just and 
fair under the circumstances. His conscience will play a role and 
so will his experience, his knowledge of the law, his intuition. 
His deliberations will lead to a tentative judgment, cradled for 
the moment in his brain. 
6) he may even face a dilemma: how to do justice within 
the limits set by precedents that would bind him or by statutes, 
where he may well find that such precedents are threatening to 
block his way towards what he senses as the just decision in the 
case. Also, he will be looking for precedents that may support 
his decision in statu nascendi in which case he will 'follow' 
them. Where they go against his line of thought he may try to 
'distinguish' them for any of a number of reasons, all of them 
showing in which way the unwanted precedent refers to a fact sit-
uation or to other elements in the case that render it sufficient-
ly different from the case at bar so as not to carry authority as 
a precedent. In some cases he may find himself compelled to fol-
low a precedent where the statutory text leaves no loopholes or 
an unwanted precedent must be followed due to its level of 
authority. 
7) then the judge will formulate the ratio decidendi and 
the ensuing jugment, thereby 
8) -sometimes- formulating one or more obiter dicta. 
d) The Concept of Stare Decisis 
This concept of stare decisis is the basis upon which rests 
the doctrine of the binding precedent. It means: leave previous 
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decisions undisturbed. It is a practical rule, dating back to 
early times, perhaps to the days of the first Year Books (15th 
century), serving as a guide for the judiciary. Originally it was 
not the ratio decidendi but the ruling itself that carried 
weight. Development of the present day doctrine took hundreds of 
years, until finally in the second half of the 19th century the 
rule was established that 'judges are absolutely bound by decisi-
ons, where they cover the facts of the case before them and are 
made by a court whose authority is binding on the judge'. At that 
point in time the binding element was to be found in the ratio 
decidendi. 
Now turning to today's implementation of the rule of bind-
ing precedent, the question arises when precedents are binding. 
Two elements are involved: the territory of the court and the 
level of authority of the court. 
i/ In all of Canada: 
The Supreme Court of Canada is held to be part of the judi-
cial organization of each individual province. Hence, its judg-
ments carrying the highest authority in the land, are binding 
on all courts below in all of Canada. 
The question may be raised whether the Supreme Court of 
Canada is bound by its own decisions. This matter appears to be 
(formally) unresolved. In 1949, when Canada became 'master of 
its own law', the Supreme Court of Canada assumed the role of 
highest court in Canada, thereby replacing the British Privy 
Council which, up to that point in time, had the final juris-
diction. The Privy Council, however, is an advisory body and not 
a judicial tribunal, advising Her Majesty with respect to the 
final decision in a case at hand, and Her Majesty 'could not ad-
mit to be bound'. 
The S.C.C, is not held to be bound by any Canadian statute 
and, consequently, is perfectly free to depart from its own pre-
vious decisions. Practically, probably in the interest of cert-
ainty and predictability of the law, the S.C.C, will follow its 
own decisions unless it has reasons and grounds to distinguish a 
case. 
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ii/ Within the Territory of a Province: 
Within each province decisions of higher courts are binding 
on all courts below. 
Also, earlier decisions in the same court or in courts of 
the same level, are binding upon judges deciding new cases. 
Moreover, where in a superior court cases may be heard 
either by a single judge or by a full bench, the decision of the 
single judge does not bind his brothers of the same court. 
In all other situations precedents do not bind a judge but 
may be 'persuasive', that is: have such merits as a decision re-
garding a comparable case, that judges may be inspired to follow 
it, either entirely or with such amendments as they may wish to 
make. 
As a result: a decision in a Court of Appeal in one province 
does not even bind the lowest court in another province, whereas 
a decision made in that lower court may be so brilliantly con-
ceived as to become persuasive to any higher court. 
Should a court base its decision on more than one reason, 
then all of these reasons are to be considered rationes decidendi 
and will all be binding in situations where a single ratio would 
bind. Here slumbers a problem: judges may come to the same de-
cision following different, maybe even contradictory reasons. Are 
all of such contradictory reasons binding? This matter seems to 
remain unsettled. 
Finally, where in a recent decision a precedent has been 
overruled, future decisions will be made on the newly-made rule 
(if and when binding). The outcome of earlier cases, decided on 
the overruled precedent, does not change the relationship between 
those parties then affected. In other words, one cannot reel back 
the situation and seek a new decision on the ground that 'the law 
has changed' and now would lead to a different decision. 
e) Statutes, though Accessory, are Binding 
Statutes are always binding: they embody the expression of 
what the supreme legislator. Parliament, representing the people, 
have decided to enact as the law of the land. As such, statutes 
bind the courts. 
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1) However, judicial decisions are not based on the text 
of the statute as such, but on prior decisions proclaiming a giv-
en statutory rule applicable to a comparable fact situation. 
2) Where doubts as to the applicability of a statutory 
provision should arise, the art of statutory interpretation 
comes into play, following a set of rules, not necessarily all 
clear and easy to follow. The legislator is assumed to be saying 
what he meant to say. In other words, the literal understanding 
of the statute text takes precedence where doubt should exist as 
to various meanings of a term or terms used. 
Preparatory discussions in Parliament of a statute-to-be do 
not play any role as a guide for interpretation as may be the 
case in civil law countries. The 'spirit of the law', or its 'in-
tention' are no guidelines either. 
There is a definite tendency to apply a restrictive rather 
than an expansive interpretation of a statute. The reason appears 
to be that as of olden days the statute was seen as a supplement-
al tool for doing justice, an auxiliary to the unwritten common 
law. The courts were leery of Parliament's rising influence, 
seemingly intruding upon the judge's privilege to innovate, to 
protect the individual against too much interference by govern-
ments with private rights, and to make law as well as to clarify 
it. In modern days Parliament will interfere with the judiciary 
as little as possible. This could change, however, anytime if 
Parliament should so decide. 
Judex est lex loquens. 
7 Coke, 4a 
A judge Is the law speaking. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE JUDICIARY 
A, OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION 
For the purpose of sketching the organization of the Judici-
ary in Canada, the actual situation in the Province of Ontario is 
described. The other provinces have a largely similar judicial 
organization, althoug comparable courts may be known by different 
names. Broadly speaking, the Canadian judicial organization and 
the procedures followed are based on the English rules of 1875 as 
amended and extended since then. Only such courts as may be 
required to deal with strict liability issues are mentioned. 
a) The Supreme Court of Canada 
This court has been the highest appeal court in Canada since 
1933 -in criminal cases- and since 1949 -in civil cases. 
Such appeals brought from cases heard in the Province of 
Quebec follow Quebec civil law if they are civil cases. Criminal 
cases, however, follow common law, since criminal law is an ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction. 
Some categories of cases, covered by its jurisdiction, in-
volve claims against The Crown in right of Canada and issues such 
as copy right, industrial design, trade marks and matters of in-
ternal revenue. 
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b) The Courts Below 
Discussing the 'courts below' the Supreme Court of Canada, 
distinction is made between courts with civil and courts with 
criminal jurisdiction. (Ontario) 
1) Courts with civil jurisdiction 
i/ the Supreme Court of Ontario (S.C.O.) 
Within this court are three distinct courts: 
the Court of Appeal: the highest appeal court within the 
province; 
the High Court of Justice: the trial division of the S.C.O. 
and usually called: 'The Supreme Court', having general 
jurisdiction in all civil matters, and 
the Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice: mainly an 
appeal court that may also hear applications for judicial 
review. 
ii/ County and District Courts 
There is one such court for each county and district 
in Ontario. Generally their jurisdiction includes cases 
where the amount in dispute is less than $7,500. 
iii/ Small Claims Courts 
These are the courts of the lowest level in which 
cases are heard with a monetary limit of $1,000. They pro-
vide a less formal and less expensive way to obtain justice 
in relatively small issues. Parties may plead their own 
cases. In practice, however, the road towards a judgment 
does not allow for too much speed, since cases have been 
filed in great numbers, creating far too often serious back-
lags. 
2) Courts with criminal jurisdiction 
As mentioned before, criminal law is enacted by Parliament 
and set out in the Criminal Code and other federal statutes. If 
we should reserve the term 'criminal law' to indicate only the 
law regarding 'real crime', excluding all other offences and if 
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we then would use the term 'penal law' in order to refer to law 
regarding all other offences, namely 'regulatory', 'statutory' or 
'provincial' offences, the following would apply: 
Criminal law is a federal issue and the exclusive jurisdict-
ion of the federal Parliament. It deals with 'true crime'. Parli-
ament may also create penal law, not to be found in the Code but 
in separate federal statutes. Such offences would not be 'crimes' 
but 'penal offences'. 
Penal laws may also be enacted by the provinces and, by del-
egation, by lower administrative entities. Again, they can only 
create offences. 
As a consequence: criminal law is in force in the entire 
country. Penal law promulgated by the federal Parliament is like-
wise enforceable in all of Canada. Penal law enacted by a provin-
ce has no force beyond that province's borders and comparable is-
sues may be regulated in different manners in different provin-
ces. Quebec creates its own penal law, but the criminal law is 
in force in Quebec too. 
Administration of criminal and penal law, however, is in 
the hands of courts established not by the federal Government, 
but by the provinces. Thus, the following courts deal with 
crimes and offences: 
i/ the Supreme Court of Canada as highest appeal resort. 
ii/ the High Court of Justice (Ontario) may try any in-
dictable offence (serious criminal offences about 
which more is to be said) such as criminal negligence, man-
slaughter, murder, rape. 
iii/ the Provincial Courts, formerly the Magistrate's or 
Police Courts, have two divisions: a Criminal Divi-
sion and a Family Division. The Criminal Division may try 
nearly all offences created by federal legislation (crimes) 
and all offences set out in provincial statutes. 
iv/ the Provincial Offences Court. 
This recently established court merits to be discus-
sed in some more detail. It represents a new approach. 
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3) A new approach: from 'accused' to 'defendant' 
With respect to the provincial offences a new Act has been 
created by the Legislature of the Province of Ontario, the Pro-
vincial Offences Aatt 197 9. The text of this Act was published 
by the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, in a brochure 
which also contains an introduction to the Act and a message from 
the Attorney General, from which we quote te following: 
"Many people have found the procedure which 
governs the prosecution of provincial offences 
confusing, expensive, time-consuming, and much 
too complex for the seriousness of these offen-
ces". 
Therefore this Act was passed in order to: 
"...simplify previous practices, eliminate 
unnecessary technicalities, enhance basic 
rights and protections, and remove the obstacle 
of delay from the conduct of legal proceedings". 
This Act deals with 'minor offences against provincial laws, 
which are not in any real sense criminal acts...'. 
Provincial laws are intended to regulate legitimate and 
necessary activities in the public interest, not to punish crim-
inal or immoral acts. Essentially, the Act is concerned with 
'material delicts', contraventions or violations, that is: mainly 
with strict responsibility offences of the penal strain. 
Even in provincial offences, however, there is a diversity 
in the relative gravity of offences as may be shown by pointing 
out that 'penalties range from a few dollars to terms of impris-
onment of up to five years". This is not just a small matter in 
view of the odium attached to getting a criminal record. About 
90% of the offences referred to, however, are minor infractions, 
the highest fine for which is under $300. The remaining 10% are 
of a more serious nature and involve issues related to serious 
driving offences, or offences in respect of legislation regarding 
protection of the environment, consumer protection, construction 
safety and trading in securities. 
This Act is in fact a provincial mini-code of Penal Proce-
-80-
dure and, sometime in 1981 -or in certain cases earlier with ap-
proval of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, when a municipality 
should so legislate by by-law- will also become applicable to of-
fences created by Ontario municipalities. 
The Act replaces the Summary Convictions Act (Ch.450, R.S.O. 
1970) and the Summary Convictions Amendment Act (Ch.10. R.S.O. 
1971). 
As a consequence, the distinction of offences in 'summary 
conviction offences' and 'indictable offences' still stands. One 
change consists in the creation of a special forum which is to 
deal with summary conviction offences: the Provincial Offences 
Court. The scene of its activities is physically removed from the 
surroundings of the criminal courts. 
All proceedings are simplified, some interesting changes in-
corporated. For instance: a person charged with a provincial of-
fence is no longer identified as 'the accused' but as 'the defen-
dant'. "This change in terminology" -says the brochure- "reflects 
the move away from criminal procedure towards a new procedure 
which more closely resembles civil procedure". The traditional 
summons may be replaced, in a number of situations, by an 'offen-
ce notice'. A defendant may appear with or without legal repres-
entation by an agent or lawyer. 
Section 2 of the Act formulates its purposes as follows: 
"2. - (1) The purpose of this Act is to 
replace the summary conviction procedure for 
the prosecution of provincial offences, including 
the provisions adopted by reference to the 
Criminal Code (Canada) with a new procedure that 
reflects the distinction between provincial of-
fences and criminal offences". 
So far, so good... but practice will have to show whether 
the Act will achieve its goals: simplifying procedure, de-con-
gesting the overloaded court-rooms, cutting down the present ex-
asperating delays, removing the stigma of criminality from merely 
regulatory offences and render more efficient the collection of 
fines without ressorting to the alternative of a prison term. 
It also just might bring the layman closer to understanding 
the law-in-action, divorced from rituals and complexities beyond 
his grasp. 
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Mos retinendus est fidelissimae 
ve tus tat is. 
4 Coke, 78 
A custom of the truest antiquity 
is to be retained. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOURCES OF CANADIAN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
A, THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE 
a) Historical Notes 
It may be of some interest to enlarge on remarks made previ-
ously. 
When the English settlers started to organize their life 
style in the new homeland, Canada, it was not surprising that 
they continued to base the relationships between individuals, and 
between individuals and society on traditional English common law 
practices and procedures the English common law, consisting 
largely of a multitude of judicial precedents and a restricted 
number of written statutes. 
A new environment, new situations, new problems demanded new 
solutions and slowly the English common law was adapted, Canadi-
anized to some degree and gained its own 'local' character. 
Criminal law followed this trend, parting ways in the sense 
that substantive criminal law became distinct from English crim-
inal law, as well as in the sense that Canada achieved what Eng-
land did not until the present day codification, of a sort, of 
Canadian substantive and procedural law. 
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In England Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), philosopher and jur-
ist, advocated codification of the criminal law, followed by 
Leslie Stephen (1832-1904) who found himself inspired by studies 
of the English Law Reform Commission (1838). However, an English 
Criminal Code never emerged. 
Based on Stephen's studies, the first Canadian Criminal Code 
incorporating scattered criminal statutes, was drawn in 1893, to 
remain virtually unchanged by revisions in 1906 and 1927. 
In 1955 a more incisive revision took place, resulting in a 
reduced number of sections (from 1100 to 753), which restated of-
fences more clearly and modified a number of provisions. 
An example 
"The definition of Section 247 of the 1893 
Code had seemed to make civil negligence 
punishable as a criminal offence. Referring to 
the rule stated by Lord Hewart m Pex v. Bate-
wan, the Commission adapted the definition 
found in section 191 of the 1955 Code and added 
sections 192 and 193 on criminal negligence 
causing death or bodily harm". 
- Note that these sections are now numbered: 
s. 202, 203 and 204.- (55) 
b) English Criminal Law still in Force in Canada? 
We have already touched, in passing, upon this question.The 
changes of 1955 also had the effect that all 'common law offences' 
were abolished except 'contempt of court', a rather indistinct 
offence committed where a party before a court fails to comply 
with a superior court order or does anything that insults or in-
dicates resistance to the court or its judges and, generally, any 
conduct that is likely to prejudice the fair trial of an accused 
person. (56) 
One of the consequences of the 1955 revision was that Cana-
dians can only be found guilty of an offence included in an Act 
of Parliament. Courts could no longer 'create' offences. 
Externally in its formulation of criminal law provisions 
Canada was now its own master. This does not mean, however, that 
-at least in theory- English criminal law had completely ceased 
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to apply. 
English criminal law would still be applicable where a provisi-
on does not conflict with the Code or other federal statute or 
where Canadian statutes provide no regulation. Thus, general 
principles and the rules regarding defences, excuses and justi-
fications -as in force in 1955- (see section 7 of the Code) are 
still in force. 
"It follows that where statutes in Canada 
are silent on these matters, common law con-
tinues to apply. In point of fact, section 7 
takes in not only English common law but Eng-
lish statutes as well. However, as England has 
little or no legislation in many areas of 
criminal law, section 7 refers mainly to the 
case law of England". (57) 
Like any other areas of law, Canadian criminal law is in 
motion. Further amendments to the Code have been made and will 
be made in the future. 
c) Organization of the Code 
Much criticism has been leveled at the internal organization 
-or rather, lack of it- of the Canadian Crimnal Code. 
Containing 25 'Parts', encompassing in excess of 770 secti-
ons, the first eleven Parts (425 sections) deal with substantive 
criminal law. The remaining fourteen parts deal with criminal 
procedure. 
Definitions of basic notions are spread out over the entire 
code. Some are of a general nature, applicable throughout the 
code (s, 2) others appear to be restricted to certain specific 
parts, most of which start with a section providing definitions, 
(Exception: Parts 1, 2, 11-13, 15, 17, 19, 22-23, 25). 
Some are specific, for instance: 
Sec tion 2 : 
"'Day' means the period between six o'clock 
in the forenoon and nine o'clock in the after-
noon of the same day". 
Others do not define in the proper sense of the word but in-
dicate extensions of a term that appears to be of general 
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knowledge : 
Section 2: 
"'bank-note' includes any negotiable instrum-
ent (a) issued by or on behalf of a person car-
rying on the business of banking in or out of 
Canada, (b) issued under the authority of the 
Parliament of Canada or under lawful authority 
of the government of a state other than Canada, 
intended to be used as money or as the equival-
ent of money, immediately upon issue or at some 
time subsequent thereto, and includes bankbills 
and bank post bills;" 
Some are framed in a language that requires a considerable 
degree of initiation in order to be understood and may cause some 
confusion in the mind of anyone else: 
Section 3 (5): 
"Where an offence that is dealt with in 
this Act relates to a subject that is dealt 
with in another Act, the words and expressi-
ons used in this Act with respect to that 
offence have, subject to this Act, the meaning 
assigned to them in the other Act." 
Other criticisms as to the contents of the Code will be re-
ferred to later, where their relevance to strict liability offen-
ces will be discussed. 
Generally it is said that the Code lacks logic and cohesion. 
A variety of offences, showing no common factor that would, for 
instance, link the description of the objective elements of these 
offences together, is lodged under Part IV. This part contains 
sexual offences such as rape, seduction, incest, offences to cor-
rupt morals (s.159) followed by procedural provisions (s.160); 
from disorderly conduct by indecent acts it moves to loitering 
and obstructing officiating clergymen, vagrancy, but also 
spreading false news. 
Much work is presently done by the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada -referred to earlier- in reviewing and, indeed, re-writing 
the entire Code. This is an undertaking which may have a strong 
impact, among many other things, upon legislation related to the 
area of strict liability offences. 
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d) Quasi-Criminal Offences 
We have already suggested that the term 'quasi-criminal' is 
not a very fortunate choice where reference is being made to of­
fences that are definitely not criminal offences, but are said to 
be offences 'in the nature of criminal offences'. They were assum­
ed to be of that nature since they were prosecuted in the same 
manner, following the same general modus procedendi, as if they 
were, indeed, criminal offences. The 'nature' of the conduct in­
volved, is not criminal in any way. 
In an attempt to distinguish this class of offences from 
criminal offences, it was said that they refer to mala ртокгЪгЬа. 
Crimes, however, are also mala, definitely ргокгЬгіа. 
Referring to what was said about the 'provincial offences', 
we do not think we need the term 'quasi-criminal offences' and 
therefore shall not use it any further. 
More on the substance of the provincial offences will be 
said later on. (58) 
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MENS REA 
(90, 108) 
I 
INTENT 
(106) 
DESIRE and/or 
FORESIGHT of CERTAINTY 
as to CONSEQUENCE 
General Spec ific 
(120) 
I 
CONSEQUENCE 
encompassing 
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (121) 
and 
WILFUL BLINDNESS (118) 
r (120, 
RECKLESSNESS 23 2; 
(conscious risk taking) 
FORESIGHT of 
PROBABILITY 
(in various degrees) 
as to : 
— ' 1 — 
SURROUNDING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
also known as 
ADVERTENT NEGLIGENCE 
(120, 222) 
cf.-
OPZET als: 
- OOGMERK 
- NOODZAKELIJKHEIDS-
- ZEKZRHEIDS-
- WAARSCHIJNLIJKHEIDS-
BEWUSTZIJN 
OPZET als 
MOGE LIJ Kli EID SBE WVSTZIJN 
(The figures indicate the pages 
where the topic is dealt with.) 
Omnis comparatio Claudicat. 
No comparison is perfect. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BASIC NOTIONS 
A, SEMANTICS 
It appears to be useful to discuss some of the relevant 
common law terms as a point of departure in dealing with the 
criminal law of Canada. Mens vea and actus reus will be covered 
in more detail in Chapter Eight. This preliminary introduction 
will be closed off by a short discussion of the Principle of Leg-
ality. 
Actus reus and mens rea indicate the objective and subject-
ive elements of the offence. We shall refer to the various forms 
of partyship and identify their counterparts in Dutch criminal 
law. 
a) The Forbidden Conduct: Actus Reus 
Criminal law is concerned with human conduct that is repre-
hensible in the eyes of the law and therefore prohibited. When 
the legislator formulates the specification of an offence, that 
is: defines the offence, he is dealing with the task of expres-
sing two of its aspects which, together, establish all of the 
constitutive elements or ingredients, external and internal, of 
the offence. 
The external ingredients consist of a full description of a 
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particular type of human conduct the law seeks to repress, built 
upon the assumption that the actor has no justification or excuse 
or, in other words: that he has no defence. This description pro-
vides a definition of the actus reus, that is: conduct that on 
these grounds gives rise to responsibility and indebtedness to-
wards society. 
The internal ingredient refers to the mental element that, 
generally, must be present and must relate to the external ingre-
dients. An exception is the group of offences of strict or absol-
ute liability, to which we shall return later in full detail. The 
internal ingredients describe the form in which mens rea may be 
present. 
b) The Mental Element: Mens Rea 
Mens rea may be present either in the form of criminal in-
tent or of recklessness. 
Not all forbidden conduct requires mens rea. In many instan-
ces the mere presence of legal fault, that is: of negligence, 
suffices. In situations of strict liability and responsibility 
for conduct by other parties (vicarious liability) negligence is 
usually not even required. Both categories constitute exceptions 
to the adage 'actus non faoit reum nisi mens sit rea'. (59) 
These topics will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Eight. 
c) Commission 
Commission is the voluntary performanòe -while being in a 
state of consciousness- of certain conduct prohibited by law, in 
view of the harm such conduct causes (for instance 'homicide') or 
of the mischievous tendency it demonstrates (for instance: 'for-
gery'). In this context: 'words' (as where 'libel' is involved) 
or 'possession' (for instance: of narcotic drugs) may be crimin-
ally relevant 'acts' or 'conduct'. 
-90-
d) Omission 
'Conduct' encompasses not only 'acts' (commissions) but also 
omissions. This is the reason why the term 'conduct' is preferred 
to the term 'act'. Generally, either a commission or an omission 
is required before a criminal law provision may become operation-
al. 
Omission is non-performance where performance is required by 
law. It is only the neglect to perform a legal duty that is crim-
inally relevant and leads to liability. 
Usually, omissions are categorized under two headings: 'real' 
omissions and 'commissions by omission'. 
Real omissions may be committed intentionally where they are 
the result of a decision 'not to act' where action is indicated, 
or in a state of being aware that 'one is not acting as one 
should'. 
Commissions by omission (the oneigenlijke omissiedeliaten of 
Dutch criminal law) create consequences as a result of a faillure 
act that, itself, is usually caused by negligence. The actor is 
punishable for not fulfilling his (entire) duty and/or for not 
having had the diligence to appreciate what his duty entailed. 
e) Partyship 
1 ) The Direct Participant 
The 'direct participant' is the actor described in section 
21(l)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code: the person who actually 
commits the offence: 
S.21(l)(a): 
"Every one is a party to an offence who 
(a) actually commits it ... 
Section 21(2) merits special attention as it is heavily 
loaded with consequences related to positions of strict liability. 
This section reads: 
S.21(2): 
"Where two or more persons form an intention 
in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and 
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to assist each other therein and any one 
of them, in carrying out the common purpose, 
commits an offence, each of them who knew or 
ought to have known that the commission of 
the offence would be a probable consequence 
of carrying out the common purpose is a party 
to that offence." 
The 'direct participant' is the 'principal in the first de-
gree' -as English criminal law classifies him- and the pleger in 
Dutch law. 
2• The Indirect Participant 
i) Operating through an Instrumental Person 
The 'indirect participant' operates through the instrument 
of an irresponsible party(an insane person or an infant) or of 
an innocent party (a person acting under a reasonable and justi-
fied mistake). The intermediate principal -as he is called- is 
solely liable. He is the doen pleger of Dutch law. 
ii) Aiders and Abettors 
Section 21(l)(b) states that other parties to the offence 
are those who do anything or omit to do anything for the purpose 
of aiding any person to commit that offence and section 21(1)(c) 
includes any person as a party to an offence who abets any person 
in committing it. 
What is 'aiding'? What is 'abetting'? The Code does not pro-
vide any definitions. Both terms are coming close to being syn-
onyms and usually they are charged as a pair. 
Glanville Williams (60) states that 
"... a person is guilty of aiding and abetting 
if he is either (a) a conspirator who is 
present at the time of the crime, whether or 
not he in fact assists, or (b) anyone who 
knowingly assists or encourages at the time 
of the crime, whether a conspirator or not 
and whether present or not." 
He then goes on to say: 
"Some authorities require every abettor to be 
'present', but they construe the word widely. 
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Thus the Draft Code of 18A3 defined it as 
'near enough to help, or to encourage with 
the expectation of help." 
The distinction between aiding and abetting is not easy to 
formulate. 
"'Abets' means to encourage and while it is 
common to speak of 'aiding and abetting', 
the two concepts are not the same and either 
activity constitutes a sufficient basis of 
liability." (61) 
Similarly in R. v. Curran (1977), 38 C.C.C. 
(2d) 151. 
However : 
'Abet': "... to command, procure or counsel, 
encourage, induce or assist (the principal) 
to commit (an offence)." (62) 
and 
"... to facilitate ... promote ... or help 
in advancing or bringing about (the commission 
of an offence)" (63) 
From the above it would appear that the 'aider' is the mede-
pl-iahtige of Sr. , art.48, 1 ; the 'abettor' is the medepliohtige 
of art.48, 2 . The parallel does not seem to be perfect. 
iii) Counsellors 
Aiders and abettors, in their facilitation of the commission 
of an offence, may operate through influencing the mind of an-
other. So does the counsellor. 
'To counsel' usually means: the act of a person who, while 
not actually committing the offence, by his will contributed to 
it or procured it to be done. (64) 
How does a person contribute? Fitzpatrick C.J. in Brousseau 
v. Regina stated:(65) 
"I construe 'counsel' used in collocation 
with 'procure' to mean 'advise' or 'recommend'.." 
'To counsel' then appears to refer to two distinct offences, 
one indicating shared liability as in partyship by 'counselling', 
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the other indicating specific liability on its own merits: the 
'inchoate' offence of counselling. (See below). Partyship by 
counselling is a preparatory conduct. 
The Code refers to counselling in section 22 which reads: 
"22(1): Where a person counsels or procures 
another person to an offence and that other 
person is afterwards a party to an offence, 
the person who counselled or procured is a 
party to that offence, notwithstanding that 
the offence was committed in a way different 
from that which was counselled or procured." 
"22(2): Every one who counsels or procures 
another person to be a party to an offence 
is a party to every offence that the other 
commits in consequence of the counselling 
or procuring that the person who counselled 
or procured knew or ought to have known was 
likely to be committed in consequence of the 
counselling or procuring." 
In Dutch law, Sr., art 47, 2° deals with uitlokking which 
appears to be nearly analogous to 'counselling' with the follow-
ing distinctions: 
Uitlokking is only punishable if one of the means cited in 
Sr., art.47, 2 was used: 
"Punishable as perpetrators of an offence are 
those 
2° - who through gifts, promises, abuse of 
authority, violence, threats or deceit or 
through procurement of opportunity, means 
or information, intentionally provoke the 
commission of an offence." 
HSR (66) point out that the emphasis is on the offence rath-
er than on the actor and set out the following four conditions 
for establishing a punishable uitlokking : 
the intention to incite or induce another person to the 
commission of an act forbidden by law through the use of 
any of a limited set of 'means'; 
as a consequence thereof the other person's decision so 
to act must have been caused (psychological causation); 
the other person, in order to carry out the resulting 
plan to act, must have committed the act or at least a 
punishable attempt; 
the party so induced and acting must, as a consequence 
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of his activity, himself be criminally accountable; 
otherwise the instigator would be an intermediate prin-
cipal. 
It would therefore appear that the Dutch equivalent of the 
counsellor is the uit lokker, although in Dutch law the perpetrat-
or must be, himself, criminally liable. 
It will be noted that certain of the means mentioned in Sr., 
art.47, 2 -procurement of opportunity, means or information-
could also qualify the act of 'abetting'. 
Finally it must be said that counselling, aiding and abet-
ting do not require a legally or physically capable participant. 
"One may physically be incapable of committing 
a crime and yet guilty of it through the act 
of another who is capable, and whose act is the 
act of both, and why not equally so where there 
is legal incapacity?" (67) 
Aiders, abettors, counsellors are 'accessories before the 
fact'; to be liable they need not be bodily present or assisting 
when the offence is being committed. 
3. Co-operation After Completion of an Offence 
The 'accessory after the fact' is not a party to the commis-
sion of an offence by the principal. As 'accessory after the fact' 
would qualify a person who "knowing that a person has been a 
party to an offence, receives, comforts or assists him for the 
purpose of enabling him to escape" and "may be indicted, whether 
or not the principal or any other party to the offence has been 
indicted or convicted or is not amenable to justice." (C.C.s. 
521). 
Hiding an offender in order to help him avoid apprehension, 
supporting his false alibi in an effort to help him escape (68) 
are typical examples. 
An offence of the same class is 'possession of property ob-
tained by crime' (69) with an inherent possibility in case of 
'recent possession' for the possessor to be also convicted of an-
other offence, for instance, theft, by inference that he obtained 
the goods found in his possession through such offence. 
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Being an 'accessory after the fact' constitutes a separate 
offence. 
Comparable situations in Dutch criminal law come under the 
heading 'begunstiging' ('furtherance') but encompass only a lim-
ited number of cases such as referred to in ST., art. 189 -which 
is roughly identical to C.C.s.23(1)-, Sr., art.416 (intentionally 
'buying, renting, selling etc. anything obtained by a criminal 
of f enee) (comparable to C.C, s.312), or assisting a prisoner at 
prison breach (C.C, s.132(b)) and a number of offences known as 
'verspreidingsdelicten ', that is to say· offences related to dis-
tribution to the public of certain publications, texts or pict-
ures, of a nature insulting to certain persons in authority or to 
certain classes of persons, or likely to incite the public to 
revolutionary acts such as noting. {Cf. C.C, s.65). 
f. Inchoate Offences 
The term 'inchoate offences' indicates a class of offences 
that never reached completion. They may, however, lead to the 
complete performance of an offence and, on that ground, result in 
partyship. 
Where the offence 'aimed at' does not mature into completion 
the inchoate offence remains punishable on its own merits. 
The main inchoate offences are 'incitement', 'counselling' 
and 'attempt', all forming part of the introductory stage of some 
other offence, namely: the offence incited or counselled to, or 
attempted. 
1. Incitement (Samenspanning) 
To 'incite' is: to provoke, urge, instigate, persuade, move 
a person to commit an offence. As such it would not seem to be 
too distinct from counselling: contributing to another's criminal 
conduct by influencing his will or by procuring, that is causing 
certain conduct to materialize. It also comes close to conspiring. 
Glanville Williams (70) points out that "every act of incit-
ement is also an attempted conspiracy... an incitée who agrees to 
-96-
act becomes immediately guilty of conspiracy." 
As long as the inciter thinks that the crime contemplated is 
possible, he is liable, regardless whether the crime is possible 
at all or, at least, impossible at the time the incitement took 
place. 
Inciting includes counselling, ordering, giving advice re­
garding an offence which, itself, for some reason remains unper­
formed. 
Incitement and conspiracy are closely related. Conspiracy is 
an agreement to commit an offence, resulting in concurrence of 
intent to act 'in concert' with respect to some ulterior offence. 
It is immaterial whether the conspirators "... may repent and 
stop, or may have no opportunity, or may be prevented, or may 
fail. Nevertheless the crime is complete it was completed when 
they agreed." (71) 
Conspiracy is punishable either in general (C.C ,s.423(l)(d) 
or in some qualified forms conspiracy to commit murder (subs, a) 
or to prosecute a person for an alleged offence (subs, b), to in­
duce a woman to commit adultery or fornication (subs. c). 
C.C, s. 423(2) refers to conspiracy in order to effect an 
unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. 
"A conspiracy consists not merely in the 
intention of two or more, but in the agreement 
of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do 
a lawful act by unlawful means." 
(See: Muloahy v. The Queen) (72) 
"It is, of course, essential that the con­
spirators have the intention to agree and 
this agreement must be complete... also.. 
there must exist an intention to put the 
common design into effect." 
(See: R. v. О'Вггеп) (73) 
The Dutch equivalent is 'samenspanmng '. The Dutch Code sets 
out (art. 80) that "conspiracy exists as soon as two or more per­
sons have agreed to commit the criminal offence." 
Here, too, conspiracy is considered a preparatory act. 
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2. Counselling (Цъііоккъпд) 
Again, like conspiracy, counselling may be punishable either 
in general or as a specific offence 
C C , S.422 makes counselling an offence on its own merits 
if the offence is not committed, the counsellor may still be con­
victed and punished as one would be attempting to commit that of­
fence. C C , S.224 puts counselling to commit suicide m a class 
apart. 
In Dutch law, 'counselling' is the offence of Sr., art.42,2 
-игііоккгпд-. 
3. Criminal Attempt (Родгпд) 
The Canadian Criminal Code defines 'attempt' in s.24 as fol­
lows 
"24(1) Every one who, having an intent to 
commit an offence, does or omits to do anything 
for the purpose of carrying out his intention 
is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence 
whether or not it was possible under the 
circumstances to commit the offence." 
"24(2) The question whether an act or 
omission by a person who has an intent to commit 
an offence is or is not mere preparation to 
commit the offence, and too remote to constitute 
an attempt to commit the offence, is a question 
of law." 
The cardinal question is what is the correct, objective 
identification of the conduct constituting an attempt' In other 
words what are criminally relevant characteristics9 
Glanville Williams sets out four elements (74) 
i) the conduct must be sufficiently proximate to the crime 
attempted 
As to proximity, various theories have been formulated, 
none of them generally accepted Thus the 'proximity rule' 
stating that mere preparation is not enough, or the 'equi­
vocality rule or theory of proximity proposing that "an act 
is proximate .. only if it indicates beyond reasonable doubt 
what is the end towards it was directed" (75), a theory that 
has been rejected in Canada. (76) 
Proximity is an issue left to the judge for decision. 
n ) The conduct must aim towards a crime, not towards non-
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criminal conduct. 
iii) The crime intended needs not be possible. 
iv) Whether the person attempting a crime must be present 
in person, is unsettled in English law. 
We shall leave this topic but not before having briefly con-
sidered some aspects of 'preparatory conduct'. 
As in Dutch law, when analyzing 'criminal attempt', the cru-
cial issue is to distinguish between mere 'preparation' and the 
'true attempt'. There appear to be no easy answers. 
In R. v. Cline (77) Laidlaw, J. said: 
"It is my respectful opinion that there is 
no theory or test applicable in all cases, 
and I doubt whether a satisfactory one can be 
formula ted." 
When is a certain act (or omission) purely preparatory and 
when does an act (or omission) constitute a 'beginning of execut-
ion'? The decision as to this issue is a question of law (C.C., 
8.24(2)), but on what premises could a court make such a decisi-
on? 
Some of the problems encountered in making the distinction 
between preparation and execution may be illustrated by the case 
of Henderson v. The King (78). 
Three men, Henderson, Medos and Carter agreed to stage a 
hold-up at an office of the Royal Bank of Canada in Vancou-
ver. Sofar, there is a conspiracy, purely preparatory in 
nature. 
They proceeded in a car towards the bank. (Is this still 
preparatory conduct or already the beginning of execution? 
See later.) Approaching the bank, they saw a police cruiser 
in the near vicinity, drove away from the bank, abandoned 
their car and walked to the nearby railway yards, where a 
shoot-out developed, irrelevant to the issue discussed. 
Preparation or execution? 
Taschereau J. said: 
"The trio were seen in an automobile going 
in the direction of the bank... there was 
nothing done by the trio, no overt act immedi-
ately connected with the offence of hold-up 
and robbing. (Emphasis added). Although it may 
be said that no one could doubt the express 
purpose of the bandits, I do not believe... 
that the mere fact of going to the place 
where che contemplated crime is to be committed 
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constitutes an attempt. 
There must be a closer relation between the 
victim and the author of the crime; there must 
be an act which displays not only a preparation 
for an attempt, but a commencement of execution, 
a step in the commission of the actual crime 
itself. 
However, his brothers Estey J., Locke J. and Kerwin J. con­
cluded that there was indeed an attempt. 
In the words of Estey J.: 
"Henderson and his associates had, with a 
common intention to rob the Royal Bank perfected 
their plan, acquired the equipment they deemed 
necessary, including their respective revolvers 
and ammunition. All that completed, they had 
entered upon a course of conduct for the pur­
pose of immediately accomplishing their object. 
They had proceeded sofar that within sight of 
the bank they were frustrated by the presence 
of the police. 
These circumstances in relation to the nature 
and character of the offence intended constitute 
an attempt to rob the bank." 
In R. v. dine (79) Laidlaw J.Α., citing Lord Mansfield in 
ί?. v. Scofield (80), stated: 
"Lord Mansfield laid down the principle that 
an attempt to commit a crime is a crime... In 
the degrees of guilt there is a great difference 
in the eye of the law, but not in the descript­
ion of the offence. 
So long as an act rests in bare intention, 
it is not punishable by our laws; but immedi­
ately when an act is done, the law judges, not 
only of the act done, but of the intent with 
which it is done; and when it is coupled with 
an unlawful and malicious intent, though the 
act itself would otherwise have been innocent, 
the intent being criminal, the act becomes 
criminal and punishable·" 
In Dutch law similar problems exist. Discussing the "border­
line between preparation and execution", HSR say: (81) 
"Judges (in considering similar situations 
where an attempt had been made) have given 
contradictory answers. Equally vacillating 
in this respect are the learned writers, who 
attempted to propound a formula which could 
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be used as a touchstone, without succeeding, how-
ever." 
HSR appear to prefer Binding's formula: "... an act -in or-
der to qualify as an attempt- must have been of such nature that 
at the moment when completion of the offence was frustrated, such 
completion was likely to be realized", or -in other words-:"there 
was "acute risk that completion would follow". 
Two mainstreams in the doctrines are apparent, identified as 
the 'subjective' and 'objective' doctrines. 
The subjective doctrine proposes that attempt is punishable 
if the offender, by his act which commences the execution, demon-
strated his dangerous frame of mind and his capacity to carry the 
offence to its completion. Thus: intent coupled with capability 
or rather: mens vea and capability make an offender liable? 
Does this draw the demarcation line between preparation and ex-
ecution? We fail to see that. 
The objective doctrine proposes that the offender's conduct 
be such that completion of the offence would have followed but 
for the intervention of some extraneous influence. (82) 
Sr., art.45 sets out: 
"The attempt to commit a crime is punish-
able, when the actor's intent has manifested 
itself in the commencement of its execution, 
while such execution did not attain completion 
solely as a consequence of (intervening) 
circumstances (operating) independently from 
the actor's will." 
The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) has adopted the object-
ive doctrine. 
4. The Impossible Attempt 
In Canadian criminal law, an attempt is punishable whether 
or not "it was possible under the circumstances to commit the of-
fence". (C.C., s.24(l)). 
Impossibility of an attempt, factually or legally, may be 
due to : 
a) the use of ineffectual means (attempting to shoot a 
person with a pistol containing blanks, etc.) 
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b) the failure of object or victim (buying goods supposed 
to have been stolen by the vendor whereas they were 
not; obtaining money under false pretenses while the donor 
knew the pretenses were false, etc.) 
c) the actor assuming the act he is doing is punishable 
whereas it is not; 
d) the attempt being a non-criminal attempt (owner steal-
ing his own property thinking it is someone else's). 
In essence these situations represent 'mistake'-cases, 
either as to fact or to law. 
The common law courts are far from unanimous in their deci-
sions. For instance, in State v. Damms (83) the majority opinion 
held the accused guilty. 
"It is our considered judgment that the 
fact, that the gun was unloaded when Damms 
pointed it at his wife's head and pulled the 
trigger, did not absolve him of the offence 
charged, if he actually thought at the time 
that it was loaded." 
But Dieterich J., dissenting, held: 
"The total inadequacy of the means (in 
casu, the fact that the weapon was not loaded) 
in the manner intended to commit the overt 
act of murder, precludes a finding of guilt 
on the crime charged..." 
In The People v. Jaffe (84), another American case, the 
majority of the Court held the accused not guilty: 
"If what a man contemplates doing would 
not be in law a crime, he could not be said, 
in point of law, to intend to commit a crime... 
If the thing is not a crime, he does not intend 
to commit whatever he may erroneously suppose." 
However, Chase J., of the same Court, dissenting, said: 
"That the defendant intended to commit a 
crime is undisputed. I think the record shows 
an attempt to commit the crime of criminally 
receiving. . . stolen...property." 
In Rex v. Hensler (85) -the giver of money knew that the 
pretenses presented to him, were false- the conviction of the ac-
-102-
cused was confirmed, although the giver could not be misled or, 
to put it differently, although the giver allowed himself to be 
misled. 
In this context C.C., s.251(1) is of interest: 
"Every one who, with intent to procure 
the miscarriage of a female person, whether 
or not she is pregnant... is guilty..." 
-Similarly in S.252-. 
It may safely be stated that, if a person thinks that a 
certain conduct is criminal, whereas it is not, the attempt to 
engage in that conduct is not a criminal attempt. Unless the 
legislator qualifies certain conduct as criminal, it is guiltless 
A more detailed discussion of 'attempt', the various forms 
of the impossible attempt -whether factually or legally impos-
sible- and related issues, would go beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Suffice it to say that the Canadian legislator, in formulat-
ing S.24 of the Criminal Code, appears to have made a wise decis-
ion in rendering the possibility or impossibility of an attempt 
irrelevant as to its punishability. 
In Dutch law the terms 'absolutely' ineffectual (as in an 
attempt to poison another with pure water) and 'relatively' in-
effectual (as in administering too small a dose of poison) means 
are used. Where relatively ineffectual means are used, there is 
merely a degree of risk, reason HSR, proposing the following 
test: "Was it probable, given the specific circumstances of a 
case, that the harm aimed at could have been caused?" (86) 
In Dutch law, there is no punishable attempt where an actor 
-of his own free will- decides not to continue in the pursuit of 
his criminal intent. 
-103-
C I V I L 
a r i s i n g f rom : 
1. CONTRACT 
2. TRUST 
3. TORT (17 4) 
LIABILITY 
is either 
] not discussed 
I 
CRIMINAL/PENAL 
I 
arising from performing the 
ACTUS REUS (108) 
I 
(including 'words', 
'possession', 'knowledge') 
a civil wrong 
(Cf. Onveohtmatige Daad) 
I 
which may be engaged in: 
a) INTENTIONALLY 
b) RECKLESSLY 
c) NEGLIGENTLY* 
d) by performing the 
FORBIDDEN 
FAIT MATERIEL 
and 
leading to strict or 
absolute liability. 
(Topics only very summarily 
referred to) 
*) Negligence here means: 
failure to reaoht the 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD of the 
'REASONABLE MAN' 
1) INTENTIONALLY 
I 
2) RECKLESSLY 
I 
p3) NEGLIGENTLY 
See: DOLUS, 
MENS REA 
(107) 
I 
4) by committing forbidden 
FAIT PUREMENT MATEHIEL 
-regardless of any dis­
position, mental or 
other-
and (may) lead to 
LIABILITY 
ι ' 1 
STRICT ABSOLUTE 
(22Z, 242,277) 
Voluntas et propositum 
distinguunt maleficia. 
Bract.f ois.2b,136b 
The will and the proposed end 
distinguish crimes. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE QUALI FYING FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION - SEMANTICS 
It would appear useful at this point to consider in some 
more detail, those objective and subjective factors or elements 
that constitute the description of an offence. 
The objective constitutive elements describe certain conduct 
of persons in context with which the term actus reus must be dis-
cussed. The subjective constitutive elements are referred to by 
the term mens rea, a term which also needs some further explorat-
ion. Before attempting this, the word reus should be defined. 
The obvious translation of the word reus is 'guilty', and 
this translation could be misleading. In essence, the word reus 
appears to be neutral in the sense that it does not necessarily 
qualify a noun to which it relates, as morally, criminally or 
civilly deficient, reprehensible, reproachable or guilty. 
The Dictionnaire étymologique by Ernout-Meillet explains the 
word as follows: 
"'Reus' . . . le défendeur dans une cause. 
Pour les anciens 'reus ' était un dérivé de 
'res' et ils l'expliquaient par 'celui dont 
le bien, l'affaire est en cause...' 
Opposé à 'petitor's 'reus' a désigné 'le 
défendeur', l'accusé et même 'le coupable', 
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sens qu'il a conservé dans les langues 
romanes ..." 
"'Res': œns ancien: 'bien', 'propriété', 
'possession', intérêt dans quelque chose', 
encore conservé dans des expressions juri-
diques ou fixées par l'usage: 'res famil гаг is ', 
'res publiaa', 'habere rem': 'avoir du bien...'" 
Par suite: "intérêt à traiter ou à discuter 
spécialement en justice". 
What gives the term reus its criminally relevant connotat-
ion clearly is not the conduct by itself. 
B. ACTUS REUS 
What, then, does actus reus mean? 
'Actus' translates into 'conduct', comprising commissions 
and omissions. 'Reus' appears to mean: 'debatable', 'open to 
scrutiny', 'qualifying for assessment from some point of view', 
'in need of justification or excuse', or a similar, rather neut-
ral formula. 
Consequently, 'actus reus' should mean no more than: conduct 
of a person that for some reason needs to be qualified as to 
whether it renders the actor responsible or liable in law, either 
criminal or civil. Thus: one and the same conduct may be neutral, 
beneficial or detrimental. 
A person puts a knife into another person's breast and kills 
him. John Doe, a butcher, was cleaning a turkey; Ronald Roe, 
jokingly, sneaks up behind him and suddenly hits him on the back. 
Doe, startled, wheels around and by accident stabs Roe. 
A surgeon opens his patient's ribcage in preparation for 
open heart surgery. His scalpel cuts into the heart. The patient 
survives or dies depending on whether the procedure is successful 
or not. 
A murderer stabs his victim in the heart. 
In all of the given situations someone puts a knife into 
some other person's heart. The conduct itself is identical in all 
cases. Clearly, the conduct itself is no qualifier. 
'Mens', that is: the mind alone, divorced from conduct that 
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translates thought into action, is also criminally irrelevant. 
Criminal law does not aim at punishment for thoughts or intenti-
ons that did not become manifest to the outside world through ob-
servable conduct or its consequences. 
It is the combination of the two, of what was in a person's 
mind when he was engaged in a certain conduct, held by law to be 
reprehensible, that may render a person liable. A causal link 
between the two is required, qualifying the conduct, that is: the 
results thereof, as criminally relevant and qualifying the actor 
as a person to be held culpable, unless he can present an excuse 
or justification. 
There is another type of conduct: negligent conduct, where 
the mind does not inspire the actor. Leaving 'criminal negligence' 
out of this discussion, since it is a demonstration of total dis-
regard for the life or safety of another person and as such car-
ries its own mens rea, it may be stated that 'negligence' is lack 
of diligence. It may be socially unacceptable as it tends to cre-
ate risk or danger; it is certainly not inspired by the mind. For 
that reason it must not be relevant where true crime is involved. 
More will have to be said about this later, since negligence 
is of essential importance in the discussion of strict liability. 
(87)(88). 
C. MENS REA - THE SUBJECTIVE MENTAL ELEMENT 
The most crucial issue in criminal law, where the accounta-
bility of the doer of a forbidden act is under scrutiny, is the 
matter of mens rea, usually translated as 'the guilty mind', the 
criminal intent or recklessness. The ground rules may seem simple 
but practice is far from that. Even the legislator has to cope 
with related problems: when or when not to clearly express the 
need for intent or recklessness in order to render an alleged of-
fender accountable, or how to deal with the 'intent' issue where 
several persons have conspired to commit an offence -no violence 
intended- and one of them kills a person. 
This 'need' for mens rea has been clearly expressed by the 
use of a variety of terms at one hand; on the other, mene rea 
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is being attributed or imputed. The statutory legislators have 
all too often followed the policy of either omitting to express 
clearly whether or not an offence requires mens rea, or setting 
out rules, the violation of which per se make an offender 'crim­
inally' liable regardless of his intent. This is the area of the 
'strict liability offence', the real topic of this paper; it will 
be explored in considerable detail. 
Keeping all of this in mind, mens rea in general will be 
discussed in this chapter; its specific relevance regarding 
strict liability offences will be the subject of Part Two. 
The first question must be: how does mens rea become mani­
fest? 
a) Mens Rea - Dolus 
Schmeisser in his Criminal Law - Cases and Comments states: 
(89) 
"Much of the difficulty concerning the 
mental element has been caused by the use of the 
phrase mens rea, the most confused and misinter­
preted phrase in criminal law, (See: R. ν . T o i s o n , 
•infra). Courts have variously used the phrase to 
refer to the mental element required in a crime, 
to a guilty mind in a moral sense, to criminal 
intent, whether general or specific, or to the 
absence of mistake of fact. If the phrase serves 
any worthy purpose, which is doubtful, the only 
safe meaning is the last-mentioned one where 
it is used in a negative sense furnishing the 
accused with a defence where he has operated 
under a mistake of fact. 
A special problem of intent arises in con­
nection with criminal offences based on negli­
gence, where the intent is imputed on the basis 
of the accused's conduct. 
It may well be a safe meaning, but it is still not very en­
lightening. Stephen J. was not less critical of the term mens rea 
in R. v. Toison (90): 
"My view on the subject is based upon a part­
icular application of the doctrine usually, 
though I think not happily described by the 
phrase Non est reus, nisi mens sit rea. Though 
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this phrase is in common use, I think it most 
unfortunate, and not only likely to mislead, 
but actually misleading, on the following 
grounds: it naturally suggests that, apart 
from all particular definitions of crimes, 
such a thing exists as mens rea, or 'guilty 
mind', which is always expressly or by im-
plication involved in every definition. 
This is obviously not the case, for the 
mental elements of different crimes differ 
widely. Mens rea means in the case of murder, 
malice aforethought; in the case of theft, 
an intention to steal; in the case of rape, 
an intention to have forcible connection with 
a woman, without her consent; and in the case 
of receiving stolen goods, knowledge that the 
goods were stolen. In some cases it denotes 
mere inattention. For instance, in the case 
of manslaughter by negligence it may mean 
forgetting to notice a signal. It appears 
confusing to call so many dissimilar states 
of mind by one name. It seems contradictory 
indeed to describe a mere absence of mind as 
a mens rea or guilty mind." 
Dibregarding the fact that the modern view today is, that 
negligence is not one of the forms of mens rea (as will be noted 
later) -which results in making the final sentence of the quote 
irrelevant-, we cannot agree with the statement as such. 
Whatever it is that makes a mind guilty in different scenarios, 
a common denominator could still be acceptable. 
Stephen's position appears to be that there is no need for 
the use of the term mens rea in each of its specific connotations 
tailored to the type of crime described. He also is of the opin-
ion that, whatever the value of the term, it does not need to 
be written into the description of an offence. In the same judg-
ment he stated 
"Crimes are in the present day much more 
accurately defined by statute or otherwise 
than they formerly were. The mental element 
of most crimes is marked by one of the words 
'maliciously', 'fraudulently', 'negligently', 
or 'knowingly', but it is the general -I might, 
I think, say the invariable practice of the 
Legislature to leave unexpressed some of the 
mental elements of crime. In all cases what-
ever, competent age, sanity, and some degree 
of freedom from some kinds of coercion are 
assumed to be essential to criminality, but I do 
-109-
not believe they are ever introduced into any 
statute by which any particular crime is de-
fined." 
Having said that the meaning of words such as 'malice', 
'negligence'' and 'fraud' has been sufficiently clarified by num-
erous cases, he said, referring to 'knowledge1: 
"With regard to knowledge of fact, the law, 
perhaps, is not quite so clear, but it may, I 
think, be maintained that in every case knowl-
edge of facts is to some extent an element of 
criminality as much as competent age and 
sanity." 
The term mens rea, then, appears to be a collective term, 
indicating that an offender, having decided to do a certain act, 
did the act either with full awareness of its quality and nature 
and of the consequences resulting, or without such awareness. In 
the first situation he knows what he is going to do (or is doing) 
and appreciates that what he is doing constitutes a wrong. The 
quality of this awareness may be coloured in a spectrum that ex-
tends from the meanest viciousness to stubborn defiance of, say, 
a regulation. In the second situation, the excuse that he was not 
aware of committing a wrong, that is: ignorance of law, will not 
save him. A conviction if bound to follow. 
A separate category would be formed by the numerous offences 
resulting from negligence, where mens rea would not be required 
and where the simple performance of the proscribed act would re-
sult in liability (as in regulatory or statutory or provincial 
offences; strict liability) and where awareness of being involved 
in forbidden conduct may even be totally absent. 
A refinement with respect to distinguishing categories of 
mens rea was proposed by Fauteux J. in Rex v. George (91) 
"In considering the question of mens rea, 
a distinction is to be made between i) intent-
ion as applied to acts considered in relation 
to their purposes and ii) intention as applied 
to acts considered apart from their purposes. 
A general intent attending the commission 
of an act is, in some cases, the only intent 
required to constitute the crime, while, in 
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others, there must be, in addition to that 
general intent, a spécifia intent attending 
the purpose for the commission of the act." 
(Emphasis added.) 
An example: common assault requires a general intent only; 
robbery requires a specific intent: the assault in robbery has an 
ulterior motive, namely: theft, and is the first stage only of 
the robbery, namely a way to subdue the victim to such a degree 
that theft may be succesfully committed. 
Summing up: 
i) Mens rea - however expressed in words such as 'knowing-
ly', 'maliciously', 'intentionally', and so on, is directed at 
the forbidden act, and 
ii) at the ultimate consequence, while 
iii) the actor must appreciate the causal link between the 
act and its consequence(s), -desired or not desired as in offen-
ces involving negligence-. 
iv) Mens rea is either 'general' or 'specific', a distinct-
ion significant in context with the availability of certain def-
ences. 
At this point, although perhaps somewhat prematurely, we 
propose to discuss the Kundeus Case (92) because it presents an 
interesting impression of the interplay between mens rea, error 
facti and possession. 
Before going into some of the details of this case, a few 
preliminary remarks will prove useful in assessing the merits of 
its outcome. 
These remarks deal with Canadian legislation 
as to drugs. 
Broadly speaking, a distinction is to be made between 
'drugs' and 'narcotics'. The Food and Drugs Act (93), here-
after referred to by the letters FDA deals with 'drugs'; the 
Narcotic Control Act (94) deals with 'narcotics'. What are 
drugs? What are narcotics? 
The FDA recognizes three categories of drugs. 
The first category we may define as 'med.ical and hygi-
enic drugs' which may be sold only upon written or verbal 
prescription. The second category comes under the general 
title of 'controlled drugs' while drugs under the third 
category are known as 'restricted drugs'. 
-Ill-
What is the distinction between 'controlled' and 
'restricted' drugb 7 The statute does not give specific def­
initions by brand or street names. In lieu thereof it re­
fers to 'schedules' and for the purpose of this discussion 
three schedules are to be mentioned: (These schedules are 
part of the 'Regulations' which complement the statute) 
Schedule F. identifies all drugs of the first category 
("foods, drugs, cosmetics and devices", says the statute). 
Schedule G. contains all drugs of the second category, 
the 'controlled' drugs; Schedule H. mentions all drugs of 
the third category, the 'restricted drugs'. 
The NCA carries its own schedule. 
Obviously, dealing with any drugs of the third category 
is more frowned upon than dealing with those of the second 
or first categories. However, this frown may prove to be 
somewhat inconsistent. 
Take, for instance, 'possession'. In order to avoid re­
peating the same terms over and over again, we shall refer 
to drugs of the first category as F-drugs, to those of the 
second category as G-drugs and those of the third as H-drugs 
Thus: possession of: 
a F-drug: no offence; a G-drug: simple possession, 
that is: possession for one's own use, is no offence; pos­
session for the purpose of trafficking is an offence; a H-
drug: simple possession as well as possession for the pur­
pose of trafficking are both offences. 
Now look at penalties. Here is where some confusion 
creeps in. 
We must first clarify the term 'traffick'. The term 
does not apply to F-drugs, but only to G- and Η-drugs and to 
narcotics; there it has its own definition. 
Traf f ick(ing) is a collective term, defined m the FDA, 
S.33 as to G-drugs, and in s.40 as to Η-drugs. It means: 
"to manufacture, sell, export from or import into Canada, 
transport or deliver (otherwise than under the authority of 
statute and regulations)" 
The penalty for trafficking and for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking is the same for G- and Η-drugs: no 
fines; mandatory prisonterms of 10 years. 
Fines: maximum fine for F-drug offences: $5,000, which 
is the same as the maximum fine for simple possession of a 
Η-drug. In both cases: a maximum prison term of 3 years, or 
both. 
Finally: traf fick(ing) under the NCA means: to manu­
facture, sell, give, administer, transport, send, deliver 
or distribute or to offer to do anything mentioned here. 
Simple possession is an offence. Possession for the purpose 
of trafficking and trafficking carry a life term. 
We have now set the scene upon which Kundeus is to 
enter. We do not know whether he was aware of the fact that 
dealing in a substance 'held out' to be a G- or Η-drug car­
ries the same penalties as dealing in the real thing. 
We don't know either whether he realized that 'mescal­
ine' is an F-drug, -to which the term 'traffick' is of no 
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relevance-, that 'speed', an amphetamine is a G-drug and 
'acid' or LSD, lysergic acid diethylamide, a H-drug, while 
'hash', a drug made from Indian hemp (СаппаЬгв indica, with 
similar properties as Cannabis sativa or 'true hemp'), or 
marihuana, is a narcotic drug. 
All we know is that Kundeus was a drugpusher m action. 
His action took place in a beer parlor of a Vancouver hotel. 
He was letting the world and more specifically potential buyers 
know what merchandise he had available, by calling out (!): 
"Speed, acid, MDA -another Η-drug, methamphetamine- or hash", 
thus neatly covering the NCA and most of the FDA. An undercover 
police constable, present in the parlor, asked for hash or acid, 
but Kundeus said he was sold out and offered mescaline. The con­
stable bought two 'hits' for $4. 
Kundeus left the parlor, returning shortly afterwards and 
gave the constable two capsules. He was promptly arrested. Later, 
upon chemical analysis, the capsules proved to contain LSD. 
What happened to the charges laid in the various court rooms? 
The Trial Judge accepted the Crown's evidence and convicted 
Kundeus, holding it was all simply a matter of mens rea. Kundeus, 
for reasons of his own, did not adduce evidence in his defence. 
The Court of Appeal set this conviction aside and the Crown 
appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada restored the original conviction 
holding that Custeau (95) was to be followed. To this case we 
shall have to return later. 
We should first look at the errores faeti, abounding in this 
case. 
Firstly, Kundeus was in error as to the nature of his mer­
chandise. He offered to sell mescaline to the undercover police­
man; he believed that what his supplier gave him, was mescaline, 
he sold and delivered to the policeman what he believed to be 
mescaline. 
Secondly, the policeman was in error he asked for, paid for 
and received what he believed to be mescaline. 
Finally, Kundeus' supplier must have been in error when sup­
plying the far more expensive LSD instead of mescaline. 
Both the Trial Judge and the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that such errors were irrelevant, the highest Court also noting 
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that Kundeus had not adduced any evidence m order to show his 
'honest belief (that he was selling mescaline and not LSD) ... 
amounting to a non-existence of mens rea.'. This S.C.C, decision 
represented the concurrent opinions of seven out of nine judges, 
the Chief Justice, Bora Laskin, with Spence J. concurring, had an 
entirely different opinion, which we think -always with due res­
pect- is far more satisfactory than the majority judgment. 
At this point we shall have to consider 'possession' in con­
text with 'knowledge'. 
Possession, in both the FDA and NCA, means possession as de­
fined in the Сггтгпаі Code, and this means, on the authority of 
the S.C.C, in the Beaver Case (96) -a case to which we shall also 
refer back later- "To constitute possession within the meaning 
of the criminal law it is my judgment, that where as here there 
is a manual handling of a thing, it must be co-existent with 
knowledge of what that thing is, and both these elements must be 
co-existent with some act of control (outside public duty)" This 
formula saved Beaver's neck at least as to one of the charges. 
It did not help Kundeus. Why did it fail' 
Possession requires knowledge and knowledge may be defective 
as a result of ignorance or mistake. 
We have not forgotten that Kundeus 'adduced no evidence in 
his defence'. Theoreticallj., he might have tried to come under 
FDA, S.29, dealing with 'want of knowledge'. If the parcel he 
delivered to the policeman was m the same condition it was in 
when he bought it and he could have proved it, he might have been 
acquitted. However, in that case he should have given written 
notice to the prosecutor, that he was going to prevail himself 
of that pleading and, also in writing, would have had to disclose 
the identity of his supplier. The drug-underworld with its notor­
ious lack of sense of humour, would have frowned upon him and the 
risk is far from imaginary that, had he used that defence, the 
state of his health would have taken a sudden turn for the worse 
(if he was lucky) or become non-existent (if he was not). So, 
wisely, Kundeus remained silent. 
Given these facts, we are facing the following issues, as 
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pointed out by Laskin C.J.C., based on the following reasoning. 
The drug offences involved require mens rea, which is held 
to be either of a general or of a specific nature. The Crwon, ap-
pealing, argued that Kundeus had shown a 'general intent' to 
traffick in drugs, any drugs, by advertizing his merchandize mag-
na voce in that beer parlour, and that he could only be discul-
pated by virtue of a mistake of fact. This, the prosecution 
stated, was out of the question, since the substance Kundeus did 
deliver was 'a drug'. 
How valid does this argument appear to be? 
Where the legislator has taken great pains -as shown in our 
introductory remarks- in distinguishing the various types of 
drugs, putting different penalties on contraventions depending on 
what drug is involved, distinguishing in that respect also as to 
the conduct, and so on, the question arises whether such 'general 
intent' -if it be there- could be indiscriminately transferred 
from one drug to another, regardless of the statute they come 
under respectively, regardless of the sections of the FDA they 
are mentioned in, and -consequently- regardless of the fact that 
the offences are to be distinguished as major or perhaps lesser 
offences, depending on the various penalties set out. If such 
transfer should be possible, mistake of fact per se would not be 
a defence. If the required mens rea could not so be transferred, 
mistake of fact is a defence. 
Thus, the first issue is: evidence shows that Kundeus had 
the mens rea to commit the lesser offence: 'selling' a prescript-
ion drug (mescaline, a F-drug) without a prescription. The term 
'trafficking' is not applicable to mescaline of the F-group. The 
question now becomes: is that same evidence, proving a lesser of-
fence, sufficient, or even admissible, as evidence to support a 
charge for a more serious offence: 'trafficking in LSD'? Laskin 
thinks it is not. Mens rea and actus reus (assuming the conduct 
was proven) "must relate to the same crime", which in this case, 
they do not. Two different crimes are involved. Mens rea cannot 
be transferred, unless Parliament were to so legislate. 
The second issue relates to mistake of fact: what are the 
requirements for mistake of fact to exist? 
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Does a mistake of fact have to be objectively reasonable, or 
is it sufficient that it is based upon a honest belief' As estab-
lished in the Beaver Case, a honest belief suffices. 
The third issue is was Kundeus innocent of the offence 
charged, though guilty of another offence -as a result of a hon-
est mistake of fact- or must he prove that he was innocent of any 
offence' In view of what was said referring to the first issue 
where mens rea is required for a specific offence, such mens vea 
must be proven. "If there is to be a relaxation of the require-
ment", Laskin states, "should it not come from Parliament, which 
could provide for the substitution of a conviction of the lesser 
offence, in the same way as provisions now exist in our criminal 
law for entering a conviction on an included offence." It is 
clear, that Laskin does not accept the proposition and he muses 
"There may be some regret on the part of the 
Court to free a person who appears to be guilty 
of an offence with which he has not been charged. 
That regret, if any be there, cannot be a vehicle 
for making a particular charge which cannot be 
proved serve as a foundation for imposing culp-
ability of another, which is not an included of-
fence. If there is to be a modification of prin-
ciple in a situation like the present one, it 
must come from Parliament..." 
"If there should be any doubt on the evidence 
whether the accused offered and intended to sell 
mescaline, that doubt cannot be translated into 
an affirmative finding, certainly not in this 
Court, that he offered and intended to sell LSD. 
At the worst, it would require a new trial. 
I see no such doubt and on the considerations 
I have canvassed, I would dismiss the appeal." 
As mentioned before, the majority of the S.C.C, was of a 
different opinion. Referring to the King Case (97), de Grandpre 
J., speaking for the majority pointed out that there a rebuttable 
presumption had arisen that he voluntarily had induced his state 
of being impaired (a dentist had injected him with sodium pento-
thal before extracting two teeth, how 'voluntary' is a man's con-
duct when shivering in a dentist's chair')... and must be con-
victed unless evidence is adduced which raises a reasonable doubt 
as to his fault... but Kundeus had not adduced such kind of evi-
dence. De Grandpre concluded that the decision in Custeau (98) 
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was the proper one. And Kundeus lost his case. 
We cannot avoid any longer bringing Custeau on the scene. 
Custeau, too, was charged with trafficking in LSD though he 
thought he was dealing with mescaline, and convicted. However, 
as De Grandpre admits, the Court of Appeal had made an error 
there, too, mescaline, true to its nature, played a confusing 
role. The Court of Appeal of Ontario described mescaline as a 
'controlled drug', which it is not and never has been. The Court 
of Appeal held that it is an offence to traffic in either a con-
trolled or a restricted drug, which is, of course, correct, but 
mescaline is neither. The point is, that once mescaline was 
identified as such, the term 'trafficking' entered the discussi-
ons, a term that does not apply to mescaline. The confusion is 
based on the idea that trafficking includes selling, but the mere 
selling (FDA, s.15 does only mention selling) is not trafficking. 
All in all, we submit that both judgments appear to be un-
satisfactory. 
In Kurdeus we were facing issues related to mers rea, pos-
session, mistake of fact, transfer of general intent... what 
about attempt' And the technique of laying the proper charge in 
a case7 Laskin stated 
"There is another consideration which should 
be brought into account in this case. The 
Crown's case was built on evidence of an under-
cover policeman which must have been as well 
known to the prosecuting authorities before the 
trial as it was as a result of the trial. 
I can appreciate that there could have been 
some difficulty in determining what charge 
should be laid on the facts as disclosed by the 
chief Crown witness. Although the Crown may 
have felt that it could support the charge 
actually laid, it could also, as a matter of 
precaution, have laid a charge of attempting to 
traffra in mescaline. Such a charge is support-
able under s.24 of the Criminal Code which makes 
it immaterial whether it was possible or not to 
commit the intended offence." 
One last remark. If we should assume that the drug of-
fences referred to were offences of strict or absolute liability 
{quod non) the effect of both Kundeus and Custeau, if in author-
ity, would be devastating. The defence of ignorance or mistake 
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would be unavailable and the mescaline transaction could and 
would result in a conviction for a more serious crime than actu-
ally perpetrated, whereas the accused would not even have the 
chance to plead these defences. 
Of further interest in the given context is R. v. Hancock 
(99). There it was held that 'sell' in s.2 of the FDA -as it is 
specified in the definition- must be in relationship to a specif-
ic substance. In other words: if the charge is: offering mescal-
ine for sale, then the accused -offering mescaline where, in fact 
the substance turns out to be something else- must be acquitted. 
However, Hancock was decided... some two years after Kundeus. 
We shall now return to another aspect of mens rea, that is 
to 'wilful blindness'. 
b) Mens Rea - Wilful Blindness 
Wilful blindness deals with an actor's degree of knowledge 
of 'surrounding circumstances', where such knowledge is part of 
the objective elements of an offence. 
Knowledge may be totally absent; or it may be present, being 
either complete or incomplete, correct or incorrect. 
Where knowledge is present and is complete and correct, 
there is no problem in a situation where the actor -notwithstand-
ing that knowledge- was not deterred from acting (or from omit-
ting to act), thus satisfying the relevant precondition for liab-
ility. 
However, where there is no knowledge at all, or where knowl-
edge is incomplete or defective, wilful blindness may be present. 
The question is when 'blindness' is 'wilful' and, as a consequen-
ce, may result in liability. The matter is related to the quest-
ion whether the actor had a duty to know. 
Suppose John Doe, taking a leisurely walk, observes a street 
fight. His initially casual interest is raised considerably when, 
approaching the scene, he sees that two men are battling a third 
one, in which he recognizes his best friend, Ronny Roe, an ama-
teur boxer. Merrily he joins the fracas in order to help his 
friend. He punches one of the opponents out, only to be knocked 
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out himself in the next moment by the other opponent. Shortly 
afterwards, having regained consciousness, he finds himself 
charged with assaulting a police officer, a fate shared by his 
friend Ronny, although their opponents did not wear uniforms and 
did not state they were policemen. 
Doe's defence could be: 'I did not know these men were pol-
ice officers". In other words, he would claim lack of knowledge 
of that particular surrounding circumstance. Is this defence lik-
ely to save him from criminal liability? 
A few questions must be asked: 
1) did it ever occur to him that he just might be fighting 
police officers? Or: 
2) did he perhaps ask himself whether they were, but did 
not bother to find out; or 
3) knowing his friend to be a notorious rowdy, did he sus-
pect strongly that the opponents were police officers? 
Or, finally 
4) was he almost certain they were -no matter why he 
should be thinking that way-, but wanted to assist his 
friend anyway, deciding not to find out? 
In the first supposition his ignorance is likely to be reas-
onable. He has no ground to suspect that the opponents are police 
officers and consequently he has no duty to inquire. 
In the second case his conduct just might be reckless as to 
the possibility that he was getting involved in a fight with the 
police, and even more so in the third position. It could perhaps 
be argued that the 'reasonable man' would have inquired, although 
in the given example the technique of gaining such knowledge 
("Kind sirs, before punching you out, may I please know whether 
you are police officers?") may be somewhat hard to apply. It may 
well be that the reasonable man under the circumstances would 
throw his punches first and ask the questions later. 
Finally, in the fourth supposition, lack of knowledge is 
definitely deliberate: the accused intended not to obtain knowl-
edge. In other words, he is wilfully blind. 
Obviously, evidence as to the degree and nature of an accus-
ed's knowledge may be hard to come by and present, and the Crown 
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may find having serious problems in that area. This may explain 
why the Supreme Court appears to show an inclination to require 
something less than actual knowledge, namely: recklessness as to 
the duty of knowing, where one ought to know and the reasonable 
man would have attempted to gain such knowledge. Thus in Leary v. 
R. (100). Leary, accused of rape, was reckless as to his knowl­
edge -or lack of it- regarding the woman's consent. However, this 
was the minority view, holding him liable on that ground. The 
majority held him liable for another reason: they did not accept 
his defence of drunkeness. 
We must confess that, as in many other scenarios, we are not 
overly impressed by arguments in which the 'reasonable man' gets 
involved. We shall confront him later. 
c) Mens Rea - Recklessness 
Mens теа is said to comprise 'intent' -the desire of the 
consequence of certain conduct, but also, in most cases, the fore 
sight of their certainty- and 'recklessness' -the foresight of 
the probability or likelihood that a consequence could materiali­
ze or that surrounding circumstances may in fact not be what they 
appear to be. 
Recklessness is also known as 'advertent negligence'. It 
will be dealt with later in some more detail, in Part Two. 
d) Included Offences and Specific Intent 
In the present context we should refer to 'included offences' 
or 'compound offences'. Common assault is a simple offence, caus­
ing one kind of harm, intended by the actor. Robbery is a com­
pound offence, causing more than one kind of harm: bodily harm 
and theft. Common assault is included in robbery. (101) 
For compound offences, the specific intent required is aimed 
at the ulterior motive or purpose of the act. Thus, in rape, the 
assault aims at subduing the victim for the purpose of making 
forced intercourse possible. 
The matter is relevant in connection with the defence of 
drunkeness. For offences where a general intent is required, 
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drunkeness will not provide a defence, if a specific intent is 
required, drunkeness may provide a defence. 
e) Mens Rea - Criminal Negligence 
At first sight 'intent' and 'negligence' {'dolus' and 'cul-
pa') would seem to be mutually exclusive if there is intent, how 
could there be negligence at the same time7 It appears to be 
merely a matter of semantics. The 'negligence' in 'criminal negl-
igence' is in fact 'recklessness' of the worst kind callous dis-
regard for another's life or health, and recklessness is one com-
ponent of mens rea. The Code deals with criminal negligence in 
sections 202 et seq. 
f) Attribution of Mens Reg 
The matter touched upon in the following paragraphs will be dis-
cussed -as to certain aspects- in more detail in Part Two The 
following is intended as an introduction to generalities. 
Conduct may, in certain situations, result in consequences 
as to which the actor did not have any specific intent or was 
reckless m his assessment whether they might arise In such 
cases rrers rea is said to be 'attributed' or 'imputed'. 
The best way to demonstrate how Canadian criminal law is 
dealing with 'original' and 'attributed' mens rea is perhaps by 
taking a closer look at the provisions of the Code regarding homi-
cide. 
1) Homicide 
The definition of homicide -causing the death of a person-
is succinct and broad. (102) 
Section 205 of the Code (hereafter referred to as C.C.) 
reads 
"205.(1) A person commits homicide when, 
directly or indirectly, by any means, he 
causes the death of a human being. 
(2) Homicide is culpable or not culpable. 
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(3) Homicide that is not culpable is not an 
of fence . 
The term 'culpable' is not to be translated into Dutch by 
the word 'culpóos '. In context with homicide it describes a crime 
"varying from the very lowest culpability, up to the very verge 
of murder'.' (103) It means: blamable, censurable, involving the 
breach of a legal duty or the commission of a fault. "Culpable" 
in fact connotes fault rather than guilt". (104). This would 
come close to the Dutch culpóos. However, C.C., s.205(4) reads: 
"Culpable homicide is murder or manslaughter 
or infanticide" 
And since C.C., s.212 defines 'murder' as follows: 
"Culpable homicide is murder 
(a) where the person who causes the death of 
a human being 
(i) means to cause his death...." 
it is clear that 'culpable' includes 'intentional' without being 
synonymous. The Dutch legal term culpaos however, is the opposite 
either of intent or of chance or accident (105). Therefore 'culp-
able' and 'culpóos' are not identical. 
When does an offence qualify as culpable homicide? C.C., 
s.205(5) indicates four 'means': 
"A person commits culpable homicide when 
he causes the death of a human being 
(a) by means of an unlawful act, 
(b) by criminal negligence, 
(c) by causing that human being, by threats 
or fear of violence or by deception, to 
do anything that causes his death, 
(d) by wilfully frightening that human being, 
in the case of a child or sick person." 
From the above it follows that murder, manslaughter and in-
fanticide -all being forms of culpable homicide- may be committed 
by any of the four means cited. 
The distinction between murder, manslaughter and infanticide 
is to be made as follows: 
Dealing first with infanticide, we find a parallel to the 
Dutch 'privileged offence': though intentionally committed, the 
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offence carries mitigated penal consequences Thus 
C.C. , S.216: 
"A female person commits infanticide when 
by a wilful act or omission she causes the 
death of her newly-born child» if at the time 
of the act or omission she is not fully re-
covered from the effects of giving birth to 
the child and by reason thereof or of the 
effect of lactation consequent on the birth 
of the child her mind is then disturbed." 
In such a case the excuse is 'temporary insanity' of some 
degree. The penalty is set out in C.C, s 220 imprisonment for 
five years. Did the accused female not have one of the above ex-
cuses and did she act 'wilfully', s.590 would apply and the fem-
ale would be facing a charge of murder or manslaughter. 
The Dutch code recognizes mitigating factors as well, but 
introduces one reason only, namely 'fear of discovery of her 
delivery'. 
Sr., art.290: 
"The mother who, under the influence of 
fear of discovery of her delivery, intentional-
ly causes the death of her child during or 
shortly after the birth of her child, is 
guilty of manslaughter of a child and punishable 
by incarceration for a period of no more than 
six years." 
In this provision the act has the quality of being impulsive. 
However, if under the same conditions as referred to in art.290 
the mother only forms the intention to kill her child as soon as 
it is going to be delivered, or shortly after, and then causes 
the death of the child, she is guilty of infanticide 
Sr., art.291: 
"The mother who, for the purpose of carrying 
out her decision (to take the life of her child) 
made under the influence of fear of discovery 
of her forthcoming delivery, intentionally caus-
es the death of her child during or shortly 
after the birth of that child, is guilty of in-
fanticide and punishable by incarceration for 
a period of no more than nine years." 
Leaving infanticide out of further discussion, two other 
forms of culpable homicide remain to be discussed murder and 
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manslaughter. 
2) Murder 
The way Canadian criminal law deals with murder is quite 
different from the way Dutch criminal law deals with it. The main 
reason appears to be that several archaic principles of the com-
mon law survive in , or at least have put their heavy imprint on 
legislation dealing with murder and many learned writers have 
vented their criticisms. In Part Two we shall refer back to this 
aspect; here we intend do lay some of the groundwork. 
The question: 'When is homicide to be qualified as murder?' 
is answered mainly in C.C., s.212 and s.213. We propose to quote 
the relevant sections of the C.C. at this point. Some of this 
will be, at least in part, repeated in Part Two, for the conven-
ience of the reader. 
C.C. , s.212. 
"Culpable homicide is murder 
(a) where the person who causes the death of a 
human being 
(i) means Co cause his death, or 
(ii) means to cause him bodily harm that he 
knows is likely to cause his death, 
and is reckless whether death ensues 
or not." 
Section 212 refers to two aspects of mens rea: 'meaning to 
cause the death' represents the 'intent'-aspect; the offender's 
attitude as to the potentially fatal outcome of his causing 
bodily harm, points to the 'recklessness-aspect'. It should also 
be noted that, while the intent under a(i) is directed at taking 
a person's life, the intent under a(ii) is directed at causing 
bodily harm. 
'Likely' is not as strong a precondition as 'necessarily', 
'unavoidably' or 'as a matter of course'. It means: 'probable, 
such as might well happen or turn out; to be expected'. (106) 
'Recklessness' and 'reckless' are terms used in the C.C, 
whereas the Dutch 'roekeloosheid' or 'roekeloos ' are terms used, 
not in legislation, but 'in jurisprudence and practice'. (107) 
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In such cases, where recklessness is charged, the actor did not 
care at all about the consequences of his act; he did not care 
whether his victim would survive or die. 
C.C., S.212: 
"Culpable homicide is murder 
(b) where a person, 
meaning to cause death to a human being, or 
meaning to cause him bodily harm that he 
knows is likely to cause his death, 
and being reckless whether death ensues or not, 
by accident or mistake causes death 
to another human being, notwithstanding that he 
does not mean to cause death or bodily harm 
to that human being; (emphasis added) 
It will be noted that s.212(b) is, materially, a repetition 
of s.212(a)(i) and (ii), referring to the same intents and to 
recklessness. The victim, however, is not the person the offender 
had in mind but 'another human being'. The actor is guilty of 
murder even where he 'does not mean to cause death or bodily harm 
to that other human being'. Does this sound like 'strict liabili­
ty'? We shall look at that angle in Part Two. Here we state the 
accepted doctrine: it is said that the original intent or reck­
lessness, in other words the original mens rea is transferred 
by the law to cover the consequences which involve the un-intend-
ed victim. 
C.C., s.212: 
"Culpable homicide is murder 
(c) where a person, for an unlawful object, 
does anything that he knows or ought to know 
is likely to cause death, 
and thereby causes death to a human being, 
notwithstanding that he desires to effect 
his object without causing death or bodily 
harm to any human being." /
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 (emphasis added)· 
Here, the original intent is aimed at certain conduct, en­
gaged in by the offender in furtherance of some unlawful object, 
by which we have to understand, it seems, the commission of some 
criminal offence. Whatever is represented by 'anything', it is 
clear that it is something dangerous and the offender is suppos­
ed to know that. His desire to cause no harm is no excuse. He 
accepts the bad chances and is to suffer their consequences. 
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Some may say that -as to the resulting death- mena rea is im-
puted . However, there is a distinct element of recklessness which 
cannot be blotted out by the offender's desire not to cause harm. 
Section 213 deals with murder in the commission of any of a 
number of specified offences (known in earlier days as 'felonies' 
which term is not in use any longer. Hence the group label: 'fel-
ony murder', not in general use anymore either.) 
As a sample of draftsmanship, we submit, s.213 is a nightmare. 
C.C., s.213: 
"Culpable homicide is murder 
where a person causes the death of a human being 
while committing or attempting to commit 
high treason or treason 
or an offence mentioned in section 52 (sabotage), 
76 (piratical acts), 76.1 (hijacking an aircraft), 
132 or subsection 133(1) or sections 134 to 136 
(escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody), 
143 or 145 (rape or attempt to commit rape), 
149 or 156 (.indecent assault), 
subsection 246(2) (resisting lawful arrest), 
247 (kidnapping and forcible confinement), 
302 (robbery), 306 (breaking and entering) or 
389 or 390 (arson), 
whether or not the person means to cause death to 
any human being and 
whether or not he knows that death is likely to 
be caused to any human being, 
if 
(a) he means to cause bodily harm for the purpose 
of 
(i) facilitating the commission of the offen-
ce, or 
(ii) facilitating his flight after committing 
or attempting to commit the offence, 
and the death ensues from the bodily harm; 
(b) he administers a stupefying or overpowering 
thing for a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), 
and the death ensues therefrom; 
(c) he wilfully stops, by any means, the breath 
of a human being for a purpose mentioned in 
paragraph (a), and the death ensues therefrom; 
or 
(d) he uses a weapon or has it on his person 
(i) during or at the time he commits or 
attempts to commit the offence, or 
(ii)during or at the time of his flight after 
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committing or attempting to commit the of-
fence , 
and the death ensues as a consequence. 
At this stage we shall limit ourselves to the following re-
marks. 
The offender's intent or recklessness, that is his mens rea, 
as to the death of his victim, are irrelevant. His knowledge as 
to the likelihood of death being caused by his conduct is also 
irrelevant. 
The essence is: the offender intends to commit one of the 
list of criminal offences. In order to succeed, he intends to 
subdue his victim by causing bodily harm, administering a stupe-
fying or overpowering thing or by choking him. He may do the same 
when trying to flee, to succeed in his flight. If the victim, as 
a result, dies, the offender is a murderer. The same applies if 
he has a weapon on his person -apart from using a weapon- and for 
any, even unforeseen reason it causes harm and death ensues, the 
offender is a murderer. 
Again the question: does this sound like strict or absolute 
liability? This matter will be explored in Part Two. 
Comparisons with Dutch criminal law are not easily formul-
ated. 
'Murder' is defined in the simplest of terms: (108) 
Sr., art.289: 
"He who intentionally and after premedi-
tation takes the life of another, is guilty 
of murder and is punishable with a life 
sentence or with a prison term for a period 
not exceeding twenty years." 
There do not seem to be parallel provisions to C.C., secti-
ons 212 and 213. Anything not amounting to murder as under Sr., 
art.289, is manslaughter. Homicide/manslaughter under special 
circumstances, not unlike those of C.C.,s.212 and 213 are dealt 
with in separate provisions. The crime is qualified as man-
slaughter, but the penalties are increased to the (near) maximum 
penalties. Thus, for example, Sr., art.288 : 
"Manslaughter followed by, accompanied by or 
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preceded by the commission of an offence and in 
preparation for or in facilitaion of the execut-
ion of such offence, or, in case of being taken 
in the very act, for the purpose of assuring 
to himself or to other participants in the of-
fence, either impunity, or possession of what 
was obtained illegally, is punishable with a 
life term or with a prison term for a period 
not to exceed twenty years." 
How does the Dutch code deal with some of the criminal of-
fences mentioned in C.C., s.213? 
As mentioned before, if serious bodily harm or death ensue, 
the penalties are severely increased. Thus, for example: 
3) Rape 
Sr., art. 248: where serious bodily injury is caused, the 
penalty may go up to twelve years imprisonment; where death is 
caused,the maximum prison term is fifteen years, the same as for 
manslaughter. 
4) Robbery 
Sr., art.312 (4o): -comparable to Sr., art.288-: where the 
offender uses violence or threats of violence, and serious bodily 
harm ensues, or death ensues, the maximum penalties are, again, 
twelve and fifteen years respectively, as in manslaughter, where 
the victim died. 
5) Arson 
Sr., art.157 deals with intentional arson, art.158 with 
negligent causation of a fire ( both provisions also refer to 
explosions and floods). Art.157 provides heavy penalties: a 
prison term of 12 years or less if a risk is created of damage 
to properties or the community at large; fifteen years or less if 
fear for the loss of human life is created; a life term if such 
fear materializes in the death of a person or a prison term of 
twenty years or less. 
It is to be noted here, that the penalty for creating a risk 
to human life carries the same penalty as manslaughter; where a 
-128-
person died, the penalty equals that for murder. 
We prefer the Dutch way of treating this type of criminal 
offences over the Canadian way, if only for the reason that in 
Dutch law there is no need for supplementary theorizing, bring-
ing notions such as imputed mens rea, constructive murder or fel-
ony murder into the discussion. The basis for liability is simp-
le: one commits a criminal offence on which one's intent is 
focused; as a result extra consequences -bodily harm or death to 
a human being- arise. They might not be intended, but they did 
indeed occur. The offender pays the debt by being subjected to 
a heavier penalty, as if he had, willingly, committed manslaught-
er or murder. One is held liable for the material consequences of 
one's conduct. 
Having said this, the question is unavoidable: in how far 
are we now looking at strict liability in the situations referred 
to'7 This will be analyzed in Part Two. 
6. Manslaughter 
Section 217 of the C.C. defines manslaughter. 
"Culpable homicide that is not murder or 
infanticide is manslaughter." 
Manslaughter requires only a general intent, whereas murder 
and infanticide require a specific intent. (109) 
As a comparison: Sr., art.287 reads: 
"He who intentionally takes the life of 
another is guilty of manslaughter and is 
punishable with imprisonment for a period 
not to exceed fifteen years." 
The missing element that would qualify the conduct as mur-
der is the element of 'premeditation'. 
Under certain circumstances Canadian law provides for the 
reduction of a murder charge to one of manslaughter where the ac-
cused acted 'in the heat of passion'. (110) 
C.C, s.215: 
"(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would 
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be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the 
person who committed it did so in the heat of 
passion caused by sudden provocation. 
(2) A wrongful act or insult that is of such 
nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordin­
ary person of the power of self-control is pro­
vocation for the purposes of this section if 
the accused acted upon it on the sudden and 
before there was time for his passion to cool." 
(Ill) 
We should like to note that Dutch law appears to deal with 
'transferred nens rea' (see C.C., s.212(b)) in a rather different 
manner. The situation is, that A.'s mens rea is directed at caus­
ing bodily harm or death to B. Through accident or mistake C. be­
comes the victim. A. is held liable as a result of the doctrine 
of 'transferred mens rea'. 
In the given situation, Dutch law would treat the issue as a 
case of 'aberratio ictus'. HSR reason (112): "What the offender 
intended to do, was not attained; what he attained was not in 
tended. A.'s intent was not directed at causing harm to C. There­
fore he is not guilty of intentional manslaughter of C. The jur­
idical analysis should be that A. commits an attempt at man­
slaughter of B. and, probably, is also guilty of negligent homi­
cide of C. (.ST., art.307), provided that he was able to foresee 
that his bullet could go astray and that C. could get hit and 
also provided that he ought to have foreseen this. Also, there 
is the possibility to analyze this case as 'dolus eventualis', 
namely where A. is so strongly determined to hit B. that he would 
risk discharging his gun, even if he considered it likely -bad 
shot as he knows himself to be- that an innocent bystander could 
get wounded." 
In Canadian law this would come close to criminal negligen­
ce, were it not that C.C.,s.212(b) clearly refers to situations 
as the one referred to. 
In situations as found under C.C, s.213 (the so-called fel­
ony murder cases) Dutch law would probably qualify the offender's 
mens rea as dolus eventualis от even as 'bewuste schuld': the of­
fender failed to foresee the possibility of the victim dying 
through strangulation (as in a case of rape); however, he could 
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and should have had the foresight of this possibility and thus 
have avoided the outcome. Practically the question is how much 
foresight may be expected from a man under such circumstances? 
Dolus eventualis seems to be the better answer. (113) 
Another aspect of the constructive mens rea category is in 
the area of common intent and shared responsibility for whatever 
one offender does, by the other offender(s) acting with him in 
concert. A. and B. agree to carry out the common purpose of rob­
bing C.; in the execution of their plan, A. kills C. This makes 
B. liable for murder or manslaughter, for instance where he knew 
that A. bought a hunting knife, and ought to have foreseen the 
probability of this knife going to be used in the commission of 
the planned offence. (114)(115). 
In Dutch law it would seem that, in view of the intentional 
co-operation and the acting in concert in the execution of the 
common purpose, the intent of both offenders is to be qualified 
as dolus premedita tus. A. and В. are 'medeplegers', both liable 
for the full. 
7) Callous Disregard as Malice 
C.C.,s.212(c) deals in fact with a degree of negligence, so 
serious under the circumstances of a case, that it becomes the 
mens rea for murder: the offender pursues an unlawful object (the 
accused, a physician, is called upon to perform an abortion). He 
performs the operation, not aware that the woman's pregnancy was 
too far advanced with the result that the surgical procedure be­
came an act 'that he ought to have known' was likely to cause 
death. (He had seen the patient only on¿e, on the day of the 
operation and had not established the stage her pregnancy was in) . 
The woman died. 
The physician escaped a conviction for murder -which was 
seriously considered-, having been given the benefit of the doubt 
in lack of evidence of the circumstance that he knew or ought to 
have known the woman's condition. The conviction was for man-
slaughter. The punishment was the same as for murder: a life term 
(116) In Dutch law it is not likely that a manslaughter charge 
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would have been considered. The treatment -the operation- was not 
maltreatment, but treatment under conditions wherein it should 
not have been attempted. That the physician was not aware of the-
se conditions -where he ought to have been- points to culpa lata. 
It was not an error in judgment after assessing the risks involv-
ed in the procedure, but a faillure to lay the foundation for 
such assessment. It would appear that Sr., art.307, j 0 309 are 
applicable: negligently causing the death of another, committed 
by a physician, that is: a professional in the execution of his 
professional duties. 
8) Imputed Mene Rea 
Mens rea, as discussed, has been made a requirement for ac-
countability either through a clear expression in the description 
of the offence ('intentionally', 'wilfully', 'knowingly', 'mean-
ing to', 'with the intent', etc.) or it has been 'supplied' 
through the use of legal fictions ('transferred', 'constructive', 
'imputed' mens rea). 
Quite another category of offences, to be found in the Code, 
and in a great variety of statutes and regulations, may not even 
refer to mens rea as a requirement for liability, either in clear 
terms or in any terms at all. It is said that this category does 
not require mens rea or, that mens rea is established by the 
simple doing of the forbidden act. 
These are the 'strict liability offences' and since they are 
the real topic of this paper, they will be discussed in detail in 
Part Two. 
9) The Principle of Legality 
The 'Principle of Legality' is expressed in three Latin adages: 
a) nullum crimen sine lege; 
b) nullum crimen sine poena; 
c) nulla poena sine lege (poenali). 
It is to be noted that reference is made to lege and not to 
lege praevia. In Canadian law the passing of an ex post facto law 
is possible as a consequence of the accepted rule that Parliament 
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has supreme legislative powers. A few brief examples may illust-
rate the point in question. 
A trader in foreign currency had contravened certain war-
time regulations relating to his trade. Penalties provided for 
such contraventions had been increased after the date the accused 
committed the offence he was charged with. The defence pleaded 
the nullum principle of non-retro-activity. 
Humphrey J. said: 
"None of these authorities (those relied 
upon by the defence) suggests any doubt about 
the undoubted right of Parliament or of His 
Majesty by Order in Council, so long as it is 
intra vires of the statute which authorizes 
it, to make any alteration in the law which 
is thought right. 
"The doctrine as to the retroactive effect 
of a statute or Order in Council, while I 
fully subscribe to it and would willingly give 
full effect to it in any case where the lang-
uage of the Statute or, as in this case, of the 
Order in Council, under consideration is free 
from ambiguity." (117) 
Humphrey J. then quoted with approval the words of Lord 
Mansfield in Rex v. Jackson: (118) 
"Now it is a general rule that subsequent 
statutes which add accumulative penalties do 
not repeal the former statute." 
In the same case Tucker J. said: 
"Although I do not, I confess, like the 
idea of punishments being increased after 
the offences have been completed, none the 
less, the language is clear, and I think it 
is impossible to escape from its consequences." 
"In this case the amended Regulation did not create an of-
fence where there was none before. It merely increased the 
penalty provided..." 
A person by the name of Soo Gong (119) was apprehended and 
convicted on a charge that he: 
"...on the 31st day of January, A.D.1925 
did unlawfully have in his possession drugs, to 
wit: Cocaine and Morphine without an authority 
or a licence... contrary to the provisions of 
section 4(d) of the Opium and Narcotic Drugs 
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Act 1923..." 
Also, a deportation order was made 
McDonald J. stated 
"... nothing can be clearer than that a man 
cannot be convicted of a statutory crime which 
is only made a crime after the offence has been 
committed." 
The learned judge concluded that the conviction of Soo Gong 
was based on the 1925 re-enactment of the statute, the date of 
which (June 12, 1925) was posterior to the date of the commission 
of the offence (January 31, 1925) and not on the original Act in 
force at the time of the commission of the offence. 
Therefore Soo Gong won his application to regain his freedom 
and the related deportation order was quashed as "based on a bad 
conviction". 
The set of 'nullwn principles' appears to be of great import­
ance not only because their implementation provides the means for 
distinguishing between criminal and non-criminal conduct at any 
given point in time, by providing the citizens with foreknowledge 
regarding which type of conduct is to be avoided in order to 
forestall commission of an offence. They also help prevent judge-
made criminal 'legislation'. 
It would seem that special importance is to be attached to 
implementation of these principles in context with strict liabil­
ity legislation. 
When dealing with strict liability offences, such liability 
-if at all acceptable, or at least inescapable- in view of its 
far reaching consequences, divorced from intent or even culpa, 
becomes more than just a burden as the price we pay for living in 
a highly complex industrialized society. That sort of liability 
should never become a gamble with unknown odds, a kind of legal 
roulette. 
We shall return to these principles when discussing the 
Dutch viewpoints on the matter, especially certain narrower 
delineations such as 'nullurr delictum^ nulla poena sine praevia 
lege poenali ', 'nullum еггтеп sine lege scripta' and 'nullum 
crimen sine lege striata', the latter of which aims at preventing 
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the judge in criminal court from interpreting the criminal law 
through analogies, although exceptions do exist. 
Finally, there is the adage 'nulla poena sine culpa': in 
Dutch criminal law there are no provisions for punishing an actor 
in absence of any culpa, that is, where no fault at all exists. 
Dutch criminal law is a ' s c h u l d s t r a f r e c h t ' , Canadian criminal law 
is a 'Tatstrafvecht '. 
Consequently, strict liability should have no place in Dutch 
criminal law. Yet, strict liability appears to be gaining ground 
as will be demonstrated later. Also, the AVAS defence is not a 
defence lacking exceptions. 
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Excusat aut exténuât delictum in 
capitalibus quod non operatur 
idem in civilibus. 
Вас.Max.г.15 
That may excuse or palliate a 
wrongful act In capital cases 
which would not have the same 
effect in civil injuries. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE DISQUALIFYING FACTORS 
GROUNDS FOR IMPUNITY 
A, GENERAL NOTES 
Before proceeding it should be pointed out that the Canadian 
Сггтгпаі Code does not contain any neat classification of the de­
fences. However, an attempt is made to group the defences, rele­
vant to the main topic of this paper, according to their charac­
teristics. 
The situation the defence faces is not unlike the one the pro­
secution finds itself in. The description of the offence sets out 
the objective and subjective elements constituting an offence; 
the prosecution ('The Crown'), m order to succeed, must prove 
any and all such elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The objective of the defence is to adduce evidence that cre­
ates this reasonable doubt -as a minimum- or even to prove the 
accused's innocence of non-accountability. Such proof is con­
sidered to be complete on the balance of ргоЪаЪъІъіъев, usually 
a somewhat lighter task than that facing the Crown, allowing the 
accused the benefit of reasonable doubt. Where a jury was em­
paneled and the evidence regards matters of fact, it is the com­
mon sense of the jurors that decides such issues. (120) 
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Ια order to stay within the scope of this paper, most of the 
substantive defences (the word is used in its broadest sense: 
counteraction to the Crown's attack) will be referred to summari­
ly. Some of them will be highlighted as being of more direct in­
terest in context with strict liability offences. 
B, CLASSIFICATION OF DEFENCES 
A broad classification of defences may be set up as follows: 
a) Excuses, 
b) Justification, 
c) Exculpation. 
a) The Excuse 
Characteristic for the excuse is, that the conduct of the 
alleged offender remains unlawful, but that his punishment has no 
rational purpose -as seen by various penological doctrines- under 
his particular individual circumstances, on the ground that the 
accused : 
must not be held accountable as a consequence of (1) age or 
(2) insanity (mental disease or disorder), 
or in cases where the accused has no freedom of decision as 
a consequence of (3) necessity, or (4) compulsion (duress). 
We shall briefly look at each of these excuses. 
1) Age 
Age may have one of two consequences where the juvenile of­
fender is concerned: it may either be an excuse, rendering him 
unaccountable, excepting him from any punishment, or it may re­
sult in his incapability to commit a certain offence, where age 
is an objective constitutive element of the offence. (See: 'ex­
culpation', infra). 
C.C., sections 12 and 13 deal with accountability. 
Section 12 reads: 
"No person shall be convicted of an offence 
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in respect of an act or omission on his part 
while he was under the age of seven years." 
This incapacity is absolute, cannot be rebutted and the of-
fender cannot be punished. 
Section 13 reads 
"No person shall be convicted of an offence 
in respect of an act or omission on his part 
while he was seven years of age or more, but 
under the age of fourteen years, unless he was 
competent to know the nature and consequences 
of his conduct and to appreciate that it was 
wrong." 
This incapacity is not absolute, may be rebutted by the 
Crown by proving the juvenile was competent to a certain degree 
in view of all the personal factors influencing the young offend-
er's personality. 
This excuse will not be further discussed. 
2) Insanity 
The excuse of insanity is referred to in C.C., s.16 and its 
substance is based on -but not an exact parallel to- the famed 
M'Naghten Case. (121) 
In fact, where English case law formulates " 'knowing ' the 
nature and quality of a physical act", Canadian case law seeks to 
bring the wording in line with modern day psychological and psy-
chiatric insights and speaks of " 'appreciating ' the nature and 
quality of an act or omission or of 'knowing ' that an act or 
omission is wrong." 
C.C., s.16 reads 
"(1) No person shall be convicted of an 
offence in respect of an act or omission on 
his part while he was insane. 
"(2) For the purpose of this section a 
person is insane when he is in a state of 
natural imbecility or has disease of the 
mind to an extent that renders him incapable 
of appreciating the nature and quality of an 
act or omission or of knowing that an act or 
omission is wrong. 
"(3) A person who has specific delusions, 
but is in other respects sane, shall not be 
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acquitted on the ground of insanity unless the 
delusions caused him to believe in the exist-
ence of a state of things that, if it existed, 
would have justified or excused his act or 
omission. 
"(4) Every one shall, until the contrary 
is proved, be presumed to be and to have been 
sane . " 
The McRuer Report on Insanity (1956) observes that the dis-
tinction between the English and Canadian interpretation and im-
plementation of M'Naghten's rules hinges on the use of the word 
'appreciating ' -as contrasted with 'knowing ' - , that is the capa-
city to foresee and measure the consequences of the conduct. 
Another matter regards the interpretation of the word 
'wrong'. Is this to be understood as 'legal wrong' as in the Eng-
lish case of R, v. Cardinal (122) or as 'moral wrong'? The Report 
proposes that 'wrong' means: wrong not only in the legal sense 
but something that would be condemned "in the eyes of mankind" 
and offers the following consideration: 
"As we conceive it, the function of the crim-
inal law is to regulate relations among the 
Queen's subjects, and it must be viewed from the 
point of view that those who are responsible 
for their acts should be held accountable for 
the protection of society and that those who 
are not responsible should not be held to be 
criminal offenders." 
The Report also contains some criticism of the wording of 
section 16(3): 
"Medical witnesses agree that if a person 
suffers from 'specific delusions' as a result 
of disease of the mind he cannot be 'in other 
respects sane'. 
But the report admitted: 
"... there does not appear to be any reason 
to conclude that there exists any widespread 
dissatisfaction with the law as it is now 
administered." 
Reliance on the 'irresistible impulse' argument -as related 
to insanity- appears to have a bleak future in Canada. Riddell 
H.J. (123) made this quite clear. 
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"Under our law, if a man when he commits an 
act is not by reason of insanity, or disease of 
the mind or imbecility incapable of appreciating 
the nature and quality of the act and of know-
ing it is wrong, he is responsible. 
"The law says to men who say they are afflict-
ed with irresistible impulses: 'If you cannot 
resist an impulse in any other way, we will hang 
a rope in front of your eyes, and perhaps that 
will help' 
"No man has a right under our law to come 
before a jury and say to them, 'I did commit 
that act, but I did it under an uncontrollable 
impulse', leave it at that and then say, 'now 
ac qu it me ' . " 
It is to be noted that under Canadian law no excuse of 
'diminished responsibility' is available as it exists, in some 
cases, in Dutch law. (124) 
The defence of insanity is not a defence that should be pre-
sented lightheartedly. The accused, while escaping imprisonment, 
will in all likelihood end up in an asylum. 
Two further excuses are based on 'lack of freedom of decisi-
on' which may result from two categories of external influences: 
those created by non-human influences etc., leading to the ex-
cuse of 'necessity', or by situations created by human inter-
vention of some kind, leading to the excuse of 'compulsion or 
duress'. 
3) Necessity 
The Canadian code does not define any of the terms mentioned 
but recognizes these excuses in a few provisions. 
Thus in C.C., s.45, dealing with surgical operations: 
"Every one is protected from criminal res-
posibility for performing a surgical operation 
upon any person for the benefit of that person 
if . . . 
"(b) it is reasonable to perform the operat-
ion, having regard to the state of health of the 
person at the time the operation is performed 
and to all circumstances of the case." 
'Reasonable' appears to be synonymous with 'necessary' for 
the benefit of the person and it is a statutory rather than a 
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common law defence The common law defence of necessity seems to 
be available where surgery is part of the procedure to procure 
abortus provocatus as in Morgenthaler v. The Queen (125)(126) and 
in the same case m appeal (127) although in this particular case 
'necessity' as a defence was not accepted for lack of evidence. 
'Reasonable' in section 45 would appear to leave room for 
other options. An operation may be reasonable, but other ways 
to treat a given affliction could also be available. In this view 
the term 'necessity' would not seem to apply but rather something 
approaching 'adequate', 'effective', 'preferential' in lieu of 
'the only inescapable way to treat that affliction'. 
'Necessary' in the sense of 'the only way' may be found in 
C C , S.221 killing an unborn child in the act of birth (before 
it has become a human being) if the actor "in good faith... con­
siders (causing the death of such child)... necessary in order to 
preserve the life of the mother of a child, and causes the death 
of such child." 
In C.C., s.276 publication of defamatory matter may be ex­
cused if it regards matter "(a) that is necessary to publish in 
order to refute defamatory matter published in respect of him by 
another person...", but certain conditions limit the availability 
of the excuse. 
There does not appear to be any clearcut doctrine respecting 
this matter. The 'necessity' of section 45 seems to lack the 
element of inevitability which it appears to have m s.221 and 
276, but in s.276 it suggests a mode of self-defence rather than 
an excuse, with the classic limitation of self-defence "...does 
not in any respect exceed what is reasonably sufficient in the 
circumstances." 
Two cases may illustrate how two separate divisions of the 
same Court, in the same year, came to opposite decisions. Poth 
cases regarded violations of the Game Act of Hew Brunswiak, for­
bidding to kill a moose ('Amerikaanse eland', an impressive 
creature as to size, weight, speed of motion and lack of sense of 
humor) at any time or season. 
In R. v. гскегв (128) the accused, having entered a forest, 
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was attacked by a moose. He shot the charging animal.Subsequently 
he was prosecuted and pleaded self-defence, which plea was not 
accepted by the Court for the following reasons: 
(a) the offence was held to be a strict liability offence; 
(b) the accused entered the forest, knowing it was forbidden 
to kill moose and took, willingly, the chance of being attacked. 
(.'volenti not fit iniuria'? - strictly a tort-law concept: vol­
untary assumption of risk'). 
Vickers was convicted, no doubt asking himself what he 
should have done under the circumstances in order to stay within 
the law. 
The Court reasoned, having the offence identified as a 
strict liability offence, that no defence was available. This is 
not held to be 'good law' since qualification of an offence as a 
strict liability offence, merely excludes the defence of 'mistake 
of fact', leaving other common law defences open. 'Voluntary as­
sumption of risk' is a concept alien to criminal law. 
In the same year R. v. Brean (129) was decided. The fact 
situation was identical to the one in Vickers. Another division 
of the same Court held: offences under the Game Act are not of­
fences of strict liability, and therefore require mens rea -which 
may be rebutted- and leave room for a plea of self-defence. This 
appears to be a rather strange pronouncement where the attacker 
is an animal, not subject to norms of human behaviour. 
In situations such as referred to above, the proper excuse 
is 'necessity'. 
Examples of situations where necessity may provide an excuse 
are: C.C., s.45 (surgical operations, see above), s.198 (persons 
undertaking acts dangerous to human life), s.221 (killing unborn 
child in act of birth), s.251 (abortion). 
'Necessity' as 'leaving no alternative but the violation of 
law to preserve life' was accepted as an excuse in the William 
Gray Саве (130), an American case decided by the New York Circuit 
Court. The case regards a sailing ship under embargo that got 
into a heavy storm and nearly suffered shipwreck. 
In R. v. Dudley & Stephens (131), a case of cannibalism on 
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the high seas, in a lifeboat, where the youngest crew member was 
killed and eaten by the others. 'Necessity' proved to be no ex­
cuse. They received the death penalty but in view of the suffer­
ing already sustained, this sentence was commuted to six months 
imprisonment. 
In R. v. Holmes (132) -another case where a disaster at sea 
plays a role- a crew member who had assisted in throwing passen­
gers out of an overcrowded lifeboat, also pleaded 'necessity' in 
vain, though the Court admitted that 'necessity' may provide a 
defence where no other means are available to solve a crisis. 
Among more recent cases are: R. v. Kitson (133) and P. v. 
Kennedy (134). 
In the first case, the accused, having had too much to drink 
had fallen asleep in the driver's seat of his car. There were no 
keys in the ignition lock. Waking up suddenly, he realized that 
his car was moving, rolling downhill. Taking the steering wheel, 
he manoeuvered the car down the slope onto a grassy patch. He 
was convicted of 'drunken driving'. He also lost an appeal be­
cause the Court found that, as the evidence showed, he was in 
fact 'driving' the car. 'Necessity' as an excuse was ignored. 
However, in the second case, Kennedy was accused of speeding 
-generally held to be a strict liability offence-. His excuse was 
'necessity', because another car at a great rate of speed was 
'tailgating' him and Kennedy did not dare slowing down, afraid of 
being hit. He got off. It was held that under the circumstances 
exceeding the speed limit was a necessity for the preservation of 
life and a valuable piece of property his car. 
4) Compulsion or Duress 
'Compulsion' or 'duress' is a specific form of 'necessity'. 
The common law defence of necessity appears to be available in 
circumstances where a crisis situation has been caused by other 
agents than violence or threat by a human being. In Via Kers and 
Breau it was a charging moose, in The Угіііат Gray it was a 
series of violent storms, in Dudley & Stephenson and in holmes 
it was a shipwreck on the high seas, in Kitíon a parked car 
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started moving downhill. Kennedy would seem to jump out of the 
pattern: it was the other driver tailgating him, that caused a 
situation of immediate danger, but perhaps it could be fitted 
into the pattern by assuming that the emphasis is to be put on 
the pursuing car, moving at high speed, rather than on its driver 
who caused that car to move fast and too close to Kennedy's car 
in front of him. Yet, this explanation may not sound entirely 
satisfactory. Perhaps this case demonstrates that "the rules of 
necessity in Canada, as in most Anglo-American areas, are not yet 
fully developed." (135) 
Compulsion, then, is an excuse in cases where a person is 
forced to react to the behaviour of another person who threatens 
him or subjects him to acts of violence. 
C.C., s.17 sets out when this excuse is available and also 
enumerates specific exceptions: 
"A person who commits an offence under com-
pulsion by threats of immediate death or 
grievous bodily harm from a person who is 
present when the offence is committed is 
excused for committing the offence if he 
believes that the threats will be carried out 
and if he is not a party to a conspiracy or 
association whereby he is subject to compuls-
ion, but this section does not apply where the 
offence that is committed is high treason, 
murder, piracy, attempted murder, assisting 
in rape, forcible abduction, robbery, causing 
bodily harm or arson." 
In addition, section 18 provides: 
"No presumption arises that a married woman 
who commits an offence does so under compulsion 
by reason only that she commits it in the pres-
ence of her husband." 
With respect to incest the following is provided: 
"]50(3) Where a female person is convicted 
of an offence under this section and the court 
is satisfied that she committed the offence by 
reason only that she was under restraint, 
duress or fear of the person with whom she had 
the sexual intercourse, the court is not 
required to impose any punishment upon her." 
In The Queen v. Carker (136) Carker was an inmate in the 
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Oakalla Prison Farm (Pritish Columbia). 
"A substantial body of prisoners, shouting 
in unison from their separate cells, threat­
ened Carker who was not joining in the disturb­
ance, that if he did not break the plumbing 
fixtures in his cell he would be kicked in the 
head, his arm would be broken and he would get 
a knife in the back at the first opportunity." 
Carker gave in to the threats and was subsequently charged 
with and convicted of 'unlawfully and wilfully' damaging public 
property thereby committing mischief. The Court of Appeal set the 
conviction aside and ordered a new trial, m which he was ab­
solved. 
The Supreme Court of Canada restored the сог гсігоп on the 
following grounds 
(1) Carker caused the damage wilfully, (137) 
(2) Carker, in corranittii)g the offence, was protecting him­
self from future harm, 
(3) The defence had not suggested that Carker did not know 
that what he was doing would 'probably' cause damage. 
With due respect this reasoning seems to be difficult to 
understand and accept. Carker, of course, 'wilfully' damaged 
the plumbing m the same sense as Vickers and Preau 'wilfully' 
pulled the triggers of their guns. Is not the issue rather, if 
and to what degree compulsion caused Carker to 'will' doing the 
damage9 
Also, in a prison -a sub-society where threats and violence 
are part of daily life- there is no escape from one's fellow in­
mates. There are periods when the prison population is outside 
their cells. The threat was to do him harm 'at the first oppor­
tunity'. Is this future harm9 But for the confinement of the 
rioters at the time they were compelling Carker to join in that 
general spree of destruction, the threat might have been carried 
out immediately. Under the circumstances 'the first opportunity' 
was as immediate as prison life could provide. 
In an English case, R. v. Hudson & Taylor (138) the accused 
were charged with perjury in a trial of two men; one of them 
wounded the other in the presence of the accused. Under oath they 
-146-
did not identify the attacker. They admitted having lied but 
pleaded the excuse of duress: they had been threatened ("they 
would get her and cut her up") and out of fear, lied in court. 
They received a conditional discharge but appealed their case. 
The Criminal Court of Appeal quashed the convictions. One of 
the reasons? 
"A condition of raising the defence (of 
duress) was said to be that the accused had 
no means, with safety to himself, of preventing 
the execution of the threat." (139) 
This reasoning would have served well in the Carker Case. 
Finally the English case of R. v. Steane (140). 
Before the Second World War Steane was a film actor in Ger-
many, living in Oberammergau with his wife and two sons. He was 
arrested and taken to Berlin, his family remaining at home. In 
January 1940 he entered the service of the German Broadcasting 
System and was involved in broadcasts. 
After the war he was charged under the Dejenoe (General) 
Regulations, Reg.2A. with 'doing acts likely to assist the enemy 
with intent to assist the enemy' and convicted. (Emphasis added). 
The Court of Criminal Appeals quashed the conviction. 
Steane pleaded 'duress': he was in constant fear for the 
well-being of his wife and children, and lack of intent. The 
Court reasoned: 
" (1) As to duress : 
"... very different considerations may apply 
where the accused at the time he did the act 
is in subjection to an enemy power and where 
he is not. British soldiers who were set to 
work on the Burma road, or, if invasion had 
unhappily taken place, British subjects who 
might have been set to work by the enemy dig-
ging trenches would, undoubtedly, have been 
doing acts likely to assist the enemy. It 
would be unnecessary surely in their cases to 
consider any of the niceties of the law 
relating to duress, because no jury would 
find that merely by doing this work they were 
intending to assist the enemy." 
"(2) As to intent: 
"In our opinion, it is impossible to say that 
where acts were done by a person in subjection 
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to the power of another, especially if that 
other be a brutal enemy, an inference that he 
intended the natural consequences of his acts 
must be drawn merely from the fact that he 
did them. The guilty intent cannot be presumed 
and must be proved." 
Yet, the Court did not come out -while quashing the convict-
ion- with a straightforward recognition of the excuse of duress, 
as created by the threats of a 'brutal enemy' and blackmail. 
b) Justification 
Grounds for 'justification' have a different effect. Certain 
conduct, otherwise unlawful, is rendered lawful (i.e.: no crime 
is committed) as a consequence of one of the justifying circum-
stances: performance of a legal duty, exercise of a legal right 
as in defence of self, of another or of property), obedience to 
a lawfully given order or consent. 
1) Performance of a Legal Duty 
Where a legal duty is imposed on a person, he has no choice 
but to perform whatever the law requires him to do, and conse-
quently no liability will attach. (C.C., s.25 et seq.) Section 25 
refers to persons administering and enforcing the law, either as 
a private person or as an official. 
2) Exercise of a Legal Right 
Where a legal right is being exercised -within the limits set 
out in the law- the same reasoning would apply. The difference 
with performance of a legal duty is that a person exercising a 
legal right does have an option whether or not to exercise it. 
The limitations inherent to the exercise of a legal right 
may, perhaps, best be illustrated with respect to self-defence. 
The general rules are to be found in C.C., s.26: 
"Every one who is authorized by law to use 
force is criminally responsible for any excess 
thereof according to the nature and quality of 
the act that constitutes the excess." 
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Self-defence may be justified in various situations. Thus, 
where the defence is directed at an unprovoked assailant: 
(C.C. , S.34:) 
"(1) Every one who is unlawfully assaulted 
without having provoked the assault is justified 
in repelling force by force if the force he 
uses is not intended to cause death or grievous 
bodily harm and is no more than is necessary 
to enable him to defend himself." 
What, if death or bodily harm result from self-defence? 
C.C, s.34 sets the limits: 
"(2) Every one who is unlawfully assaulted 
and who causes death or grievous bodily harm 
in repelling the assault is justified if 
(a) he causes it under reasonable appre-
hension of death or grievous bodily harm from 
the violence with which the assault was ori-
ginally made or with which the assailant 
pursues his purposes, and 
(b) he believes, on reasonable and probable 
grounds, that he cannot otherwise preserve 
himself from death or grievous bodily harm." 
Beyond that, liability remains (murder or manslaughter). 
Similar limitations apply where the accused himself assault-
ed another without justification, although not intending to cause 
death or grievous bodily harm, or where he provoked the assault, 
he may use adequate force against his victim if the latter over-
reacts, but only to prevent death or grievous bodily harm. How-
ever, if at all possible, he is also under the obligation to stop 
the fight and leave the scene. (141) 
Force may also be used to prevent being assaulted by another. 
The key-note remains that excess in the use of force must be 
avoided. 
Similar justifications exist in case of defence of another 
person or of property. Discussion of this topic in any greater 
detail would seem to go beyond the scope of this paper. 
3) Obedience to a Lawfully Given Order 
C.C, S.32 deals with the use of force or the ordering of 
the use of force by peace officers or military personnel, and the 
public in general. 
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There are limitations: the peace officer must believe, in 
good faith and on reasonable grounds, that the use of force he 
orders is necessary and not excessive; the military personnel 
must obey unless the order given is 'manifestly unlawful1... and 
whether an order is manifestly unlawful is a question of law and 
not of fact. 
However, this section deals only with the suppression of ri-
ots, a situation in which even 'every one' may use force in order 
to squelch a riot before a peace officer is on the scene, again 
provided that certain limitations are imposed. 
The crux in situations such as those referred to, where 
human passions and turmoil are manifested, is to determine when 
an order is 'manifestly unlawful'. We shall not enter further in-
to this discussion. 
4) Consent 
In a country where ice-hockey, football (not the Dutch soc-
cer), boxing, wrestling and so on are part of the regular supply 
of panent et circenses for the populace, the justification of con-
sent could hardly be missed. 
Numerous and all too often very serious injuries are being 
inflicted, often with permanent consequences. The public appear 
to hold that part of the attraction of, for instance, ice hockey 
games, are the incidents where players of opposite teams slug it 
out on the ice. Boxing and wrestling -the latter often labeled 
'demonstrations'- result in wounds, some times brain damage. At 
last some flagrant cases are being considered for criminal pro-
secution. 
What is the defence? Consent? 
The Code does not define 'consent' but uses the word in some 
sections, mainly to indicate that it is not a defence. 
Thus in section 140: 
"Where an accused is charged with an offence 
under section 146, 149 or 156 in respect of a 
person under the age of fourteen years, the fact 
that the person consented to the commission of 
the offence is not a defence to the charge." 
Section 146 deals with a female person under fourteen years 
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of age, who consented to sexual intercourse or, section 149, who 
consented to being indecently assaulted while, however, her con-
sent had been obtained 'by false and fraudulent representations 
as to the nature and quality of the act'. Similarly in a case of 
indecent assault on a male, or buggery. 
Section 244 deals with assault and finds application on the 
sports scene: proof of lack of consent is an essential element of 
the offence; where there is an agreement to fight (as in a match) 
there is no lack of consent provided the actions of both parties 
stay within the scope of the consent. (142) 
Section 247 refers to kidnapping of a person and section 248 
deals with abduction of a female person, 'against their will'. Is 
the female abducted under sixteen years of age, the fact that she 
consented to or suggested the abduction is held to be immaterial 
and consent provides no defence. 
Finally, section 14 looks at both persons, at the one giving 
the consent and at the other, acting on it: 
"No person is entitled to consent to have 
death inflicted upon him, and such consent 
does not affect the criminal responsibility 
of any person by whom death may be inflicted 
upon the person by whom the consent is given." 
Quite another matter is the 'color of right' defence where, 
rightly or mistakenly the offender acted under a honest and/or 
reasonable belief that he acted with the consent of another party 
by lack of which his act would have to be qualified as theft.(143) 
Other problems as to mistake of fact and mistake of law are in-
volved. The problem is not further discussed here. See: Regina v. 
Shymkowiah. (144) 
Returning to sports: the old tort law adage 'volenti non fit 
iniuria' appears still to have validity except in prize fights -
"but no athlete should be presumed to accept malicious, unprovok-
ed or overly violent attack." See: R. v. Maki (145) 
c) The Denial Defences 
The defences sofar discussed were 'affirmative defences': 
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the offender admits to the conduct he xs charged with, but pre-
sents either an excuse or a justification. Thus the actor recog-
nizes that the conduct happened as described and charged, and 
that all of the constitutive elements of the offence are present. 
The excuse renders the accused non-punishable; the justification 
renders him not guilty, since his conduct was, for some reason, 
legalized. 
The 'denial defence' claims that one of the constitutive el-
ements -or more, as the case may be- of the offence is missing. 
In other words, the person charged claims that his conduct does 
not (completely) satisfy the description of the offence charged. 
Thus, where mens rea elements of the offence are involved, 
the accused must show that he did not have mens vea; where a 
certain quality is part of the description, that quality may have 
to be denied (for example: not being the father who is under the 
obligation to care for a child, not being a peace officer, and so 
on). Vhere some duty has been neglected, it may be necessary to 
show that no legal duty existed; or mistake and ignorance may, 
under certain circumstances and conditions, be pleaded. 
These various modes are briefly looked at in the following. 
1) Lack of Mena Rea 
Automatism, Somnambulism, Drunkenness 
General Notes 
i- Automatism may be insane or non-insane automatism. 
Where it is non-insane, it may be a symptom in persons suffering 
from "an obscuration of the mental facilities, loss of volition 
or memory, or kindred affections", we read in Black's. 
Insane automatism would have to lead to the excuse of insan-
ity, based on a mental disease or disorder. 
11- Somnambulism or sleepwalking or doing things while 
still under the influence of sleep "whether this is anything mo-
re than a co-operation of the voluntary muscles with the thoughts 
which occupy the mind during sleep is not settled by the physio-
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logists", states Vharton. (14P) 
m ) Drunkenness is "the effect produced upon the mind or 
body by drinking intoxicating liouors to such an extent that the 
normal condition of the subject is changed and his capacity for 
rational action and conduct is substantially lessened." (147) 
Automatism and somnambulism are closely related in that 
somnambulism is one specific form of automatism. 
'
rhe following cases are of interest. 
A man by the name of Fraser killed bis child, who vas sleep­
ing in the same room with bim. ITe was discharged as not respons­
ible after it was established that he vas suffering from somnam­
bulism. (H.M. Advocate v. Fraser) (148) 
A similar verdict was reached in Fain v. Commonwealth.(14°) 
•^ аіп had fallen asleep m a hotel lobby, a public place, having a 
loaded revolver on his person. A sleepwalker since childhood, he 
also was a potentially violent man when suddenly awakened. One of 
the hotel employees, wanting to provide Fain with a room, at­
tempted to wake him up, and was promptly shot and killed by Fain. 
The Court instructed that he should be acquitted if he was un­
conscious or in such a state that he did not comprehend where he 
was and what he was doing. 
More involved was the case of Bratty v. The Attorney General 
for Northern Ireland. (150) 
Bratty drove a girl home in his car, a service he had ren­
dered her many times in the past. Later in the evening of that 
particular day the girl was found dead at the roadside, strangled 
with a stocking taken from her left leg. There had been no sexual 
assault. Bratty explained that he had driven the girl home many 
times before, but that -during that fatal evening's trip- he had 
"some terrible feeling and then a sort of blackness" and that he 
then assaulted and strangled her. 
The jury at trial were asked by the defence to return one of 
three "separate and completely independent verdicts", namely: 
'Not guilty' (which verdict, as the defence suggested, 
was the proper one) because Bratty "was not master of 
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the situation, but he was in a state of automatism"; 
- that Bratty was incapable of forming the particular in-
tent to constitute murder, that is an intent to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm because "his mental conditi-
on was so impaired and confused and he was so deficient 
in reason that he was not capable of forming this in-
tent", and that the verdict should be manslaughter; or 
that Bratty was insane as set out in the M'Naghten rule 
as he was suffering from psychomotor epilepsy. 
At Bratty's trial the judge left only the third verdict to 
the jury, who rejected the defence; he further refused to put the 
two other defences to the jury. Bratty was found guilty of and 
convicted for murder. The case was appealed. 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the first verdict had right-
ly not been left to the jury, who clearly did not accept that 
Bratty's condition could be brought within the M'Naghten rules: 
no medical evidence had been presented "that the conduct of the 
accused might be compatible with psychomotor epilepsy, which is a 
disease of the mind affecting the reason... and could cause ig-
norance of the nature and quality of the act done..." if "medical 
evidence can assign no other cause for that ignorance." 
The Court of Appeal, however, also stated that automatism 
could not only arise from insanity but also from other causes, 
for instance a blow on the head, or -in other words- that there 
exists a form of automatism to be called 'non-insane automatism'. 
The appeal was dismissed and the case went to the House of Lords. 
As a principle, it was stated, the prosecution must prove 
that all the constitutive elements of an offence were present in 
a case. It is up to the defence to prove either insanity or auto-
matism. In the case, the defence had not "laid the necessary 
foundation" to establish another cause for automatism (such as a 
blow to the head) and when the jury rejected insanity, nothing 
else was left to put to the jury but the defence of automatism, 
but automatism had not been established. 
Lord Denning concurred and clarified his decision: 
"No act is punishable if it is done involunt-
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arily; and an involuntary act in this context 
'-some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as 
'automation'- means an act which is done by the 
muscles without any control by the mind such as 
a person who is not conscious of what he is 
doing, such as an act done whilst suffering 
from concussion or whilst sleepwalking." 
However, Lord Denning also stated the parameters: 
"The term 'involuntary act' is capable of 
wider connotations and to prevent confusion 
it is to be observed that in criminal law an 
act is not to be regarded as an 'involuntary 
act' simply because the doer does not remember 
it - as long as he was conscious at the time 
... nor because the doer could not control his 
impulses to do it... or because it is unintent-
ional or its consequences were unforeseen... 
Once you exclude all the cases I have 
mentioned, it is apparent that the category 
of involuntary acts is very limited." 
Drunkenness 
Drunkenness is intoxication through the use of alcoholic 
drinks, but other forms of intoxication by other drugs come under 
the same category. The essence is that the effect of the drug 
used is such as to impair the mind and body to such a degree as 
to render the offender "incapable of forming one of those specif-
ic intents" -required for commission of the offence charged- and 
"it logically follows that he didn't have the necessary criminal 
intent when he did the act and not having the intent he is to be 
found not guilty." (R. v. Hartridge) (151) 
Two questions need clarification: 
a) what kind of intent may be affected by intoxication? 
b) what kind(s) of intoxication, voluntary or involuntary, 
may affect intent while allowing the defence? 
As to question (a): again the matter of distinguishing be-
tween general and specific (or particular) intent is important. 
In the Hartridge Case Culliton C.J.S. stated: 
"While there is ample authority that when, 
through the voluntary consumption of alcohol, 
the accused is rendered incapable of forming 
a specific intent (emphasis added) where the 
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existence of such intent is essential to 
constitute the offence... this will be a 
defence to that particular charge. I can find 
no authority, however, that the same circum-
stances would be a defence to a criminal act 
where mens rea is an essential element of the 
offence as distinct from a specific intent. 
What authority there is indicates that 
voluntary drunkeness, even to the point where 
the accused is acting in a state of automatism, 
would not be a defence in the latter case." 
As a result a charge of murder -requiring specific intent-
would be reduced to a charge of manslaughter. See: Director of 
Publia Prosecutions v. Beard (152) 
"... this does not mean that the drunkeness 
in itself is an excuse for the crime but that 
the state of drunkeness may be incompatible 
with the actual crime charged and may therefore 
negative the commission of that crime. 
In a charge of murder based upon intention 
to kill or to do grievous bodily harm, unlawful 
homicide with malice aforethought is not establ-
ished and he cannot be convicted of murder. 
But nevertheless unlawful homicide has been 
committed by the accused, and consequently he is 
guilty of unlawful homicide without malice afore-
thought, and that is manslaughter." 
This decision was quoted by Widgery L.J, in R. v. Lipman 
(153) who then said: 
"Self-induced intoxication is accordingly 
no defence." 
As to question (b): what kinds of intoxication, voluntary or 
involuntary, may affect intent? 
Involuntary intoxication may take various forms: at a party 
someone, by way of a prank, spikes the non-alcoholic drink of an-
other who is a non-drinker, because he knows that alcohol affects 
him, even when taken in small quantities; someone takes anti-hist-
amines for a cold, not realizing that in many cases they induce 
drowsiness; or a man visits his dentist, gets an anaesthetic 
-sodium pentcthal-, and when driving home, is involved in a car 
accident, as in R. v. King (154) 
In this case Taschereau J. stated: (it was a charge of driv-
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ing while impaired). 
"Intention is not an element of driving while 
impaired by liquor or drugs, when the offender 
takes liquor or drugs... (but) 
"When a doctor has given an injection of a 
drug to a patient, who is not aware of the 
state of mind it may produce, there is no 
volitive act done by the driver and he cannot 
be conv icted . " 
Of some special interest in this case is that King was 
warned after the treatment, while still in the dentist's room, 
and potentially while yet under influence of the drug injected, 
in two different ways: he was asked to sign a printed form stat-
ing: "Patients are cautioned not to drive after anaesthetic un-
til head clears"; furthermore, when the treatment was finished 
he paid his bill -by writing a cheque- to a nurse who gave him a 
similar warning to which King replied that he intended to walk. 
At the trial the nurse stated that King appeared to be perfectly 
normal. 
All King remembered was getting into his car, starting driv-
ing and nothing else. He became unconscious and rear-ended a 
parked car. He did not recall hearing any warning or signing any 
form. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal. 
2) Violation of the Principle of Legality 
The 'Principle of Legality' states that no crime exists 
where the law does not qualify certain conduct as criminal, that 
no crime should go without punishment and that no punishment 
should be meted out except that provided by law. 
If any of these precepts were violated, that is: if a person 
should be charged with a crime under the provisions of English 
common law not covered by C.C., s.7(l), or if an offender was not 
punished as provided by law prescribing, for example, a mandatory 
penalty (such as mandatory loss of a driver's licence for certain 
periods of time under the Highway Traffic Act) or, finally, where 
an accused was punished with a penalty not provided by law, he 
would have a defence. 
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3) Mistake and Ignorance 
Since mens rea -where it is the decisive element in the 
assessment of a person's conduct- involves the mind of the actor, 
any influence on the mind becomes a factor to be assessed when 
establishing an actor's culpability. Thus, defences such as com-
pulsion or duress and necessity aim at demonstrating that the 
mens pea the accused appeared to have, was not generated as a re-
sult of a freely made decision. 
Vickers (155), Breau (156), Dudley and Stephens (157), Kit-
son (158), Kennedy (159), Steane (160), and numerous others, all 
claimed some form of external pressure, decisive for the genesis 
of their mens rea. Where successful, the success affirmed that a 
mind, not made up freely, is not a guilty mind. 
'Mistake' and 'ignorance' also influence the mind in that 
they project a state of affairs, as to facts, or an understanding 
of what the law requires or permits, which is not correct and 
does not correspond to reality, factual or legal. 
The distinction between mistake and ignorance of fact or law 
is of considerable importance. The primary question is: does any 
of the two, or both, provide a defence? Before answering this 
question, the following semantics must be dealt with. 
What is mistake? There appears to be a distinction in mean-
ing between the terms 'mistake (error) in fact' and 'mistake (er-
ror) in law' at one hand, and the terms, respectively, 'mistake 
(error) of fact' and 'of law', at the other. We shall use the 
word 'mistake' in the following. 
Where the terms 'mistake in fact or in law' are used, the 
situation these words relate to appears to be a situation that 
could only exist in court proceedings. Thus, a mistake in fact 
means: "... in judicial proceedings" a mistake "in fact occurs 
when, by reason of some fact which is unknown to the court and 
not apparent on the record (infancy, death of a party) it renders 
a judgment which is void or voidable". See: Cruger v. MoCraaken. 
(161) 
A 'mistake in law' means: "An error of the court in apply-
ing the law to a case on trial, e.g. in ruling on the admission 
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of evidence, or in charging the jury." (162) 
Where the parties themselves are 'in error' or 'under a mis-
take', the words appear to relate to what was in their minds whi-
le doing certain things. 
Thus: 'a mistake of fact' means an error "which proceeds 
either from ignorance of that which really exists or from a mis-
taken belief in the existence of that which has none".See: Norton 
v. Marden. (163) 
A 'mistake of law' means that a person is "under an error of 
law, who is truly informed of the existence of facts, but who 
draws from them erroneous conclusions of lau", (emphasis added). 
See: Mowatt v. Wright. (164) 
Although the terms referred to appear to be used indiscrim-
inately as far as the words 'in' or 'of' are concerned, in this 
paper, dealing with criminal law, the terms 'error' or 'mistake' 
of fact or law will be used. 
What is Ignorance? 
Ignorance is absence of knowledge, either with respect to 
facts or to law, as opposed to error or mistake, indicating that 
one has wrong information. Ignorance and mistake are not synonym-
ous. Error may be caused by ignorance; ignorance does not neces-
sarily imply that error was the basis for it. 
In what way do mistake or ignorance of fact and of law af-
fect the accused? The problems raised by this question are mani-
fold and complex. Often one of them is, how to identify whether a 
given datum, for instance: 'possession', is a matter of law or 
fact. The following attempts to provide a brief review of modern 
day opinions on this matter. 
The essence of denial defences is that they aim at attacking 
one or more of the constitutive elements of the offence charged. 
Where defences of mistake or ignorance aim at the subjective 
element of mens rea, they attack the suggestion of presence of 
knowledge itself ('any one who knowingly...) or of other forms of 
mens rea based on knowledge of some kind, such as intent, fraud, 
will. In the event this attack is successful, mens rea is negated 
However, in offences based on negligence, where negligence 
-159-
is assumed to take the place of mens rea, or perhaps it should be 
said: to supply mens rea, mistake or ignorance provide no defence 
unless they were honest and justified. 
In strict liability offences, however, no form of mens rea 
is required at all. Doing the forbidden act is sufficient reason 
for liability. Error or ignorance offer no defence, where an ab-
solute liability offence is involved. 
One of the problems is how to define the word 'fact' and, 
particularly, to ask the question: "is the law a fact" in the 
sense that 'it is knowable and as objective a datum as any em-
pirical fact'? Accepting the proposition that 'the law is a fact' 
appears to bring both terms, fact and law, under one and the same 
denominator. Yet, for many reasons the distinction is of import-
ance. This matter is of interest, not as material for an exercise 
in semantics but for the simple reason that the basic difference 
between fact and law may lead to conclusions that are miles apart 
when considering the effects of ignorance and error in both 
areas. Also, the matter is of specific interest in context with 
offences of strict liability. 
Ever since legal principles have been formulated in either 
classic or neo-classic catch-phrases, law and fact have been un-
derstood as being different things, being in different corners. 
Webster's Dictionary, one of the jurist's aids of interpret-
ation, defines 'law' as: 
"Rule of action and conduct imposed by 
superior authority, enjoining what is right and 
prohibiting what is wrong... a body of customary 
or enacted rules and practices, the observance 
of which is sanctioned and enforced by the sup-
reme governing body in a state, and which are 
recognized by the community as binding ("the 
laws of England")... a specific enactment... 
branch of knowledge (legal science)... body of 
rules, usages, principles; procedure, action, 
behaviour, recognized and observed by custom and 
usage as correct..." 
Nowhere the word 'fact' is used to define 'law'. 
Turning now to 'fact', again quoting Webster's: 
"Something done, a deed, act; something that 
has happened, an event... something, some object 
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or condition chat actually exists in space... 
something that has been experienced... something 
adduced as truth... the quality of being actual... 
established by actual experience as distinguished 
from theory, speculation or the creation of fancy 
... a circumstance presented as part of a case 
in a court of law as having actually occurred, 
and proved by evidence, as distinguished from 
the legal effect or bearing of such occurrence." 
Again, no identification whatever of law and fact as being 
synonymous. 
In legal practice the distinction is clearly demonstrated in 
the old adage that 'questions of fact are for the jury, questions 
of law for the judge to decide'. The distinction would make no 
sense if the two words were synonyms. 
Law may lead to fact. One may know for a fact that a certain 
couple is married; the quality of being married can exist only 
when the couple went through a recognized form of marriage. If 
they did not, they are not married. The same legal rule (law) 
may lead to two different results: compliance leads to marriage; 
non-compliance does not. The resulting facts are diametrically 
opposite. 
Saying that 'law' is a 'fact', as knowable and as objective 
a datum as any empirical fact, does not convey any other message 
than: it is equally possible to know law and facts. But, what 
does 'knowing (the) law' mean? Is it, to know that a certain law 
exists, such as in the rule that the existence of foreign laws 
is a matter of fact? Does it also mean: 'to be aware of the con­
tents of the law'? Does it include knowledge as to how various 
courts interpret the same rule in different ways at different 
times? Such kinds of questions one finds raised in connection 
with offences of strict liability. 
Clearly, of olden days some notion of the distinction be­
tween law and fact has been expressed in maxims such as: 
"Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia iuris non excusat" от, in 
the words to be found in 1 Coke, 177; Broom, Max.253: "Every man 
must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no 
saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance may not be carried" 
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Although this maxim has the flavour of being inspired by pract­
ical policy making rather than by philosophizing about the matter 
it presents an easy rule of thumb, to close juridical escape 
hatches by way of an casually made statement such as: "I did not 
know', as easily made as the statement we have quoted before: "I 
could not help myself, I was under an irresistible compulsion..." 
However, here we would not dangle any rope in front of the 
offender's nose, where the offence is of a statutory or regulato­
ry nature... contained in tens of thousands of sections existing 
at present and yet increasing month by month, constituting the 
bulk of today's legislatory pollution. 
Maxims have the disturbing habit sometimes of being contra­
dictory and pitting them against each other is a cynic's true 
pleasure. "Ignovantia legis neminem excusat" but also: "Ignoran-
tia iuris sui non praeiudiaat iuri", and "Ignorare leges est lata 
culpa"...от 'gross neglect', but there are defences against neg­
lect. (165)(166). 
In a democracy, where the voters are held to be part of the 
legislative process through their elected representatives, it is 
logical to assume that, eo ipso, the voters should know what laws 
exist and are in the process of being enacted, This, too, is a 
fiction, but perhaps an unavoidable fiction. Enactments are publ­
ished; who wants to know, has the possibility of knowing, at 
least in theory. Practically, however, it is impossible. One 
glance at the sheer avalanche of federal, provincial and municip­
al enactments, one glance only at the tax legislation -affecting 
literally everyone and where continuous changes are the rule ra­
ther than the exception, or one glance at consumer protection 
legislation, will make it clear that this fiction is just what 
the word indicates: a legal fiction of which Webster says: "Some­
thing assumed to be a fact, irrespective of whether it is or not, 
in order to avoid some technical difficulty." 
And technical difficulties there are: one only has to read 
the divergent opinions regarding some issue, held by legal scien­
tists, judges of the highest courts, lawmakers at any level. 
Where does the layman stand, assumed to know what the law is and 
what the law attempts to tell him in order to govern his conduct 
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in society and avoid being summoned to appear in a criminal court 
room? Up to that happy moment when more sophistication and more 
clarity will pervade the territory of legislation and judiciary, 
the people must live with these fictions and the assumptions they 
spawn. The matter is urgent where offences of strict liability 
are involved. Though it may appear a contradictory statement at 
this page, it might well be that in that area, ignorance of law 
or mistake of law -under certain conditions- must not provide a 
defence, and neither should ignorance or mistake of fact. This 
matter will be brought up again in Part Two. 
Before leaving the present topic, we should have another 
look at ignorance and mistake of law and fact. 
Ignorance, that is: lack of information of what the law sets 
out as rules for human conduct and a mistake as to what the leg-
islator's intentions were, when he enacted certain rules, appear 
to be treated in a manner similar to the one applied to ignorance 
or mistake of fact. 
In R. v. Villeneuve (166 ) ignorance or a mistake of law pro-
vided the accused with no defence in a charge of driving a car 
while his licence was revoked. He was apprehended before the re-
quired notification had reached him. Revocation under the circum-
stances was mandatory, and the accused -assumed to be cognizant 
of the relevant statutory provisions- was held to know that his 
'privilege' of driving a motorvehicle had been revoked regardless 
whether he had been notified officially, notification not being a 
requirement under the circumstances. Sufficient numbers of driv-
ers had suffered the same fate and this Villeneuve should have 
known. 
In P. v. MaoLean (167) the accused's driver's licence had 
been suspended because of his refusal to take a breathalizer test, 
an offence followed by automatic revocation. Employed as an air-
port radar maintenance man, he drove his maintenance truck on 
airport grounds, known to be federal property. Aware of the re-
vocation of his licence, he phoned the Registrar of Motorvehicles 
and was told that for driving on government property he did not 
need a licence, but solely permission from his employer. This he 
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had. Involved, at the airport, in a rear-end collision, he was 
charged with 'driving while disqualified' (168) 
The accused had made a conscious effort to find out what his 
legal situation was. He had made inquiries at the office of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted police (R.C.M.P.) who had given their per-
mission since in their information he did not need a licence for 
driving on airport grounds. 
Although C.C., s.19 states: "Ignorance of the law by a per-
son who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that 
offence", MacLean was held having established his bona fide ef-
fort to gain knowledge about a difficult and not easily trace-
able point of law. He relied on what he was told by knowledgeable 
people and should be excused. Clearly, s.19 is not as absolute 
as the text of the regulation would suggest. 
There are other situations leading to exceptions, such as 
where a man has sexual intercourse with a woman believing her to 
be his wife, or a man disposes of property he thinks his own. 
Ignorance and error are closely related and the area of error is 
the law. It appears to be settled that a mistake as to whether 
some conduct is or is not punishable, provides no defence. 
The ignorance/mistake problems are multifaceted and diverg-
ing opinions abound. One of the main problems is lack of defin-
ition of 'fact' and 'law', lack of distinction between 'ignorance 
and error'; lack of delineation of their various ambits and lack 
of legislation affixing clearcut legal consequences to the use of 
these terms in their more precise usage. 
Ignorance or mistake of fact offer a defence. Again the 
'claim of right' or 'color of right' defence surfaces. Thus in 
the Shymkowich Case (169) where law and fact seem to merge. In 
this case Fauteux J. said that the claim of right must be a hon-
est one, thoug it may be unfounded in law or in fact, and Rand 
L.J. stated that, where an accused is asserting a claim of own-
ership, "a claim to ownership of a chattel, althoug it may de-
pend on matter of law, is, in most cases, a question of fact, or 
its legal basis may in the ordinary sense of the word, be sub-
sumed in fact." A belief must be 'honest and reasonable' regard-
ing "the existence of facts which, if true, would have constit-
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uted a defence. (170) 
Where does the layman, attempting to weave his way past so 
many mantraps, trying to stay on the straight and narrow, go for 
advice? 
To legal counsel? 
"If the ignorance of counsel would exclude 
violations of the criminal lav, the more 
ignorant counsel could manage to be the more 
valuable and sought for, in many cases, would 
be his advice." 
"If advice of counsel could afford immunity 
to one accused of the violation of a penal 
statute, it would result in the advice of an 
attorney being paramount to the law." (171) 
To the Courts? 
"There is no case cited, nor can we find one, 
on diligent search, holding that the decision 
of an inferior court can be relied upon to 
justify the defendant in a criminal case in the 
commission of the act which is alleged to be 
a cr ime. 
"We are disposed to hold with the O'Neil 
case that, when the court of highest jurisdict-
ion passes on any given proposition, all citi-
zens are entitled to rely upon such decision; 
but we refuse to hold that the decisions of any 
court below, inferior to the Supreme Court, 
are available as a defence..." (172) 
In other words: a citizen must not only know the law, but 
must also be aware of what the highest court has held that law to 
be saying. 
Yet, there appears to be some light at the end of the tunnel 
and it is not the light of an oncoming train. "There is no pre-
sumption in this country that every person knows the law; it 
would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so", said 
Maule J. (172a) and Abbott C.J. mused: "God forbid that it should 
be imagined that an attorney, or a counsel, or even a judge is 
bound to know all the law" -it would create a host of liability 
problems in all such cases where he would not know the law.'(172b) 
The same justice is credited with the observation, says Glanville 
Williams, that "everybody is presumed to know the law except His 
Majesty's judges, who have a Court of Appeal set over them to put 
-165-
them right". Lord Mansfield had the practizing fraternity in mind 
when he stated: "It would be very hard on the profession, if the 
law was so certain, that everybody knew it." (172c) 
Glanville Williams adds his own observation: "The idea that 
the vast network of governmental controls can be known by every-
one is today more ludicrous than ever." (172d). 
With all of this we agree wholeheartedly for reasons we 
shall return to in Part Two. 
Culpa lata dolo a e quip ar e tur·. 
Gross negligence Is held 
equivalent to intentional wrong. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
NEGLIGENCE 
A. NEGLIGENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW 
a) Negligence Defined 
A discussion of negligence is impossible, as it would seem, 
without summoning the 'Reasonable Man' onto the scene, a man who 
has attained an unimpeachable position in legislation and juris-
prudence, as well as in pleadings and legal writing. We shall 
consider him only in his role in criminal law, although it would 
appear that his main area of exemplification of civic virtues is 
in tort law. 
In his book, Uncommon Law, A.P. Herbert, tongue-in-cheek, in 
summing up this fictitious person's extraordinary qualities, 
wrote: 
"Devoid, in short, of any human weakness, 
with not one single saving vice, sans prejudice, 
procrastination, ill-nature, avarice, and ab-
sence of mind, as careful for his own safety 
as he is for that of others, this excellent but 
odious creature stands like a monument in our 
Courts of Justice vainly appealing to his 
fellow citizens to order their lives after his 
own example." (173) 
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In other words: The Reasonable Man is not 'for real'. 
Closer to what appears attainable by mere human creatures is 
what Laidlaw J. said in Arland & Arland v. Taylor (174) 
"He is a person of normal intelligence who 
makes prudence a guide to his conduct. He does 
nothing that a prudent man would not do and does 
not omit to do anything a prudent man would do.t 
He acts in accord with general and approved 
practice. His conduct is guided by considerations 
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human 
affairs. His conduct is the standard 'adopted 
in the community by persons of ordinary intel-
ligence and prudence'" 
In criminal law society deals with everyday people, with 
their weaknesses, limitations and defects. They, at times, fail 
to understand, know, appreciate what the law says, requires of 
them, commands them to do or not to do. But they should... it 
represents practising their duty of care reflecting the standards 
of care in a given society. It includes the art of foreseeing the 
relationship between cause and effect. Negligence is the negation 
of all of that, and more. It is indifference, under certain circ-
umstances deteriorating into wanton and reckless disregard, which 
characterizes criminal negligence. 
Negligence may play a role where a moral wrong is hardly -if 
at all- involved. Negligence is the failure to live up to socie-
ty's standards, however expressed and in which ever way formulat-
ed to suit particular circumstances or situations. Reflecting 
human weakness, it is at the foundation of the absolute liability 
concept. "He who will not be ruled by the rudder, must be ruled 
by the rock". 
The law addresses everyone, including those who by nature, 
background, lack of education, bad habits, lack of backbone, 
failing health -mental or physical-, are stupid, short tempered, 
nervous, lazy, indecisive, irresponsible. 
Also, the level of care required may vary with given situ-
ations, with the role a person plays in society, with the more or 
less serious consequences resulting from want of care. This al-
most sounds like tort law and it is unavoidable. Many offences 
where negligence plays a role, do not only have penal relevance; 
they cause harm either to society at large or to the individual 
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and the matter of damages is raised. This is where tort law comes 
in, in an effort to assess and assign responsibility and perhaps 
distribute the losses. For a action in tort, damages must be 
proven. Mere negligence, causingnno damage to any party, is not 
actionable civilly. (175) Penal law, however, does not depend on 
damages for prosecution. 
b) Degrees of Negligence? 
In view of the above: are there 'degrees of negligence'? 
Is the classic quantification of 'culpa levissima, culpa levis, 
culpa lata' valid? Is 'gross negligence' any worse than just 
felight negligence'? Or is negligence a notion which admits of no 
quantification, only meaning 'lack of appropriate care in view of 
specific circumstances'? 
It would appear that the latter view has found some accept-
ance. See, for instance, Cowper v. Struder (176). Gross negligen-
ce is defined as "very great negligence in the circumstances of a 
particular case". And in Wilson v. Brett (177) Baron Rolfe quali-
fied gross negligence as "ordinary negligence with the addition 
of a vituperative epithet". Judge Magruder (178) is said to have 
explained the difference between negligence, gro s negligence and 
recklessness as being the distinction between: "a fool, a damned 
fool and a God-damned fool". 
Certain situations, such as driving late at night in bad 
weather while fatigued, demand of a person to take more than just 
ordinary care and should perhaps lead to the decision not to 
drive at all. Lack of foresight and appreciation of the risks 
created, misjudging a danger potential or overestimating one's 
level of endurance, may constitute a "very marked departure from 
the standard of responsible and competent drivers". (179) 
It seems that the term 'lack of due care', that is: care 
applied in respect of a given set of particular circumstances, or 
such care as the level of importance of the protected interest 
would demand -that is 'appropriate care', would seem to be more 
proper than words expressing a gradation in negligence. Nonethe-
less, we shall use them, since they will be found in numerous 
cases as well as in academic writing. 
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с ) Negligence and Intention 
Are 'negligence' and 'intent' mutually exclusive? Could a 
person be aware of being negligent and yet act or continue acting 
and is he than still negligent? 
Apart from criminal negligence, which embodies its own in­
tent, is there a form of negligence to be called 'wilful' negli­
gence? Could a person have the determination to act in a certain 
way, knowing his act is negligent? It is rather hard to conceive 
for if he knows and yet acts, he is acting wilfully, but may not 
be concerned about the consequences. He has intent in a similar 
way as the co-conspirator-bank robber who knows that his partner 
has a weapon on him. He is not concerned whether the partner will 
or will not use it. He shares his partner's intent and liability. 
What if a person knows that his character make-up is such 
that it is his 'second nature' to be forgetful, absent-minded, 
easily distracted or sloppy? This form of knowing really means: 
through experience and knowledge of self he is aware of his sec­
ond nature. He even may struggle with himself to correct the sit­
uation, but only be partially successful. It would seem that on 
such a person rests a particular general duty of care. But what 
about the 'accident-prone' person? 
This brings up the matter of 'advertent' and 'inadvertent' 
negligence. Again, the terms are difficult to fathom. They were 
used by Cartwright C.J.C, in his -dissenting- judgment in Peda v. 
The Queen. (180) 
Peda was a cab driver in Toronto, Ontario, charged with 
dangerous driving -at a high rate of speed- down an exit 
lane of a multi-lane highway. When a car in front of him 
slowed down, brake lights glowing. Peda applied his brakes 
but lost control of his cab and a collision resulted. Both 
Peda and his passenger testified that the last thing they 
saw consciously, were the brake lights of the car in front. 
His main line of defence was that the sudden applic­
ation of the brakes by the driver ahead of him, caused him 
to lose control. The jury did not accept this explanation, 
but blamed the event on the excessive speed Peda was driv­
ing at. They concluded Peda was guilty of dangerous driv­
ing as in C.C., s.233(4), criminal negligence in operat­
ing a motorvehicle. 
Cartwright C.J.C, appears to identify 'criminal negligence' 
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with 'advertent negligence' and the meaning of 'advertent' comes 
very close to 'awareness of negligence', that is 'recklessness'. 
Since criminal negligence represents intent per se, advertent 
negligence has clearly the same capacity and is the other facet 
of mens rea, the twin of intent. Cartwright said: 
"So long as it is the law that a necessary 
ingredient of the offence of dangerous driving 
is 'advertent negligence' it is essential that 
the trial judge should so instruct the jury in 
all cases in which on the evidence they might 
properly find that the conduct of the accused, 
while dangerous in fact, did not involve 
'advertent negligence...' 
"I do not mean by this that the judge should 
employ the adjectives 'inadvertent' and 'advert-
ent'; but he must, in my view, bring home to the 
jury that in order to convict they must be 
satisfied that there was 'negligence of sufficient 
gravity to lift the case out of the civil field 
into that of the Criminal Code....', something 
more than mere inadvertence or mere thoughtless-
ness or mere negligence or mere error in judg-
ment... that there was on the part of the accused 
'knowledge' or wilful disregard of the probable 
consequences or a deliberate failure to take 
reasonable precautions." 
'Inadvertent', then, equals 'unintentional negligence' or 
simply: 'negligence'. Looking again at Cartwright's dictum, at 
the words "negligence of sufficient gravity to lift the case out 
of the civil field", the question arises: does this mean that 
non-criminal negligence is exclusively a civil term, a term be-
longing in the law of torts? Does negligence-as-inadvertence have 
any place in criminal law? In the so-called 'quasi-criminal' law, 
that is in statutory or regulatory offences perhaps? These are 
questions to be gone into in context with strict liability. 
Negligence, the duty of care and the standard of care in 
society are closely interrelated. What if negligence could be at-
tributed to a group of persons engaged in a shared pattern of 
activity? For instance, traffic regulations and driver training 
emphasize the need for drivers of cars on a highway to keep at a 
certain distance from oneanother, in function of the speed driven 
and circumstances such as road conditions, the weather, the time 
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of day. One look at the highways, during rush hour, suffices to 
see how drivers in general behave as a group. The individual 
driver, attempting to stay with the traffic regulations, may act-
ually create a greater risk by so doing than when he would simply 
drive in harmony with the pack. Ey going slower he is irritating 
drivers behind him or in parallel lanes. The impatient ones will 
weave around him, cut in front of him, reduce the distance be-
tween their car and his to a few feet of separation. 
On a hilly, winding road, a two lane highway with solid 
double lines forbidding all passing, the driver attempting to 
keep to the maximum speed limit, knows from experience how his 
colleagues will react: they will tailgate him, pass him under the 
most risky conditions, uphill or in a curve, at night flicking 
their highbeams on and off or even keep them on steadily. 
Is this cautious driver a person who acts outside the stand-
ards practically set by the driving community, even is he is in-
side of the law? Is he, practically, a source of danger? Does 
'due care' in his case mean: stepping on the accelerator? Is he 
under compulsion and is that his defence for going over the speed 
limit? If he continues driving, is he then advertently negligent 
in view of the risks he creates and takes? Is he 'reckless'? 
In his Criminal Lau Glanville Williams states: (181) 
"Recklessness as to consequence occurs when 
the actor does not desire the consequence, but 
foresees the possibility and consciously takes 
the risk. In inadvertent negligence, on the 
other hand, there is no such foresight. For many, 
if not most, legal purposes recklessness is 
classed with intention. 
"It is like intention in that the consequence 
is foreseen, but the difference is that whereas 
in intention the consequence is desired, or is 
foreseen as a certainty, in recklessness it is 
foreseen as possible or probable but not desired. 
"If the actor foresaw the probability of the 
consequence he is regarded as reckless, even 
though he fervently desired and hoped for the 
exact opposite of the consequence, and even 
though he did his best (short of abandoning his 
main project) to avoid it." 
Of course, the answer to the above questions regarding the 
cautious driver is, that one must stay within the law, but some-
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how that answer triggers more questions. 
d) Casus or Accident 
The unusual, unforeseen, unexpected, unlooked for event, not 
caused by intent or negligence, is an 'accident' ('casus'). 
Accident excludes negligence: 
"... an accident is an event which occurs 
without the fault, carelessness, or want of 
proper circumspection of the person affected, 
or which could not have been avoided by the 
use of that kind and degree of care necessary 
to the exigency and in the circumstances in 
which he was placed." (182) 
In R. v. Finney (183) the accused was an attendant in a lun-
atic asylum and charged with bathing the patients, among whom was 
a man by the name of Watkins. When having finished with Watkins, 
Finney told him to get out of the bath, knowing that Watkins was 
capable of understanding an order. Finney's attention was divert-
ed by a newly appointed attendant, who asked a question. Being in 
another room, from where he could not see Watkins, and assuming 
that the latter had left the bathtub, he turned the water back on 
-it was the hot water- and Watkins died some time after from the 
burns sustained... for he had not left the bathtub. 
Lusk J. instructed the jury as follows: 
"Now, if the prisoner, seeing that the man 
was in the bath, had knowingly turned on the 
tap and turned on the hot water instead of the 
cold water, I should have said there was gross 
negligence, for he ought to have looked to see; 
but from his own account he had told the deceas-
ed to get out and thought he had got out. 
"If you think that indicates gross careless-
ness, then you should find the prisoner guilty 
of manslaughter; but if you think it inadvert-
ence not amounting to culpability, or what is 
properly called an accident, then the prisoner 
is not liable." 
The verdict of the jury was: 'not guilty'. 
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В. NEGLIGENCE IN TORT LAW 
This paper is concerned with criminal law only. Tort law, 
the law regarding 'civil wrong(s)' is concerned with assessment, 
quantification and distribution of a loss, sustained by a victim 
of a tortious act committed by another. 
Prosecution of a person for an offence that at the same time 
constitutes such tortious act (for example: 'assault') does not 
bar a civil claim for damages. However, the primary question is: 
if a penal statute sets out certain rules in order to protect 
society, imposing certain duties on its members, is there at the 
same time and by virtue of the same statute, created a corrollary 
right for the benefit of the victim of non-compliance with that 
statute? 
The answer depends upon how the legislator has expressed any 
intention in that direction. If no intention was expressed, the 
answer becomes the result of interpretation of the statute, and 
"an interpretation of the statute, according to ordinary canons 
of construction, will rarely yield a necessary implication pos­
itively giving a civil remedy." Thus Dixon J. in O'Connor· v. 5. P. 
Bray Ltd. (184) 
In the same case Dixon J. said: 
"In the absence of a contrary legislative 
intention, a duty imposed by statute to take 
measures for the safety of others seems to be 
regarded as involving a correlative private 
right, although the sanction is penal, because 
it protects an interest recognized by the 
general principles of the common law." 
In tort law notions such as duty of care, standard of care, 
negligence, intent, a number of defences, run more or less paral­
lel with those notions as used in criminal law. 
-174-
Causa vaga et incerta non 
est causa rationabilis. 
5 Coke, 57 
A vague and uncertain cause 
is not a reasonable cause. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CAUSALITY 
A. CAUSATION DEFINED 
Both the criminal conduct and its consequence are objective 
constitutive elements of the offence. The link between them, the 
attributability of the consequence to the conduct is the object 
of the numerous doctrines of causality. 
Unless distinctions are made, the chain of causal factors 
has neither beginning nor end and thus no relevance to the gener-
al purpose of the criminal law. 
Many doctrines have been developed in order to define the 
concept of causation and to give it practical delimitations. 
Thus, causation is said to be either physical (the doing of 
a particular thing by the actor) or psychological (the creation 
of some effect through another person, through exertion of some 
influence on another person). This distinction, however, leaves 
the question regarding the essence of causation begging. 
The definition needed is a practical one, relevant to the 
functioning of the criminal law, enabling the prosecution to 
point a finger at a person, saying: "Your conduct caused the un-
desirable consequence; therefore you are liable and punishable". 
There is the famed 'but for'-test: "One fact or event... is 
a cause of another when the first fact is indispensable to the 
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existence of the second", (185). "In the trial of controversies 
this means that a defendant should not be charged with respons-
ibility for a plaintiff's harm unless we can conclude with some 
degree of assurance that the harm could not have occurred in the 
absence of the defendant's misconduct." 
Although this is tort law language, pointing out the "bare 
minimum requirement for imposing liability", the language is use-
ful in criminal law too. The problem to find the right definition 
is still with us. "Unless we can go this far, we must dismiss the 
claim without further ado. If we do reach this point, we are war-
ranted in investigating further under the guise of determining 
proximate cause". Clearly, this would also apply to criminal law: 
if the accused fails to qualify under the 'but for'-test, the 
prosecution has no case. 
One aside: if we understand the matter at hand correctly, we 
should not be too far from the truth in stating the following: 
the 'but for'-test results in pointing out the 'conditio sine qua 
non', the cause without which there is no causal link between 
conduct and consequence. Theoretically it would seem that there 
could be more than one conditio sine qua non, but they would have 
to be of the same nature: none could be eliminated without inval-
idating the resulting conclusion as to actorship of an accused. 
Where we speak of causa próxima, we obviously speak about a plur-
ality of potential or actual causes, not necessarily of the same 
nature and certainly not of the same quality when considered in a 
time frame. By comparison the immediate, latest or nearest effi-
cient cause is deduced and therefore the causa próxima could only 
be one specific cause. 
The question remaining, however, is how to understand the 
'but for'-principle and how to define the term 'proximate' and 
again the search veers back into the past: when and to what de-
gree is an event in the past, before the harm was done, relevant 
and, if there were many potential causes, which one of them is 
relevant. How 'near' is 'proximate'? The purpose of the exercise 
is: limitation as to the number of potential causes and selection 
of the one that would allow attaching liability to the actor. 
Manufacture of a gun, used in killing a victim, could be a 
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'cause', inclusive of the designer, the miners and processors of 
the iron ore and so on. The reasoning becomes almost infantile. 
However, when the gun is sold, one buyer could put it in a show-
case, being a collector; another could use it to go into the bush 
and shoot a moose and be called a hunter or poacher; another 
again, could kill a person and be charged with murder. The gun is 
merely a tool which may be used in many different ways. 
Saying that the manufacturer or vendor are too remote in 
time or place, is no answer. The tool is a neutral, dead thing. 
Manufacturing it is an indifferent activity. Using it for the 
wrong purposes may involve crime. Whatever tool is used in the 
commission of a crime, the thing used and its makers, cannot 
have anything to do with the use made of it, unless they should 
be involved through other channels. 
Looking for a cause, we are looking for a person, for crim-
inal law is concerned with human conduct. In that person we are 
looking for certain conduct and its effects. The real question 
is: did the conduct of that person result in the undesirable con-
sequence, in the harm inflicted? 
The problem will not go away by asking: was he the necessary 
cause (causa sine qua non), or adequate cause, or was the harm 
done the natural and probable consequence of his conduct? Such 
questions only generate further questions for who is to say what 
the meaning is of 'necessary', 'adequate' or 'natural and prob-
able consequence'. Add to this such terms as 'exclusive cause' 
or 'intervening cause' or 'cumulative causes' and the problem of 
defining the basic word 'cause' is still with us. 
Yet, the matter is of vital importance, especially where 
offences of strict or absolute liability are involved, for there 
liability is determined solely on the causal link, sidestepping 
the question of mens rea and perhaps even disregarding the ele-
ment of negligence. "Die Tat tutet den Mann". 
More is the pity that, in the criminal courtroom, causation 
is a layman's problem, for it asks a question of fact and laymen 
must decide on it. In instructing the jury the problem of caus-
ation or causality must be brought home to these twelve men good 
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and true, in everyday terms. It will not do to give them a choice 
of latin expressions for the same reasons Cartwright C.J.C, in 
Peda would not instruct the jury with terms such as 'advertent' 
or 'inadvertent' negligence. The question for the jury is: 'out 
of all possible men, was it this one man before you, who killed 
the victim by using this one pistol out of millions of other pis-
tols?' Or, in other words, did this man, by his conduct, 'inter-
fere' in the "natural course of events which makes a difference 
in the way these develop?" (186) Did he, by his conduct, give 
color to an otherwise neutral situation? And, in so doing, did he 
commit an offence? Alone? With others in concert, over and above 
what others had already done? At his own initiative or maybe 
while being forced? After hearing the jury's answer, the court 
will then worry about the correct label to describe the mode of 
partyship involved and the consequences attached. 
B. TODAY'S VIEW 
Undoubtedly modern day writers will go on speculating about 
issues related to the problem of causality. Today it seems that 
the 'but for'-test is still accepted, combined with a quest for 
the presence of a form of mens vea and well distinguished there-
from. In Redline (187) it was said: (one of two fleeing robbers 
was killed by a gunshot from a policeman's pistol; the other rob-
ber was held guilty of murder; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
reversed the conviction and granted a new trial). 
-Referring to a previous case-
"... the felons were held accountable... 
on the basis of proximate causation regard-
less of who fired the fatal shot..." 
Why was Redline held to be the proximate cause? Involved in 
the commission of a criminal offence, he tried to escape from his 
police pursuers, drew fire -that is: 'caused the police to shoot-
and thus he was the proximate cause as to the killing of his ac-
complice. 
In Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County (188) a comp-
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arable situation- the term "proximately resulted" is used. In 
Rex v. Jordan (189) we find "direct and immediate cause". 
In Я. v. Smith (190) Lord Parker said: 
"It seems to the court enough for this 
purpose to refer to one passage in the judg­
ment of Lord Wright in The Oropesa, where he 
said, (1943) p.32, 39: "To break the chain 
of causation it must be shown that there is 
something which I will call ultroneous, some­
thing unwarrantable, a new cause which dis­
turbs the sequence of events, something which 
can be described as either unreasonable or 
extraneous or extrinsic". 
Generally, this area of the law appears to be still in 
motion, and certainly has been for many years. In a series of 
robbery cases the causal link is justified differently: 
"The killing of officer Ingling had its 
genesis in the robbing by the defendant"... 
"A knave who feloniously and maliciously 
starts a 'chain reaction' of acts dangerous 
to human life must be held responsible for 
the natural fatal results of such acts." (191) 
"If the defendant sets in motion the 
physical power of another, he is liable for 
its result." (192) 
"It makes no difference that defendants 
could not know in advance the precise course 
of events that would follow when they attempted 
the robbery. Their attempted robbery set in 
motion a chain of events... It was normal human 
response for Jones... to return the fire." 
Recalling that in Redline the defendant was not found 
guilty as charged and that a new trial was ordered we may now 
find the following: 
Redline (1958) overruled Thomas (1955), distinguished 
Almeida (1949) -the same court overruled Almeida in 1970 in Com­
monwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Smith v. Myers (1970) A.2d 550. 
The common ground for these decisions was, that they were held to 
be needless extensions of the 'felony murder rule'. An interest­
ing detail is the following reasoning: in the words of Charles 
Alvin Jones C.J. in Redline : 
"In the present instance, the victim of the 
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homicide was one of the robbers who, while 
resisting apprehension in his effort to escape, 
was shot and killed by a policeman in the per-
formance of his duty. Thus, the homicide was 
justifiable and, obviously, could not be availed 
of, on any rational legal theory, to support a 
charge of murder. 
"How can anyone, no matter how much of an 
outlaw he may be, have a criminal charge lodged 
against him for the consequences of the lawful 
conduct of another person? The mere statement 
of the question carries with it its own answer." 
The decision inspired Bell C.J. -who dissented- to a fiery 
diatribe, closed off with the following words: (in Smith) 
"All of the aforesaid cases were actually in 
practical effect overruled when there was a 
change of personnel in the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, at which time they ignored all 
the reasoning and the principles and the prior 
decisions of this Court and changed the law 
and decided Commonwealth v. Redline,... 
"This was until today, I repeat, the most 
damaging blow to the protection and safety 
of Society ever delivered by the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania. 
"For all the reasons hereinabove mentioned, 
I very vigorously dissent." 
Respiaiendum est judiaanti ne 
quid aut duriue aut remissius 
oonstituatur quam causa déposait; 
пес enim aut severitatis aut cle-
mentiae gloria affeotanda est. 
The judge must see that no order 
be made or judgment given or 
sentence passed either more 
harshly or more mildly than the 
case requires; he must not seek 
reknown, either as a severe or 
as a tender-hearted judge. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
REASONABLE ATTRIBUTION 
OF LIABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
a) The Dutch View? 
We pause here for a moment. 
At this point we are approaching the final chapters of Part 
One and are ready to deal with the main topic of this paper: 
criminal liability in its various forms, but especially: liabil-
ity for unintentional, non-reckless conduct. We shall mainly 
discuss liability resulting from negligent conduct and from con-
duct found in no-fault scenarios. 
The basis for criminal or penal liability in such situations 
is the mere causation of certain undesirable consequences, that 
is: the doing of some act forbidden by law or the omitting to do 
something the law prescribes, thus creating a harm the law aimed 
at preventing from arising. 
Where mens rea has no role to play, the prosecutor nor the 
accused have to worry about evidence pro or contra the subject-
ive elements of the offence where liability is absolute. 
Generally, the emphasis is on the actus reus, the conduct 
and its consequences. Therefor, proof of causation is essential 
in finding an accused liable. Having established causation, the 
question arises: 'where are its limits?' How much of what follows 
upon the conduct, how much of the consequences, are to be held 
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against the actor? How many 'future' events are 'caused'? Where 
does the clock stop? 
In view of the importance of these questions in regard to 
offences of absolute or strict liability, we propose to enter 
into some more detail with respect to the causation problem, 
taking special notice of the most recent Dutch case law. 
B. THE FATAL CHAIN 
a) Actor - Conduct - Consequence - Liability? 
All doctrines on causation appear to have one element in 
common: they are, in essence, attempts to limit the length of the 
chain of causation. In one direction, they see to the past in a 
search for that one crucial factor that started this chain in a 
way of sufficient relevance to allow putting the blame for the 
occurrence of a certain consequence on an offender. In the other 
direction, looking into the future, they attempt to determine 
what consequences must be deemed to have arisen from that oper-
ative factor, again of such relevance that the actor must be 
blamed for it. The future is taken to be the time elapsed since 
the factor -conduct of some kind- started to operate. 
The issues such doctrines attempt to help solving, are of 
prime importance, since causation is the basic condition for 
guilt and liability to exist. 
So many great minds have pondered the related problems, so 
many tomes were written; yet, too much confusion and too many 
controversies appear to exist. It is therefore with an appropri-
ate amount of trepidation that we approach this box of Pandora. 
Yet, approach it we must, as we search for liability, strict or 
absolute, and, above all, for liability that is 'reasonable'. 
There are some particular problem areas to be crossed when 
discussing causation. For instance, any doctrine on causation 
attempts to reach two opposite goals: it attempts to forge the 
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chain that ties an actor to his conduct and its consequences, 
while at the same time attempting to exclude actors, conduct or 
consequences -or, at least, limit their numbers, their scope, 
their character-. Such doctrine tries to promote the accused from 
the status of 'alleged actor' to 'proven auctor', and from there 
to blameworthy culprit and convict. The person involved may be 
lucky enough to have a denial defence, negating his actorship, a 
disculpatory defence -evidencing his lack of blameworthiness and 
guilt- or perhaps an excuse -saving him from a penalty. 
In other words, such doctrine aims at establishing the ori-
ginator of the undesirable consequence while at the same time 
seeking to limit the scope of his liability. 
Another aspect of the same characteristics is, that doctrin-
es on causality are mostly framed in terms suggesting their accus-
atory tendency while not (clearly) also showing their defensory 
tendency. Society is 'looking' for a cause in order to affix 
guilt and liability on an individual. 
Where most of the criminal law sprouted its roots in times when 
liability followed upon proof of an actus reus, a fallacy could 
easily arise: "post hoc, ergo propter boa", which could transmut-
ate, potentially, absolute liability into 'limitless' liability. 
Such limitless liability would be as absurd a concept in respect 
of 'future' events, as would be limitless causation in respect of 
past events. 
Moreover, the quest for the cause of a consequence is, 
essentially, an utterly pragmatic exercise. Facing a certain 
harm, we wish to find out whom we have to blame and, consequently 
punish for it -and, civilly, from whom to extract compensation. 
As a rule we are not interested in punishing the father who sired 
the accused, the gunsmith who manufactured the automatic, or whom 
ever else who was, before or after the conduct led to the harm, 
merely part of the surrounding circumstances. 
There appears to be no merit in reviewing the various doct-
rines here. They must be assumed to be of general knowledge. In-
stead, we propose to take a somewhat closer look at what HSR 
state to be the authors' opinion: (193) 
"... a causal link exists, where on the basis 
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of common experience, available at the time 
an offence was committed, a consequence could 
reasonably be expected to emerge, thereby 
starting from the knowledge the prudent man 
possesses, unless it would become clear that the 
offender did have knowledge beyond that, in which 
case such extra knowledge becomes the touchstone." 
(emphasis added). 
Prima facie, this sounds like a practical, all-embracing 
definition of alluring simplicity. 
However, what is to be understood by 'common experience' 
{'algemene ervaringsregelen ' ), 'knowledge of the prudent man' 
('de kennis van een voorzichtig mens'), 'reasonably' ('redelijk-
eruijze ' ) ? Is a prudent man characterized by his knowledge or by 
his prudence and is there not more need for prudence where knowl-
edge is less? 
It would appear that the expression 'knowledge of the prud-
ent man' is used to further define 'common experience'. Thus, the 
sum total of what all prudent men, having different levels of 
knowledge, possess as common, that is 'shared' knowledge, would 
describe the term 'common experience'. Consequently, this common 
experience, gained in the practice of daily life, is empirical 
knowledge. Since nothing in life is certain, the maximum degree 
of knowledge attainable does never reach 'certainty'. It may come 
close, but will never exceed the value of 'the usual', 'the ob-
served', 'the statistically assessable' knowledge as to the con-
sequences of certain conduct. 
In determining causality there will, therefore, never be 
certainty in all situations. This is one conclusion that indicat-
es that, after all, doubt may remain part of the equation. 
Furthermore, again we see the term 'reasonably' emerge, this 
time coupled with the term 'expected', ('could reasonably be ex-
pected'). Such expectations are said to be based on common exper-
ience that leads to common knowledge, and teaches us the empiric-
al law of foreseeability, predictability, calculus of probability. 
There is still ample room for doubt: foreseeability of probabil-
ity based on experience? Von Kries, nomologically, after all? 
But Von Kries "originally wanted to take into account only such 
circumstances the actor knew or could have known". (194) 
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Or should we perhaps say: "ought to know" or "ought to have 
known"? Why? Because, after all, we are looking for a person to 
affix blame to, since he was the instrument of damage or harm. 
We are still examining the links in the causal chain: actor-
cause - actus reus - consequential harm - guilt (or not) - liab-
ility (or not) - penalty (or not). What about the extension of 
the chain into the past? Thus: prior cause - actor - cause...etc. 
(Some driver, for good reasons, brakes suddenly; the driver be-
hind him swerves in order to avoid him and hits a pedestrian... 
etc.) In this context we may also ask: where do we place the 'in-
citer' ( 'uitlokker ') or the agent provocateur? 
So, we have been dealing with foreseeability ante factum and 
RUmelin offers us foreseeability post factum, referred to earlier 
{'objektiv nachträgliche Prognose'), hindsight, by other persons 
than the actor, looking at events in a relaxed, analytical manner, 
free from pressure to act properly in a situation of, often sud-
den, danger. 
Does the road lead from subjective foreseeability to object-
ive foreseeability, and from there to guilt and to liability? 
Does this mean, that by objectifying foreseeability we introduce 
strict, maybe even absolute liability? 
b) Exit Foreseeability? 
One further step could be taken and was, indeed, taken by 
the Dutch Supreme Court, the Hoge Raad (hereafter referred to by 
the letters ER) It would appear that the HR dropped the require-
ment of foreseeability -subjective and objective-, disregarding 
even the fact that a certain event or consequence could only 
very rarely arise, dropping out -as it were- of an established 
probability pattern, and switched over to a new way of establish-
ing liability: the 'objective, reasonable attribution of a con-
sequence to an actor" as, for instance, in the Letale Longembolie 
case (195). In the Haagse Ruit case (196) the formula still was: 
that the consequence (the death of two persons on the sidewalk) 
"was reasonably foreseeable on the ground of common experience". 
In the Long Embolie case the formula became: 
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...that the occurrence of lethal embolism 
in the lung following injuries caused by a col­
lision as referred to, гв not an occurrence of 
such a nature that the victim's death could not 
reasonably be attributed to the actor as a con­
sequence of the collision." (emphasis added) 
Unfortunately the formula is in the negative form. There are 
good reasons for this way of formulating the basis of the decisi­
on. Assuming that the HR had said: "... that the occurrence is ... 
one of such nature... that the victim's death could reasonably be 
attributed to the actor as a consequence of the collision" (al­
ways with the understanding that the actor caused the collision) 
the included suggestion would have been that, according to common 
experience, lung embolisms usually follow injuries resulting from 
a collision, a statement that certainly is not correct. All the 
HR appears willing to conclude is: 'death, resulting from an em­
bolism in the lung, is not to be excluded as a consequence of in­
juries sustained in a collision.' 
However, where are the limits, those precious limits causal 
doctrines are trying to set out? There are numerous things that 
could not be excluded. Assume that the victim suffered a fatal 
coronary or a stroke while being in the hospital and under treat­
ment for the injuries sustained in the collision. It seems, that 
by its nature, the coronary or stroke or, for that matter the em­
bolism, were the proximate cause of death. Therefore it cannot be 
excluded on medical grounds. But could it perhaps be excluded as 
a consequence of the injuries, and thus of the collision? No, the 
HR states, it cannot be ruled out. It does not appear to be rel­
evant that the victim was in hospital; the conclusion would have 
been the same if the victim had suffered the embolism on his way 
to hospital in an ambulance, on the road at the scene of the ac­
cident or, shortly after release from hospital, at home. Thus, 
the reasoning is: the collision caused the injuries, which caused 
the embolism, which -by itself or in combination with the injur­
ies- caused death; since the accused caused the collision, he 
caused all of its sequels. Reasonably, death cannot be ruled out 
as a consequence; its cause is 'reasonably' attributed to the 
accused. 
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However, embolisms may occur where no injuries were sustain-
ed. They even may occur where injuries were sustained that are of 
no relevance, medically, to the embolism. How could we know? Pow 
could anyone know? Is there room for doubt? Is medical expert evi-
dence conclusive or does it merely reflect the state of the art 
as it is todate? If there is doubt, the accused in this case may 
have been blamed for no conclusive reason. 
One of the medical experts stated: 
"... the injuries were serious but, by their 
own nature, would not necessarily have to have 
led to the victim's death." 
In other words, a coronary (as a result of shock, anguish, 
etc.) or a stroke, or perhaps some other calamity, could also 
have been a cause of death, either as a further sequel of the in-
juries or, independently, as an unrelated phenomenon...twelve 
days after the accident. Yet, non of them are fatal per se; many 
people survive, in many cases even more than once. We are, then, 
left with considerable doubt. 
In this context we refer to what the Advocate-General Mok 
stated, after referring to the medical opinion cited above: 
"As I see it, this is not to be so inter-
preted as to mean that there is a causal link 
between the injuries and the death. 
"That does not alter the fact that there may 
have been a combination of (contributing) 
factors, one of which -in the present case-
could have been the age of the victim." 
The first part of this statement, it seems to us, is obscure 
It becomes clear only by assuming that in the case report we have 
at hand, a printing error has crept in. V.Tiat Mr Mok said, we as-
sume, is "... that there is no causal link between the injuries 
and the death" ( ". . . geen oorzakelijk verband")in stead of "a 
causal link" ('.'..een oorzakelijk verband") for two reasons: 
if there were no causal link, liability on that ground would not 
result; moreover, if the reported phrase is correct, than the 
second sentence leaves us puzzled. 
Van Veen's words, in his annotation to the case, seem to 
confirm this line of thought: 
"... that death -twelve days after the 
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accident- is not always a consequence of the 
nature of the injuries sustained, does not 
imply that the death of the victim is not a 
consequence of the injuries. 
"The real issue is, whether in this case 
there was a link between the accident and the 
death of the victim of such a strength, that 
one may validly use the term 'cause' in the 
sense it is used in in art.36 WVW. 
"The HR says there is such a link." 
How does the HR know, or arrive at the conclusion that such 
link exists? Medical expert evidence? The medical expert(s) did 
not say death was the unavoidable sequel to the injuries. It said 
the contrary. 
If we analyze the data correctly, it would seem that we are 
looking at two statements: 
1) that an embolism, resulting from injuries, cannot be 
reasonably ruled out as a consequence of the collision; 
2) that death as a further sequel cannot be ruled out as a 
consequence of each of the two, of the two combined, or 
of each one of the two combined with some other factor 
such as the victim's age. 
What does 'reasonably' mean here? What else could it mean 
than that by virtue of logical reasoning the conclusion was 
reached that death could not be ruled out, that is: that death was 
not unforeseeable. It seems that one cannot avoid -when discuss-
ing cause and effect- framing certain relationships between the 
two in terms of foreseeability, negative or positive, regardless 
of the actual words used. What the HR was really saying, we thlnH 
is that in the chain of events nothing can be found (such as a 
factum novum, an intervening cause, as the embolism conceivably 
might have constituted) that pointed to anything else that could 
have caused death. The embolism did not rate such status of in-
tervening cause. The causal chain was not broken by it. 
Thus, even where the word 'foreseeable' is not used in this 
judgment, it seems that the basic idea of foreseeability still 
lingers on in the background. 
Van Veen, in his annotation, suggests: 
"Decisive is, according to V.R.1975, 85, 
the question whether circumstances have arisen 
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not connected with the victim, and of such a 
nature that this death could not reasonably be 
held against the accused. By this is meant, 
circumstances having arisen after the collision, 
that have nothing to do with the victim's 
constitution." 
Why could the embolism not have accurred anyway, injuries or 
not? In such a case, why then could the embolism not have been 
considered being an intervening cause? Who is to know, but we can 
not rule out this possibility. 
Is not the essential question: was this death truly a final 
consequence of the collision and the injuries it caused, rather 
than the question: could the possibility of such death be ex-
cluded? The first question was perhaps not easy to answer, but 
the second question, it seems to us, is far too easy, does not 
allow an unambiguous answer, and -as a minimum- leaves room for 
considerable doubt, a 'dubium' that in this case did not go 'pro 
reo'. After all, we are not sure whether the victim died from 
such'causes as the accused found posted in his debit. 
Van Veen also stated: 
"It attracts the attention that in this short 
formula (-death cannot reasonably be ruled out 
as a consequence of the collision-) no mention 
is made at all of the measure in which, ante or 
post factum, this consequence could have been 
foreseen." 
We have already suggested that the element of foresight has 
not really disappeared. It has been obscured. However, the quest-
ion remains whether it would really have made any difference at 
the bottom line. 
c) POST QUOD or PROPTER QUOD? 
The matter of foreseeability in casu would also have brought 
forward the question: post quod, vel propter quod? It is, as we 
see it, a matter of semantics. 
By what standards could something be ruled out or not? 
Medical, for instance? A physician, asked to answer such question 
could only do one of two things: reply on the basis of experience 
("usually such injuries bring the risk of an embolism and ensuing 
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death") or, as a result of experience, on prognosis ("when such 
injuries are sustained, an embolism cannot be ruled out, neither 
could death")... but what else is 'prognosis' than foreseeability 
based on personal experience and/or generally accepted medical 
doctrine, itself the product of experience. 
On the above we base our conclusion that 'reasonable attrib­
ution' in terms of 'attribution of consequences that cannot be 
ruled out' seems to be very close to, if not essentially the 
same as 'attribution on the basis of foreseeability', objective 
foreseeability. 
There seems to be a difference, however: foreseeability, a 
positive criterium, has more potential in restricting liability 
-by restricting causality- than reasonable attribution, framed in 
a negative formula such as 'cannot be ruled out'. We understand 
that the refinements of the various, subsequent causality doct­
rines tended to limit rather than expand such liability as the 
new formula appears to do. Thus, foresight was required . 
Foresight, even the objective kind of the prudent man, is 
the result of such attempts to limit causality and liability; it 
attempts to justify why the blame was put on the accused. If he 
only had informed himself, or had stopped and thought before act­
ing, and so on, as he could and should have done, this event 
would never have happened; however, he did not and is therefore 
the auator of the harm and to be blamed. 
'Attribution' seems to include all such consequences as 'may 
not reasonably be ruled out'. Justification of the blame becomes 
utterly vague, sets no parameters that could serve to inspire an 
effort to act more diligently in the future at the same time set­
ting an example to others, and would appear to lead to 'liability 
unlimited', fiercer than strict or absolute liability could ever 
be. 
For, now the question arises: what defence may be put up? 
Where foreseeability played a role, the accused had a chance to 
adduce evidence showing there was no way to foresee consequence X 
for reason Y and Z. It would seem that the only defence that 
could be efficient is a defence showing that the accused did not 
cause the harm, whatever the harm was. 
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Clearly, the requirement of foresight is encountered at two 
different stages of the search for the responsible man. 
First it appears on the stage when causality as to the event 
itself is established: this is most clear where negligence is at 
the root of the issue. 
Then it returns at the moment that causality as to the 
event's consequences is established. 
Does the new formula do away, seemingly, with any of the two 
requirements, foresight as to the event and foresight as to its 
sequels ? 
Before attacking this problem, we need to go into some more 
details of the case. 
The charge in the Long Embolie case consisted of two counts: 
1) careless driving, while impaired by alcohol, resulting in a 
collision that caused the death of another; 
2) in the same manner causing death; here no mention is made of 
the accused being impaired. 
These charges are based on art. 36, 1 W W . 
Two causal links must be proven: 
1) the death of the victim must have been caused by a collision 
or running over or as a result of taking evasive action; 
2) the death must have been caused by the accused's negligence. 
Section 2 of art.36 W W was not charged, It deals with caus-
ing grievous bodily injuries under the same circumstances as re-
ferred to hereabove. Section 3 refers to a driver who commits 
either one of the above offences while being impaired by alcohol 
or other drugs. 
The courts below did not hold that the accused was impaired, 
and therefore he was acquitted of the first charge, leaving open 
the second. 
The courts below accepted as proven that the accused's 
negligent way of driving had caused a collision. The HR said: 
".. that Rechtbank en Hof (County Court and 
High Court of Appeal) were able to deduce from 
the evidence presented, that the appellant drove 
utterly carelessly into the intersection of the 
highways mentioned (one of which was the so-
called 'Europaweg', a major highway. D.) ... 
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although not familiar with the local situation, 
while his attention was somewhat diverted by 
his friends in the car and by traffic signs 
along the roadside, without reducing his speed 
which at that point was between 40 and 50 km/h., 
although knowing he was approaching a major 
highway, traffic on which had the right of way." 
Could there be any doubt that this is the language of fore-
seeability? The accused is blamed for lack of foresight. He is 
said to have caused the collision through his own negligence. 
Thus it seems that where culpa is concerned, this landmark decis-
ion used the criterium of foreseeability where negligence was to 
be established, that is, where causality as to actorship was the 
issue. 
Apparently, some kind of a problem arose where the second 
causal link was involved. The charge was not based on section 2 
of art.36 W W : causing serious bodily injury. It was based on 
section 1: causing death as a result of causing a collision. 
The victim sustained serious bodily injuries -not lethal per se, 
as medical expert evidence revealed-, went to hospital for treat-
ment, suffered a lung embolism and, twelve days after entering 
the hospital, died. 
The crucial question now becomes: was this death caused by 
the collision, where an embolism had intervened or where an em-
bolism had occurred? In other words, was the embolism an inter-
vening cause, not related to the accident, or was it one of the 
consequences, causing the death of the victim who would not 
necessarily have died as a result of the injuries sustained. 
A positive answer does not seem possible, one way or the other. 
This is where the new formula comes in: embolism and subsequent 
death, after suffering serious bodily injuries, are not to be 
ruled out as consequences of the collision for which the appel-
lant was to be blamed. 
The word 'foreseeability' is not used. But we have attempted 
to show that it was still a factor, though in disguise. The dis-
guise is the new formula. 
We asked: does this new formula ('reasonable attribution of 
liability') only operate as to consequences involved? It seems, 
in this case, that it did. We shall have to look to future case 
-192-
law on the issue, in order to find the answer to this question. 
For the time being we are left with the impression that the 
new formula creates a causal link between a known fact -conduct-
and, at least partly, unknown, even unforeseeable consequences: 
liability, whatever the consequences, whenever they arise, based 
on negligence, provided no intervening cause disrupts the causal 
chain. At that point, proof of diligence has no effect, since 
negligence was proven. 
d) Reactions 
The judgment discussed inspired a reaction from two sides: 
W. Nieboer and G.A.M. Strijards argue contra the new formula and 
in favour of keeping foreseeability as the criterium in causality 
issues. W.II. Vellinga argues in favour of reasonable attribution. 
In their first article (out of three) (1P7) Nieboer and 
Strijards point out that foreseeability plays a role with respect 
to the subjective, mental, constitutive elements of an offence, 
-where guilt is determined-, with respect to the doctrine of 
criminal attempt -more specifically where the distinction between 
preparatory conduct and the commencement of execution of the act-
us reus is the issue; in regard to the matter of punishment and 
its nature and degree and to the question whether an offender 
merits blame and, if so, to what degree, and finally, in context 
with the issue of prevention: causing the potential offender to 
stop and think of what the consequences could be of certain cond-
uct he is about to become engaged in. 
In a follow-up article (198) they discuss what they call: 
'causality based on expert evidence', in which they, speaking 
about the problem of causality where certain conduct generates 
consequences in regard of which expert evidence has to be called, 
rightfully warn that statements made by expert witnesses are, by 
their very nature, non-juridical, one-sided and slanted into the 
direction of the witness' specialty. Therefore, they observe, the 
expert testimony or evidence must not have such weight on its own 
so as to determine criminal liability; consequences as the expert 
sees them, are not consequences which, of necessity, are to be 
blamed on the accused. Expert evidence, therefore, needs to be 
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're-coded' ('translated') into juridically relevant terms. 
In a third article (199) they point out that the justificat-
ion of a judgement (the 'ratio decidendi') should never be so 
vague as to become a magic formula, disclosing nothing relevant 
at all of the motivation the judge had when coming to his decisi-
on. They wish to maintain the doctrine of foreseeability as a 
criterium, although it may need some further refinement in order 
to be of value under all circumstances. 
They consider the causality as the expert sees it from his 
point of view, as the 'basic' or 'ground-level' causality; it may 
serve as a rather constant causality basis, upon which a further 
structure is to be erected of four levels: 
1) in offences where dolus or culpa are required and prov-
en, causality problems are minimal; expert evidence poses no 
problems either. 
2) where offences of omission are involved and foreseea-
bility was made an element of the offence by the legislator, ex-
pertise-causality based on knowledge ex ante exclusively, follow-
ing rules of common experience, will determine the probability 
level of the consequence; 
3) in some cases colored by special or specific extra 
knowledge {'besonderes Kausalwissen') of the offender, and 
4) where such foreseeability is not made an element of the 
offence -as based on common experience- the consequence must be 
typically something that reflects the nature of the conduct: this 
they call 'gevolgscongruentie ', which we tentatively translate by 
'compatibility of conduct and consequence', kept in check by the 
basic criterium 'no punishment without guilt'. 
The overall impression we are left with is, that the authors 
had in mind to revitalize the foreseeability criterium, refining 
it by adding some subsidiary criteria as referred to. They fear 
that, by dropping foreseeability as a criterium, a void will re-
sult which, sooner or later, is to be filled and they do not 
think that 'reasonable attribution of liability' is going to 
achieve that. 
Vellinga (200) is in favour of the new criterium, at any 
rate where offences of negligence are concerned. 
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Vellinga distinguishes between 'factual causality' (or may-
be: 'technical' causality) -X. hits Y. but X. was not negligent; 
yet, factually, technically, physically, he caused Y.'s death but 
is not to be blamed and is therefore not guilty- and 'criminally 
relevant causality' -same event, but X. was indeed negligent; 
however, Y. died because in the collision his pacemaker was shat-
tered. X.'s negligence did not kill Y.; his negligence was not 
criminally relevant-. 
The criterium of foreseeability sees to causality as well as 
to guilt. Guilt has, more and more, become an objective datum as 
a result of legislation aiming at protection of safety. These 
rules and regulations reflect the foresight of the legislator, 
built into the provisions in an attempt to prevent injury and/or 
death. They are the starting point for his concern. Therefore, 
regardless of foresight, present or not, correct or erroneous, in 
the mind of the individual, contravention of such safety regula-
tions must be held to have caused the harm foreseen by the legis-
lator. Today, a combination of that foreseeability and other 
factors determines whether certain conduct is, or is not, permis-
sible. In earlier years, foreseeability of the consequence by the 
individual determined his guilt. Now, foreseeability is a condit-
ion for guilt, but other factors co-determine it. 
Furthermore, foreseeability need not cover the exact sequen-
ce of events, the causal chain of events, but it is sufficient 
that the offender could and ought to have foreseen that, somehow, 
his conduct could lead to the undesirable consequence. 
Moreover, the limiting influence of foreseeability was, in 
practice, largely illusionary. Many factors were left out of con-
sideration (egg-shell skull, etc.) and the HR understood by 'fore-
seeability': 'foreseeable as possible' (rather than probable), a 
tendency resulting in an interpretation meaning: 'all imaginable 
consequences', which then were labeled 'foreseeable following 
rules of common experience'. In other words, the meaning of 'fore-
seeable' was so generalized and objectified, that the criterium 
lost its specific flavour and did do next to nothing for setting 
limits to liability. 
Nonetheless, Vellinga observes, causality through foresee-
ability still has its place, together with other criteria. The 
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newer view appears to be: 'without foreseeability no causal link; 
with foreseeability of the consequence there is a causal link, 
not per definition, but depending on other factors.' At any rate, 
foreseeability is no longer the one and only criterium for caus-
ality. 
Thus, we appear to have two schools of thought: 'back to 
foreseeability, but as modified' (Nieboer/Strijards) and 'foresee-
ability, yes, but supported by other criteria' (Vellinga). 
How far are they apart? 
The terms 'modified' and 'supported' may hold the key for 
the comparison of the two schools. 
Nieboer and Strijards, in their third article (201) use the 
term 'omvormen' ('modify') and 'om-coderen' ('re-code'): 
"We could also call chis causality as seen 
by the expert, -expert causality-, 'basic' or 
'bottom-causality'. This idea of a 'bottom-
causality' renders finding a solution via the 
condito sine qua non causality redundant. 
The system is created by the description of the 
actus reus; the expert causality is to be in-
tegrated into that system: to that end the 
expert causality, that is: extra-judicial 
causality is to be modified, re-coded by im-
plementing criteria for attribution of liabil-
ity for the consequences." 
If we grasp all of this correctly, the writers are stating 
that, for any liability to exist, there must be a basic minimum 
of causality, to be established by expert evidence, lack of which 
must lead to the conclusion that there is no causal link. 
This physical, technical, factual, basic causality, however, 
is not fit to be used in the courtroom because it was conceived 
as a result of thought patterns and expressed in language, too 
specialized, being part of the expert's greater knowledge about 
a relatively restricted area, for such use. Therefore, in order 
to establish its relevance for the courtroom, the expert causali-
ty language must be 'translated' ('modified, re-coded') into 
juridically relevant terms. Certain criteria are to be implement-
ed when such re-coding takes place, taking into consideration 
four categories of actus reus as described in the criminal law. 
Here is the schedule: 
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CAUSAL NEXUS 
ι 
SUBJECTIVE CAUSALITY 
ι 
DOLUS CULPA 
OBJECTIVE CAUSALITY 
LEGISLATOR 
ι ' 1 
made did not make 
foreseeability an 
element of the offence 
I 
AS A BASIS FOR LIABILITY 
Clearly, the writers attempt to set new parameters for 
foreseeability, or rather, refreshen the paint on the stakes. 
Where dolus (.'gewild' en 'geweten') от culpa ('in etaat een 
gevolg te voorzien maar terzake in gebreke') are required (202), 
no re-coding of the expert's language is needed. Where the legis­
lator made foreseeability an element of the offence and causality 
is not subjective but objective, the expert's opinion as to ob­
jective foreseeability deals with an assessment of the degree of 
probability that a certain consequence is likely to ensue.. 
Thus, in three out of four categories foreseeability remains 
the criterium. As to the fourth: such assessment requires as 
basis or minimum: compatibility of actus reus and consequence. 
However, how do we know whether such congruence exists other 
than through common experience, either the common experience of 
'everyone', or the common experience of the expert, that is: ex­
perience common in his circle. However, is not 'common experience' 
the arsenal of knowledge from which a prognosis may be made in a 
search for consistency of effect from every given cause, in order 
to discover an expert's dearest treasure: a 'law'? That, we sug­
gest, is nothing else but foreseeability. Therefore, it appears 
to us that the writers pleaded foreseeability's case quite con­
vincingly. 
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There are two further points we should like to highlight: 
firstly, the writers appear to be putting expert-knowledge and 
expert-evidence in their proper places. They de-mistify it, say 
something like: beware, it looks convincing and it may well be 
convincing, but only so within the realm of and the terms used 
within the discipline in which the witness is an expert. For 
courtroom use it must be re-stated in juridical terms and receive 
its proper evaluation as to the specific matter at hand. 
Secondly, discussing congruence of actus reus and conseq-
uence, they state at page 415: 
"Supplementing the criterium of congruence 
requires extensive generalization: all detail 
relative to the manner in which a given con-
sequence may have occurred, is to be left out 
of consideration. It is sufficient that the 
consequence is part of the group of 'congruent' 
consequences. 
"It is for this reason that the congruence 
criterium fits so well in all such situations 
where the causal link has been made an objective 
element, outside of the requirement of general 
foreseeability, because we are dealing with 
facts which, -at one hand- increase, broadly 
speaking, drastically the chances that certain 
undesirable consequences may occur, while 
-at the other hand- in every specific case the 
risk level is difficult to assess and the mode 
in which a consequence may follow, seldom can 
be foreseen." 
The type of congruent consequences, in terms of being 'bad 
risks', may be determined with the help of 'ex post' data. 
"Calculating with ex post data means that in 
this category of liability for consequences, the 
interest of victims, as protected by the crimin-
al law, receives a high priority. Within the 
framework of this pro tectionary view, the inter-
ests of the accused must give ground although, 
here too, the principle of 'no punishment with-
out guilt' must not be relinquished. Congruence 
between cause and consequence, even where it is 
an objective requirement, is still ruled by the 
requirement of blamability. Practically, there 
will be the need for an acceptable AVAS-defenee ; 
however, where congruence was established, this 
might be a heavy order to fill." 
It should not be forgotten, however, that not only society 
but also the individual is protected by the criminal law, regard-
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less of such individual being the victim or the offender. Each 
one receives the kind of protection contingent with his role. 
Putting the accused's interests on a level below that of the 
victim's, does not seem right in criminal law, where blame, guilt 
and punishment are the issues. It may be right in civil law, 
where the issue is compensation. 
The congruence requirement, by itself, appears to be sound, 
in the sense that where no congruence can be established, causal-
ity should not be found. But, if we use the principle to state: 
a certain consequence is not incompatible -whatever that con-
sequence be- we are practically holding an accused liable for 
anything, provided it is not incompatible and, therefore 'cannot 
be ruled out'. This, we suggest, approaches absolute liability so 
closely that it appears to merge with it. The writers' remarks 
respecting the AVAS-defence appears to confirm this view. 
Their study was clearly inspired by the Longembolie case, 
where it was held that the victim's death could not be ruled out 
as a consequence of the collision. Once it was established that 
the appellant drove negligently, no AVAS could save him, for the 
defence would fly in the face of a proven fact. At that point he 
became wide open for anything consequential that, on the basis of 
expert evidence, was not to be ruled out. We suggest that at that 
point liability became absolute. Such, it would seem, was the ef-
fect of 'reasonable attribution'. 
Is it too bold a step now to say: 'reasonable attribution of 
liability' opens the door for strict, even absolute liability? Or 
even, equals absolute liability under a new name? Still dealing 
with offences of negligence, we axe tempted to affirm this. Once 
the actus reus is proven, evidencing negligence, AVAS as a defen-
ce of due diligence drops out of the proceedings. What is left is 
the question whether the consequence -in the formulation of the 
HR- could not be ruled out, since it was not incompatible. And so 
liability ensues. 
Vellinga is 'pro' reasonable attribution of liability and 
he focuses his attention on the 'role of foreseeability in offen-
ces of negligence'. 
Vellinga does see a continuing role for foreseeability 'in-
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side of causality' but there are other criteria. What these crit­
eria are, is not too clear. A reference to pages 103 and 104 of 
his Gevaar en Schuld op de Weg appears to be of little help un­
less the 'other criteria' are to be found in the comparison of 
foreseeability as applied to guilt (the accused could and ought 
to have foreseen...) and as applied to causality (the accused on 
the basis of rules of common experience, could reasonably have 
foreseen...). Thus, culpability arises from both a blamable lack 
of foresight as to guilt and causation. 
'Redelijke toerekening ' may lead to limitation of liability, 
says Vellinga, more clearly than a broad-spectrum foreseeability 
would do, which -moreover- would also include within the culpa­
bility such events as the accident an ambulance might get involv­
ed in transporting a victim to the hospital, or faulty medical 
treatment. In fact, Vellinga uses an argument similar to Nieboer 
and Strijards' argument, that cause and effect must be compatible. 
Whether the incidence of accidents ambulances may get into, 
or of faulty medical treatment being administered, is high or low. 
we suggest that they are ηουα facta, interrupting the original 
causal link, adding a new cause. When the victim would have died 
anyway, accident or no accident, faulty treatment or not, the in­
tervening cause would not delete the accused's culpability. The 
intervening causes would only hasten the victim's death. Such 
events would not really be intervening causes, but concurrent 
causes, creating their own specific liabilities for those who 
brought them about. The problem arises where death was not neces­
sarily a consequence of the original injuries sustained: who is 
to say that it was, or was not, doubtful that the victim was go­
ing to survive? Could the medical experts have foreseen the oc­
currence of an embolism in any, more certain way, than by saying 
'it could not be ruled out'? 
Vellinga appears to be satisfied that the HR made the deci­
sion 'into the direction of reasonable attribution of liability'. 
"Rightly, foreseeability has lost its role as an all-encompassing 
criterium for causality." (203). Such foreseeability was -and has 
been for years past- an objective criterium anyway; the point of 
view of the accused was never considered. What was objectively 
foreseeable established the norm, Vellinga states. 
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How far are the two schools apart, we asked. We think that 
they are rather close to oneanother, if not parallel. 
Nieboer and Strijards refined the foreseeability criteria 
and postulated congruence of cause and effect, i.e. objective 
compatibility (4th category). Thus they leave room for criteria 
other than foreseeability, where the law does not require it. 
Vellinga also sees room for other criteria, without clearly stat-
ing what they are, curtailing the scope of foreseeability, not 
eliminating it. 
Nieboer and Strijards state: (204) 
"Therefore it is our hope that the Hoge Raad 
in the future will fill the 'empty shell' of 
the reasonable attribution of liability with 
heteronomous criteria and that foreseeability 
will be an important element among these. For, 
by so doing, the loss that now is likely to be 
suffered, may yet be converted into gain." 
e) Towards Strict or Absolute Liability? 
Now coming back to what started all of this, the Longembolie 
case, we cannot help but thinking that the decision does not ap-
pear to be quite fortunate for the following reasons: 
1) The dia tum: 'Occurrence of a lethal lung embolism after 
sustaining injuries as described, caused by a collision 
... is not of such a nature that death of the victim cannot reas-
onably be held against the accused as a consequence of the colli-
sion', appears to open the door for a general sort of liability, 
potentially encompassing anything, regardless of foreseeability 
or rarity of the sequential event, provided the physical conditi-
on of the victim (before the accident) would not preclude such oc-
currence. It could include the egg-shell skull. It appears to be 
a modern version of: "one takes one's victim as one finds him'. 
Whether this is fair or not, is another matter. 
But the decision discloses no clear justification of the ac-
cused being held liable for this particular death other than by 
implying: 'you, accused, caused the injuries; an embolism cannot 
be ruled out as one of the potential consequences; the embolism 
resulted in death. Ergo, you caused this death. 
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It does not state: it was to be foreseen, although it might 
have to be considered a relatively rare occurrence. 
2) There may have been more detailed medical evidence 
available in the court files, not disclosed in the judgment. That 
leaves an outside observer at a disadvantage. 
Assuming that medical evidence said that in this particular 
victim, because of age, general physical condition, etc. an em-
bolism could not be ruled out (or perhaps even, 'was to be expect-
ed') in the event that certain injuries should occur, the quest-
ion arises whether this means that the accused is to be blamed, 
since the accused is to be held the person who caused the collis-
ion in the mechanical sense of the word and, consequently, caused 
the embolism? If the victim was likely to suffer an embolism 
(or heart attack or stroke) because such was his physical pre-
disposition, a calamity waiting for a trigger event, could it be 
said that the accused was 'guilty'? 
What if an elderly father learns that his daughter-in-law 
bore a long hoped for grandson and heir and that father, predis-
posed to sooner or later suffering a coronary, does indeed suffer 
one, and dies? Did the daughter cause his death? Is she liable? 
Does it make any difference that bearing a child is no offence? 
Does it change the rules of causal linkage? Causality and guilt 
are not per definition inseparably united, but they seem to be in 
the Long embolie case, and we suggest this is an unhappy marriage 
that, someday, will happily end in a divorce as must be hoped. 
In both situations the trigger event (a collison in the first, 
childbirth in the second) caused a death which cannot be ruled 
out as a consequence, and in the second situation the suggestion 
leads to an absurdity. 
3) If a new tendency is taking over to objectify liability 
by objectifying causality and guilt, so be it. There 
might be great merit in it. Put, if so it be, why not speak clear 
language and say: "Potential offender here is a warning: if you 
plan to be engaged in conduct that has built-in risk setting 
elements, beware'. If the risk materializes in the form of harm, 
any harm at all, society is going to hold you absolutely liable 
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as soon as your conduct results in guilt. All of the consequences 
are going to be held against you, foreseeable or not, rare or not, 
aggravated by other, concurrent or intervening causes or not, 
provided only that such consequences are congruent. The same will 
apply to the persons who contribute such concurrent and interven-
ing causes." 
This, obviously, is absolute liability and it may well prove 
to be the final answer to many of today's criminal liability 
problems. 
We do not like foreseeability as a sole criterium, certainly 
not in its force-fed forms (foresight after the fact, etc.). We 
do not like 'reasonable attribution of liability' in the vague, 
non-defined form it appears to be in today. 
In such situations we prefer absolute liability where negl-
igence was established or any form of mens rea, provided the law 
and its language is clear, leaving no room for doubt. Such lex, 
depending on the harm done, may in many cases well be dura; it 
would be a small price to pay for increased, overall safety on 
the roads, in the manufacturing plants, on the construction 
sites, in our eco-systems; but let it be scripta. 
The parameters of criminal liability must be clearly set out 
in order to create liability that is reasonable. 
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Culpa tenet (teneat) suos 
auctores. 
Ersk.Inst.4,1,14 
Misconduct binds (should bind) 
its own authors. It is a never 
failing axiom that everyone is 
accountable only for his own 
delicts. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
In perspective with criminal law, liability means: respons-
ible or accountable for, being bound by or exposed to the conseq-
uences of one's conduct in the form of penalties. 
The emphasis is on the penal effect of the commission of of-
fences, that is: on punishment. Canadian criminal law is in es-
sence 'Tatstrafrecht ', whereas Dutch criminal law, although in 
essence, also 'Tatstrafreaht', has adopted the tenet that no 
punishment must be meted out in absence of any fault. Therefore 
Dutch criminal law may also be qualified as a ' Schuldstrafrecht '. 
Jescheck states: 
"Das Verbrechen tritt fUr die Umwelt als 
begangene Tat in Erscheinung... 
"Im System des Tatstrafrecht s knüpft die 
Strafe an die verbotene Handlung an, ent-
scheidend ist der Vorwurf, der dem Täter 
wegen der Begehung einer in ihren Merkmalen 
festgelegten Tat gemacht wird ("Tat schuld") , 
wobei freilich die Strafzumessung auch 
charakteristische Züge der Tat erpersHnlich-
keit berücksichtigen kann." (205) 
This would also apply to Canadian as well as to Dutch crim-
inal law, exception taken as to the fault requirement in Dutch 
law. The emphasis is primarily on punishment. 
In tort law the emphasis is on compensation and distribution 
of losses. In earlier days this distinction was not made. The 
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'writ of trespass' allowed a. plaintiff to recover damages for a 
wrong suffered by him, but the defendant would also be punished 
at the hand of the King's justices. (206) 
A 'wrong' was committed, either against the king (amounting 
to a wrong against the state), or against an individual. The in-
tent of the party committing the wrong became a basis for dis-
tinction between crime and tort (15th century) and development of 
a clear separation got on its way. 
Potter proposes that "the distinction between tort and crime 
was essentially procedural in its origin. This is brought out by 
the cases distinguishing trespass and felony. Crime was a plea of 
the Crown punishable on indictment, but tort was remedied by a 
civil action." (207) 
This separation and further development into two distinct 
areas of law leaves both fields clearly defined, although not 
necessarily 'fenced off' against one another. Issues such as 
causation, negligence, liability, interact in the sense that 
newer insights in one area may influence the other. 
Fleming points out that the history of torts shows a remark-
able turnabout in tort law. (208) Individuals have two basic in-
terests: security and freedom of action. Security demands that a 
victim who sustained some harm, should receive compensation re-
gardless of the other's motivation and purpose, even in cases of 
faultless causation. Freedom of action demands that a person who 
inflicts some harm upon another, should only be held responsible 
if he acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently, that is: 
through fault or culpability. "At any given time and place, the 
rules of tortious liability reflect a compromise between these 
two competing concepts." 
In primitive times the emphasis was on security and liabili-
ty was strict. Under influence of Christian philosophical con-
cepts moral culpability was introduced, often protecting the in-
jurer more than the injured, since the injurer's intent or 
negligence -or their absence- would decide the level of liability. 
The 19th century saw the introduction of the doctrine of 'no 
liability without fault', gaining ground during the industrial 
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revolution: a revival of the tendency towards preservation of 
freedom of action. 
In modern times compensation is again stressed, a return to 
a point of origin. Compensation includes distribution of losses 
over society 'as a whole or part of it', through insurance and 
price calculation techniques. 
It is clear that tort liability is quite different from 
criminal liability, where compensation is far from the legislat-
or's mind. Nonetheless, newer trends appear to point in a new di-
rection: compensation of victims through the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board, funded by public money: society shares the 
damage resulting from crime related injuries suffered by an indi-
vidual. 
After attempting to present a brief outline of Canadian 
criminal law, the problems and issues related to 'strict liabil-
ity' are now to be discussed. It will be attempted to show that 
absolute and strict liability are not only not on their way out, 
but appear to be heading for a modernized role. 
-207-

PART TWO 
ON 
REASONABLE 
LIABILITY 
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ENGAGING IN THE 
I 
FOREIDDEN CONDUCT 
I 
(generating the undesirable consequence) 
. I , 
NEGLIGENTLY UNAWARES 
may lead to 
CRIMINAL/PENAL LABILITY (277, 333) 
classified 
PRE-SSM* (351) 
I 
STRICT=ABSOLUTE 
LIABILITY OR 
RESPONSIBILITY 
I 
neither allowing 
the defence of 
DUE DILIGENCE 
as 
__i 
Г 
POST-SSM* (361, 397) 
LIABILITY 
which may be either 
1 
STRICT (351) 
allowing the 
DEFENCE OF 
DUE DILIGENCE 
See : 
'Halfway House 
Doctr ine' 
(361) 
ABSOLUTE 
NOT 
allowing the 
Defence of 
Due Diligence 
(365,369, 
393) 
*) 'SSM' stands for the Sault Ste Marie decision, 1978, 
referred to in the text. 
Omnia regula suas patitur 
exaeptiones. 
Every rule is liable to its 
own exceptions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STRICT LIABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Strict liability means different things to different people. 
To the Legislator it means that certain conduct must be pro-
hibited, even where it is part of some entirely acceptable, per-
haps very beneficial activity, since that particular type of con-
duct may result in creating harm, damage or danger to health, to 
safety and even to life. In order to safeguard the wellbeing of 
its members, society cannot allow such consequences to material-
ize, regardless of the fact whether the offender acted malicious-
ly, negligently or faultlessly, unaware of what his conduct could 
lead to. Therefore, certain defences against a charge of this 
nature, may have to be either restricted or made unavailable at 
all. 
For legislation to be efficient, that is: goal oriented, it 
must clearly indicate which types of conduct come under the cate-
gories referred to. 
To the Prosecution it means an easier task: where conduct 
itself, divorced from any subjective factor that caused or in-
spired it, is forbidden, the Prosecution is absolved from proving 
mens rea or negligence. This simplifies the Crown's task consid-
erably. 
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It is also said that, generally, administrative efficien­
cy is improved. 
To the Judiciary it also appears to offer a simplification 
proportional to the one the Prosecution enjoys. However, this is 
not necessarily quite the case, for when the judge proceeds to 
establishing the measure of punishment, where an accused was 
found guilty, the offender's personality and his motives, his 
mens rea or negligence, will be factors in the quantification of 
the penalty. 
To the Citizen is means that he may be found guilty for 
having engaged in certain conduct or having created certain con­
sequences, even when he was unaware, or merely negligent, ignor­
ant or in error. More than to anyone else, it is of the utmost 
importance to the Citizen to know -and, as a minimum, to be able 
to find out- in advance, whether certain conduct will put him at 
the wrong side of the Law. This requirement has not only to do 
with efficiency in the maintenance of law and order. It has to do 
with justice. In this area certain criticisms have been leveled 
and we shall be looking at some of them. 
From the above it may be seen that the interests of Legis­
lator, Prosecution, Judiciary and the Citizen do not necessarily 
run a parallel course, although the common goal of all parties 
concerned is maintaining a society based on justice, where law 
and order are secured by peaceful means, and where the highest 
standards for safety and life, health and the eлvlronment are set 
and guarded. 
In the coming chapters we shall look at these aspects. It 
will not be possible to follow the above sequence strictly since 
they are tightly interlaced We shall also look at some critic­
isms and, at that point, signal the progress made in adapting an 
age-old maxim to modern day living and identify the signs that 
seem to allow some forecasting for the future. 
Our main interest will go out to penal rather than to crim­
inal offences, for it is there where the action is. We suggest, 
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however, that by considering strict responsibility in its relev­
ance to criminal offences -its classic role- we improve the per­
spective in which to study strict responsibility and penal offen­
ces. This holds true, we think, in both systems, Dutch and Cana­
dian. 
It will be noted that, sofar, and partly in the following, 
various terms such as 'strict' or 'absolute' liability or res­
ponsibility, 'absolute prohibition' are used. Up to recent times 
-that ts up to the Sault Ste Магге case- all of these terms had 
the connotation of 'liability against which the defence of ig­
norance or mistake of law or fact would offer no protection.' 
Later on we shall have to discriminate in the use of these terms. 
Doing so where рте-Sault Ste l/av ¡.e case law is concerned, seems 
to be of no value. The cases show an indiscriminate use of the 
terms indicated and some confusion might arise through any at-
tempt to 'correct' the situation 
B. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
This paper attempts to draw a comparison between the Dutch 
and Canadian criminal law systems in their treatment of offences 
of negligence. Of foremost importance is the question are the 
terms 'culpa' (Dutch law) and 'negligence' (Canadian law) syn-
onymous, that is 'aequivalent'' This question must be answered 
before all others in order to establish whether a valid compar-
ison may be drawn at all between offences based on culpa and 
those based on педігдепае. 
There is another issue Canadian criminal law, primarily, 
aims at punishing an offender for reprehensible conduct, it is 
'Tatstrafrecnt '. Dutch criminal law also centers primarily on 
reprehensible conduct and in that sense, as we stated before, is 
also a 'Tatctrafrecht'. However, it assigns a slightly different 
role to the factor of 'дигіі'. Where guilt is entirely missing, 
an actor is not to be punished. In Canadian law, however, through 
the use of a fiction, guilt may be attributed or imputed in a 
-213-
number of situations. 
In both systems the first question to be asked is: did the 
alleged offender indeed do the act he is charged with? If so, the 
person of the actor comes under scrutiny,the main issue now becom-
ing: must this actor be held censurable or does he have a defence, 
that is: an excuse or justification? Are such defences available 
at all? In this context the meaning of 'guilt' in both systems 
is to be discussed. 
The third issue brings us nearer to the formulation of the 
basic problem: where both systems are, essentially, conduct ori-
ented and demand a measure of blameworthiness -guilt- in order to 
render an actor punishable, how then would it be possible to rec-
oncile the need for a guilt component in justification of con-
sequential punishment, with strict liability (the Canadian sys-
tem), whereas in Dutch law absence of all guilt renders, in most 
cases, an actor non-punishable. 
Canadian law uses a fiction. Mens rea encompasses intent and 
recklessness; it does not include negligence, but in cases where 
negligence plays a role, mens vea is imputed. This fiction is not 
used in Dutch law and this is one of the areas where both systems 
diverge. 
The basic problem may now be defined: if, in Canadian crim-
inal law absence of all guilt does not necessarily lead to impun-
ity -absolute liability is still with us- and if in Dutch crimin-
al law absence of all guilt does, usually, prevent an actor from 
being punished, what is the difference -if any- between both 
systems in assessing guilt as a basis for liability, that is for 
punishment? 
In drawing comparisons our attention does not center on true 
crime where mens rea in most cases, clearly is a prerequisite. 
The comparisons deal mainly with violations of regulatory or 
statutory provisions. This will not prevent us from also looking 
briefly at true crime in both systems, where absolute liability 
appears to be hidden in the shape of certain fictions. 
In discussing 'guilt' we shall also have to establish its 
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correct translation into Dutch. 
С. SEMANTICS 
By now it must be showing that the writer has a special con­
cern in respect of the meaning of certain terms in English as 
well as in Dutch. When going into some length where discussing 
semantics, the risk exists of either stating the obvious -which 
is bad form-, or of appearing to be guilty of pedantry -which is 
bad taste. 
The reason for this specific concern lies in the fact that 
the writer, having first been educated in Dutch law, initially 
succombed to the lure of accepting seemingly self-evident paral­
lel notions as identical when exposed to the intricacies of the 
common law. Such risk, if not recognized in time, leads to mis­
conceptions, as the writer found out the hard way. 
Also, he is not aware of the degree of familiarity with com­
mon law concepts the Dutch reader may, or may not possess. Rather 
than venturing boldly into assumptions that may prove to be wrong, 
he prefers attempting to be as explicit as possible. For similar 
reasons basic concepts, briefly touched upon in Part One, will be 
more accentuated in the coming chapters where the context would 
seem to warrant it. 
a) Guilt Means Schuld7 
The rather elusive term 'guilt' (or 'guilty') has been an object 
of analysis for ages. Old adages attempt to give it a practical 
meaning. We should now briefly look at them again and compare 
them with analogous terms in Dutch. 
1) "Aatus non facit Рейт, msi mens sit pea" 
(20&a) The intent and the act must both concur 
to constitute the crime" (200) 
2) "¡ion est reus nisi mens sit rea": one is 
not guilty unless his intention be guilty. (210) 
The terms 'guilt' and 'guilty' always appear to have the 
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connotation of: criminal, sinful, reprehensible for some reason, 
legal or moral. 
Etymologically the word 'guilt' appears to stem from -or at 
least to be closely related with- the old English 'gylt', mean-
ing sin, crime, debt, which in turn may be related to the Germanic 
'gultiz' of unknown origin, but possibly connected with the old 
English 'gieldan' which means 'to pay'. (211) 
An acceptable translation, then, could go into the direction 
of either: 'criminal' or 'indebted' in the civil sense of the 
word. The first interpretation refers to ethics as between indi-
viduals and society; the second refers to ethics as between indi-
viduals. One having the meaning of 'directed at a wrong(doing)' 
or 'willing, aiming at, a wrong' and the other: having become 
liable, that is 'indebted', or 'having to repay'. 
Thus, the meaning of the maxims cited could perhaps be est-
ablished as: 'An act does not render the actor guilty (that is: 
indebted') unless his mind be guilty' (that is: 'aiming at a 
wrongdoing'. ) 
The reason for this digression is, that there seems to be a 
problem in semantics: what is the correct translation of the term 
'guilt' into Dutch? On the surface it all seems very simple: 
'guilt' equals 'schuld'. This is a point where confusion could 
arise. 
b) Culpa Means Sahuld? 
In Dutch legislation and legal writing the words 'sahuld' 
and 'aulpa' are used as synonyms. 
"'Schuld' -HSR state- (212) "is the exact 
opposite of intent at one hand, and of accident 
('casus') at the other." 
Jescheck explains: (213) 
"Schuld bedeutet demnach, dasz die Motive, 
von denen sich der Täter bei der Willensbildung 
hat leiten laszen, negativ zo bewerten und ihm 
persönlich zum Vorwur'f zu machen sind, oder 
kurz gesagt: Schuld ist VOrwerfbarkeit der 
Willensbildung." (214) 
HSR continue: (215) 
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"It (guilt) is the same as that which is 
called 'faute' in French law, 'Fahrlässigkeit ' 
in German law, 'défaut de prévoyance et de 
précaution' in Belgian law." 
Jescheck proposes: (?1P) 
"Die FahrlHssigkeit ist also nicht eine 
mildere Form des Vorsatzes, sondern etwas 
anderes als der Vorsatz", 
and distinguishes between (217) 
"unbewuszte und bewuszte Fahrlässigkeit" 
-that is between negligentia where the actor, fcs a conseq-
uence of lack of care, did not consider the possibility that he, 
while doing an act, might be in contravention of a provision; the 
'inadvertent negligence' discussed earlier; and luxuria where the 
actor realizes that in acting he could cause the undesirable con-
sequence to materialize, but trusted that such consequence would 
not be all that serious, or where he might have overrated his 
capacity of keeping control over such consequence(s) or be hope-
ful that his good luck would endure sothat such consequence would 
not follow"; the 'advertent negligence' or 'recklessness'.in Can-
adian law. 
c) Culpa Equals Schuld Equals Negligence? 
'Schuld', then, means 'negligence'? 
We do not propose to summarize in this paper the various 
doctrines respecting culpa. We should prefer to adopt that mean-
ing which in practice, that is: in the courts, has found general 
acceptance. 
In Dutch legal dogmatics the word ' schu ld ' has a variety of 
meanings: 
1) a purely factual, mechanical meaning: 'actorship': X. is 
schuldig means that X. and no other person, committed 
the act. The question whether he is to be blamed or not, has a 
defence or not, is immaterial. Suitable evidence points to X. as 
the actor. In this sens schuld is not synonymous with culpa. 
2) the connotation of 'suspected actorship', based on a 
presumption, made on reasonable grounds, that X. is the 
actor and potentially liable. Thus in the Dutch Code of Criminal 
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Procedure (218) 
"Before criminal proceedings have been 
initiated, a person is considered a suspect if 
from facts and circumstances in which he is 
involved, a presumption may be drawn that he 
is guilty of the commission of some offence." 
In this sense schuld and culpa axe not synonymous either. 
3) Schuld also means 'accountability': the identity of the 
actor and the classification of his conduct have been 
established; he is held censurable unless he should have a defen-
ce. This meaning appears to be equivalent to 'guilt': "... that 
quality which imparts criminality to a motive or act, and renders 
the person amenable to punishment by the law." (219) 
4) Schuld as part of the subjective elements of an offence 
(that is: the mental component referring to intent or reckless-
ness or negligence, and at this point of the discussion, refer-
ring to negligence) and to be defined as 'lack of due care or due 
diligence', failing to live up to generally accepted patterns of 
behaviour or failing to demonstrate an appreciation of the stan-
dard of care in the sense of not understanding, not realizing 
what could easily have been understood or realized. Here, schuld 
and culpa and 'lack of care', 'lack of foresight', in other words 
'negligence' are equated. 
In this sense 'culpa' is equivalent to 'negligence', to 
'Fahrlässigkeit', 'schuld'. 
Another term referred to in this context is 'fault'. The 
word means "negligence, an error or defect of judgment or conduct; 
'any deviation from prudence, duty or rectitude'; any shortcoming 
or neglect of care or performance resulting from inattention, in-
capacity or perversity...; neglect of duty." (220); "responsibil-
ity, culpability, liability to blame for something wrong or un-
desired" (221); "fout, feil, schuld, gebrek" (222). Usually 
'fault' is equated with 'negligence' and therefore synonymous 
with schuld in that sense. 
Remain the adjectives. The English 'culpable' and the Dutch 
'culpóos' are not equivalent. 'Culpable' means 'blamable, censur-
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able, involving the breach of a legal duty or the commission of 
a fault; the term is not necessarily equivalent to 'criminal'... 
connotes fault rather than guilt." (223) 
But in 'culpable homicide' the word indicates 'a crime vary-
ing from the very lowest culpability up to the very verge of 
murder' (224). The Dutch culpóos may indicate the very lowest 
culpability, but certainly not anything approaching murder. 
"He who acts 'culpóos' usually is someone who intends to be 
good but ends up committing a wrong", say HSR. (225) These are 
situations and cases "in which the actor causes certain unintend-
ed consequences, which he sees arise after the fact, as a painful 
surprise, consequences he would have avoided provided he would 
have conceived or foreseen they were likely to arise and because 
of which he may curse himself." 
"Culpóos" means negligent; the term contains no suggestion 
of recklessness or intent, as the word 'culpable' does in Canadi-
an law. In Dutch law, however, 'bevuste schuld' is considered to 
be one form of culpa. 
Pefore closing these introductory remarks, it may be of some 
use to compare, very broadly, some of the approaches to solving 
legal issues, as made by jurists from both systems. 
D, DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
Referring back to the historical notes in Part One, it may 
be said that differences exist between the common law and civil 
law approaches to matters legal. It would be misleading to speak 
in absolute terms. Both systems are in motion as they have always 
been. Common law is looking for more refinement in the field of 
liability -to point out one area- and civil law seems well on its 
way to extend the rules of strict liability. 
The common law is, in essence, autochtone English law, 
originated, developed and perfected in Britain by the British. It 
was from the beginning highly centralized law, reflecting the 
"instinct of judges appointed by a foreign king" (226). Canon law 
was not received in England as it was in Europe, neither was Ro-
man law, in Europe later to be blended with local customs of 
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varied origin. (227) 
We pointed out that in England individual liberties were 
gained and protected thanks to the courts and to procedure. The 
legislator, speaking for the ruler of the day, was seen as a 
threat to freedom; the courts were its defenders. Similarly, the 
legislator -Parliament- through its statutes, was considered the 
restricting factor in the judges' activities as lawmakers. There-
fore, the courts would give a statute its literal and thus res-
trictive meaning. Where a statute was obscure, the judge would go 
beyond it, looking at precedents in his search for a fair and 
just solution of the issue before him. (228) 
To counter this tendency, the legislator would go into great 
detail when drafting his statutes in order to ensure that his in-
tentions would be reflected by the courts in their judgments. As 
in the past, so it still is today. 
Civil law, its codes and statutes, aimed at safeguarding the 
liberties of the people. When interpreting an obscure law, the 
civil judge will base his interpretation on reports of parliamen-
tary debates, trying to distil from them the legislator's intent-
ion while assessing the usual meaning of the words used. Especial-
ly the codes contain the essence of underlying broad principles 
and signal the spirit of the law. The legislator does not neces-
sarily draft his provisions in too great detail, knowing that the 
judges and lawyers will look for his intentions, basing themselv-
es upon these principles of general application. 
In common law the emphasis is on case law, that is on prece-
dents as the embodiment of good sense and natural justice and as 
the building blocks of a homogeneous and in all details complete 
body of law, applicable in any situation where an issue demands a 
solution. 
Common law is said to be pragmatic. Each case stands apart 
and may or may not be decided after comparison with similar cases. 
Precedents are scrutinized in painstaking analysis of their pot-
ential applicability. Generalizations are avoided; general princ-
iples will not be found; the judicial tradition points the way 
to a solution. The emphasis is on the question: is a remedy avail-
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able"? If so, there is a right. 
In this sense judges 'make law' where a statute is obscure 
or silent, thus creating a body of rules and principles as time 
moves on. 
In civil law the emphasis is on legislation, which describes 
and sets out the parameters of a citizen's rights and duties, and 
provides the remedies to enforce them. Principles of general ap-
plication are established, guiding the courts on what and how to 
decide regardless of the individual judge's sense of what is fair 
and just. Duties, the corrolanes of rights, are outlined. 
Case law is not an imperative source of law, but legislation 
is, case law plays a secondary role, binding no judge m any way 
whatever, judges cannot lay down general rules. Their decisions 
must reflect the legislator's intentions and may, at best, be 
used by other judges m support which is, in fact, not needed. 
(??8a) 
Common law empirical, pragmatic, looks up to experience 
rather than logic, is a technique rather than a science and en-
trusts the courts with the safeguarding and development of the 
law. 
Civil law has the legislator at is focal point, is a science 
rather than a technique, subdivides its subject matter in various 
fields and formulates principles from which, by the use of logic, 
solutions may be found. 
Common law applies the adversary, civil law the inquisitori-
al system of procedure. 
Both systems seem oceans apart, but practically there is a 
mutual infiltration of each other's territory. 
This rather incomplete, only global impression of both syst-
ems must suffice in view of the scope of this paper. A more com-
plete overview may be found m Towards a Codificatbon (229) of 
which the aforegoing is a resume. 
It may be understood from the above that the common law is 
full of surprises for the civilist and the reverse must also be 
true. A handicap for the civilist, when studying the common law, 
is that he will be looking in vain for sets of ground rules and 
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their exceptions, for sets of principles, for an intellectual 
guide to help him find his way through an immense body of case 
law materials from which he is to glean what is fair and just. 
He will find no codes in the material sense of the word and it 
is not without reason that the Canadian Law Reform Commission 
gave to one of its 'Working Papers' the title: Towards a Codific-
ation (of criminal law). 
In ve dubia, magie infioation 
quam affirmatio intelligenda. 
Godb.37 
In a doubtful matter, the denial 
or negative is to be regarded 
rather than the affirmative. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STRICT LIABILITY IN DUTCH 
CRIMINAL LAW 
A, NARROWING THE ISSUES 
Sofar the emphasis in the aforegoing discussions was 
focused mainly on Canadian law. Now is the time to shift the 
focus and to narrow the issues. 
We have declined to enter into any sort of detail with res-
pect to tort law, since tort law is not part of the criminal law. 
Its main objective is not punishment of the actor ( the so-called 
'punitive damages' are allowed only exceptionally) but allocation 
and distribution of damages. Its counterpart in Dutch civil law 
may, broadly speaking, be found in the doctrine of the 'onreoht-
matige daad' (that is, a civil wrong: conduct deemed unlawful by 
civil law as opposed to criminal law). V.Tiere tort law originally 
dealt with a limited number of specific torts, in later centur-
ies extended by 'actions on the case' and, later yet, further ex-
tended by catch-all actions based on the tort of negligence, the 
doctrine of the onrechtmatige daad does not go into specifics. 
It merely sets out that conduct is (civilly) unlawful where it 
violates the criminal or any other law, even unwritten law, the 
tenets of 'bonae mores' and the generally accepted duty of care 
in society. (230) Consequently, the number of potential violati-
ons is infinite, but all ensuing claims are civil claims. 
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It may be stated, that all criminal and penal offences are, in a 
way, 'onrechtmatige daden'. The reverse, however, would not apply. 
We shall confine ourselves to criminally unlawful conduct, leaving 
the civil counterpart out of further discussion. 
It is remarkable that in Canada the doctrine of strict res-
ponsibility is at present going through a stage of review and re-
vival, while in Dutch law it appears to find only limited attent-
ion. HSR mention (231) the phenomenon merely in passing and so 
does Jescheck. (232) We shall return to this topic shortly. 
This does not entail the conclusion that strict responsibil-
ity is not extending its territory into Dutch law (for instance 
in the area of product liability) but the question is: in how far 
does strict responsibility in Dutch criminal law show some ex-
pansion? These, and related questions will be the topics of the 
following chapters. 
Where we are now engaged in narrowing the issues to be dis-
cussed, it would seem that some basic questions need to be ans-
wered first. We see two primary questions: a) when is an offence 
one of strict responsibility? and b) which Dutch word or espres-
sion indicates that an offence is one of strict responsibility? 
a) When is an Offence One of Strict Responsibility? 
It is said that responsibility for the consequences of cert-
ain forbidden conduct is strict or absolute, where the law holds 
an actor liable regardless of his state of mind, that is: regard-
less of the fact whether an actor did or did not have the intent 
to generate the consequence, or whether he was or was not reck-
less, merely negligent or totally unaware. 
At first sight this concept could appear somewhat hard to 
digest. There seems to be something basically unacceptable in it. 
'Onwetend zondigt niet' ('A person cannot commit a sin unbe-
knownst') states an age-old maxim but, like so many other maxims 
it hides as much of the truth as it reveals; it may be valid in 
the realm of ethics, but the law and ethics do not cover onean-
other any longer. The realization that one may become liable by 
conduct that has consequences one could not reasonably foresee, 
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or even wanted to prevent or avoid, may come as a shock. Yet, 
there are many examples some of which will be presented later. 
Essentially, then, strict or absolute responsibility is res­
ponsibility for consequences, arising from certain conduct forbid­
den by law; no subjective constituting element is required. The 
chain of reasoning is fatally short: A. engaged in conduct χ., 
generating consequence y. Therefore A. is liable. The question 
whether, in any of both systems, in some cases certain defences 
are available, is postponed till later and the answer will point 
out the distinction between offences of absolute and of strict 
liability. 
Thus, the answer to the first question is: an offence is 
one of strict responsibility when the offender is punished merely 
for having realized the consequence of conduct forbidden by law. 
The French writers speak of infractions purement matérielles 
and the German authors use the term Erfolgshaftung. 
The Dutch writers...? Amazing as it may seem, the Dutch 
writers borrow either from the English, or the French or the 
German colleagues. There seems to be no suitable Dutch word or 
expression. 
b) Quest for a Dutch Term 
As will be shown later, offences of strict responsibility 
are still to be found in Dutch criminal law as well as in German 
criminal law. 
HSR refer to Erfolgshaftung in context with three subjects: 
firstly, when discussing the historical aspects of crime and 
criminal law (233), secondly when discussing the various forms of 
the subjective constitutive elements of the offence (234) and, 
lastly, when discussing attempt. (235) 
In the sub-chapter, 'An excursion into the past', we find 
the following: 
"Among the Germanic tribes crimes -and the 
ensuing 'inimioitia' (Tacitus, Germania, cap.21) 
committed outside someone's own tribe against an 
alien tribe- were dealt with through the vendet-
ta, that is the 'feud'. This shows an ulterior 
objective over and above a mere reaction within 
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the tribe, namely: the desire to take 
revenge and obtain retribution. Apart from that, 
however, and apart from the fact that in case 
of manslaughter religious concepts play a role 
-to wit, the need of offering appeasement to the 
soul of a victim hoping it would stop vexing the 
tribe-, there is in the underlying principle of 
'a life for a life', 'a tooth for a tooth', some-
thing more discernible than the desire for veng-
eance and retribution. 
"When exercising the rights created by the 
feud, the tribe having lost one of its members, 
was not necessarily seeking the death of the 
offender personally. The death of any other 
member of that tribe would be sufficient to 
settle the feud. 
"Not only does this point to something else 
than the ordinary way to seek vengeance, but it 
also shows that in ancient times liability was 
assigned even in cases where death or injury 
were inflicted neither intentionally, nor 
negligently. (Emphasis added4). In those days 
the maxim obtained: "Die Tat tötet den Mann". 
(It is the conduct (act) that kills a man). 
"This so-called 'Erfolgehaftung' was based 
on the principle that one had to answer for 
what one had done. Without being an object of 
hatred, one had through one's conduct disturb-
ed a state of affairs that was in equilibrium; 
that equilibrium had to be restored." (236) 
We have emphasized some words in the above quote that show 
how liability resulted even where it was entirely divorced from 
intent or negligence, which is the halmark of strict responsibil-
ity. 
Dealing with the subjective constitutive elements of the of-
fence, HSR point out that: (237) 
"In the primitive criminal la\i...'Erfolgs-
haftung ' was the typical form of liability; not 
the subjective disposition was the criterium 
for censurability, but the objective consequence.' 
Finally, discussing criminal attempt, HSR state:(238) 
"Rendering the criminal attempt punishable 
is not a self-evident matter. In the primitive 
stages of the criminal law it was the factual 
damage inflicted upon society or upon the in-
dividual that gave rise to penal sanctions. 
"As long as the 'Erfolgshaftung' is the 
generally recognized form of liability, criminal 
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attempt has no place in the system." 
One would expect more on 'Erfolgshaftung' in context with 
the so-called 'door het gevolg gequalif'iceerde misdrijven'. For 
this aspect we shall have to turn to Jescheck. 
"Erfolgsqualifizierte Delikte sind als Rest-
bestand der alten Erfolgshaftung im StGB, noch 
reichlich vertreten, auch in Kombination mit 
einer Fahrlässigkeitstat als Grundbestand." (239) 
and further: 
"Der 'Rest von Erfolgshaftung', der im Erfolgs-
unrecht der Fahrlässigkeitstat fortlebt, besteht 
also nur darin dasz, wer Glück gehabt hat, milder 
oder gar nicht bestraft wird..." (240)(241) 
Jescheck -first quote- says that criminal offences, the act-
ual consequences of which result in increased punishment, or non-
criminal conduct, the consequences of which render the actor 
punishable, are the left-overs of the old Erfolgshaftung... and 
they are still to be found in numerous offences in the German 
Criminal Code. Yet, Jescheck also states: (242) 
"Im deutschen Strafrecht gibt es keine ob-
jektive Verantwortlichkeit wie in Frankreich bei 
den 'infractions purement materielles' oder im 
anglo-amerikanischem Recht in den Fällen der 
'strict liability ' ." 
and: 
"Aus dem Schuldprinzip ergibt sich einmal, 
dasz Strafe Überhaupt Schuld voraussetzt, sodasz, 
wer ohne Schuld handelt, nicht bestraft werden 
kann (Ausschlusz der Erfolgshaftung)..." (243) 
and finally: 
"Einmal wird durch die selbständige Bewertung 
des Handlungunrechtes der Fahrlässigkeitstat ein 
Gegengewicht gegen die in der Praxis häufig zu 
stark betonte Erfolgshaftung geschaffen." (244) 
We find it somewhat difficult to reconcile the statements 
quoted above. Attempting to paraphrase their contents fairly, we 
would have to write the following resume: German criminal law has 
no place for strict responsibility, that is for objective res-
ponsibility, because it is a system based on the principle that 
guilt is a prerquisite for punishment. Yet, the old Erfolgshaf-
tung may still be found in the guise of 'erfolgsqualifizierte 
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Delikte', whether in combination with negligence or not. The neg-
ligence aspect of this category of offences has found its own 
assessment as to their punishability, a phenomenon that is said 
to act as a counterweight to the 'Erfolgshaftung' which, in 
practice, is often emphasized too strongly. 
If we understand the above correctly, we will have to say 
that where a counterweight is needed, there must be some weight 
already present. Does the inscription on this weight perhaps read: 
'objektive Verantwortlichkeit' (Objective responsibility')? 
Rephrasing the question: do we discover strict liability in 
German criminal law, disguised as 'erfolgsqualifizierte Delikte ' 
with or without a negligence component? 
More urgent, however, is the question: are the 'door het ge-
volg gekwalificeerde delicten' of the Dutch criminal law in fact 
strict liability offences under a new label? 
We are tempted to answer this question in the affirmative. 
Further downstream we shall take a closer look at these catego-
ries of offences and also at the 'overtredingen'. 
The above appears to be a digression and it is. There is a 
purpose for it, however. The quest for a Dutch term makes sense 
only if there is substance to be covered by it. We think that 
strict responsibility is far from dead in Dutch criminal law. 
Consequently our quest is far from futile, as we hope to demons-
trate in the following chapters. 
In Part One we have quoted a definition of 'strict liability' 
(245) : 'Liability without fault' and 'fault' is the equivalent 
of 'negligence'. It is liability although one is not guilty of 
negligence, 'tor any defect of judgment or conduct, or any devia-
tion from prudence, duty or rectitude; the actor cannot be ac-
cused of any shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance re-
sulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity, bad faith, 
mismanagement or neglect of duty". (246) 
Remembering what we have said about that example of almost 
supermundane perfection, 'the Reasonable Man', we must now con-
fess that even he may be held strictly responsible when engaging 
in conduct branded as a strict liability offence. For "neither 
care nor negligence, neither good nor bad faith, neither knowl-
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edge nor ignorance will save him". (247) 
Absence of intent or negligence (dolus or aulpa) offers no 
saving grace. 
HSR, referred to above, do not enter into any searching dis-
cussion of the phenomenon; Jescheck goes into some detail when 
discussing the Erfolgshaftung in its relation to criminal attempt, 
incitement, partyship and negligence. 
Is there a Dutch term9 
Translating 'Erfolgshaftung' offers no great perspective: 
'aansprakelijkheid voor gevolgen' ('liability for consequences') 
is rather vague and far too general. He who acts intentionally or 
negligently is liable for consequences, in crime as well as in 
tort scenarios. 
'Strafrechtelijke gevolgcaansprakelijkheid ' ('criminal liab-
ility for consequences') does encompass mtns rea situations as 
well, but at least limits itself to the criminal law. 
'Strafwettelijke aansprakelijkhetd' ('statutory criminal 
liability'), as a counterpart of 'wettelijke aansprakelijkheid' 
('tortious liability') -a civil law term- puts the emphasis on 
the statute as the basis for liability, but is still too general 
and, as such, appears to have little appeal. 
'Objectieve strafwettelijke aansprakelijkheid' ('objective 
liability based on criminal statutes')"7 At least this has the 
merit of suggesting that no subjective element is required for 
this kind of liability. 
'Strafwettelijke risico-aansprakelijkheid' ('risk liability 
based on criminal statutes')? Does the term risiao-aansprakelijk-
heid perhaps constitue a promising point of departure' We should 
delve a little deeper. 
If we understand the term correctly, we must say that this 
does not appear to be a term of the criminal law; rather it be-
longs with the tort law language. Asser (248) mentions the 'risi-
co theorre' in the chapter on 'legal justification of liability' 
and has this to say: 
"The risk theory, not based on any fundament-
al ('prior') principle, but upon the search for 
an explanation of those forms of statutory liab-
ility, for which fault is not the basis, embraces 
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many variants... (Some of its proponents)... see 
the basis of liability in the creation of a 
situation of danger ( 'gevaar-theorie ' ) or in the 
circumstance that the conduct, the person or the 
thing that cause the damage, generate a profit 
for the actor who is being held liable ('profijt-
theorie ' ) 
Evidently, we are in the province of civil liability ( 'on-
rechtmatige daad'). It is hardly astonishing to see how easily 
one strays from one area into another in this borderline terri-
tory between the criminal or penal and civil liability, between 
statutory offences and torts. 
The term-component 'risico' ('risk') begs some further dis-
cussion. 
Asser states: (249) 
"Risk means that one takes a chance of losing 
when the odds prove not to be in one's favour." 
Jescheck points at the other side of the medal: (250) 
"...wer Glück gehabt hat (wird) milder oder 
gar nicht bestraft..." (The lucky one gets a 
lighter punishment or none at all...) 
Taking a chance, in this context, means however, that one is 
somehow aware that a certain conduct could, or even just might 
result in the realization of the undesirable, that is forbidden 
consequence. This awareness may encompass anything from reckless-
ness (which would have to be classified as 'intent' -'dolus even-
tualis'-) to the slightest form of negligence as in culpa levis-
sima, but stopping short of including unawareness of consequence 
(potential or actual) and of realizing such consequence while 
being engaged in conduct that is lawful per se. Therefore, the 
term 'risk liability' is not all-encompassing apart from being a 
civil or tort law term. Consequently, the term 'risk liability' 
or, more precise, 'penal risk liability', that is 'strafwette-
lijke risico-aansprakelijkheid' still seems to be far from per-
fect. 
It would seem to us that we have an option of two terms: 
(not being able to present anything better): either 'schuldloze 
strafwettelijke aansprakelijkheid' ('statutory penal no-fault 
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liability'), or: 'strafvettelijke risiao-aansprakelijkheid ' 
('statutory penal risk liability'). -As an aside: we prefer the 
word 'penal' over 'criminal' since most of the offences concerned 
are outside of the ambit of the law of 'true crime', as the terms 
'regulatory' or 'statutory offences' imply. 
Of those two options, the better one, we suggest, is 'schuld-
lose strafwettelijke aansprakelijkheid', for the following reas-
ons : 
'Schuldloos ' ('no-fault') indicates that no subjective 
constitutive element appears in the definition of the conduct 
made punishable by a 'strafwet' ('penal statute'). It is liabil-
ity for conduct proscribed by penal statutes. We have a clear 
distinction between this kind of liability and the 'wettelijke 
aansprakelijkheid', avoiding any reference to risk which could 
only suggest a connection that does not exist. 
Certainly, the term is long on words, but this is no uncom-
mon phenomenon in Dutch legal writing. 'Aansprakelijkheid-uit-
sluitingsgronden ', 'gequalificeevde valsheid in geschrift', 'per-
soonlijke strafverhogende omstandigheden' and the famed 'afwezig-
heid van alle schuld' lAVAS), and many other terms compete with 
German expressions such as 'unbestimmte Strafbarkeitsvorausetz-
ungen', 'Vorsatz-Fahrlässigkeitskombination' and 'Subjektive 
Reahtswiedrigkeitsmerkmale ' and lose in the contest. 
This 'schuldloze strafwettelijke aansprakelijkheid' ('SSA') 
may either be 'absoluut' or 'relatief', depending on whether no 
defence of ignorance or mistake is available, or whether this 
defence would be open. 
In both systems we are dealing with offences where, in the 
majority of cases, negligent conduct is the main characteristic. 
In this context a new problem of semantics is to be met, 
hiding in the Dutch word 'roekeloos '. 
The correct translation of the word 'roekeloosheid ' appears 
to be 'recklessness'. In Dutch law, roekeloosheid is a form of 
culpa, that is 'negligence'. In Canadian law 'recklessness' is 
one of the two components of mens rea, while negligence is not 
classified as mens rea. We suggest that the better translation of 
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'roekeloosheid' is either 'rashness' or 'recklessness'. It seems 
that here is some risk of confusion. For that reason we should 
perhaps elaborate somewhat on what was said in Part One with res­
pect to 'recklessness'. 
c) Negligence/Сціра - Recklessness/ffoefeeZoosfceid/Rashness? 
We have mentioned before that mens rea is a double-faceted 
component of the constitutive elements of an offence. One side is 
'intent' {'dolus') in its various aspects; the other side is 
'recklessness'. What exactly is 'recklessness' and what makes it 
qualify as an inculpatory element on one line with intent? 
Recklessness is "the state of mind accompanying an act, 
which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious 
consequences, or which, though foreseeing such consequences, per­
sists in spite of such knowledge" (251) "Devoid of caution, re­
gardless of consequences, rash, heedless of danger". (252) 
While intent indicates 'desire of consequence', recklessness 
incorporates 'foresight of probability of consequence'. (253) 
It should be noted that where foresight should equal assessment 
of 'certainty', 'unavoidability' of the consequence, we are deal­
ing with nothing less than intent. Certainty in this context 
means "such a high degree of probability that common sense would 
pronounce it certain". (254) 
Glanville Williams notes: (255) 
"... it is an error to suppose that crimes 
are divided into sharply-defined classes of 
crimes of intention, crimes of negligence, and 
crimes of strict responsibility. Some crimes 
are hybrids, having different requirements for 
different elements." 
"When it is said that given crimes need 
intention, what is referred to is intention 
as to consequence... Some of these crimes are 
satisfied with recklessness as to an accompany­
ing circumstance. Thus burglary, though a crime 
exclusively of intention in respect of the 
felony to be committed in the house, is also a 
crime of recklessness (perhaps even of strict 
responsibility) in respect of the time and 
place." 
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Reckless is not equal to carelessness. It is "... any de-
termination to pursue conduct with knowledge of the risks involv-
ed though without a desire that they should eventuate". (256) It 
is 'voluntary risk taking'. 
Returning now to 'roekeloos' ('rash', 'reckless'?) (257) the 
following is to be said. 
HSR state (258) "(In geval van roekeloosheid...) heeft de 
dader zich om de gevolgen van zijn handelingen niet bekreund." 
("...where a man is roekeloos he does not care or trouble about 
or is not anxious about the consequences of his conduct".) "Our 
Van Dale (259) refers to "very inconsiderate (thoughtless, un-
thinking, rash) and ill-advised" conduct. However, that does not 
describe recklessness. 
A man who is reckless did indeed consider, think about, 
assess, maybe even worry about such consequences, even to the 
point where he wished there was a way to avoid them. The main 
characteristic of recklessness is exactly foresight of conse-
quence, the rather high probability of its emergence coupled with 
a refusal to be deterred from doing the act, regardless of such 
consequences. 
Therefore, it would appear that recklessness is the exact 
equivalent of 'opzet als noodzakelijkheids-, zekerheids- of waar-
schijnlijkheids-bevustzijn ' ('intent accompanied by the realizat-
ion that the -secondary- consequence(s) must ensue, are most like-
ly to ensue or will probably ensue'). Classic examples are the 
cases of Thomas von Bremerhaven and the Hoornse Taart. 
Thomas von Bremerhaven, intending to blow up a ship on the 
high seas by causing a vat of gunpowder to explode (it was in the 
year 1875) was aiming at getting the insured value of the ship 
into his bank account. Unfortunately, the vat exploded premature-
ly, while the ship was still moored in port, causing 88 deaths, 
55 injured and damages in the amount of 60,000 Mark. Het Reichs-
gericht reasoned: "Die Folgen werden in den Willen aufgenommen". 
("The consequences are covered by the intent"). 
In the case of the Hoornse Taart, a man wanted to kill an 
enemy by sending him a cake containing rat poison; the sender 
knew, however, that his enemy's spouse most likely would also 
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eat a slice of the cake. Nonetheless, reasoned the Court, the man 
had done nothing to prevent the spouse from eating of the cake, 
while there was still time to issue a warning. (260) 
Thus, the recklessness of the common law finds its parallel 
in some of the forms of intent in Dutch law. This has nothing to 
do with 'roekeloosheid' which is a form of 'culpa', that is: of 
negligence. 
There is another aspect of recklessness to be discussed. In 
both systems recklessness is put at the same level as intent. 
Where there is intent, the consequence of the conduct is said to 
have been desired. Where there is recklessness, there is fore-
sight of consequence, foresight not powerful enough to deter the 
offender from acting; but there is no desire of consequence. 
Because the non-desired but foreseen consequences did not deter 
the offender, the accepted view is that he did 'take such con-
sequences into the bargain' or, to speak with Jescheck: (261) 
"Wer in dieser Weise auf die Gefahr hin 
handelt, dasz sich der Tatbestand der strafbaren 
Handlung verwirklichen werde, hat diese MBglich-
keit in die Grundlagen seines Handlungsent-
schluszes einbezogen und damit auch 'gewollt'." 
That is: 
"Whoever acts in this manner accepting the 
risk that the undesirable consequence, which is 
the objective constitutive element of the of-
fence, materializes, is to be taken as having 
made such eventuality part of the basis for his 
decision to act and, therefore, as having 
intended such consequence." 
There are two scenarios where such a situation could occur: 
firstly, a person does an act, aiming at a certain consequence 
-intent- regardless of other, foreseen 'secondary' consequences 
which may emerge but are not desired -recklessness-; secondly, 
a person does an act, not per se criminal, but criminal only un-
der certain concomitant circumstances; he takes that risk into 
the bargain, a fact that may render his conduct an offence. 
An example fitting the first scenario is: a man seeks to 
rape a woman and to stifle her cries, chokes her, not to kill but 
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to render her unconscious. As a result she dies. Foresight of 
this possibility did not make him stop. There was intent as to 
the rape and recklessness as to the potential consequences of 
choking. 
An example of the second situation is: a man seeks inter­
course with a woman, with her consent (intent, two consenting 
adults, as he thinks). However, while looking over 18 years of 
age and stating she is 20, she is, in fact, under 16. The uncert­
ainty as to the woman's age did not deter the man. He faces pro­
secution. Yet it would seem fair to state that neither the 
causing of the death in the first case, nor the fact that the 
actor actually has intercourse with a woman under 16, are intend­
ed, since they are not. 
That the actor is assumed to have such risks included in his 
intent as a result of having 'foreseen' them, appears to be only 
a way of justifying what is in essence legislative policy, to 
open an avenue towards the heaviest penalty in so grave a situa­
tion. We suggest that this technique consists in fact of imputing 
or assigning mens rea by qualifying recklessness as at par with 
intent. 
Actually, are we not looking at a fiction' 
HSR refer to Van Dijck, Pompe and Vos (262), eminent legal 
authors, who -for comparable although somewhat different reasons-
declare themselves against classification of 'dolus eventualis ' 
(' оогьаагаеіг^к opzet', 'conditional intent') as a form of in­
tent. This form of dolus does not suggest that a consequence is 
certain, likely or probable but merely possible and, as to an 
assessment of its chance of emerging, is the most vague or neutr­
al mode of predictability. (263) 
The writers referred to -Vos goes farthest in his conclusi­
ons- do not accept all, or even part of these various degrees of 
foresight and quantification of the risk to be incurred, as spec­
ific forms of intent, but hold them to be serious forms of negli­
gence 
Dolus eventualis, we suggest, belongs with all other forms 
of 'qualified intent' -that is intent qualified as to the degree 
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of probability that a secondary consequence should emerge- in one 
group, all representing recklessness under similar but somewhat 
different expectations of future harm. 
The question was: are we looking at a fiction? "If someone 
would rather not see a consequence materialize, it cannot be said 
that his intent is directed at that consequence", states Van 
Dijck (264) and we must agree. Yet, the intent is imputed, as-
signed, attributed. We border, it seems, on the 'uils-theorie ', 
referred to in Part One in context with 'intent as to consequenc-
es' , for which HSR express support (265). The catch phrase is: 
"Dat moet je wel gewild hebben" ("Obviously, you must have in-
tended the consequence"). Again, is this not attribution of in-
tent? 
So, one way of chastizing a reckless person is in attribut-
ing intent by categorizing recklessness as being equivalent with 
intent, as being 'in the nature of intent', that is, as being a 
form of mens rea. 
We find similar situations in Dutch law. Intent is held to 
take various forms or modes, distinguished as to the measure of 
probability of emergence of the secondary consequence, and all 
comparable to recklessness. 
The HR has accepted dolus eventualis as one form of intent. 
Yet, we feel strongly attracted by Van Dijck, Pompe and Vos, es-
pecially Vos, who decline qualifying as intent that they say is 
not really intent, categorizing it as culpa. Nonetheless, we do 
seem to have a problem here when qualifying recklessness as culpa 
-which is negligence-, for there was neither lack of care, nor 
lack of foresight. The reckless offender premeditated the degree 
of risk as to the potential emergence of the secondary consequen-
ce. In other words: he did think. 
Could another solution be found, eliminating the need for a 
fiction, which in itself is an artificial thing? This will be 
probed in the next chapter, when we ask the question whether 
responsibility for reckless conduct could and should be based on 
strict responsibility rather than on fiction. 
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Before moving on we have yet to finalize dealing with 'roe-
kelooshetd ', which is 'onnadenkendherd ', 'ondoordaahthebd ' 
('thoughtlessness'). We have said earlier that we find it hard to 
accept degrees of negligence and would rather assign a gradation 
as to the seriousness of the harm inflicted in view of the level 
of importance of the interest that was put into jeopardy. 
'Roekeloosheid ' -perhaps the better English equivalent is 
'rashness', without an> of the legal connotations of its near-
synonym 'recklessness'- is negligence in a very serious matter, 
creating a situation of grave danger. It is 'indifference' or 
'insouciance' as to consequences which might arise causing seri-
ous harm. HSR say (266) ". we are approaching the highest 
level of culpa... coming very close to 'dolus eventualis'. 
Put 'roekeloosheid' is negligence, not recklessness, nor 
intent 
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Fiatío est contra veritatem, 
sed pro veritate habetur. 
Fiction is against the truth, 
but it is to be esteemed the 
truth. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOME FICTIONS IN COMMON LAW 
A. ECHOS FROM THE PAST 
When Jescheck refers to 'relics of the past' when discussing 
negligence, namely the 'Rest von Erfolgshaftung, der im Erfolgs-
unrecht der Fahrlässigkeitstat fortlebt1 (267) and HSR, dealing 
with the 'door het gevolg gekwalificeerde delicten' where the law 
with reference to such consequences only demands a causal link, 
but neither intent, nor negligence, state: (268) "... it could be 
said that (these offences) are actually atavisms, that is: speci-
mens of the Germanic Erfolgshaftung referred to above, emerging 
anew in our times", then we are being confronted with a historic 
reality: in mankind's ceaseless voyage into the future, the only 
permanent thing seems to be change. 
Things, institutions, ethics, law, customs cannot, at will, 
be switched off as if they were recorded on video-tape. They are 
not projections on a screen. They are part of reality, of every 
day life. The passage of time may bring change and change could 
go in two different directions: change could result in or lead to 
the development of new institutions, customs, laws, ethics, or it 
could bring about the revival of the old, adapted to the demands 
of the times. 
Thus it is with strict responsibility, which appears to have 
been next to absolute in an ancient past. When it was in full 
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force, it must have expressed a necessary reaction of socie-
ty to certain conduct engaged in by its members. It must have 
been practical, effective and indispensable, meeting the needs of 
society's self-defence at the time. 
When certain extraneous factors, christian ethics, expanding 
civilization, made their influence felt by causing changes in so-
ciety and in its individual members, by finetuning consciences 
and softening the ways in which the daily struggle for life and 
survival was being carried on, the need for desert justice dimin-
ished. Judicial self-help had to recede in the face of mainten-
ance of the King's Peace. The 'nens rea factor and the defences 
related to it replaced the harshness of the absolute responsibil-
ity which attributed personal guilt regardless of any mental dis-
position. 
The world, Man specifically, is consistently in a state of 
change. Regrettably, change is not necessarily identical with 
progress, ethically or culturally. Occasionly mankind slides back 
and history is full of documentary evidence illustrating how 
cycle followed upon cycle, progress followed by regress. 
The fact that strict responsibility has stayed with us all 
through history, may be explained by pointing out that m certain 
situations, found at any and all times, it was the only viable 
reaction of society to individual misconduct. Strict responsibil-
ity is not all bad per se on the ground that it appears to wipe 
out the link between conscience and conduct, identifying actor-
ship with culpability and hence, liability. 
Thus, there was a period that strict responsibility retired 
to the background. The emphasis was on ethics, on natural law, on 
conscience, on a generally shared concept of what the lonae r>oreJ 
required or tolerated. 
However, when Man changes his comportment, abandons gearing 
his conduct to generally accepted ethics, that is: when Man him-
self divorces his conduct from what his conscience suggests, he 
eliminates the very factor which, in earlier ages, opposed strict 
liability and introduced personal guilt as conditional to liabil-
ity. It appears that what we see today around us, is a scene of 
change, conducive to the revival of strict responsibility. 
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We are to be confronted with the above theme again. 
Apart from this, there is another reason why strict respons­
ibility may see its role expanded. 
The complexity of modern life demands a complexity of rules, 
it appears, in order to maintain peace and order, health and 
safety, fairness and protection of the economically weaker. All 
of the true crimehas now been defined and one could only think 
of a few areas where extension of its catalogue could be expected. 
Drug related crime is a recent example of such extension. However, 
when we speak of the complexity of modern life, we are not really 
looking at true crime, but at a much vaster area where damage may 
ensue as a result of sloppiness, inadvertence, lack of diligence, 
fraud. Highway traffic, weights and measures, protection of the 
environment against pollution or depletion, prescription drugs, 
hunting and fishing -to name a few- are all subjects for regula­
tions, which become more complex as the advance of technology 
moves faster and vaster ahead. In these areas, it seems, consci­
ence plays only a minor role, if any at all. yens rea от its ab­
sence are hard to evidence. The doors have been opened wide to 
more strict responsibility legislation and a multitude of regul­
ations have already marched through it. There seems to be no end 
in sight. We shall review these statements shortly. 
For this moment it must be said, that with respect to true 
crime, strict responsibility never died. It has been living on, 
disguised, but still going strong. Where penal offences are con­
cerned, it shows a clear tendency towards proliferation, 
If the above is correct, then the search is on for examples, 
peering through the disguises, identifying the fictions, and ex­
posing what is really underneath. This is to be done for both 
Canadian and Dutch law. 
Therefore we shall now first look at true crime leading to 
strict responsibility in common law and compare it with its count­
erparts m Dutch law. Then we shall move to the lesser categories 
of punishable conduct statutory, regulatory or provincial offen­
ces, that is. to violations or contraventions of penal law. 
Under all circumstances we should attempt to recognize 
strict responsibility where it seems to be hiding. Echos from the 
-241-
past that have kept reverberating and may well be the sounds of 
the present and the future 
B. STRICT RESPONSIBILITY AND REAL CRIME 
a) Homicide 
True crime is serious business. So are murder and manslaught-
er. One would expect to find that guilt and ensuing punishment 
for commission of true crime are exclusively based on mens rea. 
In reality, strict responsibility may take its place. 
In Dutch law 'murder' is defined. (269) 
"He who intentionally and with premeditation 
takes the life of another, is punishable as 
guilty of murder..." 
This crisp definition is clear. To be guilty of murder, the 
actor must have acted with intent and premeditation. There is on-
ly one other crime listed as murder: infanticide. (270). All 
other taking of a human life is, at worst, manslaughter. 
Canadian law has adopted a more complex classification of 
homicide-as-murder. We refer to Part One, chapter 8 for a thumb-
nail sketch. At this point we propose to elaborate somewhat on 
the strict responsibility aspects. 
In this context we also refer to two essays, both having ap-
peared in the Canadian Bar Revue, the first in Volume 55 (1977) 
by Peter Turns and R.S. Reíd, both of the Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of British Columbia and of The British Coulmbia Bar, and en-
titled: From Felony Murder to Accomplice Felony Attempted Murder: 
the Rake's Progress Compleat?; the second appeared in Volume 57 
(1979), written by Graham Parker of Osgoode Tall Law School, 
York University, Toronto and entitled: Homicide - Constructtve 
Murder. 
Burns and Reíd trace the development history of mens rea. 
They say that as of Bracton's time (about 1250) "the trend away 
from strict liability towards examination of the accused's moral 
culpability had begun." They state that, essentially, mens rea m 
its earliest form was objective: "an outward manifestation of 
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wicked behaviour". Under influence of Church doctrine and of the 
ecclesiastics, who were well versed in Roman and Canon law, mers 
rea changed its character from an objective to a subjective 
standard of morality. Its outward manifestation was either intent 
or recklessness. 
Before entering into any further discussion, we should like 
to elaborate slightly on what was said in respect to homicide In 
Part One. This time we shall focus on C.C., s. 205. Repetition of 
some of the remarks already made is unavoidable. 
Section 205 is purely descriptive, merely stating that homi-
cide becomes culpable, when death is caused by means of an unlaw-
ful act, by criminal negligence, by causing a human being (by 
threats or fear of violence or deception) to do anything that 
causes his death and, finally, by wilfully frightening a child or 
a sick person and death ensues. S. 205 does not state under what 
conditions homicide becomes murder. This matter is dealt with in 
sections 212 and 213. 
The problem in the above is to define the term 'unlawful act' 
which does not include criminally negligent conduct, since this 
is mentioned separately (s.202(5)(b). Also, the wording of the 
section is '.. death is caused by neans of an unlawful act' and 
not 'during commission of an unlawful act or during an attempt to 
do an unlawful act'. No clearcut definition appears to be avail-
able. All we know is that the unlawful act must be inherently 
dangerous, that is qualify as a potential cause of harm or death. 
It is conduct such as our unavoidable 'reasonable man' would not 
fail to assess as fraught with risk for the safety of another's 
health and life. 
Section 205(4) states that culpable homicide is either mur-
der, infanticide or manslaughter. Manslaughter is not defined 
either. The Code only categorizes homicide that is neither murder, 
nor infanticide, as manslaughter. (Sections 215 and 217). 
Sections 212 and 213 describe, essentially, various kinds of 
mens rea, which qualify certain conduct as murder. 
Section 212(a)(1) mentions 'intent' to kill while s.212(a)(i) 
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mentions intent to inflict potentially lethal harm coupled with 
recklessness as to whether death will result, coupled also with 
knowledge ('... that he knows is likely to cause death...1) of 
the nature of the harm. 
It is s.212(c) that gives rise to some other problems. We 
find the term '... for an unlawful object...' and it is not 
clear what that term means. It cannot mean 'to kill or ta in-
jure' for these situations are covered by s.212a. It is neither 
equivalent to the 'unlawful act' in s.205(5) for, while the un-
lawful act must, itself, be the cause of death, the unlawful ob-
ject is merely the forbidden consequence the offender means to 
realize and in the pursuit of which he may do 'anything' of such 
a dangerous nature that, to his knowledge, is to be expected to 
cause death. The subsection goes even further by stating '...he 
knows or ought to know. .', thus objectifying the knowledge com-
ponent. Even the circumstance that the offender desires to effect 
his unlawful object without causing death or bodily harm, is no 
excuse. 
In The Queen v. Vasil (271) it was the consensus of the 
Supreme Court of Canada that the unlawful object, contemplated by 
Parliament in s.212(c) is conduct which, if prosecuted fully, 
would amount to an indictable offence requiring mens rea. This 
requirement would point into the direction of conduct, qualified 
as 'true crime', that is to say a federal offence. 
In this case reference is made to Humphreys J. in Reqrna v. 
Larkrn (272), who made a statement that later, m D.P.P. v. New-
bury (273) was characterized as 'an admirably clear statement of 
the law'. 
Humphreys distinguished between a person doing a lawful act 
as opposed to doing an unlawful act. 
Where an act is lawful, but the actor 'behaves so negligent-
ly as to cause death to some other person' the offender may be 
found guilty of manslaughter only where "the negligence is of a 
very high degree. The expression most commonly used is 'unless it 
shows the accused person to have been reckless as to the conseq-
uences of his act'." 
Where the act is unlawful and dangerous and the actor, quite 
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inadvertently, causes the death of another, he is guilty of man­
slaughter . 
Where the act is unlawful and dangerous and атоипЬъпд to a 
felony, that is, an act that was done with malicious forethought 
(either express or implied by law) he is guilty of murder, "and 
he is equally guilty of murder if he does the act with the in­
tention of causing grievous bodily harm to the person whom in 
fact he kills." 
All of this does not take away from the fact that the offend­
er's intent or recklessness is not directed at killing a human 
being but at realizing an unlawful object at committing a crim­
inal offence. Where it is said that 'he ought to know' the pot­
ential danger inherent in his conduct, the nens rea becomes ob­
jective. Where he wishes not to kill or maim, his intent does not 
cover the death of the victim, neither does his recklessness. 
Section 212(c) has been labeled the 'constructive murder' 
section. We suggest this is strict, if not absolute liability. 
The only proviso appears to be that the accused be capable of as­
sessing the 'surrounding circumstances' supposed to be within his 
knowledge. This introduces further problems where, for instance 
drunkeness is a factor, problems we do not intend to discuss any 
further at this point. 
Remains section 213, already discussed in Part One. We 
should like to add the following. Section 213 deals with the sit­
uation where an actor, while committing or attempting to commit 
any one of a specific list of serious offences (the 'felonies' of 
olden, supplemented with some moderner ones) causes the death of 
a person in any one of four specific ways, designed to facilitate 
the commission of such offence, or his flight thereafter or after 
an attempt, regardless whether he intends to cause the victim's 
death and regardless whether he knows or does not know that death 
is likely to be caused- the offender's intent or recklessness or 
knowledge are totally irrelevant as to his liability. 
Does intent play a role at all' Yes, it does. In s.213(a) 
the intent is directed at causing bodily harm. In s.213(b) and 
(c) it is directed at subduing the victim. However, these intents 
are not the primary intents that are directed at committing any 
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of the listed crimes. These intents cover the main event. The 
other ones, however, are secondary in the sense that they relate 
to auxiliary conduct that aims at making a success of what the 
primary intent is aimed at or, where the action bogs down stop-
ping at the attempt stage and where flight is the way out, that 
conduct aims at making a success of the flight. 
Yet, secondary or not, when the victim should die, the 
charge will be 'murder'. 
Section 213(d) is more severe yet. If the offender has a 
weapon upon his person and death is caused by that weapon, not 
because it was used intentionally and purposefully, but in any 
freak, unforeseeable way whatever, the offender faces a charge of 
murder. In Swietlinski v. The Queen (274) the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that 'no mental element is required under subsection 
(d) beyond the minimal intent to use or have a weapon. The sub-
section applies, irrespective of any intent to cause death or any 
knowledge of its likelihood, where an accused, while armed, is 
shown to have committed or attempted the commission of one of the 
offences named in the section.'. 
We cannot arrive at any other conclusion than that all of 
this adds up to absolute liability and, if the term 'constructive 
murder' is used, we suggest that this construction is based upon 
absolute liability, for nowhere in the offender's conduct was 
there the intent or recklessness as to the causing of another 
person's death. The section, in so many words, states that the 
offender's mens vea, as well as his lack of knowledge or even 
his knowledge, are irrelevant. 
b) Criminal Negligence 
Subsection 205(5) (b) states that homicide is culpable if 
death results from criminal negligence. 
Criminal negligence, as defined in s.202, does not require 
subjective intent. In Avthuvs v. The Queen (275), Laskin J. -as 
he then was- said that, where negligence is such as to potential-
ly cause grievous harm to the life or safety of another person 
and where the actor's attitude as to such potentiality becoming 
reality shows wanton or reckless disregard, there criminal liab-
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ility arises. 
In section 202(l)(b) the words '... shows wanton or reckless 
disregard...' are found. What is 'shown' is perceived by others, 
personified in the 'reasonable man'. Regardless of the fact 
whether the actor, indeed, had such disregard, if his conduct is 
judged as demonstrating it, he will be found liable. Again we are 
facing an objective component divorced from subjective elements. 
What else is this, but at least strict liability? 
The criminal negligence doctrine is, obviously, very much 
visible in traffic offences. We do not intend to enter that area 
of the law as to Canadian case law; we shall, however, bring up 
for discussion a number of Dutch cases. 
c) The Generally Wicked Spirit (27β) 
We are now entering an area of some confusion. 
The question is whether, for instance in murder, mens rea 
has the meaning of 'malice' directed at the act of killing in one 
given, single situation (that is: intent, directed at taking an­
other's life unlawfully) or if malice is 'a generally wicked spir­
it' that may lead to any act of violence, one of the results 
thereof being that the victim of the violence died. In other 
words, if 'malice' is to be defined as 'a generally wicked spirit' 
the next step would be to state that mens rea does not need to be 
directed at the victim's death. It is, so to speak, replaced by 
the 'generally wicket spirit' sort of a blanket coverage for any 
wrong committed. 
The proposition smacks of legal type-casting in the sense of 
'once a thief, always a thief'; 'having committed a crime once, 
it is obvious that more is to follow'. Of course, we have such 
person moving in society. It goes too far, however, to substitute 
a generally wicket spirit for the speaificity of mens rea with 
the adherent need to be evidenced in a court of law. The propos­
ition is known as 'implied malice'. 
A person who is capable of forming the intention to kill and 
to premeditate and plan such act in detail, and then executes his 
plan, must have an element in his character and a moral disposit­
ion that do not shrink away from using violence and manifest a 
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general leaning towards evil. Planning and executing a murder is 
not something a person is capable of doing all of a sudden. What-
ever the causes, he must have been pre-conditioned in order to be 
able to even consider taking a life unlawfully. In that sense, it 
is granted, one could speak of a generally wicked spirit. However, 
this does not entail of necessity that such person, when commit-
ting another crime (arson, rape, etc.) and someone dies as a re-
sult while death was not aimed at by the offender, must be assum-
ed to have committed a murder simply because he has a generally 
wicked spirit. Yet, this seems to be what s.213 is based upon. 
The main requirement for guilt under s.213 is merely: 'mean-
ing to cause bodily harm'. In other words, if the offender aims 
at causing bodily harm for the purposes and by the means recited 
in s.213, and death ensues, the conduct is constructed as murder. 
We do not think this is justified by any doctrine of wickedness 
of the spirit, a sort of legal predestination. 
Where specific intent is involved (such as in rape, arson) 
the primary intent of the actor is involved: set fire to a barn, 
cash in the insurance moneys; unfortunately a beggar sleeping in 
a haystack is burned to death; the arsonist had checked every-
where, even in the barn, and the haystack, to see whether there 
were 'people about', finding none because the beggar had hidden 
himself well. Yet, the arsonist will be found guilty of murder. 
Therefore, when Burns and Reid state: (277): "It is in this 
area that the ancient doctrine of strict liability still creaks 
throughout the law of homicide and intersects with the modern 
doctrine of mens rea, with its basis founded on foresight of con-
sequences, creating inevitable confusion particularly in cases of 
unintentional killing" their choice of words (quoting Devlin) 
(278) appears to be a deft demonstration of dislike. 'Creak' 
means: making a shrill, dry, harsh, grating sound like that of a 
piece of rusty metal upon another piece... 
The matter does not end here. Absolute liability was also 
assigned to the accomplice, whether he did or did not foresee 
that his partner was to ressort to the use of a weapon or to 
other acts of violence other than the commission of the felony 
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intended primarily, and to the offender who in committing another 
felony -e.g.: violence of some kind- without killing the victim, 
is held absolutely liable for 'attempted murder' if he did fore-
see the eventuality of the victim's death. 
Apart from the "felony" murder of s. 213, there is s.212 
(b) where the matter of transferred intent (within the same crime) 
and s.212(c) where causing death in pursuit of an unlawful object 
is dealt with. The second essay referred to, by Graham Parker, 
discusses that issue. We repeat the wording of s.212(c) for con-
venience's sake. 
"(c) where a person, for an unlawful object, 
does anything that he knows or ought to know is 
likely to cause death to another human being, 
notwithstanding that he desires to effect his 
object without causing death or bodily harm to 
any human being." 
Again, the offender is held liable for murder, although his 
intent is not at all aimed at causing bodily harm or death; to 
the contrary, it is positively not. Yet, he acted in awareness 
-real or imputed- that his act could cause harm or death. There 
was no intent, but there was recklessness. 
What about s.212(b)? There the wrong person gets killed and 
intent is said to be 'transferred', not by the actor but by the 
law. This transfer has nothing to do with what goes on in the of-
fender's mind; it is not a subjective but an objective legislato-
ry manoeuvre. We suggest that this is absolute liability, pure 
and simple. It shows, in s.212(b) that not only intent but also 
recklessness may be transferred. 
Glanville Williams states: (279) 
"'Malice' means intention or recklessness, 
and there is no reason why recklessness should 
not be capable of transfer as well as intention." 
Is all of this terribly satisfactory? We suggest, it does 
not appear to be. The method is not entirely devoid of traits of 
primitive cruelty, althoug it may seem rather practical in its 
effects. This also goes for s.213. 
One way to deal with recklessness is the way the Code and 
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and the Courts have followed: declare it one of the two forms of 
mens rea. The proposition in that case would be: Mens rea is 
either intent or recklessness; any of the two may be transferred 
or imputed where the Code so indicates; where transferred or im-
puted, the actual intent of the offender is irrelevant." 
Another way is to draw the consequences of the last part of 
the above proposition. If indeed the intent of the offender or 
his recklessness are irrelevant, there we face absolute respons-
ibility: a man is held responsible for the natural consequences 
of his conduct, intended or not. 
The proposition would now be: 
"Mens rea is intent solely; if charged it is rebuttable; 
where through accident or mistake, intentional conduct results in 
unintended consequences, or where conduct is reckless, responsa-
bility is absolute." 
There seem to be some valid reasons for such proposition": 
i) Intent and recklessness are essentially different; 
ii) if intent as to consequences was not in an offender's 
mind, he should not be charged with it through the use 
of a fiction and, if charged, he should be enabled to 
present evidence to the contrary; 
iii) if unintended consequences arise from intended criminal 
conduct, liability should be absolute; 
iv ) if unintended consequences arise from reckless conduct, 
liability should be absolute; 
v) strict or absolute liability is said to be liability 
for negligent conduct. Recklessness is held to be ad-
vertent negligence. Logically, there does not seem to 
be any argument against classification of recklessness 
as a basis for strict responsibility. "The view that 
recklessness is a kind of negligence is well expressed 
in the formulation of the American Law Institute", 
states Glanville Williams; (280) 
vi) there is no need for a fiction or artificial construct-
ion in order to justify liability. 
We prefer a straightforward recognition that liability based 
on recklessness or on unintended consequences as a result of ac-
cident or mistake, is strict responsibility. Making an actor 
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liable should not depend on a. fiction. 
d) Strict Responsibility in Dutch Law 
Now turning to Dutch criminal law, we should like to refer 
to what was already mentioned before: it appears that situations 
comparable to the ones discussed above, where recklessness is in-
volved, may be categorized as specific forms of dolus or intent. 
In Part One we have referred to the various shadings dolus may 
have, from clear-cut 'intent' to, and including, very specific 
cases the common law would categorize under recklessness. 
Dolus may relate to the conduct itself "which ensues from a 
decision taken voluntarily" or to the consequences of such con-
duct, or to other objective constitutive elements of an offence. 
It is the latter group of elements where recklessness entors up-
on the stage. 
Thus in bigamy: the married offender's intent aims at a mar-
riage with another woman, not being certain whether the legal 
spouse is alive or not. He does not intend to be married to two 
women at the same time, but he risks that possibility by not mak-
ing the proper inquiries. 
In buying stolen goods, the actor's intent is not directed 
at buying goods provided they were stolen; however, he is not 
certain as to whether they were stolen or not and he takes the 
risk that they were stolen. 
HSR state: (281) 
"Whoever commits such acts, subjectively 
convinced that certain factors are connected 
with them of necessity, faces the reality that 
his intent will be assumed to also have been 
directed at such factors." 
This appears to be the parallel of 'foresight of the (moral) 
necessity of the consequence' that common law would identify as 
intent. ('Opzet met noodzakelijkheids- of zekerheidsbewustzijn ' ) 
It is possible to put a rating on the chance that some con-
sequence might result although in many, if not most cases, this 
exercise would be a gamble in itself. After 'necessity' or 'cert-
ainty' would come 'probability' (of. Hoornse Taart) and the mere 
'possibility' ( 'Voorwaardelijk opzet' of 'dolus eventualis'). 
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These are in fact situations where the actor is reckless: 
he will not permit himself to be deterred from realizing his 
primary aim although he foresees and rates certain non-intended 
consequences. Although these various modes are categorized as 
dolus ('intent'), again it must be said that intent is assumed 
to have been in the offender's mind. It is construed in as far 
as the intent relates to the secondary consequences. In fact, 
liability is assigned for causing certain unintended consequenc­
es. 
Is this not strict responsibility? Is it not liability for 
unintended consequences? For recklessness? 
This introduces another aspect of the issue. "Versanti in 
re illicita imputantur omnia, quae sequuntur ex delicto", states 
an old maxim. ("He who is engaged in unlawful conduct, is held 
liable for all of its consequences".) It is the word 'omnia' 
that evokes the suggestion of strict responsibility: all of the 
consequences, intended, foreseen and risked, or totally unfore­
seen or, perhaps, unforeseeable. 
What to think of the following? 
A. meets his enemy B. on the sidewalk of a city street. For 
some reason they start a quarrel. Α., having freshly run out of 
ripostes, punches В., who staggers, falls onto the street, is 
run over by a passing car and killed. What liability attaches to 
A. ? 
The answer depends on the country where A. and B. have their 
fateful encounter. 
In France, A. will be held guilty of murder and nothing 
less. {Code Pénal, art. 295). In Canada it would rate a charge of 
manslaughter at the worst (С.С,5.215 or 217) In the Netherlands: 
HSR, dealing with some classic, partly invalid or obsolete terms 
related to intent, found in dogmatic writing, refers to a course 
of events as mentioned above in a discussion of 'dolus indirect-
us'. (282) 
"(The fact that the French Code Panai con­
siders such case as murder) is the result, we 
feel, of a false notion. Intent must not reach 
beyond the limits it actually had in the offend­
er's mind. Where death follows upon causation of 
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bodily harm, it is not that consequence that 
defines the intent. The real intent in the 
offender's mind must decide the nature of the 
offence. 
"In the case referred to above the offence 
is to be identified as 'causing bodily harm', 
or 'causing bodily harm resulting in death' 
(Sr., art.300 or 302). Possibly it could also 
be identified as manslaughter (art.287) but 
only if the offender intended his punch to 
cause the victim to fall into the path of an 
approaching car, or where he realized that 
this could happen, or did foresee it was going 
to happen and he accepted this consequence. 
"Also conceivable is, that only art.307 
would apply: causing death negligently." 
The essence of this opinion appears to be that intent must 
be held to be limited in scope, i.e. limited to what was actual-
ly in the offender's mind; obviously, prosecution and defence are 
not facing an easy task in situations as referred to. 
HSR also state: (283) 
"Is it possible that consequences which the 
offender did not intend specifically would come 
under the label of intent? In other words, could 
one say that an offender acted intentionally 
in the event that he did not intend such con-
sequence to follow, but foresaw its materiali-
zation as unavoidable?" 
The answer would have to be affirmative, as it would also be 
in common law. 
Summing up: 
if a consequence is desired or assessed as necessary or 
certain, there is held to be intent, in both systems; (intent as 
to that particular consequence); 
if the eventuality of a secondary consequence is rated as 
probable or possible, there is 'voorwaardelijk opzet1 in Dutch 
law, equivalent to the 'recklessness' of Canadian law, which in 
turn is one of the modes of mens rea, as case law shows; 
if there is no assessment of the eventuality of a consequen-
ce, there is negligence, which is not a mode of mens rea in the 
common law but, nonetheless, may lead to guilt; in Dutch law the 
word aulpa applies; also there could be ignorance; 
if there is a wrong assessment of the eventuality of a con-
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sequence, there may be error or ignorance. 
e) Probability of Risk 
Obviously, in many cases the degree of probability will be 
assessed by an actor and he may be proven dead wrong. That is one 
of the risks he takes, for it is the outcome of the conduct that 
is the touchstone for judging consequences. A mere push may re-
sult in anything, from the merest annoyance to death. "Die Tat 
tötet den Mann": it is the conduct that kills the victim, regard-
less of what was in the actor's mind. Strict responsibility, in 
other words, in Dutch law too? Indeed, strict responsibility in 
Dutch law, -as we see it-, neatly disguised as a specific form of 
intent and having regard to real crime. We shall discover more of 
it when discussing the penal offences in the next chapter. 
In this context it may be illustrative to refer to some ex-
pressions in support of what was said sofar. 
Whether one paraphrases "that the actor, willingly and know-
ingly, must have accepted the risk", or "willingly and knowingly 
must have laid himself open" ... "to the far from imaginary and 
therefore dismissible risk" -as the ІШ formulated in the Cicero 
and Heling van Bromfietsen cases (284), or whether one says "must 
have taken consciously into the bargain the risk that...", or 
"billigend in Kauf genommen", it all points to the one, same fact 
that the actor did take a gamble. 
The words 'willingly, knowingly, consciously, accept, bil­
ligend' appear in the formulae to suggest that there was, after 
all, the will in the sense of intent.Zioh blootstellen is the 
equivalent of 'dropping one's defences' or 'allow oneself to be 
exposed to...'. 'Far from imaginary' refers to what the so-called 
reasonable man would judge as being foreseeable, a phrase more at 
home in the area of negligence. 'Must' does not have the conno­
tation of 'was obliged to' but suggests that the conduct shows, 
after the fact, in view of what occurred, that absence of intent 
is far from likely. 
Jescheck presents what seems to be a refinement: (285) 
"Der Ausdruck 'sich abfinden mit' ist jedoch 
dem schon früher in der Rechtsprechung verwen-
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deten 'in-kaufnehmen' vorzuziehen, weil damit 
deutlich gemacht wird, dasz der Täter gerade 
die Ungewiszheit hinnimmt und sich in sie fügt, 
ohne den Kausalverlauf aus eigener Kraft im 
Sinne der Vermeidung der Gefahr zu beherrschen." 
This Statement is rather difficult to interpret. What 
we think we read in it, is the following: apparently Jescheck 
distinguishes between 'actively make a part of planning' {'billi-
gend in Kauf nehmen' or 'approvingly take into the bargain') and 
'passively accept whatever the course of events may lead to' 
{'Ungewiszheit... sich fügt... hinnimmt', that is: 'uncertainty.. 
adapt oneself... accept...) and reconciling oneself with any out-
come. 
Jescheck's definiton of dolus eventualis ( 'bedingter· Vor-
satz') appears to reflect the above. (286) 
"Bedingter Vorsatz bedeutet, dasz der Täter 
die Verwirklichung des gesetzlichen Tatbestandes 
ernstlich für möglich hallt und sich damit 
abfindet." 
'Mit in Kauf nehmen' suggests: take into account one or more 
consequences the actor visualizes as possible, accepting whatever 
consequences may materialize, foreseen and not foreseen. 
If this interpretation is correct, then Jescheck's preferred 
formula points even more clearly to strict responsibility. The 
conduct creates consequences which, in turn, create responsibil-
ity that is strict. 
How could this statement be reconciled with a previous one, 
that 'strict responsibility is responsibility for negligence', 
while the conduct as discussed is in fact reckless? For Dutch law, 
too, it may be said that recklessness is advertent negligence, 
but labeled as a specific mode of intent. Thus, advertent negli-
gence and strict responsibility would appear to be compatible. 
So much with respect to dolus indirectus. 
However, there are a-lso: 'dolus determinatus' and 'dolus in-
determinatus ' or 'particular' and 'general' intent. They have 
their basis in the 'ver sari' maxim, as does 'dolus indireotus '. 
In the case of general intent there is total insouciance as to 
who, in particular, may become the victim(s)· Thus in a shooting 
spree, where the sniper intends to 'get one or more of them' 
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when he pumps his bullets into the crowd. Fe may even intend to 
kill, to wound, to cause damage to property, and so on, and this 
form of dolus will be identified as dolus generalis. 
Thus, the actor who blows up the tracks, causing a train to 
derail, or who blows up an aircraft by hiding a time-bomb on 
board or who sinks a ship, has dolus generalis, which appears to 
be the equivalent of 'criminal negligence' in Canadian law, which 
is 'criminal advertent negligence' and therefore 'criminal reck-
lessness' , a form of mens rea, referred to in C.C., sections 202, 
203 and 204. 
'Dolus generalbs' is also present in situations where an 
actor seeks to kill his victim by one method and then disposes 
in some way of what he thinks is a corpse, unaware of the fact 
that the victim is still alive; however, the victim dies from an-
other cause, not -physicallj·- being part of the first transaction. 
Common law as well as civil law show numerous cases of this type. 
As a sampling the following may suffice. 
f) Dolus Generalis 
A classic case took place in Easutoland where, in 1952, one 
Nilobiseng Lekhoo was made drunk and then clubbed on the head. 
The assassins, believing him dead, pushed their victim over a 
cliff to give the event the appearance of an accident. Lekhoo was 
only unconscious when carried to the cliff, but died afterwards, 
as medical evidence showed, from exposure. The Privy Council held 
that there was no difference, relevant to the case, between the 
Roman-Dutch law of Basutoland (South Africa) and the law of Eng-
land and that the entire sequence of events represented but one 
transaction, indivisible in nature. (287) The verdict was· murder. 
A similar verdict was reached m Regina v. Popoff (288) 
where one Garrett was beaten, receiving multiple lacerations, 
cuts and facial wounds, none of them serious enough to cause 
death by loss of blood if treated promptly. However, assumed dead 
he was left in a field overnight and died. 
In Regina v. Church (289) a Mrs Nott was severely wounded 
and, while unconscious but believed dead by her attacker Church, 
thrown into the river; she died of drowning. The verdict was man-
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slaughter, but -as the Privy Council stated-, this direction to 
the jury was 'unduly benevolent to the appellant... the jury 
should have been told that it was still open to them to convict 
of murder.' 
In Dutch case law there is the case of Marcel N. (290) who 
was choked and then thrown into the water. Death was by drowning. 
The verdict was murder as in other, similar cases. 
HSR sum up the reasoning behind these verdicts. (291) 
"Whoever intends to murder another and for 
that purpose commits two different acts of 
violence, each of which sufficient to cause 
death, must be held guilty of murder. He suc-
ceeded completely In what he Intended to do; 
criminally it is irrelevant whether death en-
sues from any of the two violent acts." 
In cases such as referred to, strict responsibility has no 
relevance, since the intent of the actor aimed at what the final 
result proved out to be. 
Then there is 'dolus malus' ('boos opzet'), evoking the 
question whether an actor, in order to be found guilty, must be 
aware of the fact that his specific conduct was prohibited by law 
and therefore punishable. Dutch law vacillated over the years 
between a positive and a negative answer. Originally, the criter-
ium whether the actor be aware that his conduct is or is not pro-
scribed by law, was irrelevant as to his guilt. Later, in the war 
days (W.W II) dolus malus was required where real crime was in-
volved. Unsuspecting offenders, however, did not get off but were 
punished as guilty, not of a crime, but of an offence. Since 1952 
the HR has returned to 'colourless intent' ('kleurloos opzet'), 
ignorance of the law, regardless of intent, that is ignorance of 
the fact that certain conduct is proscribed, is no excuse. The 
result is, again, that it is the conduct that decides guilt. Is 
this strict responsibility' Statutes are published and therefore 
'knowable' and 'everyone is supposed to know the law', a fiction 
discussed before. Where the fiction applies, responsibility is 
strict as to 'have knowledge of the law' or suffer the consequen-
ces. 
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In conclusion: strict responsibility, where true crime is 
involved, is far from antiquated or extinct in either of both 
systems. 
We now must deal briefly with some other criminal offences 
in the category comprising those where the actual consequence 
goes farther than the actor intended or foresaw. 
C, OFFENCES QUALIFIED BY THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
The category of Offences qualified by their consequences' 
comprises a type of offences which cause a harm which eoes over 
and beyond that what the offender intended; yet, the harm is 
causally related to the conduct. The effect is that where the ag-
gravated consequences occur, the penalty set for the 'basic' of-
fence is increased. 
Before entering into the following discussion we 
should like to justify the translation of the term 
'door het gevolg gekwalificeerde delicten' by 
'offences qualified by their consequences'. 
'To qualify' is a transitive as well as an in-
transitive verb. The general or basic meaning in 
both modes is: 'to make of a certain quality, to 
give a certain quality to'. Since the verb 'qualify' 
relates to a norm (offence), only the transitive 
interpretation is of interest. 'To qualify some 
object' then means: 'to attribute specific qualities 
to, to describe as'. 'Gekwalificeerd' carries the 
connotation of: 'put into a separate category' for 
some reason, whether it be with reference to special 
circumstances surrounding the forbidden conduct, 
the way intent was formed or to certain consequences 
caused by that conduct. (292) 
Thus, where theft is the basic offence, theft 
'accompanied by breaking and entering' (the specific 
circumstances) is now 'qualified' as a more serious 
species of the genus 'unlawfully taking another's 
property'; the basic 'falsification of documents' 
(Sr . , art. 225) becomes qualified where such documents 
are authenticated documents. 
Also, where intent is involved: intentional but 
spontaneous homicide (Sr., art.287), which is man-
slaughter, qualifies as murder where the intent is 
accompanied by premeditation. (Sr.,art.289) 
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Finally, the category of most interest for the pur­
poses of this paper is the third group: offences are 
'qualified' by their consequences ехаіивг еіу. In both 
other groups referred to above, intent was involved and 
for that reason we shall not further deal with them in 
the context with strict responsibility. 
An example 'rmshandeling ' ('assault/battery'), causing 
bodily harm, may result in causing aggravated bodily harm or 
serious bodily harm and may even result in death. 
The basic offence 'rmshandelbng ', due to its consequences, 
now becomes, that is to say. now 'qualifies as 'zware mbshande-
Ігпд ' or even 'zware rmshandeling de dood tengevolge hebbend'. 
Now, the assault is still the basic assault and mens rea 
still needs to be proven. However, for the consequences that went 
beyond intent or premeditation, no proof of mens rea гз required. 
The specific consequence (aggravated harm, death) influences one 
factor only the measure of the ensuing punishment. The sole 
criterium is causality. Is this strict liability territory? We 
think it is. But more needs to be said. 
a) Secondary Consequences 
We have used the term 'secondary consequences' before. 
By this term we mean to express that certain consequences, which 
are causally related to the primary consequence, are not really 
covered by the intent, recklessness or negligence that was a 
factor where the primary consequence was involved. The question 
in how far an actor should be responsible for them is a matter 
entirely depending upon what the legislator and the courts hold 
as to causality and, in that context, foreseeability, and so on. 
Generally speaking, such secondary consequences attribute 
extra criminal liability to an offender, punished by an extra 
measure of penalty, because that is how the law provides for it. 
They never do alter the description of the offence, however; 
neither the assailant, nor the manslayer, confronted with aggra­
vated consequences of his assault and battering, will become a 
'murderer' as in the common law felony or constructive murder 
situations 
Similar observations are valid with respect to other offenc-
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es where death occurred as a secondary consequence: breaking and 
entering combined with a violent act or threat of violence, arson, 
rape, kidnapping, hijacking an airplane and others. C.C.,s.213 
contains most, if not all of them, and they have been discussed 
above. 
We have stated: the only requirement is that causality be 
established. The question now arises: at which point in time are 
we able to look at the consequences of the 'basic' conduct or, to 
put it in different terms: at which point in time could we con-
sider the 'list of consequences' as 'complete', as 'closed'? 
The deceivingly simple answer seems to be: at such point in time 
where the conduct is complete and all, criminally relevant con-
sequences have manifested themselves. To put it differently: at 
that point in time where the conduct is exhausted as a cause. 
But when is the conduct complete, when is it exhausted as a cause 
and when could it be said that all, criminally relevant conseq-
uences have become manifest? What we are really asking is, at 
what point in time are we 'ready' to judge an offender and could 
we decide that an offence has stopped having any further conseq-
uences, relevant as to the offender and his liability? This 
question is of vital importance, since we are holding an actor 
liable solely for consequences caused regardless of mens rea or 
culpa, when considering secondary consequences. Inevitably we 
find ourselves, once more, facing the issue of causality and we 
must return to it shortly. Some preliminary remarks will lead up 
to that final scrutiny of causation. 
In situations where we are dealing with criminal attempt, we 
are dealing with an offender at a point in time where it has be-
come clear that he did not succeed in accomplishing what he had 
in mind to do. It is the moment, where such failure is apparent; 
nothing will change the failed commission of an offence into a 
complete offence. Therefore, in a number of cases we hold an of-
fender liable for attempt. The point is that in an attempt we 
catch the moment where certain conduct can have no further con-
sequences as to the intended offence. The cut-off point is well-
defined. 
However, where we are dealing with consequences that did 
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emerge, thus constituting a completed ofTence, we are not only 
considering the causality issue, but also the issue of foresee-
ability and the impossibility to foresee at least some of the 
consequences where they come close to being freak events, having 
the lowest possible 'probability rating'. No great problems exist 
where a consequence could be imagined causing bodily harm does 
in a number of cases indeed result in death or lifelong paralysis 
and so do arson, rape, and others. 
But, when the rape victim is transported to a hospital and 
the ambulance gets involved in a traffic mishap where the victim 
dies, or where the victim of a traffic accident, in hospital and 
on his way to recovery, suffers a stroke, a coronary or a lung-
embolism and dies, or where he dies as a result of a fire at the 
hospital, or where he dies due to incorrect medical treatment, 
the issue becomes whether that death is still a consequence at-
tribuable to the offender. If so, the question also is, whether 
we are still dealing with 'reasonable liability'. 
The 'intervening cause doctrine' may not offer all the ans-
wers, at least not any more. The attempt to limit responsibility 
with the help of the 'conditio sine qua non doctrine' seems to be 
as futile when we look to 'the future', that is, in such situati-
ons, to the period of time starting as of the moment the conduct 
was complete, as it is when we look backwards into the past, that 
is, going back in time from the moment the offender Initiated his 
conduct. The exercise does not become much easier when looking to 
the 'adequate cause' or 'proximate cause doctrines', although 
they refine the 'conditio sine qua non doctrine' to some degree. 
The 'reasonable attribution of liability doctrine' may seem 
to be very promising at first sight, but there we shall have to 
come to terms with the word 'reasonable'. Even if it were said 
that 'the consequence was reasonably to be expected on the basis 
of general experience' -the positively framed counterpart of the 
negatively framed formula in the Longembolie case, the word 
'reasonably' m context with 'general experience' begs some fur-
ther definition. (?P4) 
In fact, we are searching for an answer to the question 
'where are the limits of responsibility7', or 'when is the offen-
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ce complete?; when can we 'stop the clock' and formulate the 
charge?; where responsibility would be strict or absolute, could 
we define any limits there? We shall search for answers in both 
systems. 
The Criminal Code (Canada), in s.210 mentions one limitation 
excluding consequences arising after a certain period of time 
has lapsed: 
"No person commits culpable homicide or the 
offence of causing the death of a human being 
by criminal negligence unless the death 
occurs wihtin one year and one day commencing 
with the time of occurrence of the last event 
by means of which he caused or contributed 
to the cause of death." (emphasis added.) 
The provision is less helpful than would appear at first 
sight, since it introduces the words 'caused' and 'contributed to 
the cause'. The limitation is of interest only where a certain 
occurrence was identified as 'cause'. We are back at the original 
question. 
Two examples may demonstrate the importance of the question 
we asked above. 
In R. v. Smith (294) the following events were before the 
court. There was a fight in a military barracks. The victim was 
stabbed by a bayonet. Undiscovered by anyone, internal bleeding 
resulted. He was carried to the sick bay but, on the way his 
clumsy attendants dropped him on the ground twice. Finally, medi-
cal treatment was incorrect on two counts and the victim died. 
Medical opinion held that the original stabwound would have al-
lowed a recovery rate as high as 75% provided proper treatment 
had been administered. 
Smith was convicted of murder by the Courts-Martial Appeal 
Court. The original wound was held to be an Operating, substant-
ial cause of death". 
In R. v. Kitahing and Adams (295) the victim was in hospital 
connected to a life-support system. When attending doctors could 
no longer detect brain activity, they removed his kidneys. The 
defence pleaded that this procedure was the cause of death, but 
in vain. The accused's conduct was also an 'operative cause of 
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the victim's death', combined with other causes. 
In both cases the word 'operative' stands out. It means: 
'having effect' (296), 'effective', 'producing physical effect 
upon'. (297) We suggest that the term 'operative' is no great 
contribution to the group of labels in use to define 'cause'. If 
an event is not operative, it is not a cause; a more 'remote' 
cause, not being 'proximate' may still be operative while at the 
same time probably carry little weight. 
Where, in both cases, the accused's conduct was held to be 
(also) 'operative', it was one of several causes; in oasu there 
was a concurrency of causes. 
In Smith neither the dropping on the ground of the victim, 
nor the administration of improper medical treatment of a patient 
suffering from internal bleeding into the pleural cavity, rated 
as 'intervening causes' that would have broken the causal chain, 
terminating Smith's liability as to what was to be expected the 
result of wounding the victim with a bayonet. The ensuing events 
were totally unforeseeable at the point in time that the victim 
had a survival chance of 75%. Yet, Smith was convicted of murder. 
We find this result hard to accept. 
In Kitahing and Adams the matter was different. It appears 
that it is a generally accepted rule that a person is clinically 
dead as soon as all brain activity has stopped, that is: as soon 
as it cannot be detected any longer with the instruments now 
available. What is left is a body, a conglomerate of tissues, 
organs and so on, that perhaps may be artificially kept function-
ing biologically without any input from the brain. Normally, he 
is than taken of the life-support systems and biological life ex-
pires. We shall not enter this area any further where medical 
research has still not finished speaking the last word. In the 
case, this victim was pronounced clinically dead and death was 
held to be caused by the accused. 
The question now becomes: when does a cause cease to be 
operative? One limitation we found in the 'one year and one day 
rule'. Another is: the intervening cause, which definitely re-
places the previous one, and 'breaks the chain of causation', as 
Lord Wright said in the Oropesa case: (298) 
-263-
"To break the chain of causation it must be 
shown that there is something which I will call 
ultroneous, something unwarrantable, a new cause 
which disturbs the sequence of events, something 
which can be described as either unreasonable 
or extraneous or extrinsic." 
In other words, an event unrelated to the previous cause? 
'Ultroneous' is a word that could not be found in the Concise Ox-
ford Dictionary, nor in Webster's Universal Dictionary. Since it 
is apparently derived from 'ultra', meaning 'beyond what is cust-
omary, ordinary, natural, proper or reasonable'(298a), it may be 
said to mean: 'an event beyond what is reasonably held to be 
predictable or foreseeable on the basis of common experience'. 
'Unwarrantable' means: not capable of being justified; 'extrane-
ous': not related to, unconnected with; 'extrinsic': external, 
lying outside, not belonging to the real character or essence. 
(299). By way of a summary, the word 'unrelated' may perhaps 
best express the characteristic of the intervening cause. 
When is a cause unrelated? Unrelated to the accused's con-
duct? To the actual consequence(s)? If common experience has 
taught that a certain conduct, a certain act, for instance, caus-
ing a certain type of bodily harm which all by itself cannot be 
reasonably predicted to have certain consequences in most situa-
tions, or that such consequence does not belong to the character-
istic sequels of the act, then that conduct should not logically 
be held to be a criminally relevant cause of the consequence. 
Yet, Smith was held to be a murderer. 
More satisfactory is the judgment in R. v. Jordan, (300) and 
already referred to earlier. Jordan stabbed Beaumont, who was ad-
mitted to hospital where he died some 8 days later, at which 
point in time the stab wound had practically healed. So, why did 
Beaumont die? Beaumont died as a result of two factors, both in-
troduced by wrong medical treatment. Firstly, after it was found 
that he did not tolerate treatment with the antibiotic terramycin 
the use of this drug was stopped, but resumed later; secondly, 
"wholly abnormal quantities of liquid" were introduced intraven-
ously, "far exceeding the output". As a result his lungs became 
waterlogged and pulmonary oedema was discovered "which led to 
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broncho-pneumonia", of which he died. Jordan's original convict-
ion was set aside. 
Smith and Jordan have much in common. Both victims sustained 
bodily injuries, not normally and characteristically fatal. Medic-
al treatment was inappropriate in both cases. The chain of causa-
tion was held to have been broken in Jordan, not in Smith. The 
accused in neither case had the animus oaaidendi. Yet, the law 
appears to be in favour of the Smith judgment. The Jordan case 
is said to be (in the words of Lord Parker C.J. in the Smith case) 
"a very particular case depending upon its exact facts"... but is 
not every case particular and depending on its own facts? 
Smith and other similar cases appear to be cases where 
strict responsibility, liability for any consequences, is at the 
basis of the verdict, introduced by a more extensive interpret-
ation of the causal nexus. 
Where do we stand in Dutch law? 
HSR (301), after discussing various doctrines, formulate the 
'causal connection' as follows: 
"Causal connection ... (exists)... when 
occurrence of the consequence must be reason-
ably expected according to common experience; 
point of departure is such knowledge as the 
prudent man possesses, unless the offender 
has special knowledge, which then would become 
the criterium." 
This appears to be eminently reasonable and acceptable. 
HSR continue: 
"In respect of the offences qualified by 
their consequences (emphasis added) one could 
probably even make a distinction as to whether 
certain consequences are more or less within 
the scope of foreseeability.("... al naargelang 
de gevolgen enigszins in het perspectief van de 
handeling liggen...") inherent to the conduct. 
Thus, when during the transport of the 
victim an accident happens, the assailant cannot 
be held liable for this event (and its conseq-
uences) . 
On the other hand, a physical condition such 
as diabetes, haemophilia, eggshell skull, not 
known to the accused, does not necessarily render 
the causal connection irrelevant. Here, the 
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maxim 'versan гп те гііісгіа' or the 'treading 
on dangerous ground' principle could apply." 
This, we suggest, points to strict responsibility. 
Retracing our steps for a moment, we now return to a previ­
ous question at what point in time do we stop the clock9 In the 
course of time, event follows upon event They may or may not be 
causally connected. If they are not, there is no problem. But how 
do we decide when to say 'they are not'9 It is somewhat disquiet­
ing that the very same basic question keeps cropping up what are 
the limits of a causal chain? It is also disquieting that even 
today, we refer to no less than four doctrines, all of them more 
or less currently accepted, as G.E. Mulder points out. (302) 
b) Back to Causality 
We used the word 'disquieting' since we are essentially 
dealing with strict responsibility offences, where guilt is not 
based upon intent (.dolus), not even always on negligence (.culpa), 
but merely upon the fact that one's conduct satisfies the des­
cription of, and therefore may be brought under a statutory penal 
provision. Guilt and liability of a person follow upon having it 
established that he is the cause of certain consequences, merely 
upon proof that he engaged in the conduct. 
Since causality generates responsibility, it would seem 
mandatory to take extreme care when establishing causality. The 
bridge between the two is 'foreseeability'. 
How does Dutch law deal with this criterium? 
In order to answer this question we propose to scan some 
Dutch case law. There is a vast number of cases dealing with 
'grove schuld' от 'culpa lata', as established on the basis of 
foreseeability. We propose to select only a few of them as being 
representative. 
To begin with, there is the Haagse Etalageruit case.(303) 
The fact situation is rather unusual. Driver Α., driving at a 
speed of about 70km/h. on a wet, slick city street, on the street 
car tracks, in a car with completely bald rear tires, got into a 
skid. His efforts to take corrective action failed miserably. 
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He hit a light column on a traffic island. His car overturned but 
continued on its wa.y, sliding on the сал- roof, hitting a man B. 
who was standing on the sidewalk close to a pedestrian crossing, 
then collided with a pole to which the traffic lights at an in­
tersection were attached, and finally came to rest, still upside 
down, in the traffic lane. This is not all. The man В., who was 
hit, was thrown into a huge showwindow of a department store. Its 
heavy pane shattered and fatally wounded a young woman C., who 
happened to be standing in front of that window. 
The defence denied a direct causal link between the collis­
ion and the death of C , but in vain. 
The HR concluded: 
"... that the sequence of events, evidence 
as to which having been accepted, following 
upon the collision, is to be considered as 
reasonably foreseeable according to rules based 
on common experience, as consequences of such 
collision of a car speeding at 70km/h, with a 
traffic column in the vicinity of a showwindow, 
and having gotten into a skid." 
We are, again, dealing with primary and secondary consequen­
ces. The primary consequence of the dangerous driving of A. is 
the skid followed by a collision with the traffic column. V'e sug­
gest that the then following events are all secondary and terti­
ary consequences. (We think that -in the same way as a cause may 
be (too) remote- a consequence may be (too) remote.) 
Is the HR stating that all of the above consequences are 
foreseeable "according to rules based on common experience"? It 
would so appear. However, the HR cannot have meant to say that 
experience shows that, as a rule, a skidding car will hit a traf­
fic column, always turning over onto its roof, hitting a person 
who is then pushed through a showwindow pane, the shards of which 
invariably will kill another person, and so on. The most we could 
say is that the described case and its sequence of events is 
highly unusual; no case, exactly the same, exists. 
All the HR intended to express -as we understand it- is, 
that in situations such as the one at hand, literally anything 
could happen, even events as those described. 
The Advocate-General appears to have considered the potenti-
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al input of 'a second traffic-related conduct' -an intervening 
cause- but rejected the idea. He said, the consequences were 
caused by the collision, even when C. was not hit physically by 
A.'s car. The accused was held responsible for the entire chain 
reaction, in the case a 'causal chain reaction'. 
Thus, foreseeability, especially as to secundary consequen-
ces, appeared to have become a totally objective, open-ended cri-
terium. And with some trepidation one asks whçre are the limits, 
if any, of such brand of foreseeability7 Does it all mean that 
foreseeability admits of no horizon and must lead inevitably to 
total guilt, that is to absolute responsibility9 
We should consider another case the Spoorwegovergang Oost-
huizen case. (304) 
The victim A. had stopped his car at a level crossing and 
was hit in the rear by another car, operated by B. As a result of 
the impact, A 's car was pushed onto the railway tracks, while a 
train was approaching. He left his car and helped his wife get 
out, when attempting to also get his daughter out of the car, he 
was hit by the train and sustained serious injuries. 
The HR decided that E. was liable for A.'s injuries. What 
about foreseeability in this case' 
An assessment of foreseeability is an assessment of options, 
since there is a great variety of ways in which a person could 
possibly react to a given event. 
The details of the situation in this case were as follows 
the barriers, protecting the level crossing, were of the type 
that close off only the right half of the highway, leaving the 
left side open. This goes for both ways when approaching the 
crossing. Thus, when a car gets trapped for some reason between 
the barriers, there always is a clear escapeway to the left side 
of the barrier. 
At the moment the half-barriers were descending, two cars 
were approaching the crossing one driven by C., the second driv-
en by A. They both stopped, A. leaving a distance of perhaps two 
meters between his car and C.'s. Then the accused B. arrived at 
the scene. He rear-ended A.'s car, which was pushed to the left, 
passing С without hitting his car, onto the tracks where only 
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the front part of the car was exposed to a potential collision. 
The situation A. found himself in was described as 'terrify­
ing'. The High Court of Appeal, earlier, had already assessed 
A.'s immediate reaction (attempting to save wife and daughter) as 
such, "that under the given circumstances., reasonable and китапІу
л 
he could not have acted otherwise." 
Such words as 'terrifying' and 'humanly' are words loaded 
with emotionality. But, did the word 'reasonably' apply? It would 
have been reasonable to either put the car m reverse and back 
off the car from the tracks, over a distance of a few feet only; 
he also could have crossed over to the other side of the tracks. 
There was no barrier there to prevent him from so doing since 
at the other side there also was only half a barrier. The Fish 
Court did even consider that if A. had done nothing at all, Mrs. 
A. and daughter would probably have come to no harm. 
Did A. panic? He did not. He left the driver's seat, walked 
around the car, got his wife out, went back to get his daughter 
and was hit. But he did not take the simplest, most effective and 
swift counter measure drive in reverse. 
The HR stated 
"A.'s conduct, according to rules of common 
experience, is to be rated as reasonably fore­
seeable as a consequence of a collision, as a 
result of which a person is put in a terrifying 
posit ion." 
A. did not make use of an obvious safety measure, designed 
by the railway engineers for just such an emergency. 
Yet, the consequences were judged to have been caused by the 
accused's "extremely careless, imprudent, heedless way of driving" 
Again the question arises did the HR mean to say that, as a 
rule, people in a situation as described above, must be expected 
to react even in the least efficient uay, exposing themselves to 
avoidable danger? This we find hard to believe. 
What the HR appears to express is if a person, in whatever 
negligent way, directly or indirectly, exposes another person to 
risk or danger, he is liable for whatever consequences may ensue. 
This, as we see it, is Erfolgshaftung of the purest blood. How 
much 'common experience' do we have enabling us to say that a 
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collision is likely to push a man through a window pane, the 
shards of which will kill another person, or that a man in A.'s 
position will react in the way he did? The man on the level 
crossing had other options. In the Haagse Etalageruit case it was 
sheer coincidence that B. and C. happened to be where they were 
and the case suggests a most unfortunate conjunction of circum-
stances... but this may be said with respect to any accident. 
In his annotation to the Oosthuizen arrest, C. Bronkhorst 
observes: 
"Recognition of the fact that admission of 
the causal nexus in criminal law really amounts 
to attribution of liability, renders -as I see 
it- the construction of foreseeabilit y contest-
able. Foreseeability makes its appearance .as a 
legal construction for the purpose of imposing 
liability. 
"The question is whether this sort of legal 
construction serves any purpose..." 
"...The diversity of possible reactions is 
without limits to such a degree that the fore-
seeability, introduced to the situation after 
the fact, represents no more than a theoretical 
argumentation in favor of a position, taken on 
the basis of considerations founded on the real-
ity of life in society." 
In other words: a legal fiction, a trait-d 'union, the miss-
ing link between conduct as cause of the harm and liability and 
punishment as the price of negligence-in-operation. 
Returning to C. Bronkhorst: 
"In fact there is, I think, the more or less 
self-evident reality that a person is bound to 
be liable for the harm he caused, alone or witb 
others, that is: liability for bodily harm, 
provided it is not too remote from his deviant 
conduct." 
Caused? But is this not the issue we try to decide by using 
the legal fiction of foreseeability? And, "...not too remote..."? 
Back to proximate cause after all? 
C. Bronkhorst does not take the final step by stating that, 
where the criterium of foreseeability has become reduced to a 
fiction, devoid of any such sense as would help determine conduct 
before the fact, we may as well stop using the empty words of the 
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term. What we are really saying, it seems to us, is: negligence 
leads to strict responsibility. 
We should also take note of C. Pronkhorst's annotation to 
the Curacaose Wedstrijd case, (305) where the consequences of a 
fatal accident were not adscribed to the driver of the other car. 
Two young men held a car race in the built-up section of the 
city. Alternately passing oneanother, one car finally pulled 
ahead in a burst of speed and passed the other car. Then its 
driver lost control and the car collided with some rocks at the 
road side. An attempt was made to hold the other driver liable. 
The HR rejected this. 
"Were the consequences 'foreseeable' either 
for the driver of the car that did not collide 
(with the rocks) or for a 'reasonable man'? The 
answer could be affirmative as well as negative. 
"This proves, as I see it, that asking such 
question merely amounts to presenting a quasi-
problem post factum and that the real issue is: 
a choice (as to where liability must attach) to 
be justified on the basis of reason and ethics. 
"Especially where offences of negligence 
and offences qualified by their consequences 
are concerned, this choice finds its determin-
ation by the -usually unspoken- views adopted 
with respect to the scope and purpose of the 
cr iminal law." 
Thus, liability -in the final analysis- is said to depend on 
reason and ethics, modulated by views on the scope and purpose of 
the criminal law. This brings to mind what Lawton L.J. said in 
R. v. Blane (306). An 18 years old girl, Jehova Witness, was 
stabbed by a rapist. Elane. In hospital she refused a blood trans-
fusion and died. The defence pleaded that the causal link was 
broken by this refusal of medical help and that Plane did not 
cause her death. "The deceased's decision not to have a blood 
transfusion was an unreasonable one". Lawson L.J. refused to fol-
low this line of reasoning and lashed out: 
"At once the question arises: reasonable by 
whose standards? Those of Jehovah's Witnesses? 
Humanists? Roman Catholics? Protestants of Anglo-
Saxon descent? The man'on the Clapham omnibus? 
But he might well be an admirer of Eleazar who 
suffered death rather than eat the flesh of swine 
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(2 Maccabees, eh.6, vv. 18-31) or of Sir Thomas 
More who, unlike nearly all his contemporaries, 
was unwilling to accept Henry VIII as Head of 
the Church of England. Those brought up in the 
Hebraic and Christian traditions would probably 
be reluctant to accept that these martyrs caused 
their own deaths." 
Similar questions may well be asked here whose reason, who-
se ethics, whose views on scope and purpose of the criminal law' 
With respect, but these criteria suffer from the same vagueness 
as the criterium of the 'reasonable man' and of 'common experi-
ence' . 
There is conduct, to be qualified as negligent, creating a 
situation of grave danger. There are serious consequences, diff-
erent from case to case. There are a few specific ones, almost by 
chance and sheer bad luck emerging from an endless number of 
potential consequences with coincidence defying the statistics. 
We are attempting to catch any and all consequences, even the 
most improbable ones, m the web of causality by means of the 
fiction of foreseeability, a fiction that is theoretically and 
practically almost meaningless. Yet, it must be admitted that the 
offender generated the primary consequence such as a collision 
with a person or a car, that triggered a sequence of secondary 
consequences. 
Instead of creating liability based on such assumed foresee-
ability, it seems more fair and square to admit that we are, in-
deed, facing liability for consequences, any consequences. That 
is strict responsibility, perhaps even absolute liability. 
Whether this type of liability is good, bad or indifferent 
in the face of justice, is an other matter to be discussed later, 
when we consider the case in favour and against strict respons-
ibility. 
c) Hindsight as Foresight? 
In this context we should perhaps also deal briefly with the 
doctrine of the 'objektive-nachträgHohe Prognose'. 
Jescheck states (307) 
"Da in Hinblick auf die objektive Zurechnung 
zu fragen ist, welches Verhalten zwecks Vermeidung 
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des Erfolges objektiv richtig ist, darf die 
Kenntniss und Kenntnissmögligkeit des TMters 
allein nicht ausschlaggebend sein. Man hat 
sich vielmehr das Kausaluissen des Tätern 
ergHnzt zu denken durch die Umstände, die ein 
'einsichtiger Mensch' in seine Ueberlegungen 
einbezogen hätte (sog. objektiv-nachträgliche 
Prognose). 
"Von nachträglicher Prognose spricht man 
dabei deswegen, weil es der Richter ist, der 
sich in den Zeitpunkt der Handlung zurück-
versetzt denkt." 
It just does not seem to feel right, this kind of judicial 
time-travel. Foresight 'after' the fact? Is this anything else 
than 'Treppenwitz', 'Esprit de l'escalier', 'hindsight which is 
always 20-20'?Do we do anything more complicated than adscribing 
to an offender a measure of foresight he did not have and per-
haps, as an individual, may not even be expected to have... in 
order to find him liable? We think this is clearly imputation of 
liability and in many, if not most situations, such imputation 
is done for good, solid reasons. The label to be put on this 
technique, however, should read: "strict responsibility". 
Before leaving the domain of strict liability and true 
crime, we must not by-pass looking at negligent homicide in the 
sense of Sr., artt.307, 308 and 309. 
"Negligence is the exact opposite of intent 
at one hand, and of chance {casus) at the 
other. For this form of culpa is required that 
a person gave less thought to what he was doing, 
knew less and was less prudent than the average 
person." (308) 
The opposite of negligence is usually expressed in 'classic' 
terms such as: prudence, diligence, caution, care and similar 
terms, that could perhaps all be brought under the common denom-
inator of 'sense of duty'. The scope of duty depends on the natu-
re of the conduct one engages in. Apart from a general obligation 
to be aware of the need of practising care and caution in any-
thing one does, there is a more specific obligation where a per-
son's conduct is that of an expert or a professional, on whom 
others legitimately may and, usually, must rely. In many of such 
'role-situations' safety, health and even life may depend on con-
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scientious, considerate, diligent conduct of the role-player. 
^uty consciousness therefore demands optimal conduct, or at least 
a serious attempt to reach such level of excellence. 
As any other theoretical speculation, this one, too, faces 
limitations where the practicalities of daily life are concerned. 
For one thing, human nature being imperfect, it is unrealistic to 
demand or even expect perfect conduct. Furthermore, it must he 
recognized that in practice more than one requirement have to be 
met at the same time, while these requirements may he mutually 
contradictory to some degree, for instance in traffic legislation 
which is based on the more generally worded provisions in ST., 
art.307 and 308. 
At the risk of stating the ohvious, it may be said that mod-
ern, motorized traffic demands and is geared to a smoothly flow-
ing pattern requiring relatively high speeds Safety m traffic 
demands, however, that no driver drives at speeds over the local-
ly allowed speed and even then the allowable speed must be fine-
tuned to actual situations and circumstances, which do change 
from moment to moment. The Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden (309) 
did give preference to smoothness (speed) over safety, but in the 
final analysis the emphasis settles on safety. (310) 
"A smooth traffic flow must be possible at 
all times, but preferably as safe as possible." 
Vie cannot resist putting a question mark after the word 
'preferably'. Is speed, after all, to he preferred over safety' 
Another element is to be added that has some controversial 
traits built in de 'vertrouwensregel ' ('the reliance rule') 
formulated by Colijn. (311) 
"The road user who drives properly himself, 
may rely on the assumption that other users 
will also obey the written and unwritten rules 
of the road, unless exceptional circumstances 
should give rise to assume the contrary. On the 
basis of such reliance he is allowed to govern 
his own conduct accordingly." 
All of the above does not take away from the reality, that 
human error may and will occur and that they will lead to disast-
rous consequences in a number of cases. The statistics paint a 
horror picture. 
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Legislator and judiciary appear to be demanding much when 
contemplating diligence on the highways: there is the rule that 
in traffic conduct some risk taking is allowed; there is the need 
for smoothly flowing traffic, moving as safely as possible, with 
all participants relying on oneanother as to their obeying the 
rules of the road. Where, then, are the criteria to be found that 
would establish culpa? When may lack of negligence be found in 
situations so fraught with risk and danger as are to be found on 
the city streets and on the higways ? 
Vellinga says:(312) 
"What kind of risk a driver is or is not 
allowed to cake, is a decisions resulting 
from an assessment based on all of the circum-
stances of the specific case at hand - as in 
all other cases where a pronouncement on 
culpability is to be made." 
This may well be entirely correct. However, it must not be 
overlooked that such pronouncements are made in the serene en-
vironment of the court room, far removed from the environment of 
the automobile, moving in the midst of the hustle and bustle of 
the traffic stream on the road. All contemplation of conduct 
-post factum- as it really was in a certain case and how it 
should have been, takes place in an atmosphere of serene detach-
ment, where time in considering options plays a role far differ-
ent from time on the road, where all too often instant decisions 
are to be made, partially influenced by panic, fright, fear, sur-
prise, audacity, stupidity, lack or excess of experience, bad 
habits and a host of other factors and emotions. 
Foreseeability before or after the fact, especially where 
secondary consequences are concerned, we did already discuss. To 
say the least, we found it wanting as a criterium. Stolidly fol-
lowing 'the law' itself may even lead to disaster. We are left 
with the impression that there is no criterium or set of criteria 
sufficiently specific, covering all occasions, all situations and 
all persons at all times. We are back to the general, rather 
vague criterium of care exhibited by the reasonable man... but 
how reasonable can a person, any person, be expected to be when he 
finds himself in danger or panic? Would that very same reasonable 
man not also have experienced panic under such circumstances? 
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Hence it would, appear understandable that the legislator is 
rather lenient where death was caused or serious bodily harm in-
flicted negligently. 
The basic provisions covering culpa on the highway rest up-
on Sr., artt. 307, 308 and 309, further detailed in axtt.25 and 
36 of the Wegenverkeerswet (Highway Traffic Act) and further spe-
cified in the Reglement Verkeersregels en Verkeerstekens (Regul-
ations regarding rules of the road and traffic signs) and in re-
lated regulations. 
Since overtredingen share a common characteristic 
with the Canadian penal offences in that culpa is not 
made one of the constitutive elements of the offence 
-culpa is not charged and to be proven- the two cate-
gories appear to be similar in nature. Also, there seems 
to be a parallel between the AVAS-defence and the defence 
of due diligence, both aiming to demonstrate that no 
fault is to be found in the actor. 
In Canadian law strict liability offences are to be 
distinguished from absolute liability offences by the 
fact that, as to the latter, the defence of due diligence 
is not available. 
By now it will have become noticeable that, gradual-
ly, the fact begins to emerge that a distinction exists 
between 'strict' and 'absolute' liability. At page 200 
we stated that -before the Sault Ste Marie- both terms 
were commonly understood to mean: liability that could 
not be avoided by the defences of ignorance or mistake. 
This theme must now be taken up again. 
Attempting to draw a parallel with Dutch law, we 
are now looking for similar distinctions and it is sug-
gested that, where in Dutch law the AVAS-defence is 
available, liability is strict.Where this defence should 
be rejected, liability would appear to be absolute. The 
question remains whether absolute liability may be found. 
Before returning to this topic, quite a number of 
related subjects must be covered. 
The first of these involves strict responsibility 
and penal offences. 
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Scire proprie est rem ratione et 
per causam cognoscere. 
Co.Litt.183b 
To know properly is to know a 
thing in its reason and by its 
cause. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
STRICT RESPONSIBILITY AND 
PENAL OFFENCES 
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
As was said before, the essence of the strict responsibility 
offence is, that the legislator seeks to punish an offender for 
the consequences of his conduct, forbidden by law, regardless 
whether the offender had any mens rea or culpa. We have attempted 
to show that, where criminal offences are concerned, strict res-
posibility is still part of the criminal law, Dutch and Canadian. 
Whether this is, or is not, a desirable situation will be consid-
ered in context with the problem of the justification of strict 
responsibility. 
In Canadian as well as in Dutch law, strict responsibility 
is rampant where non-criminal, that is: penal offences are in-
volved. Statutory, regulatory or provincial offences abound and 
so do the 'overtredingen' (contraventions or violations) of Dutch 
law. 
The class of offences referred to are created in order to 
prevent risk or harm to life, health, the general wellbeing of 
society, the economy, the environment. The provisions prohibit 
and provide punishment for either the solitary act or the heed-
less repetition of acts of the same kind (for instance: selling 
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underweight as a routine and despite of warnings) a practice that 
could lead to a consistent and harmful pattern. Most, if not all, 
are summary conviction offences, at least where 'first offenders' 
are prosecuted. In a similar way, the overtredingen, as opposed 
to misdrijven, represent categories of lesser evil. 
The main characteristic of the overtreding is that, as a 
rule, intent or negligence are not part of the description of the 
offence and, consequently do not have to be proven. 
As soon as the forbidden conduct has been engaged in or 
the undesirable consequence has materialized, the offence is com-
plete. Rather seldom we will find negligence an element of the 
offence, that is, of the description of the conduct. 
Another characteristic is also important: a great many of 
these offences are only capable of being committed in situations 
where the offender has a specific role in society. He is, so to 
speak, a 'specialist' of sorts in the widest sense of the word. 
He is engaged in activities that require certain properties or 
capacities which may only be acquired by schooling and training, 
such as driving a car, flying a plane, hunting, fishing, selling 
by weight, manufacturing goods, processing raw materials and so 
on, all perfectly legitimate activities, even if they may carry 
an inherent risk for individuals, community or environment. These 
persons are expected to go about their business in an approved 
manner, as professionals, limiting risks to bare minimums, apply-
ing all humanly possible diligence to minimize the risks. We find 
ourselves in the province of the 'impliciete/functionele kwali-
teitsdelicten' (offences implicitly connected to those acting in 
certain capacities). 
We said that mens rea is not a part of the constitutive ele-
ments of the offence, nor is culpa. We also stated that the major-
ity of the Canadian statutory offences relate to the factual com-
mission of the forbidden conduct. What could be said with respect 
to the overtredingen? Apart from just a few exceptions (313) the 
same appears to hold true in Dutch law. Culpa does not come under 
scrutiny in both systems, not being a constitutive element. 
Therefore, since the hallmark of the strict responsibility 
offence is: the absence of the requirement of intent and negligen-
ce, the conclusion is bound to he that the Dutch overtredingen 
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are in fact offences of strict responsibility. 
In that sense HSR: (314) 
"Therefore, where contraventions are concerned, 
our legislator clearly has implemented the doct-
rine of the material fact, regarding which the 
requirement of dolus or aulpa, that is: guilt, 
has been eliminated." 
Thus, in principle, the Dutch offender is capable of commit-
ting a strict liability offence. 
Obviously this concept of responsibility is repugnant to the 
basic characteristic of Dutch criminal law: 'no punishment without 
guilt'. 
The Water en melk case (315) -as is generally accepted- re-
acted to the seeming controversy. 
A dairy farmer diluted milk with water and sent his hired 
hand, who was unaware of what his boss had done in order to 
stretch the quantity of his merchandise, to sell the resulting 
product to his customers in the city of Amsterdam. He was caught 
and his employer was charged with contravention of one of the 
provisions of one of Amsterdam's municipal by-laws, prohibiting 
the sale of milk to which 'something' had been added.' The hired 
hand was not prosecuted. The farmer's defence that his hired 
had comnitted the offence, was rejected. The farmer qual-
ified as the intermediate principal and was convicted: No punish-
ment should be handed down where an actor had no guilt. 
In a more recent past the idea was launched that in overtre-
dingen dolus and aulpa (both constituting mens rea in Dutch crim-
inal law) are assumed to be required although not expressed in 
the wording of the provisions. They were to be interpolated, 
leaving to the accused the opportunity to present evidence to the 
contrary, that is, to prove absence of intent or negligence, 
which is in fact a defence of 'due diligence'. HSR observe that 
there is more to that. (316) The HR recognized a non-written de-
fence, an excuse, apart from the written excuses ('s t ra f tu i t -
sluitingsgronden ' ), namely that no punishment is due where guilt 
is totally absent. In principle this would also apply to real 
crime, but ideally, if not practically, this problem should not 
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arise in connection with true crime, since mens rea should be 
required for all true crime. 
As was stated earlier, the word 'guilt' has more than one 
interpretation. What is meant by 'absence of all 'schuld '? What 
does 'sahuld' mean in this context? 
There appear to be two interpretations. The older one holds: 
'sahuld' has the огікіпаі meaning of 'negligence' ( 'onvoorzich­
tigheid, roekeloosheid', i.e. 'lack of prudence or care'.) The 
more recent one interprets 'schuld' as 'verwijtbaarheid' (the 
quality of meriting censure, blame, criticism'). 
In the Motorpapieren case (317) the following fact situation 
was before the HR: a man had bought a motor cycle. Before riding 
it, he showed the documents he had received at the time of the 
purchase to an officer of the 'Rijkspolitie', asking whether 
these were "all the documents he would need". The officer affirm­
ed this and the purchaser rode his bike. He was stopped and re­
ceived a ticket for riding a bike while not having the required 
permits. 
The HR decided: 
"... thac the accused in his conversation with 
the aforementioned police officer came to the as­
sumption that he now could safely, that is without 
risking committing an offence, ride his motorcycle 
and that, consequently, the charge against the 
accused was to be withdrawn." 
This case is, broadly speaking, comparable to the Canadian 
case of R. v. Maclean (318), the airport radar maintenance man 
dealt with in Part One. The County Court of District Number One, 
Nova Scotia held that: 
"... the defendant made the kind of inquiry 
required by the rule in the circumstances... 
he went to the source that people ordinarily 
use to secure information about driver's licen-
ces. .. 
The Crown lost the appeal. 
We are, in fact, dealing with 'excusable error', leading to 
'absence of all guilt', that is 'absence of negligence'. On these 
grounds one could not 'find fault' with the accused in view of his 
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demonstrated 'diligence'; there was nothing to 'blame' him for, 
and consequently there should not be penal liability. 
Comparing both interpretations of culpa, as 'negligence' and 
as 'blamability', does not seem to lead to the discovery of great 
differences. They appear to describe two aspects of the same 
thing. The negligence aspect puts the emphasis on 'how responsi-
bility was generated', namely, not by dolus but by lack of dili-
gence. The blamability aspect stresses the justification of pun-
ishment: lack of care where care was due. 
There is no place for doubt, as HSR point out (319) that the 
interpretation followed by the HR is: 'any and all, criminally 
and penally relevant guilt'. 
The generally accepted 'short-hand' expression for absence 
of all guilt is 'AVAS' and we shall be using this acronym in fur-
ther discussions. 
Since the central issue in AVAS is the guilt concept, ori-
ginally culpa levissima, and later, more specifically culpa lata, 
it would appear to be of some use to consider some Dutch case law 
by way of illustration of how the Courts have dealt and are deal-
ing with negligence in situations where life and health of a 
person is jeopardized.(320) 
B. CULPA LATA BEFORE THE COURTS 
Before proceeding to establish the case in favour and 
against strict responsibility, we should stop for a short moment 
and discuss some Dutch case law dealing with culpa, not only to 
find out how the element of negligence has been treated as a 
ground for punishment, but also in order to discover in how far 
elements of strict responsibility have crept into the judicial 
reasoning. Thereby we shall pay special attention to the element 
of 'blame' in its relationship to punishment, where punishment 
was imposed. 
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a) Medical Cases 
Beginning with some cases involving medical treatment and 
prescription drugs, we find the Verpleegsters case (321) 
A surgeon C. was engaged in preparing patient M. for surgery 
in the operating room of a hospital, assisted by two nurses, B. 
and S. It was the task of S. to present bottles containing cert­
ain solutions, upon instruction by C. as to the nature of the 
solution he wished to use, to В., who would then fill a syringe 
from that bottle and present it to C. In this particular case C. 
had asked'for novocaine 1%. 
There was no problem with the first injection. The surgeon 
had not asked to see the bottle from which the needle was filled. 
Then C. decided that further injections were required. S. 
went back to the storage cabinet, took a bottle, looked at the 
label and presented the bottle to E., who filled a hypodermic 
needle and gave it to С This happened twice in short succession. 
Shortly after these injections were given, the patient ex­
pired. Somewhat later it became clear that the second and third 
injections were made, not with novocaine 1%, but with hydro-
chloridum adrenalin! 1:1000, twice over lOcc into the breast and 
twice over Ice into the heart muscle. Such dosis is lethal. 
The surgeon and both nurses.were charged with culpa lata. 
The case against the surgeon was dismissed. He was found to 
have done nothing outside of the generally accepted operating 
room routines. The case against nurse B. was also dismissed, 
since she had followed the instructions in force in that hospital 
at that time. 
Nurse S. was found guilty of culpa lata and fined 100 guild­
ers, in the event of non-payment to be replaced by 10 days de­
tention. She appealed her sentence; the Crown appealed the dis­
missal of the charge against the surgeon. 
Where could the blame have been put? 
The surgeon did not check the label on the bottle before the 
first injection. He relied on his assistants, following routine 
procedures. That he did not check the bottle before any further 
injections were given, was also considered acceptable routine ac­
cording to expert testimony. 
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That nurse В. did not check the bottle either, as it was 
presented to her by nurse S. before filling the needle, was not 
held against her since at that point in time (1962) such precaut­
ionary measure had not yet been prescribed by the hospital manag­
ement . 
Nurse S. had looked at the label but the words 'had not pen­
etrated' . 
Obviously, as this case demonstrates clearly, checking a 
label on a bottle under the given circumstances would seem to be 
of prime importance. After presenting the correct bottle the 
first time, nurse S. put that bottle back into the storage cabin­
et. Up to that moment she had been diligent. However, when the 
surgeon asked for further injections, S. was in exactly the same 
situation she was in before taking the bottle out of the cabinet 
the first time. When reaching for the same bottle again, she 
should have been as thorough in her checking as she was the first 
time. She was not and neither nurse B., nor the surgeon C. were 
aware of it. 
Now, a mastectomy is not an emergency procedure, causinE 
great commotion in an operating room. Checking the label on a 
bottle takes only a few seconds; sho could even have taken more 
time than that under the circumstances. We also think that nurse 
В., as well as the surgeon, should have made sure that they ".ere 
dealing with the correct solution. 
It seems to us that the final responsibility rests with the 
surpreon, who is the supreme commander at the scene, literally 
holding life and death in his hands. All other persons involved 
are merely helpers, performing tasks the surgeon cannot perform 
for practical reasons but which are, in fact, his tasks. He gives 
the instructions identifying the nature of the solutions to be 
used; it is his responsibility to be certain that his instruct­
ions have been followed. 
In cases such as the present one, the issue is not whether 
the hospital regulations were adequate or not; if there was even 
one instruction in the regulations a surgeon would consider 
stupid or dangerous, he would in all likelihood not follow such 
instruction. Where intelligent instructions should be found miss­
ing -as appears from the case- a responsible surgeon should make 
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up for their absence. The issue is whether this surgeon showed 
the special care to be expected of him as an expert. These, or 
similar, considerations may well have moved the Crown to appeal 
the dismissal of the charge against C. 
Part of S.'s defence relied on 'Fehlleistung' or 'mental 
block', a short-circuit phenomenon. S. did indeed look at the 
label the second time, but the meaning of the words did not reg-
ister into her consciousness. Reading the 'wrong' words should 
immediately have triggered an alarm - but it did not. The culpa 
involved here appears to be 'inadvertent negligence' {'onbewuste 
schuld '). 
Upon reading the words of the Advocate-General Moons, we 
have asked ourselves whether 'strict responsibility', though not 
referred to, was in his mind when he said: 
"Finally one must take into consideration that 
a certain category of conduce or causation of 
certain consequences, is intolerable in a society 
governed by law, to such a degree that they must 
be kept in check as much as possible, even when 
they arose as a result of unintentional conduct. 
"Therefore it may be safely stated that the 
law, facing the complex of problems regarding 
culpa, at this point in time, could only take 
the following view: 
"You are required to see to it, that you 
reduce the risks to which the most important 
group of protected Interests is exposed to, in 
as far as you at any rate, in my opinion, were 
able to foresee them without any trouble." 
"According to our substantive law, ascertain-
ing culpa does not involve assessing the mental 
make-up of the offender, but only the testing 
of his conduct by certain standards, albeit 
that such standards probably depend partially 
on the individual capabilities of the offender." 
(emphasis added). 
These words, we suggest, are also valid with respect to C.'s 
and B.'s conduct. However, the Courts found no guilt in them. 
If we understand these words correctly, then it would appear 
to us that looking at consequences which do not conform to a norm 
as may be expected of an individual with certain capabilities, 
equals looking at the violation of that norm. Where the norm is 
diligence and the actors are experts and where we do not assess 
-284-
the alleged offender's mental make-up, we are in fact confronted 
by strict responsibility. However, the charge in the above case 
is based on Sr., art.307, and culpa must be charged and proven. 
Consequently, no charges based on S T . , art.307 -and legislation 
based thereon- could be charges of a strict responsibility offen­
ce. 
We shall now look at some more case law, although not going 
into so much detail. 
The Apotheek Makassar decision (322) of the Military Tribun­
al at Makassar (Indonesia) was made in regard of a charge of cul­
pa lata against a sergeant assistant-chemist, K. 
K. was required to prepare a bottle of destilled water, to 
be forwarded to a hospital. Being seriously overburdened with 
work, he asked his Indonesian helper to do this job for him; he 
did not check, however, whether this helper had filled the bottle 
in the prescribed manner. 
Unbeknownst to Κ., at the hospital this destilled water was 
used to prepare certain solutions for injections. When a patient 
had received such injection, she became seriously ill. Γ.'s work 
was not checked by the physician, one of whose tasks was the reg­
ular supervision of the pharmacy. 
The charge against K. was dismissed on the following grounds: 
K. could not have foreseen the use that was to be made 
of the destilled water. Normally, aqua bidestillata was 
used, when factory prepared solutions were not avail­
able; 
K. was overloaded with work; 
- K. lacked experience and should not have been assigned 
the tasks he did have without effective supervision by 
a physician. 
A more recent case is another pharmacy related case. (323) 
A charge of negligent homicide was made against an assistant-
chemist, S., at Amsterdam who, filling a recipe, had to prepare 
codeine powders to be used by a child. 
He took the proper container holding codeine and labeled 
properly, showing the maximum dose for adults, which -as he knew 
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as a result of his training, is a multiple of the dose that could 
safely be administered to a child. When he calculated the amount 
of codeine to be mixed into each powder, he arrived repeatedly at 
a figure representing ten times the required dosis, not even not-
icing that the container had a total capacity of 20 grams of 
which only 3 or 4 grams were left after he finished weighing the 
amount to be used in the powders. This fact should have alerted 
him. It did not. The child patient died. 
Charged·with culpa lata, he was convicted. The County Court 
decided that he had made grave errors in his calculations and ob-r 
servations. 
What catches special attention in this judgment is the final 
consideration, where comments are made on the level of the penal-
ty. The Court took into consideration that S. was, to a great de-
gree, mentally deficient... 
All these cases appear to have a 'story behind the story'. 
We shall return to this shortly, after looking first at some de-
cisions in cases which appear to have a common factor with those 
discussed. 
b) Highway Traffic and Other Cases 
Many reported decisions carry a catchy 'label' facilit-
ating making reference to such decisions. Where such 
label could not be found -although they might exist-
we refer to the date of the decision and the Court. 
The HR decision of 20-6-1067 (324) contains some interesting 
data. The accused B. was driving on a highway, approaching a 
cyclist R., who had stopped at the roadside, one foot on the 
ground, the other leg hooked over the frame of his bicycle. On-
coming traffic consisted of a girl on a bicycle and, behind her, 
a car, operated by X. When B. came at only a short distance of 
R., X. suddenly started to pass the girl. P., in order to avoid 
a collision with X., pulled sharply to the right and hit R. 
The Advocate-General Burger said: 
"After all, I think that the fact that the 
accused had been issued a driver's licence only 
a short while ago, does not provide any ground 
for the conclusion that he is guilty of having 
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caused a traffic accident. Having a licence, 
issued only three days prior to the accident, 
is no evidence as to his lack of experience." 
"Having a driver's licence issued, justifies 
-by itself- the presumption of driving skills, 
which presumption may be refuted by mistakes 
made, but not, of course, in so short a period 
of time after the issuance of the licence." 
Van Eck, in his note to this decision, observed: 
"Having a driver's licence does not, in itself, 
allow the presumption that a driver possesses 
adequate driving skills under all circumstances. 
Clearly, the HR did not share (the Advocate Gene-
ral's) opinion either', or it would have quashed 
the judgment on the grounds of inadequate or in-
correct evidence." 
Indeed, the HR quashed the judgment because the accused's 
plea of AVAS was not properly, that is not with sufficient reas-
ons, dismissed. Apparently, the conclusion must be that having a 
driver's licence is not, by itself, sufficient evidence as to 
adequate skills in all situations. (325) 
There is the decision of the County Court at Alkmaar. (326) 
A driver, suffering from epilepsy since many years, had an 
attack while driving his car and, in a. state of resulting 'absen-
ce', hit a number of pedestrians, killing one and seriously wound-
ing several others. The Court held that no blame attached to the 
accused for driving while having this affliction, because he was 
regularly checked medically and declared fit to drive. He would 
not even remember his 'absences'. 
He was, however, found guilty of violation of WVW, art.25 
(327), but was allowed the excuse of insanity, caused by atrofia 
cerebri, loss of consciousness and dementia, "as a result of 
which the accused was incapable of appreciating the quality of 
events or of recalling them." 
It is noteworthy that the accused had been suffering from 
epilepsy for many years, was under active medical treatment and 
had never been informed by bis physician as to the nature of his 
ailment; also, he had never been discouraged from driving, nor 
forbidden to do so. 
In his annotation to this decision, Eredius refers to 
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another case, dealing with a driver suffering from diabetes. 
(328) This driver, too, had caused an accident. He, too, was re-
peatedly Judged medically fit to have his licence renewed, and 
only two months prior to the accident his doctor had told him 
that he could continue driving with an easy mind. 
Bredius comments: 
"... I think that both decisions are rather 
satisfactory because they point out clearly that, 
in order to prevent this sort of accidents from 
happening, it is primarily the task of the ad-
ministration and of the medical authorities (to 
conceive appropriate measures) and only much later 
-sometimes not at all- the task of the law." 
The County Court at 's-Fertogenbosch dealt with the follow-
ing case: (329) 
A police officer, suffering from an ailment in one of his 
legs, which hampered him in his movements and for which he had 
undergone some fifteen operations, one night went out into a farm 
field in order to check on illegal hunting with the use of arti-
ficial light. Seeing a tractor moving around, he approached it, a 
loaded and cocked pistol in his hand. He stumbled. A shot went 
off, killing one of the persons on the tractor. He was found 
guilty of negligent homicide. 
The Court, in considering the extent of the penalty, was 
critical in respect of the policeman's superiors. 
"Whereas the Court, firstly, takes into 
consideration that the accused, regardless of 
his lack of experience as a pistol marksman and 
regardless of his physical handicap, up to the 
day of the accident now before us, was maintain-
ed in his function and assigned to police field 
duty in a rural community, while his superiors 
on the ground of the requirements of exercising 
reasonable oare in the execution of their super-
visory role ought to have known, that this 
police officer, operating at night, all alone, 
and at nearly all times in the hunting fields, 
had only trained once with the Beretta pistol, 
issued to him in 1963 -showing at that occasion 
the scant experience he possessed with that 
weapon-. They also ought to have known that the 
accused, over a period of many years, had been 
suffering from an ailment that hampered his 
movements seriously. 
"... that in all probability the accused 
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would not have approached the persons on the 
tractor in a manner he now finds himself blamed 
for, if he -following a safety measure that is 
so obvious, and has by now been implemented by the 
municipal police at В.- had been made aware, in 
time, of the fact that several persons were li­
cenced to hunt while making use of artificial 
light, in the fields where the accused, upon 
orders from his superiors, was duty bound to 
exercise surveillance." 
There was another sequel: after 20 years of loyal service, 
during which period no complaint against him was ever filed, this 
police officer was fired after the accident... for health reasons. 
The verdict was: negligent homicide. The penalty was minimal: 
three months detention, conditional upon two years probation. 
This policeman had no options and could not refuse the tasks 
assigned to him. 
In all of the cases cited above, there is an element of 
'conduct behind the scene'. The hospital management and the surg­
eon, the doctor charged with the supervisions of the work in a 
military pharmacy, the pharmacist in Amsterdam, the authorities 
issuing driver's licences and the doctors establishing the phys­
ical fitness of the licencees and the superiors of the policeman, 
were not all of them -unofficially- found having been lacking in 
diligence to some degree? Or, at least, should they not have been 
found -officially- lacking? Should they not have been charged? 
Such questions dig for some form of vicarious liability in 
criminal law. In the common law examples are scarce and mainly 
related to licencee cases. The notion itself has been termed 
'odious'. In Dutch law the situation appears to be similar. 
Vicarious liability's typical domain is tort territory. As said 
earlier, we shall have to refrain from entering that area. 
c) Interference by Third Parties 
There is the category of cases where a third party inter­
feres in the conduct of the accused, being in his immediate pres­
ence, such as a person sitting next to the driver of a car, or 
where the accused's conduct was co-determined by the conduct of 
one or more other persons, not within the immediate physical 
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presence of the accused, such as other road users. Where that 
other party is at the same time a victim, the matter of culpa in 
causa arises. 
There appears to be an abundance of case law regarding this 
type of situations and, again, a brief sampling must suffice. 
Firstly, the HR decision of 11-12-1939. (330) 
The case itself was characterized by Taverne, who wrote the 
annotation, as "a classic traffic accident case". Although the 
gist of the decision is that the HR ordered a new trial by the 
Court of Appeal on the ground that the decisions of the courts 
below were not properly based on available evidence, some brief 
quotes may be of specific interest. 
The situation itself is simple: driver Α., behind driver В., 
was proceeding on a.highway, after sundown, at a speed of some 
50km/h. A. attempted to overtake B. who, at that very moment, 
found himself forced to move more towards the left side of the 
road in order to pass another car, stopped at the roadside. 
Α., in the act of passing В., moved even farther to the left, on­
to a bicycle path, hitting a cyclist. The charge was culpa lata. 
The HR stated that, even if the question whether driver B. 
should have signaled that he was moving to the left, were to be 
answerd in the affirmative, "the accused's culpa would not have 
been cancelled; he would have been found guilty anyway". 
This seems to be a leading theme in many cases: culpa in an­
other person, somehow involved in the incident, does not neces­
sarily annul culpa in the accused. 
The HR assessed the accused's manner of driving as "extreme­
ly heedless and careless", but also found that whatever evidence 
had been adduced, was insufficient to support the particular 
charge. The prosecution failed, having not done their homework 
properly. 
In HR, 22-2-1966 (331), driver A. was forced to apply his 
brakes suddenly, attempting to avoid colliding with driver B. who 
made an improper manoeuvre. A. was charged with following too 
closely. He pleaded necessity. The HR rejected this plea but con­
ceded that under certain circumstances the defence of necessity 
could apply. However, the court below had failed to reject the 
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plea with appropriate motivations and therefore the conviction 
was quashed. Pompe, in his note to this decision, came to the 
conclusion that the accused was not to blame: "it was not his 
fault". 
The category of 'following-too-closely' cases reflects real-
istically the situation in today's traffic pollution. They are a 
common occurrence. If the ideal separation between cars, in 
function of their speeds, either expressed within a time or dist-
ance reference frame, were observed, our highways would prove not 
wide enough to carry the volume and all traffic would come to a 
crouch. Keeping distance seems to be rather a matter of experien-
ce and good luck, since in traffic a compromise is sought between 
speed and safety. 
Also, there are such cases as where the 'man in the next 
seat' -next to the driver, that is- feels called upon to take 
part in the action. 
Thus the passenger sitting next to an unexperienced driver 
who noticed that they were heading into a forbidden direction. 
The driver, probably slightly panicky, could not 'find' the brake 
pedal. So, the passenger yanked at the steeringwheel and as a 
result the car mounted a sidewalk, hitting a girl. If the passen-
ger had not interfered, this accident would not have happened. 
The driver was absolved. (332) 
Driver and passengers in another car, all more or less im-
paired by too generous use of alcohol, were involved in a collis-
ion with three trees in succession, landing in a ditch. Two of 
them sustained serious injuries. The accused driver pleaded that, 
shortly before hitting the first tree, someone had pulled at his 
steeringwheel. He earned himself one month in prison and suspens-
ion of his licence for a period of four months. (333) 
In HR, 9-5-1967 (334) it was never explained why a VW sud-
denly hit a tree. The front seat passenger died of multiple in-
juries, one of which was a fractured neck. The charge against the 
driver was dismissed in a new trial, ordered by the HR since cul-
pa lata was not proven. 
A similar decision was made in HR, 25-6-1968 (335) where a 
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driver swerved first onto the right shoulder of the road, then 
veered across the road onto the left shoulder, got back onto the 
road and there hit an oncoming car. Again, culpa lata was charged 
but the HR decided that the evidence failed to support the charge. 
Sofar we were dealing with situations where the alleged 
culprit was known and could be summoned to appear before a court 
of law. In numerous cases, however, the driver is unknown and 
missing. As an aside, a cursory glance at some of the liability 
problems involved appears to be in order. 
d) The Problem of The Unknown Driver 
1) In The Netherlajids 
Before leaving the subject of culpa lata we should like to 
refer to some of the problems related to the unknown driver 
in context with W W , art.40, old and new. 
By 'unknown' we understand 'unidentified'. A driver was in-
volved in a violation of some traffic regulation or in an acci-
dent. He either drove away in his car or, where his vehicle was 
unfit to be driven, he fled the scene. As a result, his identity 
could not be established at that point in time. In some situati-
ons his identity could potentially remain unknown forever. WVW, 
art.40 attempts to remedy the situation, at least for certain 
categories of situations. 
We shall indicate by 'permanent user' a person who is not 
the 'registered owner' of a motorvehicle, but who has obtained 
the permanent use of it by virtue of some arrangement with the 
registered owner. We shall avoid using the term 'possessor' when 
attempting to translate the term 'houder', since the joy-rider 
or the car-thief are to be qualified as possessors. By 'operator' 
or 'driver' we understand whomever was actually operating or 
driving the vehicle. 
We do not intend to discuss the 'hit-and-run'-driver, who 
disappears from the scene, in his car, without leaving a trace. 
The problem of identification he poses evades any and all solut-
ion. 
What we do intend to discuss is the case where a violation 
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or accident has occurred and, while the driver was not identified, 
the vehicle's registration number could be established either be-
cause the vehicle remained at the scene, or because witnesses had 
the presence of mind to note down that number. 
In most cases the registration number points to the regis-
tered owner, who will be the first subject of investigation. In 
cases where the numberplate was a fake one, or stolen from an-
other vehicle, the case becomes more complicated without becoming 
insolluble. 
The true registered owner -we shall refer to him in the fol-
lowing by the letters R0- having been established, it is then to 
be ascertained whether he was, or was not, the operator at the 
relevant time(s). If he was, there is no identification problem. 
Problems do arise in the event that the RO was not the operator, 
or that it could not be proven that he was, or where he denies 
it, and the vehicle was in another person's possession. However, 
the RO should be able to identify the operator and the question 
is: will he disclose the driver's identity and what means does 
the law provide should he prefer silence on the topic? This is 
where the legislator formulated W W , art.40, old and new. 
The first question is: how did a driver, not being the RO, 
obtain possession of the vehicle? Did the RO relinquish possess-
ion by causing the actual driver (employee, repair mechanic, 
one of his children sent on an errand, etc.) or by permitting 
him (by loaning or leasing, by allowing the vehicle to be taken 
for a test ride, etc.) to operate the vehicle, or did he lose 
possession, because the vehicle was taken against his will and 
perhaps even without his knowledge (theft, joy-riding, use 
against his expressed prohibition, etc.)? 
Where the RO relinquished possession, he (or where a company 
limited is involved, some agent for the corporation acting with-
in his powers) will usually be aware of the driver's identity. 
Where he lost possession, the third party may not be known, per-
haps never be known. 
A secondary question is whether the RO lost possession not-
withstanding all precautions taken, or as a result of some negli-
gent act on his part (leaving the car unlocked, key in ignition 
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leaving the garage doors open or unlocked). How is his liability 
affected in such situations? 
In all of the given situations where the RO or permanent 
user is known, establishing the actual driver's identity is a 
matter of having their cooperation. In certain circumstances 
giving such cooperation may cause some hardship, emotional (hus-
band/wife, parent/child) or economical (employer/employee, sales-
man/potential customer), but given the proper regulation, that 
strain of problems may be solved. 
A tougher problem is: what to do where the RO lost possess-
ion against his will and without his knowledge, while he himself 
is at fault for lack of taking reasonable precautions. We shall 
consider these aspects in the following. 
When the legislator was facing the set of problems referred 
to, the solution of WVW, art.40(old) was devised. It was to gen-
erate quite some discussion. It reads: 
"40(1): 
"In as much as by this statute or by the 
general order in council referred to in section 
2, the owner of, or the permanent user of a 
motor vehicle is not already held liable jointly 
with the operator in the case of a violation of 
the penal provisions therein contained, such 
owner or permanent user shall be liable in the 
same manner as the actual operator for any viol-
ation of a penal provision directed at operators, 
as contained in that statute and in that general 
order in council, unless the identity 
of such operator was established or, unless the 
owner or permanent user did disclose the actual 
operator's identity, at the first demand of the 
Crown and within the time limit set out in such 
demand." 
"40(2) 
"The provisions in subsection 1 shall not apply 
in situations where the owner or permanent user 
of the motorvehicle should make it plausible that 
the motorvehicle was used against his will and 
that, reasonably, he was not able to prevent such 
use." 
At first glance, the regulation appears quite'adequate and 
clear. Many pens, however, have been put to paper, not in the 
last place because it would seem that in this regulation the kind 
of liability appears to be introduced, know as 'strict'. 
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What exactly is the offence of WVW, art.40(old)? The answer 
is not all that easy to formulate. Where the RO or permanent user 
for reasons, not coming under the umbrella of art.40(2), should 
not disclose the actual operator's identity, there the result is 
that either one (as the case may be) are to be held jointly lia­
ble with the actual (un-identified) operator in the same manner 
as the latter would have been held liable in the event that his 
identity would have been known. That, we suggest, comes very 
close to, if it be not downright 'absolute responsibility... 
Is it just? 
What if the actual operator killed another while driving the 
vehicle, perhaps being impaired by use of alcohol or drugs? What 
if he caused serious property damage? Is this remedy of the prob­
lem perhaps out of proportion? 
H. Niemeyer (336) states that the purpose of the old provis­
ion was to force the RO or permanent user to cooperate with the 
prosecution in tracing the unidentified operator involved in a 
violation or accident. Both were held liable for whatever the 
actual operator had done, unless they should disclose his identi­
ty or came under the protection of art.40(2). 
Prof.Mr. J. Remmelink (337) observes: 
"The Hoge Raad has interpreted the provision 
so as to impose on the registered owner a duty 
of care, namely to see to it that with his motor 
vehicle no traffic offences should be committed 
which, lacking an offender whose identity was 
known, would remain unpunished." 
Then the learned author continues: 
"It was clear, however, that this provision 
smacked of a fiction, since the question -for 
what kind of offences is the owner to be held 
liable?- was made entirely dependent upon the 
criminal conduct of the (unknown) operator, 
who often was, at the time he committed the 
offence, out of reach of the owner." 
The same author, now in his capacity of Advocate-General at 
the Hoge Raad, also made the following statement: (338) 
"In article АО WVW... the legislator... used 
a fiction. He 'flatly' extended the liability of 
-295-
the owner... to comprise the liability of the 
actual perpetrator." 
In HR, 2Э-4-1 70 (339) the annotator, then professor, En­
schede states: 
"2. What kind of provision exactly is laid 
down in art.40, WVW? Does it contain the des­
cription of an offence, projecting the regist­
ered owner as actor reus? Or does this provision 
hold the registered owner penally liable for 
conduct engaged in by another person, the un­
identified operator? The legislator clearly 
intended the latter... 
Nonetheless, the former interpretation is 
to be preferred. 
"3. Penal liability incurred through another 
person's conduct is a somewhat suspect legal 
concept, which is hard to reconcile with the 
principles of our criminal law." 
Enschede then goes on to state that the offence really is: 
the conduct of the registered owner, consisting of neglecting or 
refusing to disclose the identity of the operator, although cap­
able of doing so. 
"Art.40, therefore, contains in subsection 
one the description of an offence in which the 
registered owner is the actor reus and the 
conduct is: failing to disclose the operator's 
identity." 
So, thus far we have an actor reus and a specific conduct. 
Where and what is the sanction? 
Art.40(l)(old) reads: 
"... such owner or permanent user shall be 
liable in the same manner as the actual oper­
ator for any violation of a penal provision..." 
Does this mean that, although we do not hold the registered 
owner responsible for the third party's conduct -assigning to him 
his own brand of actorship and conduct, we 'smuggle in', through 
the back-door as it were, the penal consequences tied in with and 
reflecting the seriousness of the actual operator's conduct? 
Enschede says "liable in the same manner" are words which, in the 
interpretation we have advocated, do not create liability for an­
other's conduct, but do only, more precisely, define the respons­
ibility for the RO's own conduct, by referring to the relevant 
-296-
section which is part of the description of the offence." 
Practically, as to the penalty provided, it would seem to 
make little difference whether the liability incurred is assign-
ed because of one's own conduct or for the conduct of another, 
if the penalty is the same. 
One interpretation appears to lead to strict liability. 
approaching -if not fully being- vicarious criminal liability; 
the other leads to liability because of a conscious omission: 
failing to cooperate with the prosecution. There, too, liability 
seems to be strict. 
Prevention of such liability may take one of two forms: 
either cooperation as referred to by making a disclosure; the 
other is: making it plausible that the vehicle was used against 
the RO's will while he was incapable of preventing such use 
judged by reasonable standards -whatever these standards might 
be-. 
Whatever interpretation one follows, the nexus between the 
measure of punishment and the conduct of the unidentified oper-
ator remains established. This would appear to be a flaw in the 
solution, art.40(old) attempted to offer. We find the discuss-
ed line of reasoning in HR, 21-11-1972. (339a) 
There are other considerations. 
The Procureur Generaal Mr. Langemeyer concluded that art. 
40(old) ought not to be applied since it is repugnant at least 
to the spirit of art.6,2 of the Pact of Rome, in sofar as it 
appears to punish a person whose guilt has not been proven. 
Looking again at the two interpretations of the nature of the 
offence of art.40(old), it is clear that, if we hold the RO res-
ponsible for the actual operator's conduct, his guilt as to that 
conduct is not proven. If we hold him responsible for his lack 
of cooperation, then the conduct is proven. This is the way the 
HR followed. The first interpretation is rejected as being in-
correct. The second is approved but... "the punishment is the 
same... as the one provided for the offence committed by the un-
identified operator..." 
C. Bronkhorst, in his annotation, states that "the Hoge 
Raad now has made an explicit statement as to the nature of art. 
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40", but -with all respect- the question remains whether is was 
a foruitous decision. 
What we are facing is an offence with an uncertain penal 
consequence, and a potential punishment scale stretching from 
minima to maxima and we must ask how this could possibly be re­
conciled with the lex certa principle. The criminal code, all 
other penal regulations, go into minute detail in describing an 
offence, setting out its parameters, indicating the penalty to be 
incurred and modulating such subsequent punishment in gradations 
reflecting the seriousness of the harm -caused. See, for instance, 
'assault causing bodily harm' and its aggravated modes. In all 
such cases it is the actor who actually causes the harm, intent­
ionally or negligently, who is the person receiving the punish­
ment. Compared against this backdrop, art.40(old) jumps out of 
line if we follow the first interpretation. 
If we hold that the punishable conduct is refusal of cooper­
ation, the offence is complete. There is no causal link between 
that offence and whatever the unidentified operator is guilty of. 
As a matter of fact, seen in time perspective, the owner's offen­
ce is committed at a later point in time and could not even have 
been committed prior to the actual operator's conduct. What the 
offence really achieves is: assist the unknown operator in escap­
ing detection and punishment, a form of cooperation after the 
fact, in the nature of Sr., art.189 -as it would seem to us-, 
which, however, deals with forms of assistance to an offender 
guilty of a criminal offence only. Art.40 (old) would also hold 
liable the owner who assist an operator guilty of a violation on­
ly. 
This introduces an interesting aside: 
The second paragraph of Sr., art.189 exempts one who tries 
to protect certain categories of blood-relatives and in-laws. 
Art.40(old) does not even allow such lenient exception. 
Enschede in his annotation to KR, 28-4-1970 (339b), stating 
that where the registration number of the motor vehicle was est­
ablished, the owner will be known who, in most cases, should in­
deed know the identity of the operator. 
"Often it was the registered owner himself; 
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many times, too, it was a member of the family, 
a friend or employee. Usually, the owner will 
not hesitate to disclose the operator's identity 
to the police. Should he hesitate, then the 
police officer may direct his attention to art.40 
and in all likelihood this will prompt the owner 
to cooperate, since he may be prosecuted under 
art.40 anyway. Thus, art.40 works by way of 
prevent ion. 
"However, an owner could have good reasons 
to remain silent: that evening he was, himself, 
the operator but he was impaired by alcohol; his 
son was behind the wheel without having a 
driver's licence; his wife was in the car with 
her boyfriend and the owner prefers to avoid 
complications." 
Thus, art.40(old), creating a liability that may lead to 
punishment for serious accidents such as those under artt.26, 30 
and 36 W W (driving while impaired, leaving the scene of an acci-
dent and causing death or grievous bodily harm, respectively) 
caused by the operator, is more severe in its aim to detect the 
identity of the true offender, or rather, to prevent that his 
identity remain hidden as a result of the silence of the person 
who does know. Apart from emotional problems, or even economic 
problems, potentially created by art.40(old) it must be recogniz-
ed that society at large is best served when offenders are 
brought to justice, especially in cases where the harm caused was 
of a serious nature. Assistance-after-the-fact should be discour-
aged; justice must not be hampered in taking its course. The 
question is whether the old art.40 provided the proper means to 
that end. 
Clearly, the old art.40 caused serious dissatisfaction and 
a new article 40 was created. 
W W , art.40(new) was intended to clarify, rather than change 
the basics. In HR, 16-12-1075 (339c) the following is stated in 
the pleadings: 
"Ad I: In order to answer the question whether 
there was a change in legislation, case law 
has demanded consistently that it must be establ-
ished whether the norm -embodied in the provision 
involved-, or the punishment provided for, were 
changed. In such event, a change of that nature 
must be based upon a change in assessment by the 
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legislator regarding the blamability of the 
conduct. 
"It Is hard to answer this question with 
respect to the norm in art.40, since the legis-
lator in his clarifications contained in the 
memorandum of amendments, refers only summarily 
to his motivations for the amendment of the 
article, namely: adaptation of the new article's 
wording to the interpretation of the old art.40, 
as laid down in your decision of november 21, 1972, 
NJ 1973, 123." 
The HR decided regarding that point: 
"... that art.40 (old)... provided a penalty 
for failing to meet his obligation of preventing 
that with a motor vehicle ... traffic regulations 
should be broken which should remain unpunished 
lacking knowledge of the identity of the offender; 
"that this provision, as a consequence of an 
amendment in legislation, has lost its validity 
as law...; 
"... that therefore a change in legislation, 
as referred to in ST., art.l, sub-section 2, was 
established." 
What, then, is the essence of the change? 
The Advocate General Remmelink states (at page 507): 
"... the legislator found grounds to amend 
art.40, in this sense that... "anyone" who 
causes or permits (another person) to operate 
a motor vehicle, and therefore not only the 
owner or permanent user, has been put under the 
obligation of disclosing the identity of the 
operator. 
"Furthermore, one consequence of this amend-
ment was obviously, that art.40 was reinforced 
by its own special sanction, instead of the 
sanction under the old text -no matter how that 
text was interpreted- provided for the conduct 
of the operator of the motor vehicle, a sanction 
which entailed that the owner or permanent user 
could be convicted for criminal offences as well 
as for violations. 
"From the aforegoing it follows, I think, 
that the norm of art.40(old) actually ceased to 
exist. 
Th. W. van Veen in his annotation of PR, 16-1-1979 (340) 
observes: 
"According to HR, 16-12-1975, NJ 1976, 187, 
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the present art.40 WVW is of an entirely 
different nature. It holds criminally liable 
anyone who caused or permitted another to 
operate a motor vehicle, in the event that the 
operator's identity could not be established and 
he (owner or user) failed to disclose such ident-
ity at first demand..." 
The penalty provided is: 3 months detention or a fine of 
Hfl.1,000. Both are maxima (art.35,(3) ). The defence: the owner 
or permanent user are to make it plausible that they are unable 
to disclose the operator's identity. V/here they were negligent 
in not preventing unauthorized use of the motor vehicle, this 
defence might well prove futile. 
Finally, the question must be raised whether strict or ab-
solute liability was or is involved in art.40(old) or in art.40 
(new) respectively. Since in both situations a defence was and is 
provided, we may leave absolute liability out of the question. 
As to art.40(old), holding a person criminally liable for 
the conduct of another person over whom he has no control, has 
the markings of strict liability, leaving open a defence of due 
diligence, showing that the vehicle was used against the accusedte 
will or showing that he could not have prevented its use, going 
by reasonable standards. Art.40(new) leaves available the defence 
of due diligence also, by showing that the accused was not able 
to disclose the operator's identity and that negligence was 
absent. 
However, in art.40(new) it is manifest that whoever caused 
or permitted the vehicle to be used by another, is punished for 
failing to perform a specific duty: make disclosure if capable to 
do so. The penalty is fixed as to quantum; the conduct punished 
is the accused's conduct, not the actual operator's. 
If a failure to disclose is deliberate (intentional) there 
cannot be any strict liability. If it is negligent -as for in-
stance in letting the time set in the demand, pass by- an excuse 
might still be found and perhaps, in some cases, AVAS could apply. 
If the lack of knowledge of the operator's identity is the result 
of negligence by not taking reasonable precautions against un-
authorized use of the vehicle, liability may well be considered 
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strict, for whoever would have been obliged to take such precaut-
ions, failed to be diligent. This would preclude a defence based 
on applied diligence. 
Niemeyer (341) advocates a resurrection of art.40(old) for 
the benefit of a better traffie'legislation policy, since art.40 
(new) puts too complex and difficult a task on the prosecution. 
This point may be well taken. What we have against it is, that we 
would witness a return to the old situation: punishment for an-
other person's conduct in the form of what perhaps would have to 
be called: vicarious criminal liability. The measure of such 
punishment may well reflect the seriousness of the offence com-
mitted and the harm inflicted... but it is to be said in all 
fairness, that it is directed at the wrong person. Of course, 
this may well work as an extra incentive to force the owner or 
permanent user into cooperation and disclosure. However, it does 
not necessarily reflect the breach of the duty of care resting 
upon the owner or user in failing to help prevent that offenders 
remain unpunished.The accused is held to be guilty until proven 
not guilty, an unusual phenomenon in our criminal law. 
Also, the nature of art.40(old) appears to be that of a 
hybrid: depending upon the actual operator's conduct, the owner 
or user may be punished either for a criminal offence or for a 
traffic violation, even in such situations where the operator 
himself might well have a valid defence. 
Another argument against a return of the old art.40 is de-
rived from one of the criticisms leveled against the new 
art.40, namely that prosecution under the new provision is com-
plex, difficult and augments the work of the prosecution. It is 
an argument not unlike that, used in defence of absolute liabil-
ity in general: provisions of that nature relieve the prosecution 
of the task to prove intent or recklessness {dolus in its various 
and varied modes). However, we do not think that it is healthy 
legislatory policy to allow the prosecution a distinct advantage 
over the accused, certainly not where, potentially, liability for 
a criminal offence might ensue. 
Referring back to assistance-after-the-fact {begunstiging) 
HSR (341a) note that "in setting out penalties for begunstiging 
-302-
the legislator has shown great restraint". Such restraint is 
hardly noticeable where art.40(old) is concerned. 
We suggest that it is far better that the old art.40 remain 
buried, even if the prosecution's task is not alleviated by the 
new art.40, nor simplified, even in situations where the owner or 
user being themselves the unidentified operator, could not be 
touched where they deny knowledge and should make it plausible. 
It occurs frequently that an offender flatly denies a charge, 
while the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to make 
the charge stick. In such situations non-disclosure is equivalent 
to a flat denial. Such are the professional hazards of a prosec-
utor's life. 
The Advocate General Remmelink in HR, 18-9-1078 (342) said: 
"In this case the validity of art.40 WVW... 
did not come up for discussion. It has been 
said that the provision is repugnant to the 
maxim: 'Nemo cogitur prodere se ipsum'... but 
it seems to me that the legislator, in cases 
where necessity would so dictate, should be 
allowed to create exceptions to such maxim." 
What kind of necessity could be involved? Where the position 
of an accused is so carefully protected by scores of provisions 
aimed at safeguarding "fair play in criminal prosecution and at 
giving him the benefit of the doubt; where the prosecution must 
prove its case strongly enough to convince the judge, it is hard 
to see why the legislator should set aside a venerable, age old 
maxim, deeply ingrained in legal thinking, and should do this, 
not in the Code, but in a statute such as the WVW, without a word 
of justification or even explanation. To us it seems far more 
fundamental that the right to privacy upon which many exceptions 
have been embedded in the Code (for instance, search of a home, 
censoring incoming and outgoing mail in prisons, etc.) remain in-
violate. 
We prefer the new art.40 over the old, as more down to earth, 
more reasonable and more in tune with accepted principles, one of 
which is that the citizen, facing the criminal law, must be able 
to face a 'legem oertam'. 
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2) In Canada 
In Canadian traffic law there is no problem comparable to 
the problems W W , art.40 raises. Yet, the problem of the unident-
ified operator also plagues the Canadian legislators. 
Speaking broadly, traffic law is to be found mainly in the 
various provincial highway traffic acts and regulations. Since 
these acts are provincial statutes, they cannot contain offences 
of true crime which are, as explained earlier, the exclusive dom-
ain of the federal legislator, the Federal Parliament. Such crim-
inal offences are to be found in the Criminal Code of Canada. 
Section 2 of the Code defines terms such as 'highway' and 
'motor vehicle'. Sections 202-204 deal with criminal negligence, 
causing death or bodily harm, including situations related to 
traffic offences and s.219 -punishment for manslaughter- applies. 
Sections 233-239 deal specifically with criminal negligence in 
the operation of a motor vehicle, driving while impaired, road-
side testing and breathalizer tests, driving while disqualified 
and driving a motor vehicle outfitted with... a smoke screen de-
vice. 
Sections 294 and 295 deal with theft of a motor vehicle and 
joy riding and sections 312 and 313 apply to offenders who have 
possession of a motor vehicle with an 'obliterated identification 
number'. Finally, section 722 contains penal provisions. 
Of the provisions referred to, only sections 294-295 and 312 
-313 are more directly related to owner-identification problems. 
For the purposes of this brief resume the Ontario Highway 
Traffic Act (343) and related Regulations are used. 
The HTA relies heavily upon a registration system for motor 
vehicles for the purpose of owner identification. 
Thus, both the seller and the buyer of a motor vehicle must, 
within 6 days following the transaction, report the sale/purchase 
to the Ministry of Transportation (s.2) and the same applies when 
an owner changes his address (s.7(2)). Number plates must only be 
used for the vehicle they were issued for (s.9(d)). Such plates 
must not be defaced, altered, removed, loaned to someone for use 
with another vehicle (s.9) and must be kept clean (s.10(2)),etc. 
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The responsibilities of the owner or permanent user ("he 
who is in possession or control") is referred to in s.l3(3): he 
shall not permit "any person to drive the motor vehicle on a 
highway unless that person holds a driver's licence...". In other 
words, he must satisfy himself that the other person is qualified 
to drive, that is, has a valid driver's licence. It also allows 
him to establish the identity of the other. The same obligation 
rests upon lessors, such as rental agencies (s.l9(3)). It should 
be noted that the driver's licence is generally used as a means 
of identification, for instance when cashing a cheque at a bank, 
writing a personal cheque in paymant of merchandise bought, and 
so on. Apart from the driver, the vehicle itself is also control-
led. In other words, the regulations provide for the strictest 
possible administrative control of each motor vehicle, from the 
moment it leaves the assembly line to the moment the wrecker re-
duces it to a compressed chunk of scrap metal and the 'instrument' 
issued to that end is the 'certificate of ownership'. 
Part X of the HTA deals with civil actions for negligence 
(s.132) but does not relate to criminal liability where a thief 
was the unknown driver. 
Part XIII deals with accidents. Section 139 obliges every 
person 'in charge of a motor vehicle' who is 'directly ot indir-
ectly involved in an accident', to report the accident forthwith 
to the police where personal injuries or property damage in ex-
cess of $400 result. Section 140 prescribes that such person is 
"to remain or immediately return" to the scene, render all poss-
ible assistance and present complete identification. 
Remain the provisions of the Code. 
Section 295 deals with "... everyone who, without the con-
sent of the owner, takes a motor vehicle... with intent to drive, 
use... or operate it or cause it to be driven, used... or operat-
ed" and creates an offence ressembling theft, a separate offence 
not covered by sections 283-294 The owner or permanent user from 
whom the motor vehicle was stolen, is not held criminally liable. 
The Code is silent as to cases where such theft was made possible 
or facilitated through the owner's or permanent user's negligen-
ce. 
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Section 312 contains a rebuttable presumption of knowledge 
-where a person has a motor vehicle in possession, the identific-
ation number of which has been wholly or partially removed or ob-
literated- of that motor vehicle having been obtained by the com-
mission in Canada or outside of Canada, of an indictable offence. 
Again, the section relates to administrative proof of ownership 
rather than to imputation of liability where an unidentified 
driver was involved. In no other way than referred to," is there 
any provision forcing the owner or permanent user to disclose the 
identity of the actual driver. 
In the final analysis, where all obligations regarding reg-
istration and transfer have been met, and the motor vehicle was 
stolen and got involved in an accident or traffic violation, 
while the actual driver remains unknown, the Crown appears to be 
out of luck. The third party who became the victim in such an 
event, has only his insurance company to look to for reimburse-
ment of damages. 
Obviously, the old art.40 W W has no parallel in Canadian 
law. The new art.40 comes somewhat closer in that it requires the 
owner or permanent user to disclose the driver's identity... if 
he be capable to do so. 
We propose to leave the matter at this point, in order to 
return -after the above asides- to some final remarks regarding 
culpa lata, which will then switch the subject to another aside. 
e) The Proof of Culpa Lata 
From the case law cited above it becomes clear that, where 
culpa lata is charged, the HR demands evidence that leaves no 
room for any doubt. Culpa is charged, culpa must be proven con-
clusively. Where this should not be accomplished, the accused 
is not to be convicted, for there is no place here for strict 
responsibility. 
In a prior case quoted, the Advocate General Remmelink 
makes an interesting statement, that will cause us to embark upon 
a further digression. (344) 
"Indeed, one must grant the accused that the 
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evidence merely shows, that the accused's car 
got onto the right shoulder of the road, then 
onto the left shoulder, and finally veered to 
the right again, back onto the highway where 
it collided... with an oncoming car. 
"However, this does not take away from the 
fact that the judge is at liberty to deduce 
from such divergent conduct, clearly dangerous 
per se, that the driver, in so driving, was 
driving extremely carelessly (etc.) 
"Your Raad usually deems it adequate that 
conduct may be evidenced (as extremely care-
less)...if it does not satisfy a certain 
standard of care, capable of being perceived 
as such by an outsider, (emphasis added) 
Anyone who, on a highway, veers from the 
right to the left or vice-versa, is -judged 
objectively- not driving carefully by any 
standard s . " 
Well, an outsider may well be inclined, when making such ob-
servations, to think that the driver is extremely careless. What 
he sees may 'look like driving'. The crucial question is: was the 
driver in control, or did he lose control? If he lost it, could 
he be blamed for it? Appearances do not always cover facts, even 
if they suggest conclusions lightly qualified as 'self-evident' 
The question to be raised here is: does Remmelink refer to 
something similar to the 'res ipsa loquitur '-argument, which is 
so very much at home in tort law? Or does he refer to 'circum-
stantial evidence'? What do both terms mean and what distinguish-
es one from the other? 
This will be the topic for the next chapter. It will lead 
into the labyrinths of the common law of evidence, but only into 
its outermost fringes. 
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Error fuaatus nuda veritate in 
multis, est probabilior; 
et saepenumero rationibus vincit 
veritatem error. 
2 Coke, 73 
Error artfully disguised (or 
colored) is, in many instances, 
more probable than naked truth; 
and frequently error overwhelms 
truth by its show of reason. 
-308-
CHAPTER FIVE 
AN ASIDE WITH RESPECT TO 
EVIDENCE 
The 'Law of Evidence' in the common law has driven (and is 
still driving) untold practitioners and judges to distraction. 
The rules of evidence are extremely complicated and hard to find. 
(345) 
"Wigmore -the great American authority on 
evidence- Cakes eleven heavy tomes to set forth 
the law of evidence." (346) 
That is more tomes than the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure 
contains in articles ('sections') dealing with evidence in crim-
inal proceedings. (Sv., artt.338-344) 
"... Phipson, the English authority whose 
work is widely used in Canada, has a collection 
of 7000 precedents..." 
"Present evidence law has rightly been cate-
gorized as 'a proliferation of ostensibly legal 
rules, refinements of rules, distinctions in 
the refinements, refinements and distinctions 
in the exceptions and soforth ad infinitum!" 
It may be said that the vast majority of rules of evidence 
relate to admissibility of data presented in support of a case, 
either civil or criminal. We shall, -with no regrets-, refrain 
from entering into the, even broadest aspects of this matter. 
However, a brief look will be given to 'circumstantial evidence' 
and the 'res ipsa Zoquiiiir-argument. 
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A. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The prosecution is bound to prove all constitutive elements, 
objective and subjective, of the offence an accused is charged 
with. If intent or negligence are such elements, they must be 
proven. Nonetheless, an accused may be well advised in a given 
situation, to attempt counteracting the Crown's evidence by prov-
ing lack of intent, due diligence, and so on. He must, in other 
words, negative the elements charged. 
An accused appears to have a slightly easier task than the 
Crown. Where the Crown must adduce evidence, proving a case 
'beyond a reasonable doubt', an accused will satisfy the Court, 
either by raising such reasonable doubt or by adducing evidence 
capable of proving his case 'on the balance of probabilities' 
(or 'preponderance of probabilities'). Although it is held 
that a person is innocent until proven guilty, trial tactics may 
make it an efficient manoeuvre to attempt proving innocence. 
Generally speaking, evidence attempts to prove either facts 
(that the accused's conduct satisfies the description of an of-
fence) or the mental component or disposition of the actor while 
acting (in other words, that his conduct was intentional or neg-
ligent). In offences of strict responsibility the latter does 
not enter into the discussion. 
Hence the distinction between 'direct' and 'circumstantial' 
evidence of which Phipson says: (347) 
By Direct evidence is meant that the exist-
ence of a given thing or fact is proven either 
by its actual production, or by the testimony 
or admissible declaration of some one who has 
himself perceived it. 
"By Indirect, Circumstantial or Presumptive 
evidence is meant that other facts are thus 
proved, from which the existence of the given 
fact may be logically inferred." 
In other words, circumstantial evidence is a logical deri-
vation from direct evidence. It deals with facts. 
Enter Hodge's Case and the rule it contains. (348) 
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Hodge was charged with the murder of a woman, who was on her 
way back from the market, with money in her pocket. No witnesses 
were available who could testify that Hodge killed the woman. 
Evidence was entirely circumstantial: 
a) Hodge knew the woman well and had been seen in her 
presence, in a lane, near the spot where the woman 
later was found, murdered; 
b) At that same time, four other persons were present 
in that lane; 
c) Some hours later, the accused was seen at a place, 
some miles from the scene of the crime, burying 
something; 
d) The day after, the buried 'thing' was dug up. It 
turned out to be money in an amount as one could 
expect the victim to have carried upon her person 
when returning from the market. 
Was this evidence conclusive and did it lead to Hodge being 
found guilty of murder? No, it was not. Hodge was found not guil-
ty by the jury, who had been instructed by Baron Alderson that: 
"... before they could find the prisoner (= the 
accused) guilty, they must be satisfied: 
not only that those circumstances were consist-
ent with his having committed the act, but 
they must also be satisfied that the facts 
weve such as to be inconsistent with any other 
rational conclusion than that the prisoner was 
the guilty person." (emphasis added) 
And so, the question is still open: did Hodge -or did he not-
commit the murder he was charged with? Literally, he had the bene-
fit of the doubt. 
The Hodge rule may be of interest in cases such as traffic 
accidents where the situation found at the scene (a car in a 
ditch or crushed against a tree, skid marks, debris) cannot be 
factually related to a known cause. This is where circumstantial 
evidence may come into play. When an accused is known to have 
been driving a car and there is no evidence allowing for any 
other rational conclusion except guilt (the consistency/incon-
sistency elements in Hodge's rule) a conviction may be obtained. 
(349) 
This does not mean, however, as McRuer C.J.H.C, said in the 
Mclver Case, that all possible suggestions must be excluded. 
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"For example, a suggestion that a child may 
have run into the path of an automobile and that 
the appellant was diverted from his course while 
trying to avoid hitting the child, or that a 
passenger might have been in the automobile and 
touched the steering wheel, or a multitude of 
other similar suggestions. To admit such argument 
would destroy the efficacy of circumstantial 
evidence in criminal cases..." 
"... the rule makes it clear that the case is 
to be decided on the facts, that is, the facts 
proved in evidence, and the conclusions altern-
ative to the guilt of the accused must be rational 
conclusions based on inferences drawn from proven 
facts. No conclusion can be a rational conclusion 
that is not founded in evidence. 
"Such a conclusion would be a speculative, 
imaginative conclusion, not a rational one." 
Yet, children -even adults- do suddenly rush onto the street 
from between parked cars, or cross the street in a sudden dash; 
passengers sitting next to the driver do touch or yank at the 
steering wheel. Such events may well be the real reason why a 
driver could not avoid hitting a child or a tree or was seen 
'by an outsider', driving erratically. When drivers and passen-
gers suffer from amnesia after an accident, such facts may never 
be proven... Who is to say what happened in those last few sec-
onds before a car, proceeding in heavy fog, hits the abutment of 
a bridge? 
Circumstantial evidence deals with facts only. It will not 
attempt to theorize about hypotheticals. It may be used to prove 
that 'A. did drive at a speed beyond the speed limit, on a badly 
paved, narrow, winding, hilly road, in dense fog, at night; that 
he swerved from right to left, ending up against a tree, having 
attempted to bring the car to a stop to avoid a collision'. All 
of this is capable of being observed by an outsider. The mechan-
ical state the car is in, may -just may- give an expert suffici-
ent data to make a conclusion as to the car's probable speed in 
view of the results of the impact... and this may already border 
on speculation. Skid marks may add their information. A brand new 
front tire may be found wrecked: was this the cause or one of the 
results of the accident? How much caution must be used in coming 
to a definite pronouncement, for instance, as to culpa lata? 
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In HR, 4-12-1979 (350) it was held that adequate evidence 
was adduced in proving culpa lata. The accused was charged that 
he, in his car, had left the road, getting onto the shoulder and 
had hit a tree, then had veered across the highway and plunged 
into a canal at the left side; one passenger drowned. Some spec-
ific details must be mentioned: 
on the same day, prior to the accident mentioned, the 
accused had hit a traffic column in another municipal-
ity and had left the scene of the accident; 
the accused was impaired; 
it was found that the left front tire was 'kapot' which 
could mean anything from 'flat' or 'torn' to 'in shreds' 
Nonetheless the accused drove at a speed of 100km/h 
(60mph) on a narrow, winding road. 
Looking at these data, we find that something is bothering 
us. 
The only reason we know about his left front tire being dam-
aged is, because the accused said so in his statement before the 
Court : 
"I vas driving... on the narrow and winding 
Veldkamp (a highway) at a speed of about 100 
kilometers per hour, with a flat left front tire, 
and, veering to the left, drove my car, extremely 
carelessly into the Hoogeveens Vaart (a canal) 
at my left hand side, as a result of which -as I 
learned later- my passenger Ties Kouwen died by 
drowning in the aforesaid Hoogeveense Vaart, at 
the date mentioned. 
"The fatal consequence referred to is there-
fore an event to be blamed on my carelessness 
described above. 
"At the time I was impaired by drinking beer 
... to such a degree that I was not to be held 
being in a condition... capable of driving that 
car properly.. . " 
First, a more general observation. Statements of the accused 
and of witnesses in a case, taken when they are being interrogat-
ed, are edited statements. From all the answers obtained during a 
questioning, a resume is made, containing all pertinent data, and 
capable of supporting a case, or not. 
That such statements are edited becomes obvious by simply 
reading them. They all sound as if all persons accused, or all 
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witnesses, are holding a law degree (which is to be doubted). All 
legally relevant elements are carefully incorporated: 'I was 
careless', 'the road was a highway open to public traffic', 'I 
knew that excessive use of alcoholic beverages has the result of 
impairing driving skills', and so on. All constitutive elements 
of an offence are carefully covered. In the statement cited we do 
not only find factual statements; we do even find two conclusions 
drawn from these statements. Moreover, the statement reeks of 
self-incrimination. Thus the accused in the case under discussion: 
"I was driving with a flat left front tire", and "I was impaired." 
Yet, this man was not too drunk to notice that his tire was 
flat, that it was not a rear tire but a front tire, moreover that 
it was his left front tire. That is quite some detailed knowledge 
for a drunken driver and takes quite some reasoning and experien-
ce in establishing it, as any driver knows who suddenly notices 
that there is 'something wrong with the car'., could it be a tire 
or the steering...? He has to stop and walk around his car in or-
der to find out whether the problem is indeed something involving 
a tire... which tire? 
By their nature, statements as referred to, are made in the 
court room, 'ex post factum', when all data presented from many 
sources, are known and the contents of a file are known and were 
discussed with defence counsel. The question is, however, how 
much of what the accused states -or a witness states- did he know 
at the time of the accident? To put it differently, how much of 
this is knowledge gained by hindsight, rather a conclusion than 
a statement of fact, generated by looking back at those conseq-
uences and then saying something like: 'I was careless' instead 
of '...'if I caused all this, I must have been negligent...', 
just about exactly as the Court would come to such conclusion. 
In this case there was a driver, stating: 'I was impaired 
(this fact increased the penalty) to such a degree that I was not 
able to drive my car properly'. Yet, this man, in a car with a 
flat front tire -if indeed it was already flat when he was driv-
ing- drives at a speed of 100km/h on a narrow, winding road, 
alongside a canal. There is no evidence shown as to how long and 
over what distance he moved along that road before plunging into 
the canal. However, he was apparently not too drunk to know 
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his speed. But in order to drive at that speed he must have been 
on that road for quite some distance and time. Driving a Mercedes 
under such conditions at a speed of 100km/h must have taken con-
siderable skill as any driver would admit who ever attempted to 
drive a car, with a flat front tire -which affects the steering-
to a safe spot off the road, going at 100km/h. Also, a flat front 
tire would adversely affect the braking. Was this man's knowledge 
obtained after the fact as was his knowledge with respect to his 
passenger's death? Is it perhaps more probable that, while driv-
ing, that tire blew and caused the accident? Is this less con-
sistent with the evidence which regards only the ultimate outcome 
of the event, than the assumption that he performed a near mir-
acle as a driver? 
Hitting a tree, just before driving into the canal, could 
have caused him to veer off the road, was never proven. There may 
be a wealth of information in the police reports, in the reports 
of preliminary hearings, and so on, but none of this is to be 
found in the judgment. This man was convicted upon his own evi-
dence, amplified by circumstantial evidence which, to say the 
least, would seem to allow for other conclusions. There were no 
witnesses. Is there not considerable room for doubt? 
Apparently, the accused's defence counsel was thinking along 
similar lines. In his supplementary pleadings he stated: 
"Since collision with a tree was not proven, 
it should strike us as peculiar that nothing 
can be deduced from what was, indeed, proven 
(driving into the canal) as to the accused's 
carelessness as a driver, because driving into 
the canal is the very last in a chain of events 
in this accident, namely the final result. 
From this final result, however, no conclusion 
could be drawn as to the accused's negligence as 
a driver during the period prior to entering 
the canal." 
This argumentation was not accepted by the HR, holding that 
even where the collision with a tree was not proven, the remain-
ing events constituted sufficient evidence in proving the accus-
ed's negligence. 
"... the Court of Appeal... could readily 
deduce from the evidence that the accused is 
to be blamed for his way of driving to such a 
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degree, chat it is to be categorized as very 
negligent. 
"More specifically, the Court of Appeal was 
allowed to base this assessment... on the state-
ment the accused made at the court hearing... 
admitting among other things, that he was driving 
his car, of which the left front tire was flat... 
at a speed of 100km/h... on a narrow and winding 
road, flanked by a canal... while being impaired." 
B. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE USED TOO LIBERALLY? 
What bothers us in this case -and in many other cases- is 
the liberal use of circumstantial evidence... If one would strike 
out what the accused admitted to: being impaired, having a flat 
tire, driving at a certain speed, all that is left over is a car 
in a canal, with a dead passenger and a driver who escaped with 
his life. No witnesses. None, but silent pseudo-witnesses: cir-
cumstantial matter about which the judgment reveals nothing, al-
thoug it might be contained in other documents relating to the 
earlier stages of the case, before the courts below. We do not 
know. 
The same facts may prove -using this word rather loosely-
quite different things, where there are no additional data to 
corroborate one theory or the other in respect of the reconstruct-
ion after the fact, of that accident. Instead of allowing such 
reconstruction merely 'probability' value (...this is what could 
have been happening...) it is given something close to 'certain-
ty' value (... this is what must have been happening...). Unlike 
Hodge, this accused certainly did not get the benefit of the 
doubt. 
In this case the Advocate General Haak, reacting to the de-
fence counsel's remarks -cited above- said: 
"Especially where motorized traffic is 
concerned, it is possible to deduce subjective 
negligence from a manner of driving that is 
objectively preceptible as dangerous." 
"That may or may not be so, but nobody did see this accused 
while he was driving. Conclusions were drawn from the fact only 
that a car had plunged into a canal; ergo, the driver must have 
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been negligent. In other words, where direct evidence is lacking, 
the prosecution may still -as the Canadian Mounties aire reputed 
to always do- 'get his man'. 
All that-jwould be needed, is to show by the use of circum-
stantial evidence -since direct evidence is lacking- that certain 
conduct, satisfying an objective description and held to be risky 
or dangerous by generally accepted standards (such as driving in 
to a canal, hitting a tree or another car, while no clear cause 
is disclosed) is to be qualified as subjectively blameworthy. 
In other words: engage in such conduct, cause such conseq-
uences, and -whatever was or was not in your mind and whatever 
was the real cause of the final outcome- you will be held respons-
ible. Negligence is assumed proven. No AVAS could save an accused. 
This, we suggest, is strict responsibility. 
Sofar, then, we have two more or less -as we see it- disturb-
ing elements: imputed foresight, manipulated as the missing link 
between cause and effect (i.e. all effects) and we have subject 
ive responsibility deduced from conduct, objectively held as 
being negligent, careless, and so on. Here, the bridge between 
objective and subjective is, again, strict responsibility, a kind 
of 'imputed hindsight'. 
Perhaps, the Haagse Etalageruit case also illustrates this: 
could it be said that the accused, after his car turned over on 
its roof, was still 'driving' his car in the technical sense of 
the word? The driver had lost control entirely. Pe could not 
steer, he could not brake. As of the moment that car rolled over, 
the accused joined the other victims, trapped inside his car, 
going where the car went until it expended its speed. We do not 
say this man, or the other, is not to be blamed. What we do say, 
however, is that both were held strictly responsible for any and 
all of the secundary consequences. The basis was: circumstantial 
evidence. 
After this intermezzo we shall now address ourselves to an-
other topic, related to evidence, namely to the 'Res ipsa argum-
ent' . 
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fíes aaaendent lumina rebus. 
Odgen ν. Gibbons, 
4 Johns.Ch.(N.Y.)149 
One thing throws light upon 
others. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RES IPSA ARGUMENT 
A. RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
How could negligence be proven, other than by testimony 
of either the accused -should he decide to speak up- or of wit-
nesses? What if an accused remains silent on a topic and there 
are no witnesses? What if an accused is suffering from amnesia, 
unable to close the gap in his memory even if he wanted to do so 
desperately? 
Sometimes a thing speaks for itself: 'Res ipsa loquitur '. 
The problem is, when the thing speaks, whether we understand 
correctly what it appears to be saying? Does it say everything 
there is to say? Is it engaged in double-talk? Is it speaking 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? The road 
towards erroneous conclusions appears to be paved with maxims. We 
should briefly look at this one. 
There is a presumption -rebuttable, thank heavens- that an 
accused was negligent, arising "upon proof that the instrumental-
ity causing an injury, was in defendant's exclusive control, and 
that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in ab-
sence of negligence". (351) "The maxim is based merely on an est-
imate of logical probability in a particular case", says Fleming. 
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(352) 
The res ipsa argument centers upon the truism that all 
events must have a cause and, under a given set of circumstances 
it may become logically probable, when an actor is in the exclus-
ive control of the instrumentality, that it is his negligence 
that caused the consequences. 
'ties ipsa', then, may help establish negligence... but for 
the criminal law it has no recognized value: it is a tort law 
concept, in other words, a civil law concept regarding a civil 
wrong. Even if it were recognized in the criminal law, it is hard 
to see how it could do anything but establish a kind of prima 
facie assessment of a given situation that, at any rate, would 
have to be corroborated by other evidence. Yet, we do not feel 
free to dismiss the matter out of hand where Dutch law is con-
cerned. 
The argumentation found in the Hoogeveense Vaart case and 
discussed in some detail above, appears to have some of the char-
acteristics of the res ipsa argument: a car is found in a canal; 
since no driver in his right mind drives his car intentionally 
into a canal, the driver must have been negligent. Or, the driver 
was driving a car with a flat front tire at a high rate of speed 
and, since an accident occurred, the driver must have been negli-
gent. The question is, whether a driver, while driving with a 
flat tire -if that tire blew suddenly- is still in the 'exclusive 
control' of the 'instrumentality'(the car)? We are not attempting 
to apply common law maxims to civil law situations, or viae versa. 
We are merely comparing certain ways of thinking, surmizing, de-
ducing, theorizing and so on, under whatever title they may have 
'entered the books', if ever. 
How, then, may culpa be proven in criminal and penal matters 
where the res ipsa argument does not appear to be available, 
while circumstantial evidence only sees to facts? In common law, 
negligence is not considered an element of mens reat whether the 
term is given the meaning of 'the contrary of diligence' or of 
'non-intentional failure to conform to the conduct pf the reason-
able man' (353) because, as Glanville Williams explains: (354) 
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(Negligence is not a state of mind); 
"it would be linguistically objectionable to 
describe something that is not a mental state 
as 'mens '"; 
"Mens rea is a general requirement for crime 
at common law; but negligence is not usually 
suf ficient." 
Glanville Williams further states: (355) 
"In the law of tort negligence has an object-
ive meaning. It signifies a failure to reach 
the objective standard of the reasonable man, 
and does not involve any enquiry into the 
mentality of the defendant. The same rule pre-
vails in criminal law, in those spheres where 
negligence is recognized at all. 
"A person may be held guilty of negligence 
although he did not foresee the risk of harm, 
if his expectation did not accord with common 
experience; and he may also be held guilty where 
he was unjustifiably ignorant of some circum-
stances that increased the risk." 
In other words, negligence is a factual datum in the common 
law, an epitheton 'dis'-ornans, affixed to conduct that does not 
meet the common standard, because it was perceptible or perceived 
as such by a bystander. 
The res ipsa argument could be made as follows: where a con-
sequence has been perceived, the cause of which was not or could 
not be established, the presumption is that, prima facie, whoever 
was in control of whatever caused the harm, must have been guilty 
of negligence, unless he succeeds in proving the contrary. It all 
appears to come down to the following: if we do not know who 
caused the harm, we pin the liability on the most likely person, 
and then we unload the burden of proof on his shoulders. 
Thus it is clear that, where res ipsa applies, this person 
'in control', presumed to have been negligent, faces the problem 
of rebutting the presumption. This is a reversal of the onus of 
proof, as said before, from the plaintiff to the defendant in a 
civil claim and from the prosecution to the accused in criminal 
and penal matters. About this proposition more will have to be 
said soon. 
Before moving on, we should like to offer the following. 
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Wright and Linden observe: (356) 
"Concerning motor car accidents and resultant 
litigation, it has often been said that the case 
actually tried by a jury is a case that never in 
fact took place, since frequently the evidence 
is either contradictory or in many cases non-
existent. It is here that procedural devices 
and questions of proof play a large part. 
"Res ipsa loquitur is one concept that must 
be considered in this context. 
The effect given to the operation of res ipsa 
loquitur may lead away from negligence to a 
liability without fault. 
"Sometimes, by statute, we have placed the 
onus of disproof of negligence on a motorist 
in circumstances where the happening of the 
accident itself furnishes no rational basis 
for the inference of negligence. 
"The truth is that under the guise of 
'fault-finding' the courts often move in reality, 
despite the theory, close to a principle of 
liability without fault. 
"If, as Maine said, substantive law was in 
the early days 'secreted in the interstices 
of procedure', it is no less true today that 
under the guise of procedure courts are able 
to shift imperceptibly into forms of liability 
without fault, while speaking the language of 
negligence." 
We submit that a similar statement may fairly be made with 
respect to contemporary Dutch law. This does not imply that such 
a trend is to be branded as objectionable per se, as we shall at-
tempt showing when making the case in favor of strict liability. 
What appears to be objectionable, we suggest, is the procedural 
use of artificial constructions such as presumed foresight and 
hindsight arguments of the nature discussed above. 
B. THE PROBLEM OF PROVING 
Negligence does play a star role, not in real crime, but in 
statutory/regulatory, that is: penal offences. As was pointed out 
in Part One, these offences border on civil wrongs, for the cor-
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rection of which the instrumentarium of the criminal prosecution 
has been borrowed. This fact could easily tempt the unwary into 
adapting civil notions, remedies or procedures to penal issues. 
As pointed out, 'negligence' has a double meaning: the cont-
rary of diligence -where diligence is contrasted with 'absence of 
fault' (diligence, inevitable accident or misadventure) and 'ab-
sence of intent'. 
How to prove negligence, we ask again. In many situations we 
ask for the near-impossible. How to prove a negative, a lacking 
in something? We hold up standards, reasonability, foresight, 
knowledge, role playing creating expectation. We attempt to hear 
what the 'silent witnesses' have to suggest: circumstantial evi-
dence. We try to peer beyond the consequence we find ourselves 
confronted with and reason: 'nothing causes nothing, ergo: some-
thing must have caused the consequence we observe.' 
At best, this appears to be educated guess work and even if 
we did establish negligence, it does not mean that we also have 
the answer to the question: 'why' was the actor (seemingly) neg-
ligent? We end up with a 'best estimate', a hypothesis, proof of 
which keeps escaping us. But, should a hypothesis be sufficient 
for putting blame on a person? 
Where negligence is one of the characteristics of the con-
duct to be branded as an offence, the legislator has two avenues 
of approach: he could either write it into the description of the 
conduct in the provision, or he could remain silent. Where it is 
written in, it must be proven and from the aforegoing discussion 
it may appear that such proof is seldom, if at any time, achiev-
able. How far more convenient, less burdensome, more practical 
-as far as the prosecution is concerned- to leave the word out 
of the provision. No proof of negligence is required. That is the 
avenue the Canadian legislator has entered long ago. Such offen-
ces are labeled: 'offences of strict responsibility'. 
Turning to Dutch criminal law and evidence, we find a situ-
ation that appears to be altogether different. 
Evidence may be held to establish the truth as to whether an 
accused committed an offence, when one of five evidentiary sour-
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ces -or any combina-tion of them-, but none other, are used to 
show that a person's conduct satisfies the description of the 
conduct set out in the penal provision: 
the judge's own observations, made when hearing a case; 
statements made by the accused, if corroborated by 
other evidence; 
testimony of witnesses -at least two, generally-; 
testimony of expert-witnesses; 
documentary evidence as described in Sv., art.344 
What about circumstantial evidence, presumptions, inferen-
ces, 'vermoedens'? 
For the sake of making a comparison, we repeat what Phipson 
stated: (357) 
"By ... circumstantial evidence is meant that 
other facts are thus proved (by direct evidence) 
from which the existence of the given fact may 
be logically inferred." 
The Dutch Civil Code, art.1952 reads: 
"Presumptions are inferences, which the law 
or the judge deduces from a known fact (in order 
to prove) an unknown fact. 
"They encompass: those based on the statute, 
and those not based on the statute." 
We may as well stop at this point: inferences are a civil, 
not a criminal procedure source of evidence. 
Do inferences play no role at all in a criminal procedure? 
Again looking at the five sources of evidence referred to above, 
we see that the first one mentions the judge's observations. One 
cannot say that, in the inquisitory role of the Dutch judge, he 
would not 'observe'. 'Observing', sea, leads to no conclusions. 
As such, it would be a sterile sensory experiment. Observation 
leads to an intake of information, of data, which may upon com-
parison with other data, corroborate or contradict oneanother, 
but -in the end- will leave the judge with an 'impression' of the 
truth of the matter. Depending on their persuasive power, the 
judge may even become convinced by their impact. 
The same applies to all other sources, which yielded data, 
to be disgested by the judge's mind. He will compare, sift, re-
fine, condense, reconcile and eventually accept or reject the 
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final picture: 'lawful and convincing proof' is adduced... or the 
contrary. 
It could not fail that circumstantial evidence is part of 
the process, or at least something very akin to it. The final 
paragraph of Sv., art.339 reads: 
"Facts or circumstances that are part of 
common knowledge, need not to be proven." 
What is 'common knowledge? Who decides what it is? When may 
it be said, on the basis of common knowledge, for instance that an 
accused was driving 'extremely imprudently, heedlessly and negli-
gently' -or similar expressions charging culpa lata? Because a 
car ended up in a ditch or in a canal? Pecause a farm went up in 
flames? We seem to be back where we started: the HR, 25-6-1968 
decision (358) and the words of the Advocate General Remroelink, 
which we shall repeat here, taking the liberty to highlight some 
of the sentences by printing them in italics. 
"However, this does not take away from the 
fact, that the Judge is at liberty to deduce 
from such divergent conduct, clearly dangerous 
per se, that the driver in so driving, was 
driving extremely carelessly... 
"Your Raad usually deems it adequate, that 
conduct may be evidenced... (as extremely 
careless) ... if it does not satisfy a certain 
standard of care, preceptible to an outsider. 
"Anyone who, on a highway, veers from the 
right to the left, or vice versa, is - judged 
objectively- not driving carefully by any 
standards. " 
"The judge is at liberty to deduce" points to an inference 
and so to circumstantial evidence. 
"...divergent conduct, clearly dangerous per se...": diverg-
ent from the generally accepted norm a prudent man respects; 
dangerous in itself as common knowledge teaches us. 
"...conduct", outwardly perceptible as "not satisfying a 
certain standard of care": again the prudent man, looking at the 
conduct as an outsider; 
"Anyone...": common knowledge, and res ipsa: the way of 
driving of the accused speaks its own language. 
Where culpa lata is concerned, it appears that the judge, 
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indeed has quite some leeway when making up his mind and in gain­
ing his glimpse of the truth. 
The same, or similar words may be found in many other cases 
where culpa lata is charged and evidence is held being adequate 
in proving it. 
Assessing the data presented in evidence requires deductive 
reasoning. It is remarkable that it sometimes appears as if the 
dice are (still) loaded against the driver of a motor vehicle. 
C, POLARIZED EVIDENCE? 
The question is whether it may be said that in a number of 
cases evidence seems to go 'one way only'? 
In the Onverlichte Brommer case (359), a cyclist riding a 
lightweight motor cycle {'bromfiets' от 'brommer' being the pop­
ular name for this kind of vehicle), carrying a passenger on the 
pillion, was hit by a car, traveling at 100km/h. It was dark. The 
car was driving with dimmed headlights. The rural road was relat­
ively narrow, some 18 feet. The rider was seriously injured, the 
passenger died. 
Earlier that same evening, the rider had noticed that the 
bike's taillight was not functioning. He had attempted to repair 
it but without success. He decided, nonetheless, to continue his 
trip, taking care to drive extra slowly. 
The driver of the car was charged with culpa lata and the 
Court of Appeal found him grossly negligent, because: 
"... the accused was duty bound under the 
conditions to take into consideration the poss­
ibility of the presence on that road of pedest­
rians -who usually do not carry any light at all­
er other objects, stopped or moving slowly, among 
which could have been a lightweight motorcycle 
with a defective taillight." 
We shall pass by the observation that, if a lightweight 
motorcycle cannot be seen, it can at least be heard, which is mo­
re than could be said about a pedestrian. 
We suggest, however, that the bikerider was grossly at fault 
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as well. This may not cancel the accused's negligence, if any, 
but at least explain it, putting it into perspective. Also, it 
might raise the question of culpa in causa. The knowledge the car 
driver is supposed to have of the traffic conditions on that road 
is the very same as the bikerider must be supposed to have. He 
should have known that cars are to be expected using that road, 
cars which may at times be prevented from using their full high-
beams because of oncoming traffic. The bikerider must also have 
realized that he was creating a situation of danger by driving 
extra slowly. We submit that this is the second grave error he 
made, the first one being that his taillight was out of commis-
sion. His headbeam was functioning normally; for him there was no 
good reason to slow down; rather, there were two good reasons 
for him to drive at normal speed or even increase his speed: hav-
ing wrongly decided to continue driving without a functioning 
taillight he was putting himself into a situation of danger. It 
was in his interest to either get off that road -which he decided 
not to do- or cut his time of exposure to grave danger to a mini-
mum by speeding up and get this adventure over with as soon as 
possible. Moreover, by moving at a slow speed, normally not expect-
ed of a biker, he did not fit himself into an expectancy pattern: 
motorized bikes normally do not move at a slow speed. 
Had he driven at a regular speed (at the moment the car 
driver noticed him) the difference in speeds between the two ve-
hicles would have been less and he might have bought himself the 
precious extra seconds in perception and reaction time (usually 
estimated at one and one half seconds in total that would have 
given the car driver time to swerve, if not stop. Any higher 
speed of the biker would even have improved the situation. 
There is no such speculation at all in the decision and the 
driver of the car got the full blame. 
The point here is not whether the car driver's negligence is 
or is not cancelled by the bike riders negligence. The point is 
that the facts found in the situation were applied only against 
the car driver, where we would have expected a corresponding 
charge against the bike rider. 
The following case is of special interest. Where the previ-
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ous case was decided on factual data, the next one referred to 
allowed the opinion of a witness, who was not an expert, to con­
tribute to the proof of negligence. It is the case of the Bezorg­
de Buschauffeur. (360) 
A bus chauffeur was driving his vehicle on a city street, at 
a speed of some 30-40kiTi/h. Approaching an intersection, he notic­
ed that the traffic lights showed red. Without applying his brak 
es and bringing the bus to a stop, he went through the intersect­
ion and hit a cyclist, who was killed. 
The chauffeur did not stop because, as he stated, some of 
his passengers had already left their seats and were standing in 
the aisle, preparing to get off at the next stop. Fe feared that 
these passengers might get hurt if he would make an emergency 
stop. The HR dismissed his appeal, affirming that he was guilty 
of culpa lata. 
One of the statements made by a witness represents not only 
an objective account of the events he perceived -as an outsider-
but also contains a subjective opinion and the Court of Appeal as 
well as the HR accepted it in evidence although the witness was 
not an expert in the technical sense of the word. 
Witness H. said: 
"I was driving at a speed of 30-40km/h in the 
left traffic lane (on the Schoolstraat)... In 
front of me, in the righthand lane a yellow 
autobus was proceeding... at about the same 
speed. Approaching the intersection... I saw that 
... the traffic signal showed a red light. At 
that moment I was still quite a distance from 
the intersection. I was amazed to notice that 
this autobus, which could have come to a full 
stop easily, before moving into the intersection, 
continued at the same speed, heading towards the 
red light for several seconds and then drove, 
through the red light, right into the intersect-
ion. 
The Hr responded to the complaint that the Opinion' of a 
witness was admitted as part of the evidence, as follows: 
"... that witness Η. ωαβ in a position to per­
ceive that the autobus, proceeding ahead of him, 
easily could have been brought to a full stop 
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before entering the intersection." (emphasis added) 
There are no data indicating that witness H. was an expert 
such as: another buschauffeur, a traffic engineer, etc. having 
practical or at least theoretical knowledge about driving heavily 
loaded vehicles. The witness is an 'expert' only in the legal 
sense: as a driver, he is like any other driver -such as the bus-
chauffeur- an expert in that he is one of the large group of per­
sons engaged in using a special skill, requiring training, qualif­
ication and experience: driving a motorvehicle. 
His opinion was that the buschauffeur could easily have stop­
ped in time. The chauffeur had stated: 
"I am terribly sorry that all of this happened, 
but I do not feel that I am responsible for the 
collision. I drove through the red light at the 
moment I could not stop any more in time. An auto­
bus such as I was driving, some 12 meters long, 
weighing ten tons, cannot be brought to a full 
stop chat easily, although the brakes are power 
assisted. There were some 15 passengers on board." 
There was no discussion in this case why the chauffeur no­
ticed at so late a point in time that the light was red. It would 
seem that the reason for this could have been a starting point of 
the entire chain of events. His act of negligence could have been, 
perhaps, allowing himself to get distracted, for instance by a 
passenger asking him some question or by noticing that passengers 
were getting out of their seats before the bus had come to a full 
stop, or whatever else. What then followed is secondary. With 
good luck, there would have not been a cyclist starting to cross 
the street. As bad luck would have it, there was one. It is the 
'element of luck' that expresses the risk taken. 
If we may believe his statements, his worry about the pass­
engers standing in the aisle, then he had been weighing two alt­
ernatives: either making an emergency stop and possibly hurting 
some of his passengers -a very likely consequence as experience 
may have taught him- or going through the intersection and poss­
ibly risking a collision. Fis choice was between two evils, one 
known (harm to his passengers), one unknown but predictable to 
some degree (harm to an outsider). His loyalty was to his passen­
gers. However, that he placed himself in a position where such 
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choice had to be made, was the primary consequence of what is to 
be qualififed, as it seems, negligent conduct. That the cause for 
his distraction -if such there was- does not appear to merit some 
probing and discussion, we find amazing. 
Coming back to the use of a witness' opinion as part of the 
evidence, we submit that this seems to be a moot point. In this 
case only one such kind of testimony was accepted. However, if we 
imagine that in a given case several witnesses should be speaking 
out and giving opinions, how far are we then from introducing an 
age-old institution: a jury? Without the safeguards built into 
the jury system? 
Summing up, it would appear that circumstantial evidence and 
something in the nature of the res ipsa argument is being applied 
by the Dutch courts in order to forge the link between cause and 
effect. The standards of the reasonable man, his foresight and 
his hindsight, mark the threshold between diligence and negligen-
ce. Witness opinion appears to have made its entrance upon the 
scene. 
At the point where an accused was found lacking in diligence 
the matter of punishment comes up, namely: punishment for negli-
gent conduct. 
There is not only lack of diligence; there also is lack of 
intent or recklessness. 
How could meting out punishment for negligence be justified? 
This is to be discussed succinctly in the next chapter. 
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Impunities semper ad deteriora 
invitât. 
5 Coke, 109 
Impunity always invites to 
greater crimes. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT 
FOR NEGLIGENCE 
Punishment is said to have many objectives: retribution, 
('quia peaaatum est'), prevention, deterrence, education, ('ne 
pecaatur') and combinations and refinements of the two. 
This is not the place to go into any detail on this partic-
ular subject. We propose to limit the area of discussion and me-
rely consider punishment in its relation to offences of negligen-
ce, representing society's disapproval of the conduct of one of 
its members, that does not reach the going standards. 
Whatever may be the basic philosophy on which any penal 
doctrine is to rest, one element may be singled out that they 
will all share in common and it translates an entirely pragmatic 
consideration. 
Legislation without the built-in means for its enforcement, 
is impotent. It might just as well not be passed. Since legislat-
ion usually has the aim of restricting human behaviour one way or 
the other, its observance must be imposed where it should not be 
manifested voluntarily. Since human nature is such that it will 
rather oppose restrictions than applaud them, legislation that 
cannot be enforced would put a premium on non-compliance. Rest-
rictions have the tendency to force a person to forego some ad-
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vantage, something not all that popular in humans who have to car-
ry the natural burden of egocentricity all through their lives. 
All of this would appear to be obvious. 
The word 'punishment' has the connotation of a heavy-handed 
reaction to human conduct. In offences of negligence the 'quia 
peacatum est' justification seems to make more sense than the 'ne 
peaaetur' justification: you, accused, caused the harm, therefore 
you are to be punished; retribution is due, although your mind 
was probably not with what you did. However, where no intent was 
present, punishment starts to look like an overreaction. The pur-
pose of the penalty rather is: to teach the accused -and society-
a lesson for the future: you, accused, may have been unobservant, 
distracted, or maybe even stupid. Society cannot accept this. We 
shall teach you a lesson at the price of some penalty that may, 
next time around, cause you to remember and think before acting. 
Also, it should be kept in mind, especially where more serious 
harm was caused through negligence as, for instance, in negli-
gent homicide, that there is the invisible part of the punishment 
in the form of self-reproach, a conscience that will leave an of-
fender no peace of mind for a long period of time. It may not al-
ways be present. The Bezorgde Buschauffeur stated that he did not 
feel responsible for the collision that killed the cyclist. It is 
nonetheless hard to believe that the event has not been bothering 
him anyway. Generally, self-reproach will augment whatever penal-
ty was handed down in the court room. 
How to justify punishment for negligent conduct? 
Retribution need not come in the form of heavy fines or loss 
of freedom. Sv., art.307 et seq. show, that even where a person 
loses his life or is grievously injured, the offender who caused 
such misery negligently receives only a relatively light penalty. 
How much more strongly would the underlying reasoning apply, 
where the consequences of negligent conduct are far less serious? 
"Some people are born feckless, clumsy, 
thoughtless, inattentive, irresponsible, with 
à bad memory and a 'slow reaction time'. With 
the best will in the world, we all of us at 
some times in our lives make negligent mistakes. 
It is hard to see how justice (as distinct from 
-332-
some utilitarian reason) requires mistakes 
to be punished." (361) 
Of course, the same conduct, assessed as negligent, could 
also be engaged in intentionally or recklessly. For instance: 
selling short-weight, hunting in a forbidden area or during the 
closed season, allowing a river to become polluted, and so on, 
are offences of that nature. These statutory offences are usual-
ly framed as offences of strict responsibility, which -as said 
before- means merely that the prosecution is absolved from prov-
ing intent, recklessness or negligence. The same applies to most 
Dutch contraventions (overtredingen). 
A man could sell short-weight intentionally, by tampering 
with the scales he uses. If this were to be proven, the whole 
matter would probably move into the domain of fraud. What, how-
ever, if he does not realize that his scales are malfunctioning? 
The effect is the same as far as his customers are concerned: 
they get less than they paid for, but it is not caused fraudul-
ently. If this man has been warned by an inspector that his scal-
es are off and he continues using them, out of a 'the devil may 
care attitude', he can no longer be said 'being inadvertently 
negligent'. When he did repair his scales or replaced them, he 
complied with the law and there is no reason for retribution. 
The law has succeeded interrupting what could have become an end-
less repetition of the act of selling short-weight. 
In this situation, the law, using a check-and-warn type of 
approach, will operate very effectively, but it still needs the 
cane behind the door for such cases where inadvertent negligent 
conduct should become advertently negligent or worse. Here, we 
are looking for deterrence and retribution, rather than for ed-
ucation. 
As to the deterrence aspect of punishment for negligence, 
Glanville Williams states: (362) 
"At best the deterrent effect of the legal 
sanction is a matter of faith rather than of 
proved scientific fact; but there is no depart-
ment in which this faith is less firmly grounded -
than that of negligence. 
"Hardly any motorist but does not firmly be-
lieve that if he is involved in an accident it 
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will be the other fellow's fault. It may seem, 
that the threat of punishment must pass by him, 
because he does not realize that it is addressed 
to him. 
"Even if a person admits that he occasionally 
makes a negligent mistake, how, in the nature 
of things, can punishment for inadvertence serve 
to deter?" 
Vellinga observes: (363) 
"Where advertent negligence is the issue, it 
is possible to establish an offender's lack of 
proper intention; he had taken some risk consci-
ously, that is intentionally. However, as dis-
cussed before, the inadvertently negligent 
offender does not have a lack of proper intent-
ion: he would rather avoid a consequence at all 
cost. Thus, justification of punishment for 
inadvertent negligence could not be accomplished 
by referring back to proper intention in the 
offender. And so it was attempted to justify 
punishment by pointing at some lack of respect 
for fellow-man... 
"This theory proved it did not reflect 
reality. Even people, who in their way of life 
demonstrate adequate respect for their fellow-
men, may nonetheless become guilty of a negli-
gent offence." 
Vellinga concludes from his discussions (364) that up to the 
present time nobody has succeeded, looking at the problem while 
keeping the person of the offender in the centre, in proposing a 
convincing theory, resulting in justification of punishment for 
inadvertent negligence. 
Lack of a proper philosophy of life as a basis for censure, 
involves also recognition of the fact that no man is perfect by 
nature or as a result of education and training. Moreover, doing 
something negligently may not even generate a feeling of guilt. 
Rather, it may create a feeling of embarassment, annonyance or 
wonder: 'how could I ever arrive at doing something this stupid?' 
And, as we know, even Horneros has occasionally been found napping. 
We would suggest that sufficient justification may be found 
in the consideration presented above: passing laws without any 
'bite' built into them, is merely an exercise in futility. Where 
'bewuste schuld' was present, the matter is not necessarily much 
-334-
different from a situation where 'onbewuste schuld' played a 
role. In the first category some risk was accepted; in the second 
mere inattention may have been present. Whatever the case may be, 
in both situations an offence was committed. Some advantage may 
have been gained unfairly or some damage may have been done. Un-
fairly or unduely obtained gains must be neutralized; damage is 
to be repaired. The law sets the parameters of maximum and mini-
mum penalties, leaving the courts considerable leeway when tail-
oring the penalty to the person and the case. 
The 'specialist', particularly where the reprehensible con-
duct has become repetitious -or even where it merely threatened 
to become repetitious- is in fact a vulnerable person. He usually 
is a 'licenced' person, enjoying a specific privilege, which may 
be taken away from him in the event that his conduct should re-
sult in situations which the legislator aimed at preventing. 
Thus a licence to drive a car, fly an airplane, go hunting or 
fishing, sell liquor or operate a restaurant, manufacture goods, 
refine ore and so on, could be revoked temporarily or permanent-
ly. Such measures could hit very hard. In some cases they may 
just mean that a hobby cannot longer be pursued. In many others 
it could entail the loss of a job, of a place in the market, the 
closing of a plant. 
Such measures are not 'punishment' in the classic sense of 
the word. A licence is given on the basis of experience shown in 
some field and its issue is made upon certain conditions. When 
the licencee demonstrates to be seriously and consistently lack-
ing in showing such expertise and in living up to the conditions 
imposed -whatever the cause or excuse- an initial warning may be 
sufficient to generate improved conduct. If it does not, sterner 
measures must follow: since expertise was the just cause for 
granting the licence, lack of it is, logically, a just cause for 
taking it away. 
It is part of an expert's knowledge that this is the sword 
of Damocles, constantly poised over his head. 
Having arrived at this point, we must now return to some 
other aspects of strict responsibility and plead some arguments 
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in favor as well against. 
This will be attempted in the coming chapter and some, if 
not much of the emphasis will be found to rest on socio-legal 
pragmatism: to find the best legal solutions for conduct that, at 
one hand, must be recognized as being essentially beneficial, but 
on the other, may lead to harm where the rules of the game should 
not be followed as a result of negligence. 
Poena suos tenere debet actores 
et non alios. 
Bract.fol.380b 
Punishment ought to bind the 
guilty, and not others. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE CASE IN FAVOR AND AGAINST 
STRICT RESPONSIBILITY 
STRICT RESPONSIBILITY 
It is rather hard not to become somewhat repetitious when 
dealing with arguments in favour and against strict responsibil-
ity, in the sense that we shall have to refer back especially to 
the justification of punishment for negligent conduct, that is 
punishment for offences of negligence. The reason is that argu-
ments pro and contra, in one way or another, are partly based on 
grounds adduced in justification. For instance, when we say that 
a licencee must consistently show expertise and compliance with 
conditions imposed when the licence was granted, we are saying at 
the same time that society expects an expert to act reliably in a 
specific manner. This then introduces the 'Garantenstellung ' as-
pect of the matter, linked to the question whether strict respons-
ibility is the most effective, convenient way of censuring a 
failing guarantor. 
At the same time, the following discussion aims at being a 
summary, that will attempt to tie the essence of previous discus-
sions together and present a more or less rounded off total over-
view. 
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Α. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STRICT RESPONSIBILITY 
The arguments presented in favour of strict responsibility 
may be classified under two main groups: those which refer to ad­
ministrative efficiency and those which put the emphasis on the 
protection of society. (365) 
The arguments based on administrative efficiency bring out 
the following reasons: 
a) an avalanche of offences of strict responsibility pass­
es daily through the criminal courts; 
b) subjective mental culpability is extremely hard to 
prove; most offenders would escape justice where culp­
ability cannot be proven; 
c) adequate enforcement of statutory regulations would 
virtually be stymied; 
d) offences of strict responsibility relate to minor reg­
ulatory legislation. The social ends to be achieved are 
of such importance and such overall impact as to over­
ride the unfortunate by-product of punishing the moral­
ly innocent; 
e) only slight penalties are provided and no stigma is at­
tached. 
The protection of society is the main issue in the following, 
apart from the element under d) above: 
a) a high standard of care and attention is required, lack 
of which should not be excused by ignorance or mistake; 
b) the removal of loopholes (giving rise to defences) acts 
as an incentive to take precautionary measures beyond 
those that would ordinarily be taken. 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST STRICT RESPONSIPILITY 
The above arguments are met by the following counter-argum-
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ents: 
As to the first group: 
a) the sheer number of cases passing through the courts 
would not be affected by the availability or unavail-
ability of defences; 
b) punishing the truly faultless violates fundamental 
principles of penal liability; 
c) enforcement of regulations based on disregard of these 
principles is therefore unacceptable generally; 
d) 90% of all federal and provincial offences are offences 
of strict liability; the legislation creating them can 
hardly be labeled as 'minor' regulatory legislation; 
e) penalties may run into fines in the amounts of thousands 
of dollars; they even include incarceration; obviously 
a stigma is attached. 
With respect to the second group: 
a) there is no evidence that a higher standard of care 
could result from strict responsibility: 
if one has taken all reasonable care, how much more 
care could be added for fear of a prosecution in 
which one would be defenceless anyway? 
in such a case, will the actor or any other person 
be deterred, motivated, educated? 
b) If one has suffered an injustice by having been 
punished although faultless, would this not lead to 
cynicism and disrespect for the law on the part of 
the accused and of others? It would be hard to ac-
cept finding oneself liable, even after having 
taken extraordinary precautions. 
We suggest that the strongest argument against absolute res-
ponsibility appears to be the proposition that principles of crim-
inal liability are being violated. 
Punishment of those without fault, no matter how much this 
would appear to promote efficiency in prosecution, rests on a 
fiction: responsibility is imputed or attributed to the accused 
upon the sole ground 'that he performed the forbidden act'. The 
rather primitive reasoning behind it seems to be: 'since he did 
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cause the forbidden consequence by engaging in the forbidden con-
duct, he must be guilty' which is tantamount to saying 'since 
you have been accused, you must be guilty' The same reasoning 
would apply where negligent conduct is involved and where negl-
igence was excusable for some reason. 
Fictions, we suggest, are artificial aids that should have 
no place in a criminal law system which goes to extremes in pro-
tecting an accused, in giving him a fair trial on his day in 
court, in presuming his innocence until his guilt is proven, in 
giving him the benefit of the doubt and in making an accused's 
task of defending himself lighter than the prosecutor's task of 
proving him guilty. The problem with fictions in law is that they 
are used regardless of the fact that they appear to be so mani-
festly void of realism and logical validity, that any statement 
made against a fiction appears to be a statement of the obvious. 
Yet, there are situations where certain persons, acting in 
certain roles simply must not fail. A firefighter must not get 
scared and leave his assigned post, a soldier in battle must not 
retreat before having been so ordered, an obstetrician must not 
rush a delivery by using unwarranted shortcuts in order not to 
miss his favourite t.v.-show. In other words, there are situati-
ons where the protected interest must prevail over the protected 
interests of a duty-bound actor whose negligence might have been 
forgiveable if only the circumstances would have been different. 
In such cases it would seem that society, ad hoa represented 
by legislator and judiciary, itself needs a justification or 
excuse, -a defence, in other terms- when passing and implementing 
regulatory law, for disregarding one of the principles of legal-
ity. 
The question arises, however, under what conditions society 
could be allowed, excused or justified, to do so. 
C. IS STRICT RESPONSIBILITY ACCEPTAPLE? 
What the 'pleadings in favour' of strict responsibility at-
tempt to do m fact, is answering the question 'in how far is 
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strict responsibility acceptable? In attempting to find a satis-
factory answer, we shall briefly review what was said about some 
basic notions, 
We must again emphasize that we are not dealing with true 
crime but with statutory/regulatory offences. 
"The regulatory offence is basically an 
offence of negligence..." 
"... let us recognize the regulatory of-
fence for what it is - an offence of negli-
gence..." (366). 
Therefore, attempting to plead the case in favor of strict 
responsibility amounts to pleading the case in favor of (relative) 
defenselessness. Obviously, such pleadings must be founded on 
principle, that is: on the question whether it is compatible with 
the tenets of basic justice to punish either the totally fault-
less or even the justifiably or excusably negligent and ignorant. 
This question may be rephrased as follows: could a person be ab-
solutely blameless when he is either negligent or ignorant and, 
as a consequence, be beyond punishment of any kind? In yet other 
terms: is there an excuse or justification for negligence or ig-
norance? 
We should recall what Jescheck explained: (367) 
"Die Fahrlässigkeit ist nicht, wie viel-
fach angenommen wird, eine blosze Schuldform 
neben dem Vorsatz, sondern ein besonderer 
Typus der strafbaren Handlung, der sowohl im 
Unrechts- als auch im Schuldbereich eine eigen-
ständige Struktur ausweiszt. 
"Die Fahrlässigkeit bestimmt sich nach einem 
doppelten Maszstab. Geprüft wird einmal, welches 
Verhalten im Hinblick auf die Vermeidung von 
ungewollten Rechtsgutverletzungen in einer be-
stimmten Gefahrenlage ob¿ektiv gesollt ist, zum 
andern, ob dieses Verhalten vom Täter nach 
seinen individuellen Eigenschaften und Fähig-
keiten auch persönlich verlangt werden kann." 
(368) 
In other words: in offences of negligence two questions are 
to be answered: does the conduct charged constitute an offence 
established in law and, secondly, is it reasonable to demand of 
a particular actor that his actual conduct be conform to what the 
law provided in aasu. These questions probe for defences and do 
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not suggest anything new or different with respect to negligence, 
that would not apply to any other offence (including true crime): 
is the conduct proscribed and, if so, must the perpetrator be 
held accountable? 
Yet, the accountability as to inadvertent negligence, not 
being based on mens rea (in common law) deals with factors beyond 
the will and maybe even beyond the awareness of the actor. Negli-
gence and ignorance appear to be closely related as to their ef-
fect on the actor's culpability. 
Unless some very convincing reasons could be given, negli-
gence or ignorance, where they should be excusable or justifiable 
should not lead to liability nor punishment. What are the condit-
ions that would make such exculpation acceptable? Phrasing the 
question differently: what are the reasons for punishing negli-
gent conduct? Glanville Williams has this to say: (369) 
"If the defendant, being mistaken as to 
material facts, is to be punished because his 
mistake is one an average man would not make, 
punishment will sometimes be inflicted when 
the criminal mind does not exist. 
"Such a result is contrary to fundamental 
principle, and is plainly unjusf, for a man 
should not be held criminal because of lack 
of intelligence." 
Now, intelligence is not the only constitutional (in the 
sense of the psychological make-up of a human being) factor in-
volved where a person acts in a certain way. Lack of judgment, 
overly optimistic or pessimistic appraisal of risk factors, ment-
al states of depression or euphoria and scores of other factors 
may all lead to conduct that is objectively to be qualified as 
negligent (in some cases maybe even reckless), yet, are not crim-
inal . 
D. EXPERT CONDUCT 
On the other hand, society merits and needs protection. Our 
primary concern in the area of social welfare legislation is: 
limiting, if not forestalling entirely, the emergence of risks 
inherent to activities that are perfectly legal and useful, if 
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not indispensable per se. Many, probably most of these activities 
are limited to certain classes of persons who have -or should 
have- received special instruction and training, closed off by 
comprehensive testing, before becoming 'licenced'. 
Such classes of persons may comprise a very large percentage 
of the population (bicycle riders), or a somewhat smaller percent-
age (automobile operators), or a relatively small percentage 
(private pilots). 
Society, in order to be protected, must make its own con-
tribution in providing such specific education and training, or 
at least create the conditions for it and, as a sequel, see to 
their effectiveness and to the enforcement of such rules and reg-
ulations as may be created to set the standards that are the 
foundation for education, training and subsequent conduct. 
Enforcement, however, implies the use of some measure of 
force that, in order to be efficient, must be directed at pre-
vention, at securing compliance and at reacting to non-compliance 
with the rules set out for a particular activity. 
At the prevention stage we should find formal standards, set 
out in regulations, embracing training, testing, licencing and 
the provision of conditions. Securing compliance involves the on-
going checking of those engaged in an activity, possibly support-
ed and supplemented by advanced education and training. 
Reactions to non-compliance may involve the issuance of 
warnings, withdrawal of permits or licences and varying the con-
ditions. Using terms such as the above demonstrates that we are 
indeed dealing with non-criminal conduct. 
Therefore, reacting to non-criminal behaviour by using the 
tools characteristic for the law of true crime would not only be 
heavyhanded but just out of perspective. We may be better advised 
to think in terms of measures taken on the ground that certain 
preconditions are not being met (to be educated, trained, licenc-
ed; to avoid negligence; to be aware of risks and act accordingly 
and so on). This approach is not original. In Canada, for example, 
having a driver's licence is not a matter as of right; it is con-
sidered a privilege. A single violation of a traffic regulation 
may lead to a simple warning, or a fine. More serious infractions 
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may lead to registering 'demerit-points' against a driver, vary-
ing in number with the seriousness of the offence. Every driver 
is on a 'count-down' system: one starts with 15 points; when de-
merits are registered, the number decreases. At a certain level 
-9 points left- a stern warning follows. After that: a confront-
ation with the authorities follows demanding the delinquent driv-
er 'to show cause why he should be allowed to keep his licence'. 
The final stage is temporary or permanent loss of the licence. 
Some offences lead to mandatory loss of a licence (offences such 
as C.C., 234 and 236: 'drinking and driving'). Here, the judge 
has no option. 
Vie have asked the question: is there an excuse for negligen-
ce? The common ground for all such measures as referred to, is 
that the offender did not engage in a certain conduct in compli-
ance with rules and regulations, provided to render that conduct 
as safe as possible. The offender knew, or ought to have known 
such rules. He undertook to abide by them. In this he failed. 
Now, if he is not intelligent enough, shows no insight, nor 
foresight, lacks the physical ability and training, and so on, 
the question is not primarily: should society punish him for non-
compliance, but rather: should society permit him to continue 
his engagement in that activity? Society cannot afford to be 
sloppy, negligent or reckless in not-enforcing regulations con-
cerning the practice of medicine, dentistry, law, pharmacy, 
aviation, highway traffic, and so on. 
Causing harm through stupidity or forgetfulness may lead to 
the same kind and amount of pain and suffering, as causing harm 
intentionally. On what grounds should negligence be forgivable? 
Justifiable? Excusable? There does not seem to be one, compre-
hensive answer, since the data vary from case to case. Where 
intent is involved, the matter is more clear: it either can or 
cannot be proven. We discussed the issue as to proof of negligen-
ce. Even if we turn the burden of proof around the issue is not 
easier to resolve: how do we prove diligence, where the actor may 
have been totally mistaken as to the adequacy of what he thought 
was appropriate care, foresight, assessment of risk. 
Therefore, it seems far more practival to put the emphasis 
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not on punishment, but on measures, taken to make sure that pre-
conditions are being met consistently. 
After all of this, a question: is a 'measure' not 'punish-
ment' under a different label? At first sight that answer appears 
to be affirmative, at least in the eyes of the 'general public'. 
The measure, however, carries no social stigma such as incarcer-
ation usually does. Economically, a fine might be anything... 
from creating a mild irritation up to and including serious mon-
etary loss, but again, there is no stigma. It must be conceded 
that there are situations where negligence, let alone unawareness 
simply cannot be tolerated in the interest of society as well as 
of the individual, and that includes the offender. 
We shall have a final look at 'GavantensteI lung ', the 'Ver-
trauensgrundsatz', the predictability of human conduct when play-
ing a given role in everyday life, 
E. GARANTENSTELLUNG 
Negligent conduct embraces conduct engaged in wittingly and 
unwittingly (370) and the conclusion that such conduct attracts 
censure is drawn upon the consideration that lack of diligence 
{'mangelnde Aufmerksamkeit') is based on a faulty disposition 
( ' G e s i n n u n g s f e h l e r ') such as demonstrated by lack of heed, by in-
difference, carelessness and so on, or in other words: is based 
on a 'malfunction of the sense of values' (funktionelles Versagen 
des Wertgefühls') 
Where negligent conduct is engaged in unwittingly, unawares, 
the ground for censure is still the underlying faulty disposition. 
"... nämlich in der Unterschreitung des 
Mindestmaszes an Aufmerksamkeit, dasz die 
Rechtsordnung zur Vermeidung von Verlusten 
und Schäden an Werten und GUtern der Gemein-
schaft objektiv fordern musz, sofern Alter, 
Kräfte, Beruf und Lebenserfahrung des Täters 
die Belastung als tragbar erscheinen laszen." 
(371) 
It is clear that the argument in favour of punishment cent-
ers on the correction of a disposition: 
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... to cause a person to exercise greater 
control over his acts in view of the known 
dangers... and to bring about a greater fore-
sight, by causing the subject to stop and 
think before committing himself to a course 
of conduct . 
"A supporting consideration is that punishment 
may deter in respect of some subsidiary rule 
of prudence, the breach of which was intentional. 
Although the harmful result of careless driving 
is not intended, there is often an element in 
careless driving that is intended (such as 
pulling out on a blind corner) and the punish-
ment... may 'condition' the driver not to 
repeat his mistake." (372) 
HSR (373) do not agree with Jescheck when he states that 
culpa ( 'Fahrlässigkeit' ) is 'a special type of conduct rendering 
the actor culpable'. HSR see in culpa only a subjective element 
of the offence that, like intent, renders certain conduct culp-
able, that is: punishable. 
Punishment for inadvertent negligence as shown by certain 
conduct, appears to be justified primarily on the ground that the 
actor failed to comply with minimum standards, established for a 
very large variety of activities. Due to the complexity of our 
technocratic society, most types of conduct and the ways they 
must be engaged in in order to avoid harm or damage, have obtain-
ed an extra touch of specialization. Culpa reminds one of one of 
the characteristics of mens rea in that mens rea has been said to 
have many meanings: 
"Malice means one thing in relation to 
murder, another in relation to the Malicious 
Mischief Act, and a third in relation to libel, 
and so of fraud and negligence." (374) 
It would appear that a similar statement could be made with 
respect to negligence: it means a different thing under different 
circumstances. Punishment aims at conditioning the actor to com-
ply with specific minimum standards as set out in specific stat-
utes and regulations. 
HSR state: (375) 
"... punishing negligent conduct (has the 
effect of)... exposing an egocentric mentality, 
a lack of social concern in a 'graphic manner'. 
-346-
In this we recognize Jescheck's 'disposition' referred to 
above. {'Gesinnung'). Closely related to all of this are the pat-
terns of behaviour accepted in society, the doctrines of 'Garan-
tenstellung' and of reliance on another's conduct. 
Risk or danger, however, appear to be 'in the eyes of the 
beholder', and what was considered a risk some years ago, is dai-
ly routine now. The first persons to board a train when trams 
entered upon the scene, or a plane at a time nobody could con-
ceive of a thing heavier than air taking off into the blue yonder 
or a space vehicle that had all the characteristics of a ballist-
ic missile... these first persons were either heros or daredevils 
or just 'plumb crazy' in the eyes of a sceptic society... and 
perhaps in their own eyes too, 
However, one gets used to speed, to pushing the known limits 
of human potential farther and farther. One learns to appreciate 
speed, not as a risk, but as a factor of safety as any pilot will 
affirm. Speed, being a relative concept linked to time and dist-
ance, can only be assessed as to its appropriateness on hand of 
specific circumstances. What the novice driver may consider a 
breathtaking speed -60mph- may be a cause for aggravation to the 
driver behind him who cannot pass him due to local road markings. 
Risk and danger, imagined or real, are also relative con-
cepts. Those who went through a war, worked in the 'underground 
resistance movement', have occupations involving risk and danger 
as an occupational hazard, from surgeons to metal workers on high 
rise constructions, and to many others, risk and danger are just 
part of life. They lose their original preoccupation with it to a 
certain degree. Risk and danger become acceptable, even unavoid-
able for various reasons. Moreover, to the outsider those who 
(must) take certain, acceptable risks, have retained their halo 
of heroism and of pace-setters. All of these persons are part of 
society and mingle with those whose life is less exciting. 
In a way it is unfortunate that society is built up of a 
mixture of the young and the old, the experienced and the unex-
perienced, the aggressive and the defensive. Society must func-
tion taking all of them in consideration, on the highway, in the 
air, in the manufacturing plant and on the construction site. 
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They all help construct the image of the 'average man', the 
'reasonable man'. Small wonder that this creature cannot be found 
anywhere else but in the text books, where he is the 'Imaginary 
Man' and in the court rooms, where he is the 'Invisible Man'. 
Surely, realization of what was said above should, of course 
inspire everyone to attempt gaining what HSR label 'optimal dis-
position' as to occupation or function. Whether this happens or 
not is the question, but those who don't or fail should not com-
plain about punishment. (376) 
The 'Garantenstellung' is closely related to all of this: 
it is a term specially relating to omissions, more precisely to 
the 'apparent omissive offences' {'unechte Unterlaszungsdelikte ') 
which are also known as 'deliata oommissiva per omissionem '. 
Where the real omission arises from a failure to perform a 
legal duty, the apparent omissive offence arises from non-per-
formance of a duty to prevent an undesired consequence from 
arising. Jescheck (377) presents three scenarios in which this 
special kind of diligence may exist: 
Basically these are situations in which a special reliance 
on another person's conduct arises from: 
family ties, the natural bond between members of a 
family; 
close ties within a community, where reliance upon its 
members for mutual assistance and support is part of 
daily life and induced acceptance of extra risks or 
forbearance as to taking precautionary measures; 
the voluntary assumption of responsibility on which 
others rely. 
In the above situations the main issue is protection of cert-
ain legal interests. {'Rechtsgüter') 
Responsibilitv may also arise as to specific risks where the 
duty of diligence (care) r^latps to-
forestalling an undesirable c^nsenuence from arlsine 
from conduct engaged in; 
control of situations of potential danger: 
responsibility for conduct of others. 
Liability in al] of these situations is based upon non-per-
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formance of the special duty of diligence, lustifiably relied up-
on by the persons for whom the actor was expected to act. 
F. ROLL PLAYING 
Remains one further aspect for discussion a comparable form 
of reliance upon others, not necessarily linked to omissions, is 
reliance on others in the same group, engaged in the same kind of 
activity or conduct, such as highway traffic, construction, manu-
facturing and a host of others. 
There are limits to diligence and care, imposed by practic-
ability. If we cannot rely on the other driver where it is his 
duty to respect a red light, to yield the right of way, to park 
his car off the road m darkness and have his four-way flashers 
going, or -in manufacturing- that another worker hooks up the 
electrical components of a car properly, or -in construction-
that a worker observes the prescribed safety routines, and so on, 
traffic, manufacturing, construction would grind to a near halt. 
Not only that, but it is virtually impossible for many reasons 
that the next man checks on the work of all of those before him. 
All concerned must operate in a way other may safely rely 
upon. Their conduct must be predictable, as if everyone were a 
musician m an orchestra or a dancer in a ballet. A safe and 
smooth traffic flow, a safe and reliable car, a solidly construct-
ed building, are the end result of the total cooperation of those 
involved. This presupposes to a great extent that the work done 
gives a worker some sense of accomplishment, an appreciation of 
his share in the totality of operations as important and indis-
pensable as all others, irrespective of how insignificant it may 
seem. This type of mental approach may be hard to instill in a 
man who spends his day doing the same detail thing hundreds oï 
times a day until he is bored to tears and driven to distraction 
and, worse, total lack of respect for the work he is doing and 
its importance. The situation may be a little better in construct-
ion, in traffic it should be easy to do, given the proper motivat-
ion, and regardless of the fact that the orchestra is composed of 
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soloists. 
Once more: is there an excuse for negligence? 
It would seem that there is no hard and fast rule other than 
a vague answer: whenever diligence was applied by an actor, in 
his circumstances, in his particular situation, given the charac-
teristics of his individuality and the role he is playing... that 
what might seem to be negligence to the outside world, may sub-
jectively, be excusable, justifiable and therefore should result 
in impunity. Where this should not apply, liability must be the 
sequel to the conduct. 
The final question now becomes: should liability for negli-
gent conduct be engineered legislatively or judicially in the 
form of absolute or strict liability? 
Sofar we have used the terms 'strict, absolute responsabil-
ity','strict, absolute liability', rather indiscriminately as if 
they were synonyms. 
We have been following a pattern, accepted up to very recent 
times: these terms were indeed used as if they were synonyms and 
their accepted meaning was: liability without fault for which 
the defence of due diligence, admitting of the exculpating power 
of ignorance and mistake, was not available. 
However, rather recently something extremely interesting 
has happened on the way to the court room. A municipality in the 
province of Ontario was charged with polluting a river. 
The case was to change our outlook on liability for negli-
gent conduct. 
One of the spin-offs was, that from the date that decision 
was made, we shall have to discriminate in our use of the terms 
referred to, where we deal with responsibility for negligence. 
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Vix ulla lex fieri potest quae omnibus 
oommoda sitj sed si majori parti pro-
spioiat, utilis est. 
Plowd.369 
Scarcely any law can be made which is 
adapted to all, but, if it provide for 
the greater part, it is useful. 
CHAPTER NINE 
SEPARATING THE STRICT FROM 
THE ABSOLUTE 
A. CLARITY OF TERMS 
In the aforegoing we have already mentioned that up to re­
cent times, and where Canada is concerned: up to the Sault Sainte 
Marie Case -hereafter referred to as 'SSM', various terms relat­
ing to liability for negligent conduct were used indiscriminately. 
So did we sofar. (378) 
Glanville Williams, for one, refers to this type of liability 
in the following words: (37Θ) 
"Next comes a third group, those not requiring 
any kind of legal fault on the part of the accus­
ed. They are said to be crimes of strict respons­
ibility or absolute prohibition, and the necess­
ity for mens rea or negligence is wholly or part­
ially excluded. 
"There is no indication in the authorities 
that other defences are excluded, such as infancy 
or duress. 
"The word strict is therefore preferable to 
absolute, though either term may be used if its 
meaning is understood." (emphasis added.) 
So, to Glanville Williams -and numerous others- 'strict' and 
'absolute' are identical. 
What is the meaning of 'absolute liability'? 
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Prima faaie it would appear that 'absolute' means what it 
seems to say: 'complete, perfect, unrestricted, not merely relat-
ive or comparative, unqualified, unconditional, conceivable with-
out relation to other things'. (380) 
If the word 'absolute' in the context of our subject were to 
be given any of the above meanings, absolute responsibility or 
liability would logically result in 'absolute defencelessness'. 
In reality, however, some defences are, indeed, available. Since 
'absoluteness' cannot be held to be merely relative, the term 
'absolute' appears to be entirely out of place and we must con-
fess to feeling somewhat uncomfortable in using the term. Even 
if the defence would merely consist in stating that, legally, an -
accused could not perform the act and be held liable, this would 
be a defence. Apart from a strict denial ('I was not engaged in 
the conduct you are charging me with" or, in other words, 'you 
are addressing the wrong person') there is the denial of legal 
capacity: 'I am too young to be capable of acting, either civil-
ly or criminally', or 'it was not my act', where duress was part 
of an event. What all of these arguments deny is, in fact, being 
absolutely liable or, for that matter, being liable at all. 
In the case of Smith v. Stone (381) it was alleged that Sto-
ne was guilty of trespass, namely that he 'pedibus ambulando' had 
transgressed onto Smith's land. The truth of the matter was, that 
other persons had carried him by force and violence onto Smith's 
property. This denial was accepted by the judge who held, that it 
"was the trespass of the party that carried the defendant upon 
the land". This happened in 1647 when absolute responsibility was 
the rule rather than the exception. 
The point we are trying to make is that absolute liability 
is a form of liability distinct from strict liability, although 
the C.C. is silent on both. We are prepared to take this one step 
further: there appears to be a need for absolute liability, pro-
vided the label were changed. We shall return to this statement 
shortly. The issue is not one of total defencelessness but of 
relative defencelessness: in absolute liability proof of diligen-
ce would not discúlpate. 
What, then, is the meaning of 'strict liability'? 
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In strict liability situations we do not say: 'You engaged 
in forbidden conduct while desiring the consequence or, while 
foreseeing that consequence with a high degree of certainty while 
consciously accepting the risk'(intent, recklessness). What we do 
say is: 'A reasonable man, placed in your situation, would have 
avoided the harmful conduct by exercising due caution. Your con-
duct was not patterned on common experience and/or you were un-
justifiably ignorant.'(382) 
Defences against this type of charge would have to be framed 
so as to evidence that the actor was diligent, or that the harm 
related to the accused's conduct was, in fact, not causally re-
lated since it was either unforeseeable ( 'casus ', misadventure) 
or unavoidable (inevitable accident). This is in fact, claiming 
that no degree of diligence could have prevented the harm, a sit-
uation closely related to vis major, an Act of God). 
On the other hand, where a person claims that he acted 'un-
awares', his claim really states: 'I did not know I was acting 
so as to contravene the law, or so as to cause harm'; mistake of 
law or fact, ignorance as to both, or excusable lack of fore-
sight where foresight could not reasonably have been expected or 
demanded. We shall re-introduce these elements when discussing 
defences. 
At this point our tentative conclusion is: two types of lia-
bility, not based on fault only, are to be distinguished: one is 
the so-called 'absolute liability'; the other: 'strict liability'. 
We shall now move in a little more closely. 
B. PREVENTING INCIDENTS FROM BECOMING BAD HABITS 
We first return to a theme that was already touched upon. 
Sketching a broad outline of the concern of regulatory or 
statutory legislation, the following categories are usually in-
cluded: traffic, consumer protection, protection of the environ-
ment, adherence to safety regulations in industry and the trades, 
hunting, fishing, to mention the main ones. Glanville Williams 
speaks of 'public welfare offences' and categorizes them as re-
lating to offences "connected with sale", "offences of possess-
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ion", "offences related to master and servant situations" and 
"road traffic". (383) 
As observed before, public welfare regulations address 
'specialists' of some kind: the car driver, the manufacturer of 
consumer goods, the builder, the advertiser, the retailer, the 
commercial or amateur fisherman and hunter. 
All of them are engaged in activities which, per se, are 
lawful and beneficial and could not be eliminated from modern so-
ciety, but which, by their nature, also create some risk, accept-
able by society if kept within given limits. 
In most cases it is not even the isolated violation that the 
regulations aim at; their aim is rather, to prevent consistent 
violations in an area, that could create bad habits, lowering the 
standards set for a particular activity. 
If we should formulate this in terms of 'standards of good 
or due care', it could be said that, generally, public welfare 
legislation aims at setting out the concrete interpretation of 
'due diligence' or 'due care', (terms that otherwise would be too 
vague, general, unspecific) to be observed by 'specialists'. 
Whoever adheres to conduct coming under such precise interpret-
ation, may expect to be 'left alone by the law'. Whoever does not 
adhere, acts at his own peril and is punishable unless he has a 
defence, essentially evidencing that he tailored his conduct to 
comply with the duties set out. In other words, evidencing due 
diligence, leaving room for excusable ignorance and mistake of 
fact, and perhaps ignorance and mistake of law in a not too far 
away future. 
The legislator will have to consider establishing criteria 
to be observed when creating offences of absolute liability, by 
which -from here on in- we shall understand offences a person may 
be charged with, while not allowing him the defence of due dili-
gence. Neither SSM, or later cases, contain such clear criteria, 
apart from some general categorization. The legislator may find 
himself agonizing about matters such as: the harm a provision 
seeks to prevent from happening must have materialized; risk or 
danger may not be sufficient by themselves; the victim must have 
had no means of protecting himself against such harm; losses and 
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damages must not be capable of being distributed and other crit-
eria, speculation about which would seem to be beyond the scope 
of this paper. (384) 
In a brief aside the question may be raised what impact, if 
any, vis major would be allowed to have. This defence would state 
that a loss "results immediately from a natural cause without the 
intervention of man, and could not have been prevented by the ex-
ercise of prudence, diligence and care", (385) or: the event that 
caused the loss is ".. a natural and inevitable necessity, and 
one arising wholly above the control of human agencies and which 
occurs independently of human action and neglect." (386) Again, 
this amounts to a straight denial of actorship. The true cause of 
the mishap has no human author. The conduct is not human conduct 
and the consequence is the result of the influence of powers 
beyond human control. 
Since the impact of absolute liability is unavoidable, it 
must not be unpredictable. The legislator must spell out clearly 
and unequivocally what kind of conduct results in absolute liab-
ility. 
This does not necessarily imply that punishment must be max-
imal although the utmost diligence and care were required. We are 
dealing with the inescapability of responsibility based on negli-
gence, thus forcing actors who undertake highly dangerous activi-
ties to take such utmost care and be fully aware of the consequen-
ces if anything should go wrong against all what was foreseen, 
regardless of all precautionary measures taken. The legislator's 
message is clear: mind what you are doing; if you cause harm or 
damage, you will have no escape from responsibility. 
We did already discuss some of the arguments in favour of 
and against absolute liability, as found in SSM. (387) 
There is another consideration. The only ways to cope with 
conduct that might, eventually, lead to absolute liability, are: 
either performing with absolute perfection or refraining from any 
conduct at all that would carry such risk. Eoth are extremes and 
both are practically impossible. 
Absolute perfection is beyond the grasp of human potential. 
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It is: demanding the unreachable and the demand is made in the 
name of a society which, itself, is far from perfect. It is set 
out in legislation that is far from perfect, or even complete or 
clear. The conduct is then assessed by the courts which, even in 
highest resort, may have to change their views as, for one, the 
judicial treatment of strict/absolute liability may show. 
Refraining from specific conduct, involving the risk of 
being held absolutely liable may not be acceptable socially, for 
many activities, involving certain serious risks, have led to in-
ventions, products, procedures which are highly beneficial them-
selves . 
We refer again to the arguments that were presented in favor 
of absolute liability: protection of social interests by demand-
ing high standards of care and removal of loopholes that could 
frustrate this; administrative efficiency and the fact that pun-
ishment is only minor (which it is not). We shoud like to add 
some further detail to the second and third arguments by way of 
prelude to the next chapter. 
The second argument may fairly be stated as follows: 
administrative efficiency is best served by creating offences of 
absolute liability. The underlying idea is that proof of the 
actus reus is usually a relatively simple thing. Conduct leads to 
perceptible results that may be witnessed. There is no need for 
any scrutiny of the actor's mental disposition. Moreover, it is 
the actor himself only, who could answer the question whether he 
was, or was not, diligent. Then again, an actor could easily, 
post factum, give a twist to his statements, pointing at great 
care that perhaps was never present, at copies of 'safety bullet-
ins' that may never have been published or were, in practice, dis-
regarded; at printed instructions that may never have been enforc-
ed while the employer turned a blind eye away from those who dis-
regarded them. Thus, the argument goes, the prosecution saves 
time and effort (and money); procedure can be simple; the back-
lag in cases in the courts would be greatly reduced, all of this 
in the taxpayer's interest. 
The SSM case, dealing with such aj-guments, states: (388) 
in serious crimes the public interest is likewise in-
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volved; yet, as a rule, they do not lead to strict liab-
ility; 
when an absolute liability case reaches the sentencing 
stage, due diligence may be evidenced; it may not have 
the effect of disculpating the accused but it may well 
influence the degree of punishment..."and therefore the 
evidence might as well be heard when considering guilt"; 
in some instances the "legislature has indicated that 
administrative efficiency does not foreclose inquiring 
as to fault". 
Illustrating this last argument, mention is then made of 
s.198 of the Highway Traffic Act of Alberta (380) 
This section provides: 
"... that upon a person being charged with an 
offence under this Act, if the judge trying the 
case is of the opinion that the offence was (a) 
wholly committed by accident or misadventure and 
without negligence, and (b) could not by the ex-
ercise of reasonable care or precaution have 
been avoided, the judge may dismiss the case." 
Note: See also s.230(2) of the Manitoba Highway 
Traffic Act, which has a similar effect. (390)" 
"In these instances at least, the legislature 
has indicated that administrative efficiency 
does not foreclose inquiry as to fault." 
The third argument in favour of absolute liability refers to 
the penalties provided: (391) 
"In further justification, it is urged that 
slight penalties are usually imposed and that 
conviction for breach of a public welfare offence 
does not carry the stigma associated with con-
viction for a criminal offence." 
To this the Supreme Court of Canada replies: 
The argument that no stigma attaches does 
not withstand analysis, for the accused will have 
suffered loss of time, legal costs, exposure to 
the processes of the criminal law at trial and, 
however one may downplay it, the opprobrium of 
convict ion . . . 
"... It is also worthy of note that histoi-
ically the penalty for breach of statutes enacted 
for the regulation of individual conduct in the 
interests of health and safety was minor, $20 or 
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or 25; today, it may amount to thousands of dol-
lars and entail the possibility of imprisonment 
for a second conviction." 
It should be noted that disappearance of the opprobrium of a 
conviction on the ground of an offence of absolute liability may 
well become socially acceptable in the sense that it would not 
raise one eyebrow (compare bankruptcy in times of general econ-
omic stress). Since no degree of care or diligence may save the 
offender, the element of blame appears to have become extinct. 
This would be exactly one of the effects which an effort to pro-
mote higher standards of care seeks to prevent. In that respect 
it would appear that absolute liability is self-defeating. 
From the money point of view the argument seems less persu-
asive. Rampant inflation is consistently nibbling away at the 
buying power of the currency and therefore, eo ipso, at the im-
pact of fines established in 'better' times. Moreover, as may be 
seen in the tort field, losses are being distributed, either by 
insurance coverage or by increase of sales prices at the market 
level. The practical result is, that the fine becomes part of the 
production costs and is passed on to the buyers, that is: to the 
community at large. Even if a penal version of the 'punitive dam-
ages' were to be introduced, it would probably not have the im-
pact hoped for. 
The Supreme Court of Canada is clearly not in favour of the 
restricted options: offences requiring a full mens rea at one 
hand, and offences of absolute liability on the other. 
There is a third option which we shall have to compare with 
the AVAS defence in Dutch criminal law and referred to above. 
Before so doing, we should perhaps offer some final remarks. 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada in their Studies on 
Strict Liability (392) use the term 'strict' liability in the 
sense of 'absolute liability'. This study was written before the 
SSM decision. An example: 
"A trader who so packages food as to create 
an erroneous impression about its contents 
contravenes s.5 of the Food and Drugs Act and 
commits an offence even though the packaging is 
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done in all good faith and with no lack 
of care. In such offences liability is 
striât." 
-And on page 9-: 
"All of us are quite sure that s.5 of the 
Food and Drugs Act creates absolute offences." 
This is to be kept in mind when reading the materials 
referred to. The same applies to any other discussions, essays, 
etc. on the topic of strict liability, if written before (1978) 
SSM was decided. Since SSM went down into history, these materi-
als may have to be rewritten. 
Under the sub-heading The Subordinate Aims of Criminal Lau, 
(393), three aims are mentioned: 
a) bringing wrongdoers to justice; requirement: real guilt 
(mens rea); 
b) deterring people from breaking the law; requirement: 
'technical guilt'; (negligence); 
c) harm prevention by description of harms to be avoided 
and prescriptions of avoiding action; not concerned 
with guilt at all. Aim: suppression of potential danger 
by allowing certain measures to be taken. Actions not 
in personam but in rem. 
The distinctions in these various aims of the criminal law 
centers on the degrees of culpability they emphasized. Where reg-
ulatory offences are concerned, the emphasis is clearly on aims 
b) and c). To what length should society go in order to prevent 
harm from occurring? 
The justification of punishment, traditionally and generally 
is based upon culpability, a minimum level being 'fault'. Could 
we hope to do justice by punishing people who are not at fault at 
all? 
"... if the law says guilt doesn't depend 
on fault and practice says it does, we have a 
divergence between practice and law. This at 
the best produces confusion, at worst hypocrisy." 
(394) 
This argument hits hardest where absolute liability is in 
issue; it goes to the essence of culpability. 
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Another argument relates to legislatory techniques. 
The concept of liability in no-fault situations 
"... was a judicial creation, founded on ex-
pediency ..." 
"... it should be recalled that the concept 
of absolute liability and the creation of a jural 
category of public welfare offences are both the 
product of the judiciary and not of the Legislat-
ure. The development todate of this defence (of 
due diligence) [see under 'The Third Option'] 
m the numerous decisions I have referred to, of 
courts in this country as well as in Australia 
and New Zealand, has also been the work of judges. 
The present case offers the opportunity of con-
solidating and clarifying the doctrine." (395) 
The Courts have always been the protectors of civil liber-
ties against any infringement upon them by King and Parliament 
through their legislation in the form of statutes, and the above 
quote appears to confirm this reassuringly enough. 
However, the courts deal with issues post factum. As soon as 
they pronounce on the type of liability arising from certain con-
duct prohibited by legislation, the guidelines have become clear. 
The problem is, that "90% of our regulatory offences could be of-
fences of strict (= absolute) liability. The sections and regul-
ations creating them are so drafted as to give no indication whe-
ther or not mens rea is required. Pefore judicial pronouncement 
we can only wait and see." (396) 
To put this in different terms· the Courts, the Crown and 
the public are not properly informed by the legislator as to what 
kind of conduct might entail absolute liability and the resulting 
interference with an individual's personal freedom by the state. 
This could become intolerable where liability was absolute. Put 
even where liability is strict, lack of such foreknowledge is 
repugnant to the lex certa principle and therefore to the aims of 
justice. 
Mens rea offences at one side; absolute liability at the 
other. Two extremes - what might be found in the middle9 
In the middle we find a third option, known as the 'Halfway 
House Doctrine'. This doctrine will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Tutius semper est errare acquietando, 
quam in puniendo, ex parte miseriaordiae 
quam ex parte ¿ustitiae. 
Broom, Max.326 
It is always safer to err in acquitting 
than punishing, on the side of mercy 
than on the side of justice. 
CHAPTER TEN 
THE HALFWAY HOUSE DOCTRINE 
A, A PREMIUM ON DILIGENCE 
This third option is the so-called 'Halfway Pouse Doct-
rine' . It splits, as it were, no-fault liability into two cate-
gories: one allowing a defence of due diligence, involving a 
shift in the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused, 
and separating it from the other category where this defence is 
not available. 
The new category 'in the middle' assumes the label of 
'strict liability offences', a term that as of now has lost its 
old meaning as a synonym of absolute liability. 
Glanville Williams, discussing the state of affairs as it 
then was, (397), quotes Judge Jordan's words (398) while summing 
up the 'melancholy situation' adherent to the state of confusion 
the law regarding non-criminal liability (penal liability) found 
itself in: (399) 
"Statutes have acquired appendages of judge-
made law based upon the conjectures of judges 
as to what the legislature would have provided 
if it had addressed its mind to the matter, 
where there is nothing to suggest the legis-
lature thought about it at all... 
"A fertile field of litigation has been cre-
ated; multitudes of reported cases have come 
into existence, many of them irreconcilable, in 
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which the common-law rule has been treated as 
excluded or not excluded upon judge-made indicia 
derived from cases in which there has often been 
a difference of opinion as to so-called necess-
ary implications; and no one can now be reason-
ably sure of the effect of a penal statute until 
it has been tested by prosecutions." (400) 
Glanville Williams mentions two potential solutions. One is 
in clarifying the law by confining absolute responsibility to a 
specific class of minor offences, "destigmatising them as far as 
possible and removing the punishment of imprisonment", a propos-
ition made by the American Law Institute. Although it would help 
to avoid diluting the concept of crime, it would still continue 
the injustice and futility of punishing men for "consequences 
that they cannot help". 
Then this learned writer introduces the second solution: 
"There is a halfway house between mens rea 
and strict ( = absolute ) responsibility which 
has not yet been properly utilized, and that is 
responsibility for negligence." (emphasis added) 
In SSM the Supreme Court of Canada adopts this theme: (401) 
"There has, however, been an attempt in 
Australia, in many Canadian courts, and indeed 
in England, to seek a middle position, fulfilling 
the goals of public welfare offences while still 
not punishing the entirely blameless. 
"There is an increasing and impressive stream 
of authority which holds that where an offence 
does not require full mens rea, it is neverthe-
less a good defence for the defendant to prove 
that he was not negligent...". 
"Morris and Howard, in Studies in Criminal 
Law (402) suggests that strict ( = absolute ) 
responsibility might with advantage be replaced 
by a doctrine of responsibility for negligence 
strengthened by a shift in the burden of proof. 
The defendant would be allowed to exculpate him-
self by proving affirmatively that he was not 
negligent." 
Obviously, acceptance of such a revolutionary proposal goes 
against the age old presumption of innocence; in strict as well 
as in absolute liability, the liability arises from the presumpt-
ion that the accused is culpable. In absolute liability this pre-
sumption is not rebuttable; in strict liability it may be rebut-
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ted by proof of diligence. For practical reasons, we prefer giv-
ing the accused the opportunity to prove diligence, even if this 
may disregard the principle of presumed innocence; the alternat-
ive, absolute liability, does not presume innocence anyway. 
B. DILIGENCE MUST BE PROVEN 
The question now arises: what exactly does the accused have 
to prove in order to show that he was diligent? To put it in 
different terms: where a strict liability offence is charged, 
which defences will have that effect? We propose to discuss the 
defences in Chapter Twelve. Before so doing, we should like to 
retrace our steps and return to some previous remarks regarding 
the requirements put on establishing proof, followed by a brief 
expose showing how the courts have handled this matter in the 
past as well as more recently. By then we shall also be ready to 
compare this defence with the AVAS-defence in Dutch penal law. 
Where a person attempts to prove his diligence, one of the 
elements he will have to establish is, that his conduct was based 
on certain facts, the way he knew them, -if he knew them at all-
and the way he interpreted them. Diligence involves thought, fore-
thought, a weighing of alternatives as to what line of approach 
to follow. In so doing, a person may become the victim of some 
pitfalls, such as total or partial misinterpretation, incorrect 
assessment, and so on, but always being bona fide. 
The decision in Proudman v. Dayman (403) provides a good ex-
ample. 
If someone assumes that another person is licenced to drive 
a motor vehicle, whereas it turns out he is not, and allows him 
to drive it, that car owner is going to be convicted if he does 
not establish proof of diligence as a disculpatory factor. 
In this particular case evidence as to the accused's dili-
gence was not accepted, but the accused did have the opportunity 
to show that "... a honest and reasonable belief in a state of 
facts which, if they existed, would make the defendant's acts in-
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nocent", and would have afforded "an excuse for doing what other-
wise would be an offence...". 
This case is a landmark. It opened the doors for the defence 
of due diligence. 
We are still finding ourselves in the province of negligence 
which "consists of an unreasonable failure to know the facts 
which constitute the offence." (404). It is clear, however, that 
in principle the defence is, that all reasonable care was taken. 
In other circumstances the issue might be whether the accused's 
conduct was "negligent in bringing about the forbidden event when 
he knew the relevant facts." 
Speaking of evidence, we have briefly mentioned the two lev-
els at which the burden of proof operates: the prosecution must 
deliver proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"; the accused will suc-
ceed by delivering proof "on the balance of probabilities". How 
are these terms to be understood? 
Where evidence is given, persuasive to such a degree that no 
reasonable doubt remains, we are actually facing virtual certain-
ty. When is doubt reasonable? It is "that quality and kind of 
doubt which, when you are dealing with matters of importance in 
your own affairs, you allow to influence you one way or the 
other." (405) 
That degree of certainty is not present at the probability 
level. The 'balance of probabilities' leaves room for reasonable 
doubt to influence the mind of outsiders to a case. "Probable" 
means: "having more evidence for than against, supported by evi-
dence which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room 
for doubt" (406). If there is some doubt, it will be on the low-
er one of two scales -and operate against the accused- or on the 
higher one -and operate in his favour-; it will be too light in 
weight and the accused has 'the benefit of the doubt'. 
It may be said that the defence of due diligence is, by now, 
established. It was a long, slow trek through the court rooms 
over the years. The following may afford some impressions about 
its progress. 
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Culpa caret qui seit sed prohibere 
non potest. 
Dig.50,17,50 
He is clear of blame who knows, but 
cannot prevent. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
DUE DILIGENCE BEFORE THE 
COURTS 
The following will probably present a sufficiently clear set 
of examples, showing how the defence of due diligence has stood 
up in the court rooms. 
As a matter of legal principle, no one, charged with an of-
fence, must prove his innocence. "It is sufficient for him to 
raise a doubt as to his guilt", said Dickson J. in SSM, referring 
to WooImington v. Director of Publia Prosecutions (407). Woolming-
ton was charged with killing his wife with a gun shot but claimed 
it was an accident; his defence succeeded, since he had raised 
reasonable doubt. 
Dickson J. then pointed to various other cases, all of the 
absolute liability category, statutory offences "that do not by 
their terms require proof of intent", such as R. v. Molver (408) 
-see below-, a case of careless driving; Sherras v. DeRutzen 
(409), innkeeper supplying liquor to a policeman, who was in fact 
off duty; Proudman v. Dayman (410) mentioned above; Maker v. Nus-
son (411), having illicit spirits in his custody. 
Dickson quoted the following passages from Mclver, spoken by 
Mackay J.A.: 
"On a charge laid under s.60 of the Highway 
Traffic Act, it is open to the accused as a 
defence, to show an absencp of negligence on 
his part. For example, that his conduct was 
caused by the negligence of some other person, 
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or by showing that the cause was a mechanical 
failure, or other circumstance, that he could 
not reasonably have foreseen." 
Then he turned to R. v. Custeau (412). Custeau, charged with 
traficking in LSD (a restricted drug; for specifics regarding 
drug offences see Part One, under Kundeus) pleaded he was selling 
mescaline (a controlled drug); he pleaded mistake of fact. 
Mackay J.A. said: 
"In the case of an offence of strict liabil-
ity (sometimes referred to as absolute liabil-
ity) it has been held to be a defence if it is 
found that the defendant honestly believed on 
reasonable grounds in a state of facts which, 
if true, would render his act an innocent one." 
(413) 
This defence, admittedly available, did not help Custeau, 
who lost his appeal and was convicted. The case was remitted to 
the Provincial Judge for sentencing and, eventually, for charact-
er evidence to be adduced. Why did Custeau lose? 
"... in the present case the belief o"f the 
appellant, if true and accepting it as true, 
did not result in his act being an innocent 
one.. ." 
In other words: the Court held that traficking in LSD OP 
Mescaline is prohibited under the same Act, and even if he be-
lieved that he was dealing in Mescaline, this was an offence too'. 
(414) 
A Mr Burgess did not fare any better, although he, too, was 
labouring from a mistake of fact. He was charged with having a 
narcotic drug, namely opium, while he believed it was hashish. 
He was not an addict but a student who had acquired the substance 
for the purpose of experimentation. (414a) 
The Court of Appeal followed a similar reasoning: whatever 
the accused thought he had in possession, either opium or hashish 
he was in contravention of the statute anyway, either way.(415) 
Enter the Beaver brothers, Louis and Max, who did not live 
long enough to see his case reach the Supreme Court of Canada 
level, as Louis did. (416) It is a rather weird case, in the 
style of Kundeus. 
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Constable Tassie, a RCMP undercover man, operating under the 
name Al Demeter, was introduced by a drug addict, Montroy, to 
Louis Beaver, in order to buy heroin from him. 
Delivery of the merchandise to Tassie/Demeter was to be made 
at 4:00p.m. Beaver picked him up by car, drove a distance, stop-
ped at a lamppost, got hold of a parcel, handed it over to Tassie 
who paid for it... and promptly arrested Eeaver. When opened, it 
was found that the parcel contained half an ounce of morphine. 
The situation looked bad, but Beaver was not put out at all. 
He admitted all of the facts mentioned and revealed, in court, 
that there was a plot behind the plot. Montroy had been double-
crossed in the past by Tassie and when he and Beaver met, the day 
before the sale, Montroy proposed a neat little scheme "to get 
even with Tassie/Demeter": Montroy was to introduce Tassie -who 
wanted to buy drugs- to Beaver as the man who could provide them. 
A sale was to be made. However, when delivering the parcel, it 
would not contain heroin but milksugar. Beaver, who had been in 
prison together with Montroy, had at that time received certain 
favours from him and felt compelled to go along with the scheme. 
The money received was to go to Montroy. All in all a great scen-
ario of which we shall never know how much truth was invested in 
it. 
Essentially, Beaver's defence was that 1) he never intended 
to sell drugs and 2) he never knew that the parcel delivered did 
in fact contain a drug instead of the innocent lactose. There was 
a double-barreled charge in this case: having possession of a 
drug and selling a drug, contrary to the provisions of the Opium 
and Narcotic Drug Act (417) 
Having been convicted in the courts below, this accused ap-
pealed to the SCC, who delivered a split decision. 
The decision of the majority was delivered by Cartwright J.: 
a) the provisions of the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act under 
which Beaver was charged, do not constitute an absolute 
liability offence. Mens rea must be proven. 
b) "Possession" within the meaning of the criminal law, 
where there is manual handling of a thing, must be co-
existent with knowledge of what the thing is and both 
-367-
these elements must be co-existent with some act of 
control. (418) 
On these grounds the conviction for possession was quashed. 
The conviction for selling a restricted drug, however, was con-
firmed. The simple reason for this is to be found in the wording 
of the provision, s.4(l)(f): "...sells·., any drug, or any sub-
stance represented or held out by such person to be a drug..." 
In other words, if the package had contained carpet tags, Beaver 
would still have been convicted for selling a restricted drug. 
The minority judgment was delivered by Fauteux J. , who con-
cluded to affirmation of the conviction on all counts. The main 
argument as to possession was based on the opinion that the offen-
ce charged is an absolute liability offence, requiring no proof 
of mens rea and prohibiting any personal or constructive possess-
ion in absolute terms. 
One remarkable point is, that even the highest court in the 
land was not unanimous in deciding whether a specific offence is, 
or is not, of the absolute liability brand and the question aris-
es where this leaves the ordinary citizen? All of this as recent 
as 1957. 
We did already deal with the Kundeus case in Part One (419). 
The issue now coming up for discussion is the matter of de-
fences. When charged with an offence of strict liability, what 
defences are available? 
We intend to deal with five defences. The first three are in 
the nature of a denial defence; the remaining two center on ig-
norance and mistake of fact and law. 
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Impotentia excusat legem. 
Co.Litt.29 
The impossibility of doing what is 
required by the law excuses from the 
performance. 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
IN DEFENCE OF DUE DILIGENCE 
A, INTRODUCTORY 
Speaking of defences, Glanville Williams observes that there 
is an ambiguity in the term 'defence'. The straight denial defen-
ce is not a defence in the real sense of the word. (420) 
"In strictness the word "defence" should mean 
something in respect of which the persuasive or 
at least the evidential burden rests on the ac-
cused . 
"Apart from the defence of insanity, it seems 
that the only common-law defence in respect of 
which the persuasive burden rests on the accused 
is that of autrefois convict or acquit, if, 
indeed, it does there. 
"Examples of the use of the term "defence" 
where the evidential burden rests on the accused 
are the defences of accident, self-defence, 
mistake, claim of right, drunkeness, consent, 
necessity and duress." 
This goes to show that putting the onus of proof on the ac-
cused in the defence of 'due diligence' against a charge of an 
offence of negligence, is no shocking innovation. 
Before anything else, we are concerned with the problem an 
accused is facing: how to prove diligence? That is: how to dis-
prove negligence? 
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It would appear that the problem may be approached from two 
starting points: where we speak of diligence or negligence, what 
kind of question are we asking? Are we asking: "What would the 
Reasonable Man have done?" and then applying such criteria as are 
being supposedly met by this mythical giant, and comparing his 
assumed reactions with those of the accused? Or, are we asking: 
"What could reasonably be expected of this particular accused in 
his concrete particular circumstances and situation?". To put it 
differently: are we asking the accused to live up to the stand­
ards of the reasonable man -whatever these standards might be as­
sumed to be in concreto-, от to live up to such standards as we 
may expect to be within the grasp, the comprehension and potenti-
al-for-action of the individual before the court? 
Regrettably, the answer is far from simple. In one form or 
the other, we do not seem to be able to get around the notion 
'reasonable', neither in Canadian, nor in Dutch law. The stand­
ards of this reasonable man, his level of care and caution, his 
foresight, his knowledge, have never been established in clear 
terms. We are limited to the attempt of making an educated guess 
formulating at least minimum demands, all in the name of reason. 
Whatever we do, we are pitting humans against humans. Criteria 
are set by intellectually trained individuals and, at the bottom 
line, we find the dicta of the courts. The question is: could we 
be asking too much, either in general or in specific instances? 
And, if we do, how then could we affix the label of blame to a 
particular individual without divorcing culpa and blame? 
Yet, in order to prove diligence the accused must disprove 
negligence and, although he is supposed to be in a better posit­
ion of knowing whether he attempted to be careful or not, did he 
even realize he was careless? For, the essence of negligence is, 
in part, non-realization, non-foresight, non-care that may be 
part of his mental make-up. In all too many cases such insight 
comes only after the fact, after the consequences became manifest 
and after the point-of-no-return was passed. Does not everyone of 
us, occasionally, find himself exclaiming (or at least thinking) 
"How utterly stupid of me" and praise his good luck after a nar­
row escape? This is part of the lessons that experience teaches 
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us; the lucky ones walk away; the unlucky ones either die, get 
maimed or punished. Some people never seem to learn. Must we then 
assume that humans at such a lowered state of awareness could be 
trained in the manner Ivan Petrovich Pavlov trained his dogs? 
Proving diligence in order to avoid blame and consequential 
penalties is the issue an accused is facing, for without blame 
there is no culpability in strict liability situations. Absolute 
liability would seem to aim at generating the 'conditioned 
reflex'. 
The question may be reduced to: when is an offender not to 
be blamed, having engaged in certain conduct that, from the out-
side, appears to be negligent? We are searching for excuses in 
the first place, for grounds that destroy culpability and the 
reasonable man's criteria may just be of little help. 
Some assistance may be found in statutes: (421) 
"Due diligence appears in the statutes fifty-
two times; of these, twenty-six create separate 
defences of due diligence. These defences may be 
divided into three categories: 
1) defences in which an accused avoids liability 
by showing he exercised due diligence in a 
particular activity; 
2) defences in which a corporate director avoids 
liability for an offence of his corporation 
by showing he neither consented to nor knew 
of the offence and exercised due diligence to 
prevent its commission; 
3) defences in which an employer avoids liability 
for an offence committed by his employee by 
showing he neither consented to or knew of the 
offence and exercised due diligence to prevent 
its commission." 
However, as a group, these defences are all of very recent 
legislative origin, covering two main areas: protection of the 
environment or of the consumer. Related legislation also provides 
for measures, aationes in rem, to prevent a feared harm without 
the question of guilt ever arising. Our concern regarding defen-
ces covers a much wider area than protection of environment or 
consumer. Diligence is due in all areas of life, as manifested in 
conduct. 
Since no general rules were ever written with respect to the 
defence of due diligence -either in Canada or The Netherlands-
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we have no other way of learning more about this defence than by 
scanning the entire spectrum of defences and by attempting to 
establish the relevance of various defences as to their probatory 
value in proving diligence. 
An added complication in many if not most, of the offences 
is the fact that the very same offence may lead to punishment 
based on criminal/penal law as well as to an action for damages 
-where caused- based on the law of tort. As we have pointed out 
before, penal law and tort law appear to have a forum commune. 
Since negligence is the shared foundation, the problem is whether 
negligence, its proof or disproof, receives the same treatment in 
penal as in tort law. The question arises whether defences, avail-
able in penal and in tort law are identical, preceded by the 
question whether one can be held negligent penally without creat-
ing a cause of action for damages civilly. There is an overabund-
ance of case law dealing with these and related matters, its ma-
jority perhaps relating to traffic and other safety regulations. 
Where there is negligence, is the negligence required in 
penal law of the same 'nature' or character as the negligence re-
quired in tort law? We suggest it is. Consider a traffic accident 
where the accused was found guilty of negligent conduct. One 
could not very well surmise that the fact situation -we are deal-
ing with facts, not with any mental element in the offender-
leading to that conclusion as to penal liability, should not lead 
to another conclusion namely, that the accused/defendant was not 
negligent in the tort law sense. Whether the issue is actionable 
or not, is not a questioncfepending upon a difference -if there be 
such difference- in character of the negligence proven. There is 
no 'tort' of negligence, similarly as there is no independent of-
fence of negligence. Negligence is merely the basis of liability, 
either penal or tortious. 
The penal provision aims at protecting society and where the 
offender contravened this provision, he is liable unless he has a 
defence or, in absolute liability scenarios, regardless of whether 
he could prove due diligence. Tort law aims at protecting indiv-
iduals against inadvertent harm and, where it did occur, in as-
signing liability, followed by distribution of damages, but is 
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not, in principle, interested in the violation of a penal statute. 
It is therefore rather interesting to note that, while stat-
utory/regulatory legislation is enacted with the objective of 
protecting specific aspects of social wellhemg -the consumer, 
the road user, etc.- and in that sense looks more like tort law 
than like criminal law, the instrumentarium of enforcement is 
that of the criminal law. Poth are closely related, at the base 
as well as at the top. Sofar however, we have managed to avoid 
the tort-law connection studiously and we intend to keep doing 
so until the last page of this paper is reached. 
Small wonder then, that after all we find -grosso modo- the 
same or similar defences in tort law as we find in penal law. We 
shall now briefly look at defences that are of specific interest 
in respect of proof of due diligence. 
B. IMPOSSIBILITY 
First, the defence of impossibility. Generally traffic of-
fences such as speeding, causing an accident of some kind as a 
result of negligent conduct, and so on, may be succesfully met by 
the defence of impossibility. 
Where a law was passed while a ship was at the high seas, 
forbidding the transportation of native labourers by sea without 
a licence, the captain could not know a licence was required. 
This happened in 1880 and the means of communication were relat-
ivily primitive. See. Burns v. Nouell (4??). Ignorance of law is, 
as a rule, no excuse, but impossibility to know the law appears 
to afford a defence. 
In a similar vein- if a speed sign on a highway is so placed 
that during the summer the branches or leaves of a tree hide it 
from view, or if the sign cannot be seen because of an unusual 
obstruction of the view such as a van, parked at the roadside be-
cause of some defect- it would appear that impossibility is a 
good defence to a person who is unfamiliar with the situation. 
Technical defects, failures cropping up suddenly and unex-
pectedly, may afford this defence also. When the control of a ve-
hicle is taken away from him "by the occurrence of an event which 
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is outside his possible or reasonable control and in respect of 
which he is in no way 'at fault'", the defence would apply, as in 
the case where a driver is suddenly stung by "a swarm of bees or 
suffering from a sudden epileptic form of disabling attack", and 
similar sudden events, the defence will apply. The requirement, 
however, appears to be that the actor be in no way at fault him­
self as to the emergence of such sudden event. (423 ) (425 ) (426) 
Py now, there is a gromng number of pollution cases where 
the defendant sought to establish the defence of impossibility. 
They are based on regulatory provisions and regard strict liabil­
ity situations. 
Where 'impossibility' involves an outside, uncontrolable 
force, such as гз major ('Act of God') the defence may be ef­
fective. 
Thus in R. v. Springbank Sand and Gravel Ltd. (427) where 
"more than an hour after a sand quarry was closed for the day" 
high velocity winds caused a reddish sand to be blown every which 
way, causing residents of houses in a nearby lane "material dis­
comfort". It was held that there was nothing the company could 
have done to prevent or control the phenomenon. The operation 
of the quarry was not the 'cause' but 'part of the surrounding 
circumstances'. 
In Alphaael v. Woodward (428) a paper manufacturing plant 
spilled polluted washing water into an adjacent river, because 
the settling tanks overflowed as a result of malfunctioning of 
the pumping system, caused by the unexplained presence of leaves 
and other vegetable debris in the pump houses that prevented 
them from functioning properly. It appears that the possibility 
of sabotage was considered. However, it was not proven. The corp­
oration was convicted. The issue was reduced to a simple matter 
of causation. The House of Lords affirmed the conviction. The Act 
of God defence was not accepted. 
Lord Parker C.J. stated-
"... it is impossible to say that their 
actions were not a cause... unless and until 
it is shown that some other activity completely 
outside their control, the action of a tres­
passer, an Act of God, has intervened and is 
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itself so powerful a cause that what here-
tofore has been a cause merely becomes part of 
the history of surrounding circumstances." 
Such a trespasser was present in Impress (Worcester) Ltd. v. 
Rees (429), where a river was polluted by oil, flowing from a 
storage tank. A trespasser had opened the bottom valve, causing 
the oil to escape into the river. 
"On general principles of causation, the 
question which the justices ought to have asked 
themselves was whether the intervening cause 
was of so powerful a nature that the conduct 
of the appellants was not a cause at all but was 
merely part of the surrounding circumstances." 
Exceptionally heavy rainfall and other events Mother Nature 
sometimes bestows on defenceless earthlings, may give rise to 
the defence. As was said in Nugent v. Smith (430) 
"While the act of God relied upon need not 
be unique in order to afford a defence to the 
accused, it must nevertheless be something 
quite overwhelming, not merely an ordinary 
circumstance which could have been foreseen and 
guarded against." 
Where impossibility is pleaded, the accused says in fact 
that a choice between diligence and negligence -if one could 
speak of 'choice' in connection with negligence- was irrelevant 
or did not even exist because some fact or event, human or an act 
of God, intervened leaving no options at all. It appears to be a 
good defence even in absolute liability cases. The defendant 
states: "it was not my conduct", as Stone said when he had been 
carried forcibly upon Smith's land. (431) 
C. COMPULSION OR DURESS 
Flack's definition of 'compulsion' is:"constraint, objective 
necessity; duress; forcible inducement for the commission of an 
act". 'Duress' is defined as:"unlawful constraint exercised upon 
a man whereby he is forced to do some act that he otherwise would 
not have done." In other words, an outside force moves a person to 
act in a way that is imposed upon him. Clearly, this involves the 
presence or absence of mens rea and therefore this defence is not 
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relevant. 
An entirely different matter is the defence of: 
D. NECESSITY 
A thing is done '.under necessity' for the purpose of pro-
tecting an interest'of higher value than whatever value there be 
in sticking to the letter of the law. After making an evaluation 
-if one has the time to do so- one decides that one finds oneself 
compelled to 'do the better thing'. (Under compulsion or duress 
one was forced to do the wrong thing, but the actor is looking 
for some justification or excuse) 
Keeping this in mind, it must be admitted that necessity, 
duress and compulsion are not really all that sharply distinguish-
ed. Outside of the mens rea ambit, we suggest that 'necessity' 
may justify apparent negligence. Thus in Vickers (432) who was 
charged by a moose, shot it and was accused of contravention of 
the Game Aat and convicted. - Since the attacker was not a human 
being, self-defence could not be pleaded. The offence was said to 
be one of strict liability (meaning 'absolute' liability at that 
point in time). Thus also, in Kitson (433) who, being drunk, went 
to sleep in his car, that suddenly started rolling downhill. 
Waking up, he manoeuvered the car to safety but was charged with 
and convicted of drunken driving, as the term goes. 
Schmeiser comments: (434) 
"... such cases can serve only to bring the 
law into disrepute, for the general public will 
inevitably recognize the nonsens which they 
represent. The average person would be inclined 
to commend Kitson for his presence of mind in 
preventing possible injury to lives and proper-
ty instead of sentencing him to four months 
imprisonment. If the Vickers case is correct, 
the law places a higher value on a moose than 
on a human being, since self-defence can be a 
complete defence to a charge of murder." 
Speeding may become the highest form of diligence in situat-
ions where necessity would apply: a doctor or ambulance on their 
way to the scene of an accident, a husband rushing his wife to a 
hospital for a suddenly imminent delivery, a man, outrunning a 
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car following him too closely and not daring to slow down for 
safety reasons. 
The essence would appear to be that in absolute/strict liab-
ility cases, necessity removes the negligence aspect -if it be 
there- from the conduct. Moreover, the conduct inspired by necess-
ity may, under certain circumstances, well lead to a better pre-
servation or protection of the interest which a penal provision 
seeks to achieve. This is one reason why the Viakers and Kiteon 
decisions are criticized rightly as 'bad law'. 
Finally we must give attention to the paragon of defences to 
charges based on statutory/regulatory offendes: 
E. IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE OF FACT 
Referring to what already has been said about this defence 
in Part One, the following is intended to offer some added detail. 
The defences sofar referred to may all be available in cases 
of absolute and strict liability. What characterizes the absolute 
liability offence is the unavailability of the defence of ignor-
ance and mistake. They both have to do with knowledge, namely: 
lack of it (ignorance) or possessing the wrong knowledge (mistake) 
in regard of facts. V.'hether they would also apply to 'law' is 
quite another matter, but even there they may no longer be total-
ly excluded. (See under sub-chapter F. ) 
As it was said in SSM: (436) 
"Offences of absolute liability would be 
those in respect of which the Legislature had 
made it clear that guilt would follow proof 
merely of the proscribed act." 
There, ignorance or mistake would be irrelevant. However, 
where liability is strict, the defence could apply. Its essence 
would consist of the proof that the relevant ignorance or mistake 
were made honestly (perhaps also: reasonably), or in other terms, 
proof of 'due diligence' that would negative fault. 
Since we are leading up to a succinct discussion of the 
Dutch AVAS-defenee, and a comparison of the two, we feel that 
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more background could be helpful. 
Once more it is emphasized that we are considering the sub-
ject in its relation to statutory offences and that we are not 
concerned with showing how this defence would affect mens rea. 
What we are, indeed, concerned with is: the impact of ignorance 
and mistake on negligence, excusing fault and resulting in dis-
culpation of the accused. 
"Mistake (is) some unintentional act, 
omission, or error arising from ignorance, 
surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence.... 
"A mistake exists when a person, under some 
erroneous conviction of law or fact, does or 
omits to do, some act which, but for the erron-
eous conviction, he would not have done or 
omitted". (437) 
"Mistake of fact is a mistake not caused 
by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of 
the person making the mistake, and consisting 
in (1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetful-
ness "of a fact, past or present... or belief 
in the present existence of a thing... which 
does not exist, or in the past existence of 
such a thing which has not existed." (438) 
"A fact is something perceptible by the 
senses".(43P) 
There has always been much to do about the question whether 
a mistake (such as: mistaken belief) must be merely reasonable or 
merely honest or both. Tonest' means: 'genuine, bona fide' (440) 
As we said before, 'reasonable' -the way we see it- has always 
been a word that is vague today, has always been vague in the 
past and will remain vague until it will be properly defined, 
which appears to be a problem not unlike the problem of squaring 
the circle. Until such better days should arrive and that defin-
ition has become available, we understand by 'reasonable': 'not 
repugnant to reason'. Py this we try to express that whatever is 
thought being reasonable, must not entirely be impossible either 
physically or logically. 
Such honest and reasonable belief was referred to in Wilson 
v. Inyang (441) Inyang was an African who had obtained the dip-
loma of the "Anglo-American Institute of Drugless Therapy. He was 
a 'naturopath', accused of willfully and falsely using the title 
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of 'physician','which he was not. The magistrate acquitted him, 
and the King's Bench affirmed that decision. 
"... the respondent genuinly believed he 
was entitled so to entitle or describe him­
self... (as a physician); 
"... he acted reasonably in believing that 
his said course of instruction, examination, 
diploma and guild membership qualified him 
so to entitle or describe himself." 
What is needed is a reasonable ground for this belief, in 
absence of which his belief could not be honest. 
In this case Lord Goddard C.J. said 
"There may be exceptions. A man may believe 
that which no other man of common sense would 
believe, but he yet may honestly believe it." 
Quoting the Вгіів of Exchange Act, 1882, s.90 
"A thing is deemed to be done in good faith 
... where it is in fact done honestly, whether 
it is done negligently or not." 
In other words one may act honestly even on unreasonable 
grounds. It becomes a matter of appriciation when stating that a 
ground is reasonable or not. Credibility may well he the main is­
sue. Honesty refers to the bona fгаев aspect of a belief, cred­
ibility refers to the reasonability, it would seem. 
In the same case Devlin J. -who concurred with Lord Goddard-
held that 
"... the essential question is whether the 
belief entertained by the accused is a honest 
one and that existence or non-existence of 
reasonable grounds for such belief is merely 
relevant evidence to be weighed by the tribunal 
of fact in determining that essential question." 
Such honest belief would make the act innocent, as it would 
serve to prove absence of negligence. As was said before, ignor­
ance and mistake refer to knowledge, which in turn may become the 
basis for 'defective belief', leading to decisions, assessment, 
comparison, conduct and so on. 
Devlin J. pointed out in Foper v. Taylor's Central Garages 
Ltd. (442) that there are degrees of knowledge 
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"... 'actual knowledge' which the justices 
may find because they infer it from the nature 
of the act done, for no man can prove the 
state of another man's mind; \ 
"knowledge of the second degree... when the 
defendant was ... shutting his eyes to an ob-
vious means of knowledge... (and the accused) 
... deliberately refrained from making inqui-
ries the result of which he might not care to 
have"; (the third kind is) "constructive 
knowledge" ('ought to have known', etc.) sig-
nifying that the accused 'had in effect the 
means of knowledge'". 
"The case of shutting the eyes is actual 
knowledge in the eyes of the law; the case of 
merely neglecting to make inquiries is not 
knowledge at all - it comes within the legal 
conception of constructive knowledge, a con-
ception which, generally speaking, has no place 
in the criminal law." 
The second kind is 'wilful blindness'; it was dealt with 
succinctly in Part One. (443) 
Ignorance or mistake of fact, then, may counter a charge of 
negligence, that is: a charge of a statutory offence of the 
strict liability variety, provided that the belief, created by 
ignorance or mistake, be honest. Whether it is objectively reas-
onable, appears to be irrelevant. Its being honest, as we under-
stand it, is an indication that, at least subjectively, it appear-
ed reasonable and it is the belief of no one else but the accused 
which is in issue. 
As to diligence, it would discúlpate an accused if he were 
to show that his ignorance or mistake did not amount to wilful 
blindness, 
A large group of cases deals with this defence. We have re-
ferred to -and discussed in some detail- the Kundeus and Custeau 
cases as well as the Beaver case. 
We shall now briefly deal with ignorance and mistake of law. 
F. IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE OF LAW 
"Ignorantia iuris non excusat" appears to apply where 
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both, offences of true crime and statutory offences are concerned, 
and embraces ignorance as well as mistake. How strong is the rule 
postulated by this maxim? 
Glanville Williams observes: (444) 
"The view that everyone is presumed to know 
the law is now generally rejected; it is not a 
true proposition of law, and even if it were, 
it would only be a legal fiction, not a moral 
j ust if ication. 
"Lord Mansfield drily remarked that "it would 
be very hard upon the profession, if the law 
was so certain, that everybody knew it..." 
"The idea that the vast network of government 
controls can be known by everyone is today more 
ludicrous than ever." 
A more recent view of the issue distinguishes between 
crimes "resting upon immemorial ideas of right and wrong, widere 
it is the business of the citizen to know what he may legally do, 
and modern regulatory offences of which the citizen would not 
normally know unless there is something to put him on enquiry." 
(445) 
That 'something' could be the fact that someone is (or 
is to become) engaged in 'specialist conduct': driving a car, 
flying, manufacturing, starting a fast-food business, and so on. 
Yet, even in such situations he should have available a defence 
(excusable error) by which he shows that notwithstanding diligent 
efforts to acquire knowledge, he was not, or could not be aware 
of, for instance, the newest regulations or changes in the exist­
ing legislation. 
What are the potential exceptions? 
C.C., s.19 provides: "Ignorance of law by a person who 
commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that offence". 
Schmeiser observes (446) that this section is "circuitous 
and misleading. It refers to a person 'who commits the offence' 
when the question at issue is whether or not an offence has been 
committed". In a way, it is a petitio principiг. Schmeiser pro­
poses a better formulation: "Ignorance of law is not a defence 
unless it negatives the specific intent required by the offence" 
(How to apply the rule where no specific intent is required?) 
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If we read the words of the Code as "... a person who per-
forms the actus reus..." we may well be expressing what the leg-
islator had in mind even where, in the days that the Code was 
written, the common opinion was that an offence was committed 
anyway. 
Generally, mistake of law appears also "to constitute a 
defence to the breach of a regulation or ministerial order, as 
distinguished from a breach of statute, where the accused has not 
had any means of becoming aware of the regulation or order" as in 
R. v. Ross (447) -hunting in a 'closed district', not knowing it 
was closed by ministerial order; in Lim Chin Aik v. R. (448) 
-entering and remaining in Singapore against a ministerial pro-
hibition order, not knowing he was a 'prohibited person-; and in 
R. v. Maclean (449), the radar maintenance man, discussed earlier. 
Where offences of strict liability are the issue, the defen-
ce appears to make good sense in situations where the defendant 
is not a 'specialist', or -when he is- where he can show that he 
took all reasonable care to know the law but, for some excusable 
reason, was wrongly advised by those who should have known better. 
Where the defence shows that the accused did have no way of 
knowing the law, the defence approaches the defence of impossi-
bility. 
What we have been discussing sofar is the defence of 'due 
diligence' against a charge of an offence of strict liability. 
In Canada this defence is a novelty, relatively speaking, and its 
availability appears to have been affirmed by the recent SMM and 
Chapín cases. We shall have to return to both cases shortly. 
The AVAS defence in Dutch criminal law has the same purpose, 
namely of showing that an accused was not negligent, was without 
fault, was not blameworthy and not guilty. 
The next chapter proposes to deal with AVAS and some of its 
effects. 
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Consuetudo debet esse eerta; nam 
incerta pro nulla habetur. 
Dav.33 
A custom should be certain; for an 
uncertain custom is considered null. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
THE AVIS DEFENCE 
A. DILIGENCE MEANS: NO GUILT AT ALL 
The AVAS-defenee (hereafter referred to as 'AVAS') pleads 
'absence of all guilt', that is: 'due diligence'. It is one of 
the unwritten excuses of Dutch criminal law. Its aim is to show 
that even a minimal degree of blame would not attach to the ac-
cused. 
HSR state (450) that "the possibility to avoid the offence 
must have been realistic". Where the driver of a car was not sure 
whether he could safely continue driving on tires that looked 
pretty worn out, he asked the advice of a garage mechanic who 
told him that he could use them for some time longer. That is 
what the accused did, but he was stopped by the police and tick-
eted for driving a car that "was not in a state of adequate mech-
anical fitness". The HR decided that the accused was entitled to 
act on the advice of the mechanic and allowed the defence. 
HSR then continue: 
"Broadly speaking, the AVAS rule may be 
practically identified with "excusable error" 
... as a logical sequel to the premise: fault 
means blamability, the judiciary has gradually 
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come to the point where not only error of fact 
but also error of law has been deemed excusable 
under certain circumstances." 
Where 'fault' was established from a given fact situation by 
a court, the defence is inapplicable, since it would then repre-
sent an attempt to negate that what was accepted as definitly 
proven. The accused, however, could try to show that more than 
one conclusion were logically possible on the fact situation, or " 
that the fact situation did not allow to come to a certain con-
clusion. However, such efforts belong at the first stage of the 
proceedings and well before the trial judge has made up his mind, 
for at any later stage it becomes either extremely difficult or, 
in last resort, impossible. (482) 
The defence may either be adduced by the accused or, ex of-
ficio, by the judge. 
In order to assist Canadian readers, the following overview 
may be of some help. 
For this purpose reference is made to an exhaustive discuss-
ion of AVAS by G.E. Mulder. (451) 
Mulder recognizes three interpretations of the word 'schuld' 
('guilt') relevant to AVAS, namely: 'negligence','intent combined 
with negligence' and 'blameworthiness'. Of these three interpret-
ations the last one is the more important; it expresses that an 
offender "is to be held accountable or responsible to such a 
degree that he merits punishment". 
AVAS, then, points to absence of blameworthiness. A distinct-
ion is made between offences where dolus or culpa are part of the 
subjective constitutive elements of the offence (most truly crim-
inal offences, some contraventions) and offences where they do 
not (most contraventions and some criminal offences). In the 
first category, the accused is to be acquitted if dolus or culpa 
cannot be proven; in the second category the case is to be dis-
missed where AVAS is succesfully pleaded. 
Since we are dealing with penally relevant conduct, the cru-
cial question is: when exactly could we speak of blameworthiness? 
What is it, that attracts blame? 
Pompe and Remmelink identify 'blameworthiness' with 'avoid-
ability'. Mulder asks: "Is avoidable conduct under all circum-
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stances 'blameworthy conduct?" and then refines the argument : 
"Where lack of guilt is under consideration, the issue is not 
only the lack of the capability of avoiding certain conduct, but 
is, before anything else, the lack of- the duty of avoiding such 
conduct. " 
Mulder cites a case, not unlike the Steane case (452) -in 
war time an illegal worker had been 'persuaded' by the henchmen 
of the Sicherheitsdienst to disclose the names of other illegal 
workers. (453) Under such circumstances no human being could be 
held duty-bound to avoid the conduct he was charged with. (It is 
to be noted that in situations such as the one referred to, the 
defence would probably be one of 'necessity') Also, we are con-
sidering a human being whose capacity of rational thinking has 
been seriously impaired. There is not such an offence as 'fail-
ing to be a hero'. 
'Sohuld', consequently, means: failing· to fulfil the duty of 
avoiding blameworthy conduct, within the scope of one's capabil-
ities. This would encompass: 
(a) 'Internal care' - that is: appreciating the risk inherent to 
certain conduct, threatening the interest protected by he 
criminal provision, and to assess the risk properly; 
(b) 'External care' - that is: avoiding hazardous conduct, in-
cluding such conduct for which one is not qualified, and 
acting prudently in situations of danger as well as preparing 
oneself duly for certain conduct, inclusive of acquiring relevant 
information and training. 
The overall criterium is, what society holds to be the scope 
of the duty of care. 
AVAS, as a defence, may n'ot be found in the Dutch Code. It 
is part of the judge-made law and in that sense 'law, not written 
by the legislator'. (The parallel with the Canadian defence of 
due diligence is clear.) The HR confirmed in 1029 (454) that the 
AVAS-defence may not be found in the Criminal Code, but that, 
nonetheless "this principle is to be applied generally in crim-
inal cases". 
Its result is that not the conduct, but the actor is render-
ed non-punishable. However, this does not mean that the prosecut-
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ion faces the onus of proving guilt (cuZpa) in all situations. 
Normally, where the conduct of the accused conforms to the actus 
reus of a provision, guilt is implied, unless AVAS became evident. 
Mulder then discusses the 'limits' of AVAS. The opposite of 
AVAS situations -where the defence would apply- are situations of 
absolute liability, acceptable only where the statute so provides. 
Thus, one limit is to be found in the description of the offence, 
which may state that 'absence of all guilt' be irrelevant. 
A second limit refers to 'cu lpoze delioten' ('offences of 
negligence' ) where the defence of AVAS is in fact a denial of the 
culpa element. Where culpa was proven, the defence does not apply 
as stated earlier. 
A third limit regards offences where culpa is not part of 
the description of the offence, but has been made part of the al-
legations contained in the charge. Then culpa must be proven by 
the prosecution and, where the prosecution should be succesful in 
so doing, AVAS -as mentioned in the previous paragraph- would not 
provide a defence. 
Essentially, AVAS is the product of error/ignorance whether 
of fact or of law. Its ambit, in historical perspective, widened 
from covering situations of excusable error facti to excusable er-
ror juris, to impossibility to have the required knowledge and to 
excusable incapacity for acting as the law dictates. (There it 
would come close to the statutory defence of vis major or compuls-
ion. ) 
Mulder states that AVAS, apparently an unwritten general 
ground for exculpation, is in fact a specific form of defence 
embodying one of the aspects of the principle "no punishment 
without fault". As such, the defence is at one level with the 
written, statutory grounds such as: insanity, compulsion, excess 
of force in self-defence and unlawful superior order. 
The key-note, where AVAS is pleaded, appears to be: "excus-
able error'! and/or "excusable incapacity", in situations where an 
actor has a duty to avoid the forbidden conduct, or as Mulder 
states: (455) 
"In my opinion... where lack of guilt is the 
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issue... the criterium is not solely that 
avoiding (the conduct) was impossible,'but 
above all, that avoiding it was not a duty 
owed by the actor." 
As a consequence no blame is to be directed at him. In other 
words, there is no legal obligation or duty and this formula 
echos the description of the 'civil unlawful act' (". .. indruist 
tegen des dader 's rechtspliaht. . ."; consequently there is no 
omission.) 
In Part II of the paper referred to, Mulder deals specific-
ally with AVAS in relation to criminal/penal provisions contained 
in highway traffic legislation. We do not intend to go into any 
further detailed discussion of this area of the law, but propose 
to restrict ourselves to a few notes. 
P. SOME SELECTED CASE LAW ON AVAS 
In HR, 9-5-1061 (456) it was the opinion of the HR that the 
driver of the milk van with trailer, when approaching an inter-
section, was unable to see such traffic as was coming from his 
righthand side, as a result of the fact that the view was part-
ially obstructed by buildings (complicated by the circumstance 
that on that particular day there was fog) he should have refrain-
ed from going through the intersection, since yielding the right 
of way is an absolute prescript. So be it. Nonetheless we feel 
tempted to ask why, if that is the situation at this particular 
intersection, the authorities did not install traffic lights. 
Traffic rules are made to help traffic moving along smoothly and 
with appropriate speed, as safely as possible, and not to prevent 
traffic from going through an intersection. On the other hand, 
this driver could probably have made a right turn safely, follow-
ing the mainstream, then taking a left at the nearest intersect-
ion followed by another left turn, which would have brought him 
back to the street he wished to follow, a right turn there allow-
ing to pursue his planned direction of travel. 
There are various cases where a driver intends to make a 
left turn. He is held by the HR to be aware of traffic behind his 
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car, traffic that might attempt to pass him. Thus, a car was 
followed by another car over some distance (457) or by a scooter 
hidden by other cars behind the accused driver (458) and an acci-
dent occurred. The HR rejected the plea of AVAS. A driver must, 
at all times, be aware of the possibility that somewhere behind 
him other drivers may move up in order to pass him. Unless we 
understand those situations poorly, we ask how many cars to his 
rear must be kept track of by that driver? What is he to do in a 
spot where the road curves to the right? Do the following drivers 
have no duty of care? 
Fortunately, the HR is rather strict when scrutinizing the 
applicability of AVAS, not only where the accused attempts est-
ablishing the defence, but also where the courts below denied it. 
The basis for this attitude is to be found in the Dutch Code of 
Criminal Procedure, art.358: where a trial judge holds that the 
facts proven by the evidence adduced, constitute an offence, 
contradicting what the accused presented in defence, or, that 
certain grounds which would have led to mitigation of the penalty 
or its total exclusion, are not present, the judgment must con-
tain an explicite decision and where such decision amounts to a 
refusal of the defence, it must be appropriately motivated. 
When a lower court failed to do so, the HR will quash the con-
viction, since non-compliance with Sv., art.358, (3), results in 
a nullity. 
Thus in HR, 2?-?-1966:(459) a driver had to apply his brak-
es suddenly and forcefully dn a rain-slick road in order to avoid 
colliding with the vehicle in front of him, the driver of which 
made an unexpected manoeuvre. The accused skidded and hit the car 
before him. In defence he pleaded necessity. AVAS was rejected by 
the lower court: the accused was held to have been following the 
other car too closely and should have kept more distance, thus 
preventing a collision. The FR quashed this conviction: it was 
not so, that the circumstances as mentioned in the case, would 
always exclude a defence of necessity. 
In his annotation. Pompe observed that no blame attached to 
the accused or, in other words, that "there was absence of guilt" 
Mulder, in the paper referred to above, states on page 238, 
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discussing the relationship between AVAS and necessity: 
"... necessity is an exterior force which 
a person is not reasonably to be held capable 
of resisting ..." 
AVAS implies a mental concept the accused has formed, that 
is not in keeping with reality. 
In HR, 20-6-1067: (4P0) the accused was caught by a surprise 
move of an oncoming car which drifted into 'his' traffic lane. He 
pleaded necessity as to his evading action (a move to his right) 
which resulted in hitting a cyclist. AVAS was not accepted by the 
trial court, but the HR held that no adequate motivation for such 
refusal was given. 
In many such cases a third party is involved, whose conduct 
-one way or another- sets a chain of events in motion by doing 
something sudden, unexpected or even unlawful. As a result 
another driver collides with someone or something and he now be-
comes the accused. For years the 'following driver' was held 
guilty almost automatically, having been found following too 
closely. However, traffic regulations are 'laws of motion' in the 
first place. It all seems to be relative: instead of establishing 
that the 'following' driver was moving too closely to the 'lead-
ing' driver, one could equally validly state that the 'leading' 
driver suddenly obstructed the traffic behind him and he better 
have a good reason for so doing. This would also apply to sudden 
turns, sudden lane changes and sudden bursts of speed at the mo-
ment a 'following' driver attempts to pass. There are too many 
arrogant and short-tempered drivers on the roads. 
While the problems around 'causality' keep the prosecution, 
the defence and the judiciary on full academic and practical 
alert, one would expect that in such cases the 'leading' driver 
should also be brought within the ambit of the prosecution. In a 
sense, the 'following' driver is also a victim: he is caused to 
cause a mishap. 
Something not entirely unlike the situations referred to 
would seem to have happened in the case of the Curacao 'se Wed-
strijd (461). Two teenagers, by mutual but undeclared agreement, 
started a contest to see who could drive his car faster than the 
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other. They started out in a built-up area on the island. After 
passing oneanother several times, increasing their speeds every 
time, the accused was finally passed by the other driver, who 
then lost control of his car and collided with some rocks at the 
roadside. One passenger in his car died, another sustained very 
serious injuries. 
One of the problems the prosecution was facing was: how to 
frame the charge. It was phrased in terms that charged 'aiding/ 
abetting'. So, the question arose whether it is possible to be 
an aider/abettor to an offence of negligence. (Van Eck, in his 
annotation, affirms this is quite possible and that both parties 
are to be held liable for the consequences since there was a 
'common design' or plan.) Now, where we face an offence of negli-
gence, how would it be possible to suggest a design or plan, 
words that would indicate intent, "an intention in common' (as 
the Canadian Code would have identified it)? An intent to be 
negligent? Advertent negligence? Fow far are we then away from 
recklessness which, in Canadian law, is held to be part of mens 
rea? In Dutch law this would represent culpa gravissima. 
Yet, the accused did very well in the highest Court. The HR 
held, that from the available evidence no deduction could be made 
that the harm caused was a direct and foreseeable consequence of 
the accused's conduct, and therefore no culpa lata was present. 
As far as we know, the other driver was never charged and we 
wonder why. If there was a common plan between the two, we would 
expect to see two accused before the court instead of one, re-
gardless of the quite humanitarian sympathy for the plight the 
other driver found himself in. 
The same events could have happened for entirely different 
reasons. A contest is not necessarily always an event between two 
participants. If the victim, for any other reason (being late on 
his way to the airport and risking to miss a plane; or, trying 
out his recently reconditioned car in order to find out whether 
it was now capable of reaching certain speeds; or, a husband 
racing his wife, who sustained what appeared to be a heart attack 
to hospital, or an endless variation of other reasons) would have 
been driving along that road, sometimes being passed by other 
drivers or passing them himself and should have lost control, a 
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similar accident could have happened. In the case referred to 
the challenge was between two participants; in the other urgen-
cies the race is between the man and the clock. 
The essence appears to be that the hapless driver, however 
motivated, went beyond his control capabilities, an event that 
could also have happened in the other situations. 
We suggest that the common intent covered only 'having a 
contest', an objective for which at least two parties are needed 
by its very nature. The race would result in breaking local speed 
limits (not charged); no official consent had been asked for the 
race (not charged). The common intent did not cover 'to be negli-
gent' in driving safely: the purpose of the race was to find out 
who could drive faster, not who could crash first. 
The HR stated: 
"... driving at a considerable higher speed 
than 40km/h does not necessarily imply -without 
further evidence- or even could imply utter 
carelessness of the accused... and that the 
circumstances are neither apt to result in the 
aforesaid harm, nor to cause such harm unavoid-
ably, while the fact itself that a contest was 
being held, does negative such gravest negli-
genc e . . . " 
That sounds logical where only two parties were involved. 
If there would have been a third party, an outsider, who got 
killed or injured, the story would have had a different ending. 
As it stands, these words appear to suggest "voluntary assumption 
of risk", consent. The accused was found not guilty. 
One last remark: if this race would have been part of an of-
ficial race for which the assent of the authorities was obtained, 
the fact situation would have been exactly the same. What the 
prosecution termed 'culpa lata' in the first case, would then 
have been 'a spirit of emulation'; what now was an unlawful con-
test would then have been 'a sport event, unfortunately ending 
in a tragic accident'. 
The prosecution was facing two problems: how to involve the 
'first party' -the driver who was passed- by either proving in-
tent or negligence; the second problem was that the accident oc-
curred after its victim had passed that first party, a detail 
which the Procureur General qualified as 'of importance'. 
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Some other cases where the AVAS defence was not refused with 
proper motivation, are the following: 
In HR, 21-5-1968 (462) a milk retailer was in error as to 
the effect of registration in the Register of the Chamber of Com-
merce. He had asked the advice of the Chamber as to whether he 
could start selling milk before a permit was issued and had mis-
interpreted the reply to that question. 
In HR, 4-1-1977 (463) a man was charged -not having his 
driver's licence on his person- with 'refusing' to show it to a 
police constable, after having been involved in an accident. 
AVAS was not accepted -with appropriate motivation- in HR, 
21-10-1975 (464), dealing with the MS Mebo II, a floating radio 
station (sometimes referred to as a 'pirate station') that had 
come into port for overhaul, its transmitters made unoperational. 
Relying on past legislation, no longer in force, they picked the 
wrong port. 
In HR, 26-6-1979 (465) negligence was proven as to the actu-
al handling of a jammed paper shredder. AVAS was not accepted 
since the effect of admitting AVAS would have been repugnant to 
what had been proven, namely: negligence. 
In HR, 22-1-1980 (466) AVAS was at issue. The Felgian auto-
mobilist, used to having all traffic signs relevant to his direct-
ion of travel at the righthand side of the road, said that such 
trafficlight was not showing red. Peing defective, it did not 
show any colour at all. To his left side the traffic signal was 
showing red, but he thought this did not affect him, and was per-
haps placed there for traffic intending to make a left turn. So, 
thinking he was on a major highway, having right of way, he con-
tinued... through red and was charged. 
A new trial was ordered and it was found that the magistrate 
had not motivated his refusal to accept AVAS. 
From this selection of cases it would appear that the HR 
does not take the AVAS defence lightly. Where a judge refuses to 
accept the defence, but fails to motivate such refusal properly, 
or neglects to indicate what other line of conduct was open to 
the accused to avoid culpa -if any- the case is either dismissed 
or a new trial is ordered. 
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Affectio tua nomen imponit operi 
tuo. 
B r a c t . f o l . 2 b , 1 0 1 b 
Your disposition gives name to your 
words or act. 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
THE DEFENCE OF DUE DILIGENCE 
IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 
EPILOGUE 
A. INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION 
By way of introduction we refer back to some of the cases 
mentioned before. They deal mainly with mistake of fact. 
The innkeeper and his, no doubt lovely, daughter in Sherras 
v. DeRutzen (467) who poured a stiff glass to a police constable 
off duty -whereas the man was, in fact, on duty- escaped punish-
ment. As the police station was conveniently located right across 
the street, they had served off-duty officers many times. They 
were in uniform, coming from an action-filled day of work and in 
order to signal that, although in uniform, they were off the job, 
they would remove an armlet before leaving the station. 
However, on that 16th day of July, 1894, a policeman, being 
on duty, got thirsty. Before entering the pub he removed his arm-
let, marched into the watering place, ordered a drink and was 
served by the innkeeper's daughter, who assumed the policeman was 
off duty. Her father, present at the proceedings, thought the 
same. They were charged. However, it was held that their bonafide 
-393-
belief disculpated them, since the offence required guilty knowl-
edge, which the accused did not have. The Queen's Pench quashed 
their conviction by the court below. 
Of special interest is the reference to section 16 of the 
(English) Licensing Act (467a). The charge was based on subsect-
ion 2, where the word 'knowingly' has been left out, whereas it 
appears in subsection 1. Day J. held that, all this means is, 
that in a charge under ss.l, the prosecution must prove guilty 
knowledge; in a charge under ss.2 the prosecution does not have 
such duty, but the accused has the opportunity to prove he did 
not have guilty knowledge, for instance, as a result of an ex-
cusable mistake of fact. 
Day's reasoning did not find general acclaim, but Wright J., 
concurring with him in the result, held that generally mens rea 
was a requirement and concluded: 
"It is plain that, if the guilty knowledge 
is not necessary, no care on the part of the 
publican could save him from a conviction under 
S.16, ss.2, since it would be as easy for the 
constable to deny that he was on duty when 
asked, or to produce a forged permission from 
his superior officer, as to remove his armlet 
before entering the public house." 
This means that ss.2 would then be an offence of absolute 
liability, not allowing the defence of mistake of fact. 
Earlier we have referred to R. v. Gould (468), a bigamy case. 
Defendant's honest belief that a prior marriage was dissolved by 
divorce, was accepted as a defence. 
We discussed the Beaver case (469) where lack of knowledge 
that the substance, believed to be harmless, was in fact heroine, 
had the effect of disculpating him as to the charge of possession. 
We should now mention Sweet v. Parsley (470): a schoolteach-
er had the management of a farm property outside the City of Ox-
ford, England. She rented rooms to various people, keeping one 
room for herself, to be used on occasional visits to the farm, 
in order to collect the rent, pick up any mail and "generally see 
that all was well". Unfortunately, all was not well, but she was 
not aware of it. One day the police raided the premises, discover-
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ed LSD, cigaret stubs containing cannabis, and an 'ornamental 
hookah pipe' -belonging to her- that the tenants had used for 
smoking cannabis without her knowledge. 
Her lack of knowledge as well as the lack of duty to be in-
formed as to what her tenants were doing when she was not around, 
lead to her disculpation. The offence was not held to be one of 
absolute liability. (She was charged with being concerned in the 
management of premises used for smoking cannabis.) 
We considered Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward (471) where it was 
held that the woodpulp processing plant caused polluted water to 
enter a river. It was held that: 
"... their positive and deliberate acts in 
building and operating the settling tanks with 
an overflow channel leading directly to the 
river, and in failing to install pumps which 
provided an effective safeguard, had led direct-
ly to the overflow and consequent pollution of 
the river; there was no evidence of an inter-
vening act of a trespasser or of an act of God 
which could be said to have caused the overflow." 
It never became clear why all precautionary measures taken 
still did allow effluent to escape. The offence was one of 
strict, not absolute liability. 
Lord Cross of Chelsea observed: 
"The appellants having started to operate 
their plant on that day could only escape being 
held to have caused polluted effluent to enter 
the river if they proved that the overflow of 
the tank had been brought about by some other 
event which could fairly be regarded as being 
beyond their ability to foresee or control." 
Lord Salmon added: 
"This may be regarded as a not unfair hazard 
of carrying on a business which may cause pol-
lution on the banks of a river... 
"If this appeal succeeded and it were held 
to be the law that no conviction could be ob-
tained under the 1951 Act unless the prosecution 
could discharge the often impossible onus of 
proving that the pollution was caused intention-
ally or negligently, a great deal of pollution 
would go unpunished and undeterred to the relief 
of many riparian factory owners. 
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"As a result, many rivers which are now 
filthy would become filthier still and many 
rivers which are now clean would lose their 
cleanliness. 
"The legislature no doubt recognised that 
as a matter of public policy this would be most 
unfortunate. Hence, s.2(I)(a) which encourages 
riparian factory owners not only to take reason-
able steps to prevent pollution but to do every-
thing possible to ensure that they do not cause 
it." 
Many times we have referred to another river pollution case, 
the Sault Sainte Marie decision (472) (SSM), and at this point we 
are interested in its final conclusions: 
"I conclude, for the reasons which I have 
sought to express, that there are compelling 
grounds for the recognition of three categories 
of offences rather than the traditional two: 
1. Offences in which mens rea, consisting of 
some positive state of mind such as intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by 
the prosecution either as an inference from the 
nature of the act committed, or by additional 
evidence. 
2. Offences in which there is no necessity 
for the prosecution to prove the existence 
of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act 
prima facie imports the offence, leaving it 
open to the accused to avoid liability by 
proving that he took all reasonable care. 
This involves consideration of what a reason-
able man would have done in the circumstances. 
The defence will be available if the accused 
reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts 
which, if true, would render the act or omiss-
ion innocent, or if he took all reasonable 
steps to avoid the particular event. 
These offences may properly be called 
offences of strict liability. (our emphasis) 
3. Offences of absolute liability where it is 
not open to the accused to exculpate him-
self by showing that he was free of fault. 
It should be noted that, in the second category, there is no 
mention of a 'honest' belief but of a 'reasonable' belief. In 
that respect we are back to the vague epithet 'reasonable'. 
Offences of the second category thus are declared to be 'of-
fences of strict liability' , a category created by the so-called 
'Halfway House' doctrine. 
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In theory, we think that great gains were made by this tri-
partition. In practice it is still not quite clear, as to the 
second and third categories, which offences should come under 
either of the two. This may and, indeed, does pose problems in 
the far too many cases where the legislator did not clearly ex-
press whether an offence is, or is not, one of qualified liabil-
ity, that is strict or absolute liability or whether mens vea is 
required. 
SSM does not give a clear indication and the indication it 
did provide is of too general a nature: 
"Offences which are criminal in the true 
sense fall in the first category. Public wel-
fare offences would prima facie be in the 
second category. They are not subject to the 
presumption of full mens rea. An offence of 
this type would fall in the first category 
only if such words as "wilfully", "with intent", 
"knowingly", or "intentionally" are contained 
in the statutory provision creating the offence. 
"On the other hand, the principle that punish-
ment should in general not be inflicted on 
those without fault applies. (Our emphasis -
AVAS) 
"Offences of absolute liability would be 
those in respect of which the Legislature had 
made it clear that guilt would follow proof 
merely of the proscribed act. 
"The overall regulatory pattern adopted by 
the Legislature, the subject matter of the 
legislation, the importance of the penalty, 
and the precision of the language used will be 
primary considerations in determining whether 
the offence falls into the third category." 
B. AFTER THE SAULT-DECI SION 
Ergo, the ball is now back in the park of the Legis-
lature... or is it? Nothing much has happened in that area. 
Did the Supreme Court of Canada enlarge on SSM? No revealing 
decisions have come forth since 1978 that would answer questions 
as to the third category and which offences should be lodged 
there. However, the doctrine is implemented. 
Enter: the Chapín case (473), briefly referred to earlier. 
Mrs Chapin who loved to be engaged in bird-watching over 
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the barrels of her shotgun, was accused of a contravention of the 
Migratori) Birds Convention Act, which is, as Dickson J., speaking 
for the Court, explained: "a regulatory statute enacted by the 
Parliament of Canada for the general welfare of the Canadian pub-
lic, not to mention the welfare of the ducks". 
While hunting for duck, she happened to be in a spot, not 
far from an area where bait had been deposited, a fact she was 
not aware of. 
Dickson J. argued that the offence was neither a mens rea, 
nor an absolute liability offence but rather an offence of strict 
liability. 
"It is a classic example of an offence in 
the second category delineated in the Sault 
Ste Marie case. An accused may absolve him-
self on proof that he took all the care which 
a reasonable man might have been expected to 
take in all the circumstances or, in other 
words, that he was in no way negligent." 
Mrs Chapín was absolved. 
From all of this -and other cases- it may be concluded that 
the tripartition of offences referred to, is receiving growing 
acceptance. This means also that the defence of due diligence is 
becoming firmly entrenched in Canadian law. 
Thus we have a parallel between the AVAS defence -of much 
older lineage- and the due diligence defence. Their operation is 
to show that all reasonable care was taken before entering into 
certain conduct, while being engaged in it, as well as after it. 
In a way, it is the opposite of 'holding someone liable on 
reasonable grounds" ('redelijke toerekening') since it tends 
'not to hold someone liable on reasonable grounds' ('redelijke 
disaulpatie ' ?) It is somewhat amazing to find that where both 
systems, the Dutch and the Canadian, as of olden days have always 
been preoccupied with granting a great measure of protection to 
an accused ('in dubiis pro reo', 'lex aerta', 'no punishment 
without fault') it has taken so long, especially in Canada, for 
the transfer of the criterium of reasonability from the proof of 
guilt domain to the proof of innocence domain. 
It is regrettable that this landmark decision (SSM) did not 
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go one step further by more explicitely telling us what was to be 
the criterium, following which an offence is to be placed in the 
third category. Instead it leaves us with some very general char-
acteristics which, practically, leave this matter to the legis-
lator.As long as the legislator should not move his attention to-
wards this topic, we shall have to learn from future decisions 
what the highest Court may hold to be the criterium. That will 
also mean that further evolution in this area must be expected to 
be slow... but such is one of the characteristics of the common 
law. 
In forerunners of SSM it may be seen that the basic ideas 
have been around for some while. 
In R. v. Pierce Fisheries (474) the company was crating lob-
sters for transport. On a given day they were handling in excess 
of 50,000 pounds of lobster. An inspector found 26 undersized 
lobsters, some in cases already prepared for shipping. The company 
was convicted. However, the defence of due diligence was held 
having been open to the accused. Said Ritchie J.: 
"... it would not appear to have been a 
difficult matter for some officer or respons-
ible employee to acquire knowledge of their 
presence in the premises." 
The fact is, the defence was never presented. 
If the 'responsible persons' who held 'intoxicating liquor 
in storage as bailees' in R. v. Regina Cold Storage and Forward-
ing (475) would have insisted on being fully diligent in finding 
out whether the merchandise stored in their warehouse did or did 
not contain alcohol, they would have had to open every bottle and 
"have tested it, and in doing so destroyed a property which had 
been entrusted to his care" - and that would have constituted a 
civil, perhaps even a criminal wrong. 
In R. v. Piggly Wiggly Canadian Ltd. (476) a self-serve sto-
re was selling sugar in ten pound bags, some of which were found 
being underweight by as much as one pound or 10%. A clerk had 
been given the job of weighing the sugar and putting it in bags. 
The company was convicted. After establishing that the offence 
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did not require mens rea, Prendergast C.J.M. said: 
"Errors will happen in stores of all kinds, 
sometimes.by absent-mindedness at the close of 
a hard day's work, or may be, especially with 
scales of the old type, by inadvertently using 
one weight for another. But it appears that to 
protect such cases would leave the door too wide 
open to design, and so, unless there be some 
distinct differentiating principle, the liability 
has been made to cover the whole ground. 
"(The law's) justification is simply that the 
public could not be protected otherwise." 
And so, liability here was held to be absolute. 
In Hill v. R. (477) a Mrs Fill, driving her car, touched the 
rear bumper of a taxi-cab in front of her. Its driver did not 
stop but disappeared from view around a curve in the street. Mrs 
Hill did not realize she had caused a dent in the taxi-cab's rear 
bumper. Since cabdrivers have no reputation of being greatly amus-
ed when someone or something touches their vehicle, Mrs Hill 
thought nothing of the whole affair and merrily continued on to 
her destination or, in sterner language: she failed to remain or 
immediately return to the scene of the accident. However, she was 
charged, tried and convicted. Dickson J. held her guilty and said: 
"If mens vea is not essential, then whatever 
Mrs Hill believed or did not believe is irrele-
vant. There was an accident on a highway in which 
she was directly involved; she failed to remain 
or return to the scene and was, therefore, prop-
erly convicted." 
No excuse in the form of a 'mistake of fact' defence and 
hence: absolute liability. 
That was in 1972. The very same Mr Justice Dickson was to 
speak for the Supreme Court of Canada when the Sault Ste Marie 
case and the Chapín case were decided in 1977 and 1979 respect-
ively... introducing the defence of due diligence. 
The conclusion must be that progress was made and that it 
appears to depend totally on the classification of offences 
whether this defence of due diligence is available. True crime 
poses no problems generally. The statutory offences do. 
What does the Law Reform Commission of Canada have to say? 
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С. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA 
In this context, the Law Reform Commission of Canada (478) 
formulated some recommendations we feel are eminently reasonable. 
The following represents to be a correct resume: (479) 
1. -As to clarity in legislation-
Whether or not strict liability ( read: absolute 
liability ) should have any place in the criminal law, 
the law must be clarified so as to make it plain 
whether any given offence is one of strict liability. 
2. -As to 'real' crime-
Real crimes, that is: all serious, obvious and 
general criminal offences must always be based on and 
should always require mens rea and should be contained 
in the Criminal Code. 
Only for these offences should imprisonment be a 
possible penalty. 
Guilt here must always be based on personal res­
ponsibility and strict liability here should have no 
place. 
3. -As to penal offences_ 
In regulatory offences negligence should be the 
minimum standard of liability, should therefore require 
some kind of fault. 
Guilt for such offences should depend on personal 
responsibility. 
Strict liability here should have no place in 
princ iple. 
Therefore, an accused should never be convicted 
of a regulatory offence if he establishes that he 
acted with due diligence, that is, that he was not 
negligent. 
4. -As to offences outside the Criminal Code-
All offences outside the Criminal Code should, 
as a minimum, allow due diligence as a defence and 
for these, in general, imprisonment should be excluded. 
These recommendations do still not give a complete set of 
criteria as to what type of actus reus should be required for 
classification as an offence of absolute liability. The Commis­
sion appears to reject absolute liability almost entirely. This 
is a point of view we do not share for reasons as proposed in the 
following. 
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D. ABSOLUTE LIABILITY HAS ITS PLACE 
It appears that in a past 'lost in the mists of time' 
absolute liability was the rule rather than the exception. 
Conduct and consequence were the criteria for guilt and liability. 
The harshness of this rule was to lose its fierce impact on soci-
ety and individual. Mitigating factors were found in a slowly 
spreading culture and the influence of Christianity. 
A common set of ethics was established and expressed by a 
shared religion. Conscience became a guiding influence where the 
choice between good and evil was to be made. Overall patterns of 
behaviour were fairly predictable. Exceptions stood out as real 
social sores; exposure was swift and spectacular. 
Then the ages of dissent arrived, eroding the traditional 
ethics and relativing the meaning and impact of conscience. The 
precious consensus as to what was good or evil faded to the back-
ground. Sense of duty faded with it and personal convictions be-
came preponderant and began occupying the place they have in our 
own days. The 'all-of-us' generations had to yield to the 'me-
first' generations of post-war days. 
At the same time the growing complexity of society was soon 
mirrored in its burgeoning legislation. The oath, once sacred, 
lost its meaning, to become a vague promise amounting to nothing 
more than an easily pronounced formula. The lies in the court 
rooms of the world are no longer an exception. No longer is 'das 
gesunde Volksempfinden' necessarily 'gesund', nor is it a basis 
upon which the laws of the land are anchored. 
Life in an increasingly technocratic world not only has to 
cope with an increase in and intensification of old and known 
risks; it must stare a multitude of new risks in the face, many 
of them not fully understood, even today, as to their nature and 
long term affects. 
In a growing measure Man has become recalcitrant, obstinate 
and self-seeking more than ever before. 
In an attempt to be practical: what chances are there today 
to expect 'reasonably' that Man will be diligent, considerate, 
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cautious? To expect that Man is not all too often willingly blind 
and deaf? How does the lawmaker have to deal with the completely 
egocentric, living their days in a the-devil-may-care attitude of 
life, where 'today' is everything, and 'tomorrow' may never come, 
while having no expectation, nor even a scintilla of hope that 
the essence of the human being, however called, may after all 
survive, one way or the other? 
Although highly modernized as to outer appearances, too many 
are throw-backs to the primitive men roaming the jungles of a 
much younger world, for whom survival was a privilege only for 
the fittest at the cost of others.(480) 
What chance has the lawmaker, while dealing with that breed 
of people, but to deal in the oldest known concepts of a liabili-
ty that is absolute, itself a throw-back, but having the apparent 
merit of counteracting a decrease in moral awareness by an in-
crease in strictness, in an effort to have society survive? 
The ground rule seems to be obvious: whoever engages in 
certain, specified conduct, qualified by the legislator as 
highly dangerous to the interests of the surrounding world, is to 
be held absolutely liable. That kind of conduct must be earmark-
ed as incapable of being tolerated at all, regardless of a state 
of mind, regardless of culpa, of unawareness, of errors and mis-
takes. It would be the proper shock treatment for a shocking dis-
regard of society's values. 
Whatever the criteria must be for conduct meriting this 
harsh reaction, the legislation governing absolute liability will 
have to be clear, unambiguous, stern and simple. There should be 
no place for dainty fictions, artificial constructions, assumpt-
ions and convoluted reasonings. The legislator would have to 
state "This is the conduct, these are the consequences, that 
must be avoided at all costs, including the cost of holding you 
absolutely liable, guilty or not." 
That form of liability, too, would be eminently reasonable. 
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Poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes 
perveniat. 
If punishment be inflicted on a 
few, a dread comes to all. 
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EPILOGUE 
We have finally reached the last stop in this odyssee 
through areas of the civil and common law systems that have vast-
ly gained in actuality and importance over the past half century. 
No claim is staked out that every square foot has been 
covered. No pretense is even suggested that the work is perfect 
or even complete. 
Negligence and the liability ensuing in its many forms, 
whether it be civil or criminal, has always been with society and, 
given Man's inherent imperfection in so many respects, will always 
be with us, It is perhaps not as much the single act showing ab-
sence of diligence that causes the more serious harm; it is 
rather the consistent pattern of thoughtless conduct that creates 
the real damage while, at the same time, evidence of negligent 
conduct in an individual -be it personal or corporate- is often 
all too hard to come by. The consequences are felt by one and all. 
Much damage is caused by greed, again: either individual or 
corporate -the latter including commercial organizations of any 
description as well as those of their employees- and greed may 
easily lead to evading the rules written in favour of diligent 
conduct. Wilful blindness is only one facet of the problem; 
sabotage in any form is another and sabotage need not always 
take the form of clearly demonstrated ill-will. It may also, and 
more effectively, take the guise of sloppiness, lack of care, 
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disregard for the importance and value of everyone's role in 
society, whether it be at the breathtaking altitude of the board 
rooms or at the lowest end of the assembly lines. 
For such and similar reasons the escape hatch, 'evidence of 
diligence', counteracting the rebuttable assumption of guilt-
through-negligence, appears to be a reasonable solution to an 
otherwise insoluble problem. This is what both systems, each in 
its own manner, have understood and adopted: it pays to be dili-
gent. 
One of the side effects of regulating the multi-faceted, 
entirely lawful activities of a technocratic society in order to 
avoid their potentially harmful sequels, may well be what is 
often called "legislative pollution'. However, it should not be 
forgotten that most of it is directed at relatively small groups 
of 'specialists' or experts, for the protection of all others... 
and themselves. These are the areas of law where mistake or ig-
norance of law must not provide an excuse, absolving -however-
all others who should be entitled to look with a mind at ease 
at the cemetery where the old maxim 'ignorantia iuris non excusat' 
will finally have been laid to rest. 
For such reasons the creation of offences of both strict and 
absolute liability is also reasonable, proviaea tnat the legis-
lator make it luce clarius what kind of conduct should come under 
each one of these labels. 
Apart from their procedural implementation both: proof of 
diligence in Canadian common law and AVAS in Dutch civil law, 
are, we suggest, essentially the same in nature and objective. 
Clearly, identical problems inspire to finding identical solut-
ions, regardless of the legal technicalities involved. This 
would seem to be a conclusion, the comparison of different syst-
ems of law may generate; it demonstrates the basic sameness of 
Man, wherever on this globe he inherited he may find himself, 
facing things good and bad. 
Not having to pay the price for negligence constitutes the 
prize for diligence: environmental safety, wholesomness of a gal-
axy of products, health. To put it in a few words: sanity in a 
world that otherwise would go berserk. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen, waarvan het eerste 
een uiterst summier overzicht geeft van de voornaamste bestand-
delen van het Canadese, common law, materiele strafrecht, verge-
leken met overeenkomstige bestanddelen van het Nederlandse mate-
riele strafrecht. De bedoeling hiervan is een achtergrond te 
scheppen waartegen de onderwerpen, behandeld in het tweede deel, 
kunnen worden belicht. Om voor de hand liggende redenen wordt dit 
eerste deel niet betrokken in deze samenvatting. 
In het tweede deel komt het eigenlijke onderwerp van de dis-
sertatie ter sprake: strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid voor 
nalatig handelen, dat wil zeggen, voor culpoze delicten, misdrij-
ven, maar in hoofdzaak overtredingen. 
De nadruk ligt op de zogenaamde 'strict' en 'absolute liab-
ility', aansprakelijkheidsfiguren waartegenover soms beroep op 
afwezigheid van alle schuld (AVAS) als verdediging openstaat 
(strict liability) maar in andere gevallen niet (absolute liabil-
ity). 
Waar de essentie van deze aansprakelijkheid stoelt op bewijs 
van daderschap en derhalve op bewijs van causaliteit, wordt spe-
ciale aandacht geschonken aan sommige bewijstechnieken en aan de 
modernere causaliteitstheorieën. Dit bewijs is des te belangrij-
ker in gevallen waar het AVAS-verweer niet beschikbaar is, het-
geen nog sterker geldt waar niet een overtreding maar een mis-
drijf de grond vah rechtsvervolging is. Daarnaast heeft de nala-
tigheid waar zij deel uitmaakt van de delictsomschrijving meer 
bijzondere aandacht omdat zij, naast de causaliteit, de onderbouw 
vormt voor de telastelegging. 
Nederlandse doctrines worden vergeleken met analoge doctri-
nes in de common law (voorzover men hier van doctrines kan spre-
ken), zoals deze is geadopteerd in Canada en, geleidelijk aan, 
althans ten dele een eigen karakter heeft gekregen. Daarom ook 
wordt de semantiek royaal in de besprekingen betrokken teneinde 
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de terminologie van de common law te kunnen vergelijken met de 
terminologie van het Nederlandse strafrecht. 
In dit alles is getracht de redelijkheid te belichten welke 
in acht genomen dient te worden, wil men de rechtvaardigheid niet 
te kort doen, waar -in de kern- alles om begonnen is. Deze rede-
lijkheidseis wordt betrokken op de gevolgstoerekening als wel op 
de bestraffing, vooral waar straf wordt bedreigd voor absolute 
liability delicten. 
Er is een beknopte selectie uit de Nederlandse en de common 
law jurisprudentie verwerkt, dienende als een summiere illustra-
tie van het besprokene. 
Het 'Leitmotiv' van deze dissertatie is dat, waar het meren-
deel van de strafbare feiten in de aangeduide categorieën betrek-
king heeft op bescherming van de gemeenschap tegen potentieel 
kwade gevolgen van overigens volkomen toelaatbare en nuttige ac-
tiviteiten -zoals: verkeer, voedselverwerking, jacht en visserij, 
industriële bedrijvigheden en zeer vele andere-, nalatigheid een 
kwaad is. Dit geldt niet alleen daar, waar het individuele over-
tredingen betreft, maar vooral op al die gebieden waar nalatig-
heid dreigt te ontaarden tot een verwerpelijk gedragspatroon. 
Op deze gedachtengang berust de eis voor handhaving van de 
terzake geschreven beveiligingswetgeving, welker naleving moet 
kunnen worden afgedwongen al zal men in vele gevallen aan AVAS-
verweer kunnen openlaten als veiligheidsklep terwijl voor andere 
gevallen bewijs van schuldloosheid buiten het bereik van de over-
treder zal dienen te worden gehouden. Bepaalde kwade kansen kun-
nen nu eenmaal niet worden gelopen waar de veiligheid van indivi-
du of gemeenschap ernstig zou worden bedreigd. Dezelfde redelijk-
heid welke tot matiging maant in de eerste categorie, eist ter-
zake van de laatsbedoelde categorie dat het simpele verwekken van 
het kwade gevolg de bestraffing, in welke vorm ook, tot zich 
trekt. 
Dit geldt des te sterker waar bedoelde activiteiten groten-
deels het terrein van experts en specialisten uitmaken, termen 
die in de ruimste zin zijn te verstaan als aanwijzende: personen 
die zich inlaten met een bezigheid welke gespecialiseerde kennis 
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en oefening vereist. In die zin zijn fabrikanten, sportjagers en 
vissers, verkeersdeelnemers, bouwvakkers en zo verder, specialis-
ten. 
Redelijkheid in de aansprakelijkheidstelling heeft als com-
plement redelijkheid in de bestraffing: sterker ingrijpend, meer 
doelgericht en meer efficient dan boete of vrijheidsstraf is wel-
licht de tijdelijke of permanente (in geval van recidive) onttrek-
king van de toelating, licentie of akte, welke benodigd is voor 
legale deelname aan een bepaalde activiteit: rijbewijs, jachtakte, 
verlof, produktievergunning en zo verder. 
Uitteraard kunnen alle vergelijkingen tussen onderdelen van 
beide rechtssystemen niet altijd volkomen parallel lopen. Waar de 
systemen verschillen is het niettemin van belang te zien hoe ana-
loge problemen op soms uiteenlopende wijzen worden opgelost. 
Het mag echter worden gesteld dat het Nederlandse AVAS-ver-
weer en de Canadese 'proof of due diligence', materieel gesproken, 
identiek zijn. 
Tenslotte wordt gesteld dat redelijke toerekening van aan-
sprakelijkheid dient te worden gecomplementeerd met redelijke 
toelaatbaarheid van disculpatie in die gevallen waar een telaste-
legging is gebaseerd op culpa -als geconstateerd door de objectie-
ve toeschouwer- terwijl in feite, subjectief, geen schuld bestond 
in de beklaagde. On-schuld mag dan in vele gevallen niet gemakke-
lijk aannemelijk te maken zijn, maar de kans daartoe zal dienen 
te worden gegeven. 
*** 
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473 R. v. Loise Chapin, Unreported at time of writing. 
S.C.C., February 7, 8, 1979 
474 R. v. Pierce Fisheries, [1970] 5 C.C.C.193 
475 R. v. Regina Cold Storage and Forwarding,[1923] 3 W.W.R.13'87 
476 R. v. Piggly Wiggly Canadian Ltd., [1933] 2 W.W.R.475 
477 Hill v. R. (1973), 43 D.L.R.(3rd)532 
478 See note 366, supra 
479 It is to be noted that this is pre-Sault Ste Marie terminol-
ogy; 'strict liability' here is to be understood as 'absol-
ute liability ' . 
480 When re-reading the draft for this chapter, we came very 
close to toning down considerably what we presented as con-
siderations. We were asking ourselves if wè, perhaps, did 
observe society as we know it in the eighties in too sombre 
lighting- conditions. 
At that point in time-we read the House of Lords decision 
in Regina v. Cunningham, 3 W.L.R.223. 
Cunningham -we cite the case note- struck another man sever-
al blows on the head with a heavy chair in an unprovoked at-
tack motivated by sexual jealousy. The man died as a result 
of a fracture of the skull. Charged with murder, Cunningham 
denied an intention to kill, but there was evidence from 
which the jury, convicting him, could and did infer an in-
tention to inflict grievous bodily harm. The Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) upheld the conviction. The House of 
Lords also dismissed the appeal. 
Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. said: (p.231) 
"I confess that I view with a certain degree of scept-
icism the opinion expressed in Reg. v. hyam, [1975] A.C.55, 
90-93 that the age of our ancestors was so much more violent 
than our own that we can afford to take a different view of 
'concepts of what is right and what is wrong that command 
general acceptance in contemporary society.' 
"In the weeks preceding that in which this appeal came 
before your Lordships both the Pope and the President of the 
United States have been shot in cold blood, a circuit judge 
has been slain, a police officer has given evidence of a 
deliberate shooting of himself which has confined him to a 
wheeled chair for life, five soldiers have been blown up on 
a country road by a mine containing over a thousand pounds 
of high explosive, the pillion passenger has been torn from 
the back of a motor bicyle and stabbed to death by total 
strangers apparently because he was white, and another youth 
stabbed, perhaps because he was black, petrol bombs and anti-
personnel weapons have been thrown in the streets of London 
and Belfast at the bodies of security forces, cars have been 
overturned and set on fire in Brixton and Bristol, and the 
press has carried reports that our own Sovereign moves-about 
the streets of her own country protected by bodyguards armed 
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with automatic weapons. 
"If I moved a few months back I could cite the siege of 
the Iranian embassy and other terrorist sieges where hostag-
es have been taken by armed men, the shooting in the streets 
of London of foreign refugees at the hand of their political 
opponents, and many other acts of lawlessness, violence and 
cruelty". 
Having read all of this, we decided to let what we have 
wr it ten, stand. 
481 In this context we should mention the 'Weer en Vaart 
verweer' (HR, 1-2-1972, NJ 1974, 450) introduced in the HR 
decision referred to. This defence allows an accused to 
point out a 'gap' in the court's argumentation in reaching a 
guilty verdict. The accused presents new facts allowing a differ-
ent view of a situation, that is not excluded by or repugnant to 
prior evidence and was overlooked by the court in its motivation 
of the verdict reached. This 'new version', however, is repugnant 
to the conclusion the court reached, but must not be improbable 
or absurd. Upon these conditions the decision is to be held as 
not appropriately motivated and cannot stand, for the result of 
the accused's introduction of such new facts is that the charge 
cannot be proven. 
Where the charge, in essence, is based on negligence, such 
new facts will be adduced to show that the accused was not negli-
gent, that is, that he was diligent under the circumstances of 
the case. 
In that sense this defence could be categorized as one spe-
cies of the genuws AVAS-defenee. 
The question has arisen whether the Meer en Vaart Arrest is 
to be put into the same category as the Halfway House Doctrine 
in the Sault Ste Marie decision. We do not think so for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
a) The Canadian Halfway House Doctrine does not create a 
specific or new defence. It creates a specific catego-
ry of offences (mostly offences of negligent conduct of some 
kind) to be known as 'strict liability offences', which al-
low the defence of due diligence (not a new defence) and 
thus contradistinguishes this category with 'absolute liab-
ility offences', where the said defence is not available. 
b) The Dutch AVAS Doctrine does not create a specific cat-
egory of offences but is, itself, an unwritten defence, 
allowing proof of diligence by proving 'absence of all 
guilt'. Normally this defence is presented at the prepara-
tory stage of the criminal procedure ( 'vooronderzoek voor de 
Rechter-Commissaris ') , but may also be presented at a later 
stage. (The Meer en Vaart-sltuation). 
c) What both, 'proof of due diligence' and the 'Avas/Meer 
en Vaart' defences appear to have in common is that 
they, each in its own specific way and upon specific pre-
conditions, given an accused the opportunity to discúlpate 
himself on the ground of 'not having been negligent as 
charged ' . 
*** 
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PROPOSITIONS 
1. Where oífences of true crime are involved, there should be 
no place for fictions, constructions or imputations, the 
result of which would be that criminal liability ensues, not 
based on intent, recklessness or negligence. 
2. The role precedents play in the common law is quite differ-
ent from the role case-law ( 'jurisprudentir ' ) has m Dutch 
civil law. 
3. Tort law, dealing with civil wrongs, and the Dutch doctrine 
of 'onreokinatigr daad', are comparable areas of law, having 
much in common. 
4. The present-day environment in penitentiaries, jails, and so 
on (such as sexual problems, harassment, drug use, over-
crowding and other circumstances) has deteriorated alarmingly in 
comparison to the situation in the past, at the time the penal-
ties were set out. 
Consequently, it would appear necessary m many cases to 
decrease drastically the time span a convict has to sped m such 
inbtitutions, following a similar reasoning as would lead to 
increasing drastically the amount of fines, in function of the 
devaluation of the currency. 
5. In criminal law no exceptions to the Чет '•ari pta, l/>x 
certa' principle are to be tolerated. 
6. The objectives of the criminal law may be furthered in a 
more efficient and effective way b restricting the use of 
imprisonment as a penalty wherever possible, and by imposing in 
lieu thereof such penalties as would allow the victims -whether 
it be society at large or the individual- to receive compensation 
for damages sutained. 
7. The distinction between the common law adversary system and 
the civil law inquisitorial system is becoming less manifest. 
8. The belief in the existence of St. Nicholas has diminished 
at the same rate smokeless electric baseboard heating syst­
ems gained popularity. 
*** 



